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Waikato-Tainui and Ngāi Tahu’s negotiations with the Crown produced the first two 
major iwi-based agreements of the modern era of Treaty settlements in New 
Zealand/Aotearoa. While the existing historiography has previously addressed the general 
parameters of each agreement, and some key players have briefly written about their 
involvement in the process, an analysis of both negotiations through the lens of the iwi (tribe) 
pursuit of rangatiratanga (or self-determination) and the Crown’s defence of its sovereignty 
and kawanatanga (or governance) increases our understanding of these precedent-setting 
Treaty settlements. Māori rangatiratanga and Crown sovereignty and governance were not the 
only factors that drove all parties in their negotiations, but they represented the dominant 
motivating force in terms of reaching agreements on very difficult issues.  
Through an investigation of Ngāi Tahu, Waikato-Tainui, Crown and public sources, 
this thesis identifies the balancing of iwi rangatiratanga and the Crown’s sovereignty and 
kawanatanga in four major areas of the process: the development of iwi governance systems 
post-settlement, the negotiation of the financial aspects of the settlement, the parameters 
surrounding the return of land, and the formulation of the historical accounts and Crown 
apologies. The political structures set by the Crown to govern the process influenced all 
aspects of the negotiation. Waikato-Tainui and Ngāi Tahu argued that a larger quantum 
would be necessary to achieve the finality and general financial certainty sought by the 
Crown, but were challenged most prominently by Treasury. Nonetheless both iwi were able 
to obtain significant concessions. The subsequent limit set on the total financial scope of each 
settlement also influenced the amount of land that was returned. In addition the Crown’s 
overall control of the process influenced the type of Crown lands that would be returned, and 
in Waikato-Tainui’s case, the legal form in which land was returned. The negotiations 
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regarding the historical accounts and apologies that accompanied each settlement similarly 
were influenced by the limitations imposed by the Crown, in contrast to the specific details 
sought by Ngāi Tahu and Waikato-Tainui.  
The Crown was able to strengthen its governance by achieving settlements with 
Waikato-Tainui and Ngāi Tahu. Both iwi also were able to enhance their own rangatiratanga 
by settling their claims, enhancing their political power and influence regionally and 
nationally. Ultimately Waikato-Tainui and Ngāi Tahu’s Treaty settlements simultaneously 
reinforced the Crown’s sovereignty and kawanatanga and energised Ngāi Tahu and Waikato-
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Since the mid-nineteenth century Māori groups in New Zealand have been seeking 
resolutions to their grievances with the British Crown, and successive New Zealand 
governments for breaching the terms of the Treaty of Waitangi signed in 1840. These 
grievances related to a variety of issues surrounding the acquisition of land, resources and the 
undermining of Māori sovereignty. By the late twentieth century, many of these issues 
remained unresolved despite some minor attempts by governments in the nineteenth century 
and in the early and mid-twentieth century to address Māori historical grievances through 
various Commissions of Inquiry and the provision of very modest forms of compensation. 
Two major Māori groups that had been seeking some form of compensation and apology for 
decades were Waikato-Tainui and Ngāi Tahu. This thesis will explore the negotiations that 
gave rise to Treaty settlements between the Crown and Waikato-Tainui and Ngāi Tahu iwi 
(tribes) at the end of the twentieth century. These negotiations embodied the difficulty at the 
core of the Treaty of Waitangi relationship—the balance between Waikato-Tainui and Ngāi 
Tahu rangatiratanga--what they pereceived as self-determination or autonomy--and the 
Crown’s kawanatanga--what Waikato-Tainui and Ngāi Tahu viewed as the right to govern, 
and the Crown perceived as its sovereignty. 
In 1840 hundreds of Māori leaders around New Zealand signed the Treaty of 
Waitangi with the British Crown.2 Māori leaders viewed the Treaty as a political compact 
that would enable the British to control their subjects that were living in New Zealand, and 
2 Throughout this thesis the Crown will refer to the Executive branch of government: Ministers, government 
Departments and agencies and officials. See Janine Hayward, “In search of a Treaty partner: who, or what, is the 
Crown?” Thesis (Ph.D.)--Victoria University of Wellington, 1995, for an excellent discussion of the difficulty 
of defining the Crown as a Treaty Partner.  
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work in concert with their Treaty partner to govern but Māori would retain their independent 
sovereignty. The British believed they had acquired sovereignty. The Treaty was a concise 
document and had only three articles, but it was written in both English and Māori. While the 
third article was fairly accurately translated, the first two articles had significant differences 
and laid the basis for philosophical and practical disagreements between the two Treaty 
partners—Māori and the Crown.3 In article 1 of the English version Māori leaders gave 
Queen Victoria “all the rights and powers of sovereignty” over their lands. In the Māori 
version of article 1 it gave the Queen “te kawanatanga katoa”—the right to govern over their 
lands. In article 2 of the English version Māori leaders and people were guaranteed 
“exclusive and undisturbed possession of their lands and estates, forests, fisheries, and other 
properties”, but in the Māori version they were guaranteed “te tino rangatiratanga”—the 
unqualified exercise of chieftainship or self-determination over their lands, villages, and all 
their treasures.4 (The third article guaranteed to Māori all the rights and privileges of British 
subjects.) The British Crown and later the New Zealand government claimed that the Treaty 
of Waitangi had established Crown sovereignty, while Māori claimed that they had merely 
granted the Crown the right to govern. Māori claimed that the second article of the Treaty had 
guaranteed them their continuing rangatiratanga or self-determination. The Crown claimed 
that it had undisputed sovereignty as a result of the first article. These differences in 
interpretation have remained and emerged in direct negotiations between Waikato-Tainui and 
the Crown, and Ngāi Tahu and the Crown.  
Waikato-Tainui’s negotiations with the Crown formally began in 1989 without a 
Waitangi Tribunal hearing and a Final Agreement was signed in 1995 with legislation passed 
3 Alan Ward, An Unsettled History: Treaty Claims in New Zealand Today (Wellington: Bridget Williams Books, 
1998), 13-18; Claudia Orange, The Illustrated History of the Treaty of Waitangi (Wellington: Bridget Williams 
Books, 2004), 39-41.  
4 Ruth Ross, “Te Tiriti o Waitangi: Texts and Translations,” New Zealand Journal of History, 6, 2 (1972). 
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in Parliament recognising the settlement later that same year. Ngāi Tahu had their claims 
heard by the Waitangi Tribunal from 1987-1989 and their direct negotiations began soon 
after the Ngāi Tahu Report was released in early 1991. Their negotiations had two distinct 
phases, from 1991 to late 1994 and then early 1996 to 1997, with legislation formalising their 
settlement in 1998.  
This thesis explores how Waikato-Tainui and Ngāi Tahu sought to negotiate 
settlements to their historical grievances that would empower them socially and politically, 
not just restore a lost economic base.5 However, the framework for settlement developed by 
the Crown did not meet these expectations. While Māori themselves have been able to choose 
which body will represent them in negotiations, the Crown has determined how negotiations 
will take place and the parameters within which Māori expectations could be fulfilled.While 
the Treaty of Waitangi Policy Unit (which would become the Office of Treaty Settlements in 
1995) led the development of Treaty settlement policy and spearheaded the direct 
negotiations, the key institutions in determining these parameters have been the Crown Law 
Office and Treasury. Their role is to ensure that settlements have limited or controllable legal 
implications (Crown Law) and were affordable in relation to other areas of government 
expenditure (Treasury). The Crown has sought to engage in Treaty settlements so that New 
Zealand's economic and political conditions could be made more stable, and in doing so has 
attempted to make settlements full and final. However, the parameters placed upon 
settlements have never acknowledged the full range of aspirations Māori have sought from 
Treaty settlements, not only in fiscal terms (the amount of redress made available to them), 
but also in the way that their political authority (mana and rangatiratanga) might be 
recognised in the process. This is partly because the Crown's approach to negotiations has 
5 Andrew Sharp, Justice and the Māori: The Philosophy and Practice of Māori Claims in New Zealand since the 
1970s (Oxford: Oxford University Press, first ed. 1990, 1997), 1-12. 
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been to protect its sovereignty. During its negotiations with Waikato-Tainui and Ngāi Tahu, 
the Crown strove to maintain its sovereignty in the face of Māori demands to have their 
political authority –defined in Treaty terms as rangatiratanga—recognised. The process by 
which this played out during the negotiations is the major focus of this thesis. This process 
saw the negotiating parties “talking past each other”, in many respects, and eventually 
leading to compromises that resulted in a settlement.6 While the iwi may have perceived, 
perhaps correctly so, that their compromises were far greater than the Crown was willing to 
make, the number of concessions they achieved were also significant.  
Both Waikato-Tainui and Ngāi Tahu inserted the pursuit of rangatiratanga into the 
negotiations, especially in terms of the return of land. The Crown was very hesitant as it 
perceived there was little to discuss in relation to sovereignty or autonomy since it was the 
sole and undisputed sovereign. The issue of compensation that had formed the initial 
framework for the Crown’s thinking would become a point of contention. Throughout both 
negotiations there remained a disjunction between the Crown’s view of the political nature of 
any negotiated solution, and the need for some kind of structured system for Waikato-Tainui 
and Ngāi Tahu in which the extent of loss could be measured equally with the amount of 
compensation and apology provided. Coming into the negotiations the Crown would have 
been clear on its position on full and final settlements, but Waikato-Tainui and Ngāi Tahu 
were firm in their own belief that the fiscally limited settlements could not be full and final. 
These opposing views were the basis for the negotiations between the Crown and Waikato-
Tainui and Ngāi Tahu and the settlements themselves were ultimately the product of 
consensus on these differing points. These negotiations require some historical 
6 Joan Metge and Patricia Kinloch, Talking Past Each Other (Wellington: Victoria University Press, 1978).  
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contextualisation. Before setting out a summary of the settlements and a chapter structure, the 




A Brief History of Waikato-Tainui and Ngāi Tahu Interactions with the 
Crown pre-negotiation 
 
Waikato-Tainui iwi are based in the central north west of the North Island centred 
around Ngāruawāhia and extended out to the West Coast around Raglan and Kawhia and east 
down past Hamilton, and north towards Auckland stopping at approximately Port Waikato. 
Boundaries between whanau (family), hapū (sub-tribe) and iwi have always been fluid, 
marked by shared areas of influence and that remains so today.7 Ngāi Tahu are spread across 
most of the South Island with their region of interest spreading just south of Blenheim on the 
east coast of the South Island and up past the West Coast of the South Island. In 1990, the 
Māori Appellate Court confirmed the boundaries noted in the map below but it was 
challenged by other iwi in the north of the South Island, Te Tau Ihu, who also shared interests 
in some areas with Ngāi Tahu.8 Waikato-Tainui and Ngāi Tahu had very different historical 
experiences with the Crown. Waikato-Tainui’s grievances were centered on the confiscation 
of approximately 1.2  million acres of land and the devastation from the wars of the 1860s. 
Ngāi Tahu’s grievances stemmed from the Crown’s faulty purchase of 34.5 million acres of 
land over twenty years from 1844 to 1864. Both groups ended up in very similar positions—
depleted of land and resources, their social and economic positions within New Zealand 
society were severely undermined.  
  
7 Evan TS Poata-Smith, “The Changing Contours of Māori Identity and the Treaty Settlement Process,” in 
Janine Hayward and Nicola Wheen (eds.), The Waitangi Tribunal (Wellington: Bridget Williams Books, 2004), 
168-183. 
8 4 South Island Appellate Court Minute Book 673 Folio 6/3. 
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Map 1: Land confiscated in the Waikato9 
 
  
9 “Confiscation of Māori land,” <http://www.teara.govt.nz/en/map/27791/confiscation-of-Māori-land>, accessed 
24 April 2013. 
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Map 2: Ngāi Tahu land purchases, 1844-186410 
 
Ngāi Tahu’s grievances against the Crown stretched back to the 1840s. Ngāi Tahu had 
engaged in whaling and sealing enterprises in the early nineteenth century and believed that 
their land sales to the Crown and Europeans would guarantee their own usage rights to the 
resources in the region and strengthen robust political, economic and social relationships with 
10 “Ngā Hoko i Ngāi Tahu,”’ <<http://www.tiritiowaitangi.govt.nz/maps/ngaitahupurchases.php>>, accessed 24 
April 2013.  
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newcomers. The amount of land sold in the less densely populated South Island was 
enormous compared to the land sales in the North Island. From 1844-1864 Ngāi Tahu sold 
34.5 million acres of land over eight separate purchases. Promises of schools and hospitals 
were especially emphasised to justify the low prices paid.11 Ngāi Tahu were promised 
substantial reserves in addition to the areas directly around their settlements to include food 
gathering areas. The Crown failed to safeguard the reserves negotiated in the purchases. The 
Crown left Ngāi Tahu marginal and miniscule reserves and within a generation of the first 
land sale Ngāi Tahu were left landless and impoverished as settlers were provided with cheap 
and wide-ranging estates throughout the region.12  
Ngāi Tahu took their first case to Court in 1868 but the government passed 
legislation, the Ngaitahu Reference Validation Act 1868, to prevent their claims from being 
heard.13 In the late 1870s, the Smith-Nairn Commission made some initial inquiries into Ngāi 
Tahu’s grievances but the funding for this inquiry was halted before it could make any 
conclusions or recommendations. Later in 1887, Royal Commissioner Alexander Mackay 
recommended the return of land and the payment of compensation, but a change of 
government meant that his Commission’s report was ignored. Select Committees of 
Parliament looked into the Ngāi Tahu claim again in 1889 and 1890, and in 1891 Alexander 
Mackay travelled around the South Island documenting the poverty of Ngai Tahu. Just as in 
1887, Mackay recommended the return of land and the payment of compensation. In1906 
inaccessible mountainous lands that would have been impossible to farm without substantial 
capital were transferred to some Ngāi Tahu but did not address the poverty of the people.14 
Ngāi Tahu continued to petition the government throughout the late nineteenth and early 
11 Vincent O’Malley, “Beyond Waitangi: Post-1840 Agreements Between Māori and the Crown,” in Beyond the 
Imperial Frontier (Wellington: BWB, 2014), 44-70. 
12 Waitangi Tribunal, The Ngāi Tahu Report, (Wellington: Waitangi Tribunal, 1991), 175-214, 821-920. 
13 Waitangi Tribunal, The Ngāi Tahu Report, 503-524. 
14 South Island Landless Natives Act 1906. 
9 
 
                                                          
twentieth centuries. When Prime Minister Peter Fraser began to pay some compensation to 
Māori groups in the 1940s Ngāi Tahu was provided with an annual sum of £10,000 for thirty 
years. This was a small amount that quickly devalued with inflation and was seen by many 
members of Ngāi Tahu as a temporary measure. Some Ngāi Tahu leaders, especially those 
that had negotiated the compensation, were initially pleased with the settlement. Later it was 
perceived that the compensation had been forced upon Ngāi Tahu. The iwi continued to 
petition the government regarding its claims.15  
The origins of Waikato-Tainui’s grievances were also centered on the control of land. 
Many hapū around New Zealand had begun to resist land sales in the 1850s. This resistance 
developed alongside the idea of establishing a Māori King to advocate for the retention of 
Māori land and sovereignty. After Māori rangatira such as Piri Te Kawau of Te Āti Awa (in 
1843) and Tamihana Te Rauparaha of Ngāti Toa (in 1852) met Queen Victoria in England, 
they returned to New Zealand determined to promote the idea of a Māori king. These 
rangatira believed that they could nominate a sovereign equal to Queen Victoria, settle 
intertribal conflict, establish self-governing institutions and retain Māori land. With the help 
of Ngāti Raukawa rangatira Matene Te Whiwhi, Tamihana Te Rauparaha set out during the 
mid 1850s to travel around the North Island trying to convince the leaders of major iwi such 
as Tainui, Ngati Porou, Whanganui, Te Arawa and Ngāti Tūwharetoa to accept the role and 
title of King but he could not find anyone who wanted the role. Finally, in 1858 the leader of 
Tainui iwi Ngāti Mahuta, Te Wherowhero, accepted the role and title of King after having 
initially rejected it in 1856. The Kīngitanga or King Movement was formally established in 
15 Waitangi Tribunal, The Ngāi Tahu Report, 1003-1032; Te Maire Tau, “Ngāi Tahu  – From ‘Better Be Dead 
and Out of the Way’ to ‘Be Seen and to Belong,’ in in J. Cookson and G. Dunstall (eds.) Southern Capital, 
Christchurch: Towards a City Biography (Christchurch: Canterbury University Press, 2000), 222-231. 
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1858. Ngāti Hauā rangatira Wiremu Tamihana, also known as the Kingmaker, crowned Te 
Wherowhero as King Pōtatau in 1859 at Ngāruawāhia.16  
Pōtatau died a year later in 1860 and his son, Tāwhiao, was crowned as King in July 
1860. In the first year of Tāwhiao’s reign, the Kīngitanga was drawn into the disputes over 
land sales that were occurring in the Taranaki region due to the King Movement’s pan-tribal 
connections with those in Taranaki opposing land sales. In July 1863, Crown forces, 
determined to assert British sovereignty over Waikato Māori, crossed the Mangatawhiri River 
and directly attacked the Kīngitanga. While the Kīngitanga and its allies fought the Crown to 
a standstill in many battles, the overwhelming numbers of British soldiers and the part-time 
nature of the Kīngitanga army led to their eventual military defeat in 1864. The Kīngitanga 
and its allies were forced to retreat and take refuge in behind the military border, the ‘aukati’. 
The King was to take refuge in Ngāti Maniapoto and Ngāti Hikairo territories.17 Following 
their defeat, the Kīngitanga’s power as a pan-tribal force was significantly curtailed as the 
Crown confiscated “rebel” lands in the Waikato, Taranaki and Tauranga regions.18 
Nonetheless for over twenty years a parallel sovereignty would exist in the King Country, Te 
Rohe Pōtae, into which Pākehā settlers and Crown representatives could only enter with the 
permission of the Kīngitanga.19 
16 James Belich, The New Zealand Wars (Auckland: Penguin, 1998), 78-79; Evelyn Stokes, Wiremu Tamihana: 
Rangātira (Wellington: Huia, 2002), 134-189; David McCan, Whatiwhatihoe: The Waikato raupatu claim 
(Wellington: Huia, 2001), 25-58. 
17 James Belich, The New Zealand Wars, 196-200; Danny Keenan, Wars Without End: The Land Wars in 
Nineteenth Century New Zealand (Auckland: Penguin, 2009), 205-233; Evelyn Stokes, Wiremu Tamihana: 
Rangatira, 334-389; Cathy Marr, “Te Rohe Pōtae political engagement 1864-1886,” Report commissioned by 
the Waitangi Tribunal, Wai 898, A78, 2011. 
18 Bryan Gilling, “The Punitive Confiscation of Māori Land in the 1860s,” in R Boast and R Hill (eds.) 
Raupatu: The Confiscation of Māori Land (Wellington: VUW Press, 2009), 13-30. 
19 Cathy Marr, “Te Rohe Pōtae political engagement, 1864-1886,” Report commissioned by the Waitangi 
Tribunal, Wai 898, A78, 2011; Ann Parsonson, “Te mana o te Kīngitanga Māori: a study of Waikato-
Ngātimaniapoto relations during the struggle for the King Country, 1878-1884,” MA thesis, University of 
Canterbury, 1972.  
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In the Waikato, over 1.2 million acres of the most productive lands in the country 
were confiscated under the New Zealand Settlements Act 1863 as punishment for alleged 
Waikato-Tainui rebellion against the Crown.20 This punishment was executed in any rational 
way from the perspective of Māori groups living in the area. A main ally of Waikato-Tainui 
against the British—Ngati Māniapoto—had unproductive lands south of Waikato-Tainui that 
were not confiscated at all while those who remained neutral and even supported the British 
government had their lands confiscated further north.21 From the Crown’s point of view, the 
confiscations were rational because they facilitated European settlement by taking the most 
fertile land and funded the infrastructure to develop it. The confiscation of land was thus at 
the centre of Waikato-Tainui’s grievances against the Crown.22 Following the confiscation of 
land Tāwhiao coined the key negotiating principle that would govern the strategy of Waikato-
Tainui negotiators for generations: “i riro whenua atu, me hoki whenua mai”—as land was 
taken, land must be returned.23  
From the mid-1860s onwards, Waikato-Tainui leaders repeatedly petitioned the New 
Zealand and British governments regarding what they perceived as an unjust confiscation of 
their lands. The New Zealand government had begun its process of returning some 
confiscated lands to those Waikato Māori who pledged their allegiance to the Queen but the 
system was quite haphazard and followers of the King Movement did not participate.24 
During the time Tāwhiao remained with his followers in Te Rohe Pōtae from 1864-1881, he 
continually negotiated with government representatives for the return of confiscated lands. 
20 The New Zealand Settlements Act 1863; Bryan Gilling, “The Punitive Confiscation of Māori Land in the 
1860s,” 23-24.   
21 Vincent O’Malley, “Choosing Peace or War: The 1863 Invasion of Waikato,” New Zealand Journal of 
History, Vol.47, No.1, 2013 
22 Robert Mahuta, “Tainui, Kīngitanga and Raupatu,” in Margaret Wilson & Anna Yeatman (eds.) Justice & 
Identity: Antipodean Practices (Wellington: Bridget Williams Books, 1995), 23-25. 
23 Waikato-Tainui Claims Settlement Act 1995, Preamble.  
24 Richard Boast, The Native Land Court: A Historical Study, Cases and Commentary, 1862-1887 (Wellington: 




                                                          
Once he returned to the Waikato in the 1880s he made the first of many visits by the 
Kīngitanga to England to petition the British royal family directly.25 In the 1920s, the 
government established the Sim Commission to investigate some of the major Māori 
grievances against the government, one of which was the confiscation of land in the Waikato. 
The specific terms of reference for the Sim Commission were to determine whether the 
confiscations were “excessive.” The Sim Commission concluded that the confiscations were 
unjust but that Waikato-Tainui had been deserving of some kind of punishment because they 
had rebelled against the Crown.26 Waikato-Tainui argued that any confiscation had been 
unjust because they were defending their homes against British troops. Negotiations with the 
government began in the 1930s, and by 1946, Waikato-Tainui were granted a small amount 
of annual compensation, £5,000 annually for thirty years, under the Waikato-Maniapoto 
Claims Settlement Act that was eroded over the years by inflation.27 The legislation also 
established the Tainui Māori Trust Board, which managed and distributed the annual 
compensation.28 Most Waikato-Tainui leaders were not satisfied with the token annual sum 
while successive governments considered that the compensation provided was a full and final 
settlement. Some Waikato-Tainui leaders continued to pursue a fuller and more robust 
settlement of their claims against the government that included land.29  
  
25 David McCan, Whatiwhatihoe: The Waikato Raupatu Claim (Wellington: Huia, 2001), 148-150, 175-176. 
26 Mark Hickford, “Strands from the Afterlife of Confiscation, Property Rights, Constitutional Histories and the 
Political Incorporation of Māori, 1920s,” R Boast and R Hill (eds.) Raupatu: The Confiscation of Māori Land 
(Wellington: VUW Press, 2009), 183-203.  
27 Michael King, Te Puea: A life (Auckland: Penguin, 1977), 222-225; McCan, Whatiwhatihoe: The Waikato 
raupatu claim, 186-209; Michael Belgrave, “Negotiations and Settlements” in Nicola Wheen & Janine Hayward 
(eds.) Treaty of Waitangi Settlements (Wellington: Bridget Williams Books, 2012), 45. 
28 McCan, Whatiwhatihoe: The Waikato raupatu claim, 205-216; Richard Hill, State Authority, Indigenous 
Autonomy: Crown-Māori Relations in New Zealand/Aotearoa 1900-1950 (Wellington: Victoria University 
Press, 2004), 223-224. 
29 Robert Mahuta, “Tainui, Kīngitanga and Raupatu,” 25-28; David McCan, Whatiwhatihoe: The Waikato 
raupatu claim, 181-224.  
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A Brief History of the Modern Treaty of Waitangi Claims Process 
 
 The modern Treaty of Waitangi claims process began in the 1970s although its roots 
go back further to other attempts by Māori to have their historical claims addressed by the 
Crown. The alienation of Māori land through faulty land sales, military confiscation and 
bureaucratic machinations such as the Native Land Court, survey costs and rates, was at the 
centre of many Māori grievances. As the land began to transfer from Māori to European/ 
Pākehā ownership so too did the management of the environment and the environment began 
to be degraded by the farming, mining, fishing and forestry industries. Thus, environmental 
issues also became a significant part of most Māori claims against the Crown. The 1967 
Māori Affairs Amendment Act continued the Crown’s pattern of facilitating the alienation of 
Māori land, and the Act served to provide a common focus for different forms of Māori 
protest.30   
 Māori protest was quite widespread and diverse by the 1970s—there were 
conservative, liberal and radical factions that often worked together, but also worked alone. 
Radical groups such as Ngā Tamatoa had developed a political philosophy influenced by 
Black Power movements in the United States and other organisations such as the American 
Indian Movement. Nonetheless in relation to the alienation of Māori land, organisations such 
as Nga Tamatoa were largely in agreement with the more conservative New Zealand Māori 
Council (NZMC). Other protests groups were associated with trade unions such as the Māori 
Organisation on Human Rights or with women’s rights, such as the Māori Women’s Welfare 
League and these groups also called for the Crown to resolve Māori grievances. In 1975 a 
Māori land march (hikoi) was organised by a group of Māori and some Pākehā activists, Te 
30 Richard Hill, Māori and the State: Crown-Māori Relations in New Zealand/Aotearoa, 1950-2000 
(Wellington: Victoria University Press, 2009), 158-160. 
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Roopu o te Matakite, that travelled from the Far North in Te Kaeo to Wellington to highlight 
the need for Crown action to halt the alienation of land and to resolve Māori claims. This 
march had developed directly out of the response to the Māori Affairs Amendment Act 
1967.31 
 At the same time that these Māori protest movements were putting pressure on the 
government, Māori MPs also pushed the government to deal with Māori claims for historical 
redress. Matiu Rata was the Māori Affairs Minister from 1972-1975 for the Third Labour 
government. Before the Labour government was defeated by the National Party led by Robert 
Muldoon in 1975, Rata was able to introduce the Treaty of Waitangi Act, which established 
the Waitangi Tribunal. The Tribunal was a permanent commission of inquiry that was 
authorised to investigate breaches of the Treaty of Waitangi and make recommendations to 
the government, but only those breaches that had occurred after 1975. This limited the ability 
of the Tribunal to look into most Māori grievances, many of which had contemporary effects 
but which were historical in nature. The Tribunal was able to address some environmental 
claims, all of which related to the discharge of untreated sewage into rivers, streams and the 
ocean. The Tribunal recommended the treatment of sewage before disposal into water.32 The 
National Party, elected into government months after the Act was passed, limited the 
Waitangi Tribunal’s ability to function by restricting financial support for the nine years they 
were in office.33 Issues that the Tribunal could have helped to resolve during the 1975 to 
31 E.S. Poata-Smith, ‘He pokeke uenuku i tu ai: the evolution of contemporary Māori protest,’ in Nga Patai: 
Racism and Ethnic Relations in Aotearoa New Zealand (Palmerston North: Dunmore Press, 1996); Aroha 
Harris, Hikoi: Forty Years of Māori Protest (Wellington: Huia, 2008), 70.  
32 MPK Sorrenson, ‘The Waitangi Tribunal and the Resolution of Māori Grievances,’ in Land is the Price 
(Auckland: Auckland University Press, 2014), 257-259. 
33 Paul Hamer, ‘A Quarter-century of the Waitangi Tribunal,’ in Janine Hayward and Nicola Wheen (eds.), The 
Waitangi Tribunal (Wellington: Bridget Williams Books, 2004), 3-5; Mason Durie, Te Mana, Te Kawanatanga 
(Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1998), 184; Jane Kelsey, ‘From lame duck to toothless tiger,’ Mana 
Magazine, No. 3 1993. 
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1984 period, such as the occupation of Bastion Point, were instead left to grow and further 
Māori grievances were created.34  
 Despite the limits placed on the Waitangi Tribunal in its first decade of existence, 
some early findings were particularly important such as the historical context in which the 
Treaty was signed, recognition of the Māori text of the Treaty and the different Māori and 
European understandings of the Treaty especially with regard to issues related to sovereignty 
or rangatiratanga.35 The Tribunal’s findings were supported and aided by academic 
publications such as Ruth Ross’s 1972 article “Te Tiriti o Waitangi: Texts and Translations,” 
and later Claudia Orange’s 1987 publication The Treaty of Waitangi which explored the 
debates that occurred during the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi in 1840.36 Other 
academics who explored New Zealand history through the lens of the Treaty of Waitangi 
during this time also fed into the process such as Alan Ward, Judith Binney, David Williams 
and Ann Parsonson.37 Although there were some significant findings produced by the 
Tribunal’s inquiries, there was still a high level of Māori protest such as occupations of land 
at Orakei (Bastion Point) and Raglan, and annual protests during Waitangi Day 
commemorations. The Waitangi Action Committee came to prominence during the early 
1980s, and advocated for the return of lands as their predecessors had in the 1960s and 1970s 
but increasingly questioned the role that the Treaty could play in such a process. Māori 
34 When the Tribunal heard its first historical claim in 1987 it was related to the occupation at Bastion Point and 
the Tribunal recommended the return of the entire area in dispute as well as other lands and compensation: 
Waitangi Tribunal, Report of the Waitangi Tribunal on the Orakei Claim (Wai-9), (Wellington: Brookers & 
Friends, 1987).  
35 Janine Hayward, ‘Flowing from the Treaty’s words,’ in Janine Hayward and Nicola Wheen (eds.), The 
Waitangi Tribunal (Wellington: Bridget Williams Books, 2004), 30-32. 
36 Ruth Ross, “Te Tiriti o Waitangi: Texts and Translations,” New Zealand Journal of History, 6, 2 (1972); 
Claudia Orange, The Treaty of Waitangi (Wellington: Allen & Unwin, 1987); Rachael Bell, “‘Texts and 
Translations,’ Ruth Ross and the Treaty of Waitangi,” New Zealand Journal of History, 43, 1 (2009).  
37 Alan Ward, A Show of Justice: Racial Amalgamation in Nineteenth Century New Zealand (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1973); Judith Binney, The Legacy of Guilt, A Life of Thomas Kendall (Auckland: 
Oxford University Press, 1968); Judity Binney, Gillian Chaplin and Craig Wallace, Mihaia: The Prophet Rua 
Kenana and his community at Maungapohatu (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1979); Ann Parsonson, “He 
Whenua Te Utu (The Payment will be Land),” PhD thesis, University of Canterbury, 1978; David V. Williams, 
Te Kooti Tango Whenua: The Native Land Court 1864-1909 (Wellington: Huia Books, 1999).  
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protest seemed to escalate each year during the late 1970s and early 1980s as protestors 
demanded, amongst other things, that the Tribunal be provided with powers to determine 
historical claims.38 Matiu Rata, frustrated with political intransigence within Labour, left the 
Party and formed Mana Motuhake in 1980. Rata’s new political party was meant to provide a 
middle point between radical direct action protest and a Labour Party that was perceived to 
be falling behind in the realm of Māori Affairs.39   
Pressure from Māori MPs and Māori activists made the extension of the Tribunal’s 
powers to investigate historical grievances a part of Labour’s policy platform in 1984. The 
Treaty of Waitangi Amendment Act was passed in 1985 and it allowed for the Tribunal to 
inquire into Māori grievances against the Crown dating back to the signing of the Treaty on 6 
February 1840. These retrospective powers would entail detailed historical research into 
specific Māori claims against the Crown over a period dating back to 1840. This caused a 
rapid increase in the number of claims submitted to the Tribunal and very soon the system 
was completely over-loaded but the Tribunal continued to remain under-resourced. The 
backlog of claims and the Tribunal’s (initial) lack of binding powers eventually convinced 
some Māori groups to proceed directly to negotiations with the Crown.  
 When the Labour government introduced legislation to increase the investigative 
reach of the Waitangi Tribunal it also embarked on a neo-liberal economic agenda that 
clashed with its intention to resolve Māori grievances.40 In 1986 Parliament passed the State 
Owned Enterprises Act which sought to corporatise or privatise some of the most valuable 
38  Ranginui Walker, Nga tau tohetohe: Years of Anger (Auckland: Penguin, 1987); Hill, Māori and the State: 
Crown-Māori Relations in New Zealand/Aotearoa, 1950-2000, 176-178.  
39 Hill, Māori and the State: Crown-Māori Relations in New Zealand/Aotearoa, 1950-2000, 178-181, 184, 201, 
209. 




                                                          
Crown assets and land administered by government departments.41 The privatisation policies 
implemented during the second half of the 1980s were solely focused on economic 
rationalism, and originally these policies had not included any recognition of Māori claims.  
This was problematic for Māori because the government had also finally recognised their 
right to a fair hearing of their historical grievances. Any land or resources that had been 
acquired by the Crown in a way that breached the Treaty of Waitangi but had been sold into 
private hands were completely off limits in the claims process.42 Māori claimants could only 
receive government-owned lands and resources as compensation. The recognition of 
historical Treaty rights for Māori and the need and desire to privatise the economy were thus 
intertwined and also in many ways diametrically opposed. 
 In addition to the economic changes that were introduced during the second half of 
the 1980s, Labour was also intent on reforming the New Zealand political structure. 
Legislation was increasingly being written with the Treaty of Waitangi incorporated into its 
structure to ensure that the government would not be breaching the principles of the Treaty of 
Waitangi. This included legislation governing the corporate restructuring of government (The 
State Owned Enterprises Act 1986), the establishment of the Department of Conservation 
(The Conservation Act 1987), but also the Environment Act 1986, the Māori Language Act 
1987, the Education Act 1989 and the Māori Fisheries Act 1989. This pattern would continue 
on through into the 1990s. Internal factions within the Labour Party that were opposed to the 
increasing place of the Treaty of Waitangi in the legislative system, such as Roger Douglas 
and Richard Prebble, believed that including the reference to the Treaty of Waitangi would 
appease the more progressive forces within the Labour Party such as Koro Wetere and 
Geoffrey Palmer. When Māori opposed the State Owned Enterprises Act in 1987 they used 
41 Claudia Orange, The Illustrated History of the Treaty of Waitangi, 162-163; Alan Ward, An Unsettled 
History, 34-37. 
42 Ward, An Unsettled History, 34-37.   
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the wording in the government’s own statutes to argue that the Treaty of Waitangi was being 
breached. The first legal challenge to the Labour government from Māori would appear in the 
Courts in 1987.43 
 In the NZMC v. Attorney-General case the New Zealand Māori Council charged that 
the State Owned Enterprises Act 1986 breached the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi 
because the Act enabled the government to privatise land and assets, which would then 
become unavailable for use as compensation for Māori historical grievances.44 Sir Robin 
Cooke and his fellow justices in the Court of Appeal agreed that the legislation did breach the 
principles of the Treaty and forced the government to negotiate with Māori leaders to develop 
some safeguards that would protect land and assets from sale. The result was the Treaty of 
Waitangi (State Enterprises) Act 1988 which provided clawback mechanisms, called 
memorials, for land and assets that were subject to Māori claims. This meant that if a private 
interest wanted to purchase surplus state assets that had memorials, they were required to sell 
back the assets to the Crown if it was found that they were the subject of a valid claim. The 
1988 Act also introduced binding ‘remedial’ powers for the Waitangi Tribunal in which it 
could force the Crown to return State Owned Enterprise land and assets if they were the 
subject of valid claims within 90 days of making the order. The Tribunal has only used its 
powers under the Act once, in 1998.45 In that instance the Crown and the claimants, Ngāti 
43 Jane Kelsey, A Question of Honour? Labour and the Treaty, 1984-1989 (Wellington: Allen & Unwin, 1990), 
140-161. 
44 Orange, An Illustrated History of the Treaty of Waitangi, 164-166; Ward, An Unsettled History, 37-38; 
Michael King, Penguin History of New Zealand, 501. 
45 NZMC v. Attorney-General (1987); Hill, Māori and the State: Crown-Māori Relations in New 
Zealand/Aotearoa, 1950-2000, 223-226; Durie, Te Mana, Te Kawanatanga, 182-184. Recently the Supreme 
Court forced the Tribunal to at least grant a remedies hearing in the case of the Mangatu Incorporation: Haronga 
v Waitangi Tribunal and others (SC54/2010) [2011] NZSC 53. Due to the pressure from the Supreme Court, the 
Tribunal also granted the Ngāti Kahu remedies inquiry in 2012. Both the Mangatu Remedies Tribunal and the 
Ngāti Kahu Remedies Tribunal declined to use their binding powers and order remedies: Ngāti Kahu Remedies 
Report, 2012; Mangatu Remedies Report, 2013. While some commentators have criticised the Tribunal for 
refusing to use their binding powers, there are a number of interrelated factors that have prevented its use. 
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Turangitukua, negotiated a settlement before the Tribunal’s binding powers came into 
effect.46 
Another agreement was also later negotiated in 1989 to cover the privatisation of state 
forests that resulted in the establishment of the Crown Forestry Rentals Trust. Rather than 
selling the land with a memorial on the title, the Crown retained ownership of the land and 
sold the cutting rights to the forests and leased the land. The Crown would set aside 
accumulated Crown forestry rentals for Māori claimants who would receive the 
compensation whenever their claim was found to be valid as well as fund the research for 
their direct negotiations. As with the lands and assets held by State Owned Enterprises, the 
Tribunal was also empowered to make binding orders for the return of Crown forests where it 
considered a claim to be well-founded.47  
The other major Court case affecting Crown-Māori relations in the late 1980s was the 
Coalcorp case. Much as State Owned Enterprises, Crown forests and fisheries, minerals were 
found to be assets that could be used in the future for the settlement of valid Māori claims. 
Waikato-Tainui alleged that mineral wealth such as coal should equally be set aside by the 
Crown and used in a future settlement. Against the advice of most legal experts they filed an 
injunction in the Court of Appeal. The Courts once again backed the Māori claimants and 
instructed the government to halt the sale of Coalcorp assets in the Waikato so that they 
would be potentially available for Waikato-Tainui.48 
46 Waitangi Tribunal, The Turangi Township Remedies Report, 1995; Ngāti Turangitukua Deed of Settlement, 
26 September 1998.  
47 Orange, An Illustrated History of the Treaty of Waitangi, 164-169, 185-187; Ward, An Unsettled History, 38-
40; Crown Forest Assets Act 1989. 
48 Orange, An Illustrated History of the Treaty of Waitangi, 196-197; David McCan, Whatiwhatihoe: The 




                                                          
During the negotiations and Court hearings over the State Owned Enterprises Act, the 
Crown Forest Assets Act, the Māori Fisheries Act and the Coalcorp case, the Waitangi 
Tribunal held hearings for the Ngāi Tahu claim from 1987 to 1989. In the end four separate 
reports were produced for Ngāi Tahu’s claim. The first was released in 1991 and it covered 
the “nine tall trees”, that is the eight major land purchases made between 1844 and 1864 and 
the restrictions on access to mahinga kai. The second and third addressed Ngāi Tahu’s legal 
personality and sea fisheries claims and were produced in 1992. The final report covered the 
ancillary claims, which grew out of the “nine tall trees”, and was released in 1995.49 The 
negotiations between Ngāi Tahu and the Crown covered all the grievances reported on by the 
Tribunal except for Ngāi Tahu’s sea fisheries claims, which were subject to the 1992 Pan-
Māori Fisheries settlement. In the case of the “nine tall trees”, although the Tribunal did not 
uphold all of Ngāi Tahu’s claims, it demonstrated that reserves had not been awarded and 
access to mahinga kai had been severely restricted to the detriment of the Ngāi Tahu people 
and recommended restitution.  
The formation of the Waitangi Tribunal and the Court cases establishing the Treaty of 
Waitangi within New Zealand’s legal framework were important in pushing the government 
to negotiate settlements with iwi, but the Tribunal could not negotiate for the Crown. The 
Waitangi Tribunal could largely only make recommendations. It was up to the government to 
negotiate and until the late 1980s it had not made any substantial efforts to begin 
negotiations. Until late 1988, the Labour government maintained that the settlements of the 
past for major Māori grievances were full and final and they would not be re-opened. Māori 
groups, the Tribunal, the Courts and internal factions within the Labour Party led by Koro 
49 Ngāi Tahu Report (Wellington: Waitangi Tribunal, 1991), 3 Vols; The Ngāi Tahu  Claim: Supplementary 
Report on Legal Personality (Wellington: Waitangi Tribunal, 1991); Ngāi Tahu  Sea Fisheries Report 




                                                          
Wetere and Geoffrey Palmer effectively served to change the government’s mind and pushed 
it to negotiate.50 These events prompted the Labour government to create the first official 
government policy unit charged directly with dealing with breaches of the Treaty of 
Waitangi, the Treaty of Waitangi Policy Unit (ToWPU).51 From the very beginning the 
Crown Law Office (CLO) would play a significant role in assisting ToWPU to develop 
Treaty policy advice to government and gradually other departments also began to play a 
part— Treasury (in relation to fiscal matters), the Department of Conservation (DoC), the 
Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPMC) and Manatu Māori (later Te Puni 
Kōkiri). The ToWPU was originally established to solely provide policy advice to the 
government on Treaty of Waitangi issues but ToWPU officials were quickly drawn into 
involvement in direct negotiations.  
Waikato-Tainui representatives had pushed for direct negotiations to address their 
historical claims throughout the second half of the 1980s because of the backlog of claims 
that were to be heard at the Waitangi Tribunal, and after much persistence the government 
agreed. In July and August 1989 the inaugural ToWPU Director, Alex Frame, a few ToWPU 
officials, a Treasury official and Crown Law representative travelled to the Waikato to 
engage in scoping negotiations with Waikato-Tainui. Despite the productive nature of the 
discussions, the Crown maintained that it would continue with its plans to sell its Coalcorp 
assets against Waikato-Tainui protests. A month after the scoping discussions the Tainui 
Māori Trust Board took its case to the Court of Appeal and requested an injunction on the 
sale of Coalcorp’s assets. Waikato-Tainui’s victory in the Coalcorp case pushed the 
50 Geoffrey Palmer, Reform: A Memoir (Wellington: Victoria University Press, 2013), 402-414; Ward, An 
Unsettled History, 30. 
51 Hill, Māori and State: Crown-Māori Relations in New Zealand/Aotearoa 1950-2000, 229. 
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government to formally commence negotiations.52 Prime Minister Geoffrey Palmer 
announced at Te Awamaarahi Marae on 23 November 1989 that the Crown would begin 
formal negotiations with Waikato-Tainui.53   
While participating in scoping negotiations with Waikato-Tainui, ToWPU also 
drafted the government’s Principles for Crown Action on the Treaty of Waitangi in 1989.54  
The government established five principles to govern Crown action on the Treaty: 1) The 
Principle of Kawanatanga or the Crown’s right to govern; 2) The Principle of Rangatiratanga 
or the Māori right to self-management; 3) The Principle of Equality; 4) The Principle of 
Cooperation; and 5) The Principle of Redress. While the principle of redress was a novel 
approach by the Crown that was appreciated by Māori, there were other aspects of the 
Principles that came under criticism. Some Māori leaders felt that the principle of 
rangatiratanga was too limited and had undermined the findings on sovereignty made by the 
Waitangi Tribunal.55 The Crown sought to limit the principle of rangatiratanga to resources 
that Māori had already retained rather than resources that been sold, confiscated or otherwise 
obtained by the Crown through unscrupulous means.56  
 During this period the Waitangi Tribunal remained underfunded.57 When the Labour 
government was defeated by the generally conservative National Party in 1990 there were 
some fears that the minimal advances made at the end of the 1980s through the establishment 
of ToWPU, the Crown Forestry Rental Trust and amendments to legislation such as the State 
52 Hill, Māori and the State: Crown-Māori Relations in New Zealand/Aotearoa, 1950-2000, 253; Diamond, 
Māori Leaders Speak, 64. 
53 Robert Mahuta to Geoffrey Palmer, 23 January 1990, TC 30 Vol. 7, OTS archive.  
54 Orange, An Illustrated History of the Treaty of Waitangi, 198-199; Hill, Māori and the State: Crown-Māori 
Relations in New Zealand/Aotearoa, 1950-2000, 229; Durie, 188-189; Principles for Crown Action on the 
Treaty of Waitangi, Department of Justice, 1989. 
55 Durie, Te Mana, Te Kawanatanga, 204-205. 
56 Therese Crocker, “Introduction: Principles for Crown Action on the Treaty of Waitangi, 1989,” Treaty of 
Waitangi Research Unit, Historical Document Series 6, Wellington, 2011, 8, 10-11. 
57 Hill, Māori and the State: Crown-Māori Relations in New Zealand/Aotearoa, 1950-2000, 253. 
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Owned Enterprises Act would be reversed. The National Party had not traditionally been the 
political party associated with the promotion of legislation and policies that would help Māori 
generally. To the surprise of some, Justice Minister Douglas Graham along with the Prime 
Minister, Jim Bolger, pushed for a settlement process through direct negotiations. 
Negotiations that had just begun with Waikato-Tainui in 1989 continued after a brief hiatus in 
1991 with the National government and in the same year negotiations officially began with 
Ngāi Tahu. While there were regular monthly ad hoc meetings between the Crown and 
Waikato-Tainui and Ngāi Tahu negotiators respectively there was little advancement in either 
negotiation in the early 1990s. However, representatives from each party to negotiations were 
part of the pan-Māori fisheries negotiating team that concluded a $170 million settlement 
with the Crown in 1992.58  
The Crown’s negotiations with Waikato-Tainui and Ngāi Tahu were equally 
struggling around the 1993 election but by the end of 1994 Waikato-Tainui had signed an 
Agreement in Principle and Ngāi Tahu’s negotiations had completely collapsed. Just prior to 
the settlement with Waikato-Tainui in late 1994, the Crown released its new formal Treaty 
negotiating policy document that built on the principles produced in 1989, The Crown’s 
Proposals for the Settlement of Treaty of Waitangi Claims.59 While the policy addressed a 
number of issues related to the development of the Treaty settlement process, there was a 
prominent backlash from Māori groups to the unilateral fiscal limit of $1 billion (1992 
58 The pan-Māori fisheries settlement, often referred to as the Sealord deal, was signed on 23 September 1992. 
Coupled with the interim $20 million settlement reached in 1989 with the Labour government, the Crown paid 
an additional $150 million for a total of $170 million and provided Māori with 20% of all quota for fisheries 
brought within the quota management system. Māori would then use this sum to enter into a joint venture 
agreement with Brierley Investments to purchase Sealord Products Limited. The Māori Fisheries Commission 
was renamed the Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries Commission and it was tasked with developing a method for the 
equitable distribution of the fisheries assets amongst the iwi across the country. After twelve difficult years of 
negotiation between Māori the Māori Fisheries Act was passed in 2004. Paul Moon, “The Creation of the 
‘Sealord Deal’,” The Journal of the Polynesian Society, Vol. 107 No. 2 1998; Māori Fisheries Act 2004; Hill, 
Māori and the State: Crown-Māori Relations in New Zealand/Aotearoa, 1950-2000, 254-255.  
59 Crown Proposals for the Settlement of Treaty of Waitangi Claims, Department of Justice, 1994. 
24 
 
                                                          
dollars) placed on the total amount available for compensation—the “fiscal envelope.”60 In 
addition to the fiscal cap, the Crown’s proposals also did not recognise the possibility of 
Māori ownership of natural resources (except for pounamu or greenstone) and conservation 
land would only be returned in very limited and unique circumstances. Nonetheless, as Alan 
Ward has noted, they were a significant policy shift that consisted of much more than just the 
fiscal cap: “they acknowledged that historical injustices had occurred; accepted that the 
Crown had a duty to make reparation in settlements that were fair and sustainable, and 
removed the sense of grievance; and accepted that the resolution of claims must be consistent 
and equitable between groups.”61 In early 1995, the Treaty of Waitangi Policy Unit was 
renamed the Office of Treaty Settlements. Following Waikato-Tainui’s settlement Ngāi Tahu 
eventually recommenced negotiations with the Crown in mid-1996 and signed its own 
Agreement in Principle by October 1996 just prior to the 1996 election.  
Chapter structure 
 
Chapter 1 establishes the political framework of the negotiation process and will 
explore the commencement of each negotiation and the participants in each negotiation 
process. It will analyse the first major issue in each negotiation process, the return of the 
decommissioned Army Base at Hopuhopu to Waikato-Tainui, and the establishment of Te 
Rūnanga o Ngāi Tahu (TRONT). Both issues were emblematic of the Crown’s control of the 
process, but also the Crown’s focus on iwi-level leadership rather than the number of hapū 
(sub-tribes) who opposed the return of Hopuhopu to Waikato-Tainui and the formation of 
TRONT respectively. While Waikato-Tainui and Ngāi Tahu both sought to negotiate on the 
basis of strengthening their rangatiratanga, the Crown imposed early limits on the parameters 
60 Wira Gardiner, Return to Sender: What really happened at the fiscal envelope hui (Auckland: Reed Books, 
1996); Ranginui Walker, Nga pepa a Ranginui: The Walker Papers (Auckland: Penguin, 1996). 
61 Alan Ward, An Unsettled History, 52. 
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of the negotiations. Nan Seuffert has commented that rangatiratanga did not have a prominent 
place in Treaty settlement negotiations.62 In fact, rangatiratanga was central to Waikato-
Tainui and Ngāi Tahu’s aspirations for their Treaty settlement negotiations, and was 
prominent throughout the entire process. While the Treaty of Waitangi Policy Unit/Office of 
Treaty Settlements had the primary role in leading negotiations the Treasury, the Crown Law 
Office, the Department of Conservation, and the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet 
also had prominent roles to play in Waikato-Tainui and Ngāi Tahu’s negotiating processes.  
David McCan’s tribally-authorised general history of the Waikato-Tainui claim, 
Whatiwhatihoe, addressed in some detail the early negotiations with the Fourth Labour 
Government in the late 1980s but little on the majority of the negotiations that began with the 
National government in 1991.63 Alex Frame, ToWPU Director during the Fourth Labour 
government, has also analysed his own role in the Crown’s early negotiations with Waikato-
Tainui in 1989 and 1990. 64 Waikato-Tainui chief negotiator Sir Robert Mahuta published 
two articles shortly after the negotiations were concluded which provided a brief account of 
the Waikato-Tainui negotiation process.65 Mahuta’s introduction to Whatiwhatihoe and his 
interview with Paul Diamond in A Fire in Your Belly explored in more detail some of the 
political constraints under which Waikato-Tainui negotiated their settlement.66 Ngāi Tahu 
chief negotiator Sir Tipene O’Regan was also interviewed by Diamond for A Fire in Your 
Belly and similarly commented on the political limits of the negotiation process. O’Regan has 
62 Nan Seuffert, “Nation as Partnership: Law, ‘Race’, and Gender in Aotearoa New Zealand’s Treaty 
Settlements,” Law & Society Review, Vol. 39, No. 3 (Sep. 2005), 509. 
63 David McCan, Whatiwhatihoe: The Waikato raupatu claim (Wellington: Huia, 2001).  
64 Alex Frame, “Raupatu Settlement – Legal Finality and Political Reality,” in Richard Hill and Richard Boast, 
eds. Raupatu: The Confiscation of Māori Land (Wellington: Victoria University Press, 2009). 
65 Robert Mahuta, “Tainui, Kīngitanga and Raupatu,” in Margaret Wilson and Anna Yeatman (eds.) Justice & 
Identity: Antipodean Practices (Wellington: Bridget Williams Books, 1995), 18-32; Robert Te Kotahi Mahuta, 
“Iwi Development and the Waikato-Tainui Experience,” in Paul Spoonley, Cluny Macpherson and David 
Pearson (eds.) Nga Patai: Racism and Ethnic Relations in Aotearoa/New Zealand (Palmerston North: Dunmore 
Press, 1996), 117-123; 
66 Sir Robert Mahuta, “Afterword,” in David McCan, Whatiwhatihoe: The Waikato raupatu claim (Wellington: 
Huia, 2001); “Sir Robert Mahuta” in Paul Diamond (ed.), A Fire in Your Belly (Wellington: Huia, 2003). 
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also published on the political context in the period preceding the negotiations. O’Regan’s 
contribution to The Bolger Years addressed the process of attempting to convince the 
Muldoon government of the validity of their claims, and in “Impact on Māori – A Ngāi Tahu 
perspective,” the effect of the 1987 NZMC case on Ngāi Tahu.67 Similarly Ann Parsonson 
and Te Maire Tau have written overviews of the lead-up to the negotiation process and the 
final process itself but not much on the substantive negotiations which took place between 
1991 and 1997.68 
On the Crown side there has been little produced about who negotiates and what roles 
different Departments have in the negotiation process although Dean Cowie has recently 
outlined the peoples and institutions that make up the general Treaty settlement process.69 
Gavin Muirhead’s history of Landcorp provides some very frank insights into the tense 
politics which emerged between Landcorp and claimant groups such as Waikato-Tainui and 
Ngāi Tahu.70 Former Prime Minister Jim Bolger’s introduction to The Bolger Years 
commented on the difficulty of handling opposition from the ‘hierarchy of the National Party 
in the South Island’ to the Ngāi Tahu settlement.71 The work of the Minister in Charge of 
Treaty of Waitangi Negotiations from 1991-1999, Sir Douglas Graham, addressed the 
difficulties of developing the Treaty settlement process when there was little acceptance from 
the public for reconciliation and compensation. Graham also provided more specific details 
67 Sir Tipene O’Regan, “Negotiating with Politicians,” in Margaret Clark (ed.), The Bolger Years (Palmerston 
North: Dunmore Press, 2008), 174-180; Sir Tipene O’Regan, “Impact on Māori – A Ngāi Tahu  Perspective,” in 
Jacinta Ruru (ed.), “In Good Faith” Symposium, Proceedings marking the 20th anniversary of the Lands case 
(Dunedin: University of Otago and the Law Foundation NZ), 41-50; Carol Archie, Skin to Skin: Intimate, True 
Stories of Māori-Pākehā Relationships (Auckland: Penguin, 2005), 200-207; “Sir Tipene O’Regan,” in Paul 
Diamond (ed.), A Fire in Your Belly (Wellington: Huia, 2003). 
68 Ann Parsonson, “Ngāi Tahu  – The Whale that Awoke: From Claim to Settlement (1960-1998),” in J. 
Cookson and G. Dunstall (eds.) Southern Capital, Christchurch: Towards a City Biography (Christchurch: 
Canterbury University Press, 2000), 248-276; Te Maire Tau, “Ngāi Tahu  – From ‘Better Be Dead and Out of 
the Way’ to ‘Be Seen and to Belong,’ in in J. Cookson and G. Dunstall (eds.) Southern Capital, Christchurch: 
Towards a City Biography (Christchurch: Canterbury University Press, 2000), 222-247. 
69 Dean Cowie, ‘The Treaty Settlement Process,’ in Treaty of Waitangi Settlements, (eds. Nicola Wheen & 
Janine Hayward). 
70 Gavin Muirhead, Footprints in the future (Wellington: Landcorp, 2009).  
71 Jim Bolger, ‘Opening Remarks,’ in Margaret Clark (ed.), The Bolger Years (Palmerston North: Dunmore 
Press, 2008), 14. 
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regarding the National government’s negotiations with both Waikato-Tainui and Ngāi Tahu 
from his own personal perspective in Trick or Treaty?72  
The problems concerning the representation of Māori negotiators have been written 
about fairly extensively. Evan Poata-Smith and Robert Joseph have explored the difficulties 
of representation and Treaty settlement negotiations.73 Ranginui Walker’s concerns about the 
representatives who nearly signed the Whakatōhea Settlement in 1996 were explored in 
Walker’s history of the Whakatōhea claim and in Paul Spoonley’s biography of Ranginui 
Walker, Mata Toa. Margaret Mutu has also published about her own experiences as the Chief 
Negotiator for Ngāti Kahu. The difficulties of representation were also investigated in some 
of the case studies in Dion Tuuta’s Māori Experiences of the Direct Negotiation Process.74 
Nearly every commentary similarly explored the Crown-imposed restrictions under which 
both iwi-level and hapū-level leaders struggled.  
The political constraints of the negotiation process that were embodied in the tension 
between Waikato-Tainui and Ngāi Tahu’s assertion of rangatiratanga, and the Crown’s right 
to govern, also extended to the economic dimension of each settlement. Chapter 2 will 
explore how Waikato-Tainui and Ngāi Tahu tried to convince the Crown of their respective 
financial losses, and how the economic parameters of each settlement were developed. At one 
level what Māori claimants sought as compensation is apparent within their specific claims to 
72 Douglas Graham, Trick or Treaty? (Wellington: Institute for Policy Studies, 1997); Sir Douglas Graham. 
“The Treaty and Treaty Negotiations,” in Margaret Clark’s The Bolger Years: 1990-1997 (Wellington: 
Dunmore Publishing, 2008). 
73 Evan TS Poata-Smith, “The Changing Contours of Māori Identity and the Treaty Settlement Process,” in 
Janine Hayward and Nicola Wheen (eds.), The Waitangi Tribunal (Wellington: Bridget Williams Books, 2004), 
168-183;  Robert Joseph, ‘Unsettling Treaty Settlements: Contemporary Māori Identity and Representation 
Challenges’ in Treaty of Waitangi Settlements, (eds. Nicola Wheen & Janine Hayward). 
74 Dion Tuuta, Māori Experiences of the Direct Negotiations Process (Wellington: Crown Forestry Rental Trust. 
2003); Ranginui Walker, Opotiki-Mai-Tawhiti: Capital of Whakatohea (Auckland: Penguin, 2007); Paul 
Spoonley, Mata Toa: The Life and Times of Ranginui Walker (Auckland: Penguin, 2009); Margaret Mutu, 
"Recovering Fagin's Ill-gotten Gains: Settling Ngāti Kahu's Treaty of Waitangi Claims against the Crown" in 
Michael Belgrave, David Williams and Merata Kāwharu (eds.)Waitangi Revisited: Perspectives on the Treaty of 
Waitangi (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 2004).  
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the Waitangi Tribunal, but their visions of specific settlement assets have not been explored. 
Debates regarding the quantification of historical loss were dominated by Treasury, with 
Ngāi Tahu spending particularly more of its resources and efforts early in their negotiations 
on the issue. This became connected to the development of a fiscal limit for Treaty 
settlements, the ‘fiscal envelope,’ in 1994. Waikato-Tainui engaged in discussions regarding 
the quantification of its loss when the Crown released its fiscal envelope policy in 1995.  
The general financial and commercial dimensions of Treaty settlement negotiations 
have recently been addressed by Damian Stone, but not in any detail, and not specifically in 
relation to Waikato-Tainui and Ngāi Tahu’s negotiations.75  In Richard Hill’s history of 
Crown-Māori relations in the second half of the twentieth century he noted that the 
development of the Treaty settlement process in the early 1990s featured “much internal (and 
highly-contested) intra-state deliberation in which Treasury analyses featured large.”76 The 
connections between Treasury and the development of the Treaty settlement process have 
been briefly canvassed by Malcolm McKinnon, but are in need of some further elaboration in 
specific negotiations.77 A number of authors have briefly explored the Crown’s “Proposals 
for Settlement of Treaty of Waitangi Claims,” which included the fiscal envelope.78 The 
Crown’s unilateral control of the parameters for fiscal redress reflected its dominance of the 
process. Nonetheless the financial limits placed on all Treaty settlements made the Crown’s 
goal of finality difficult. The issue of full and final within the government was largely driven 
75 Damian Stone, ‘Financial and Commercial Dimensions of Settlement,’ in NR Wheen and J Hayward (eds.) 
Treaty of Waitangi Settlements (Bridget Williams Books, 2012). 
76 Richard Hill, Māori and the State: Crown-Māori Relations in New Zealand/Aotearoa, 1950-2000 
(Wellington: Victoria University Press, 2009), 262.  
77 Malcolm McKinnon, Treasury: The New Zealand Treasury, 1840-2000 (Auckland: Auckland University 
Press, 2003). 
78 Alan Ward, An Unsettled History: Treaty Claims in New Zealand Today, 52-54; Richard Hill Māori and the 
State: Crown-Māori Relations in New Zealand/Aotearoa, 1950-2000); Claudia Orange, Illustrated History of 
the Treaty of Waitangi, 217-219. 




                                                          
by the Crown Law Office but Treasury was also concerned about the finality of Treaty 
settlements because it wanted to limit the Crown’s financial liabilities whereas the Crown 
Law Office was focused on the Crown’s legal liabilities. The inaugural Director of ToWPU, 
Alex Frame, has recently published an article on the legal finality and the political reality of 
the negotiations and questioned whether finality can be achieved, much as Waikato-Tainui 
and Ngāi Tahu negotiators argued during their negotiations.79 Annie Mikaere and Wayne 
Rumbles similarly have expressed doubts about the government’s interpretation of the 
finality of Treaty settlements in light of the small amount of compensation being offered.80 
At the heart of the Crown’s governance was the certainty sought from full and final 
agreements, but both Waikato-Tainui and Ngāi Tahu were able to assert their rangatiratanga 
and provide a challenge to the Crown’s kawanatanga, or right to govern and forecast its 
finances accurately, by negotiating the inclusion of relativity clauses.  
The political and economic limits within which Waikato-Tainui and Ngāi Tahu had to 
negotiate also influenced the return of land to each iwi. Chapter 3 will investigate the return 
of land to both iwi, the mechanisms developed to protect land from alienation, and the effect 
of third-parties on the Treaty settlement process. While the Crown controlled the overarching 
process under which lands were returned and protected from alienation, third parties played a 
significant role in which specific lands were returned. The economic parameters of 
settlements particularly limited the amount of land that would be returned to iwi, while the 
political context restricted the legal structure under which lands would be returned. Waikato-
Tainui especially sought the return of lands under a form of customary title that would in 
79 Alex Frame, “Raupatu Settlement – Legal Finality and Political Reality,” in Richard Hill and Richard Boast, 
(eds.) Raupatu: The Confiscation of Māori Land. Wellington: Victoria University Press, 2009. 
80 Wayne Rumbles, "Treaty of Waitangi Settlement Process: New Relationship or New Mask?" Compr(om)ising 
Postcolonialism(s): Challenging Narratives and Practices, edited by Dr Greg Ratcliffe (Dangaroo Press, 2002); 
Annie Mikaere, “Settlement of Treaty Claims: Full and Final, or Fatally Flawed?” New Zealand Universities 
Review, 17, 2 (1997) p. 451. A research paper by Louise Taylor has provided a useful initial analysis of the 
connection between the fiscal envelope process and the government’s full and final policy: Louise Taylor, “The 
Fiscal envelope: a manifesto for finality,” LL.B. (Hons) Paper VUW, 1995. 
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theory provide additional protection from possible future alienation. As Waikato-Tainui and 
Ngāi Tahu attempted to negotiate their own respective settlements, the Crown’s over-arching 
privatisation policy impacted on the assets that would be available in any final agreement. 
The reforms of the public economy undertaken by Roger Douglas, Richard Prebble and 
others in the late 1980s continued in the early 1990s under a National government. Waikato-
Tainui and Ngāi Tahu tried to conserve the Crown’s asset base to ensure that the best possible 
settlement would be available when negotiations finally ended. Both Ngāi Tahu and Waikato-
Tainui eventually developed mechanisms with the Crown in which surplus land that the 
Crown was considering for sale could be placed in a land-bank and transferred to the 
respective settling group upon settlement. Alan Ward, Claudia Orange and Damian Stone 
have explained the general land-banking process, but this chapter will explore the specific 
development of Waikato-Tainui and Ngāi Tahu’s land-bank.81 
Although the Crown controlled the wider context in which land was returned to iwi 
such as the land-banking process, the effect of third-parties (any individuals or groups other 
than the Māori claimant group and the Crown) was also influential on the return of lands. 
Third party conservation and sports recreation interests, and former owners of Crown land 
taken under the Public Works Act, delayed the return of some lands to Ngāi Tahu and 
Waikato-Tainui, and played a role in the exclusion of other lands from both settlements. The 
change generally from co-operation to confrontation between Māori protest movements and 
environmentalists has been explored by a number of authors.82 The interaction between third 
81 Orange, An Illustrated History of the Treaty of Waitangi, 227, 255; Ward, An Unsettled History, 36-37; 
Damian Stone, “Financial and Commercial Dimensions of Settlement,” in Nicola Wheen & Janine Hayward 
(eds.) Treaty of Waitangi Settlements (Wellington: Bridget Williams Books, 2012). 
82 David Young, Our Islands, Our Selves: A History of Conservation in New Zealand (Dunedin: Otago 
University Press, 2004); Keri Mills, “The Changing Relationship between Māori and Environmentalists in 
1970s and 1980s New Zealand,” History Compass 7/3 (2009): 678-700.  
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parties and the Waitangi Tribunal has also been investigated by Janine Hayward.83 However, 
there has been little work on the role of third parties in the Treaty settlement process, 
especially the role of former owners of Crown land under the Public Works Act, and the 
challenges they can present to effecting the return of land, and subsequently Waikato-Tainui 
and Ngāi Tahu’s pursuit of rangatiratanga.84 
Chapter 4 will analyse the formulation of Waikato-Tainui and Ngāi Tahu’s historical 
accounts and apologies within the context of the Māori pursuit of rangatiratanga and the 
Crown’s defence of its sovereignty. As the negotiations began in the late 1980s with 
Waikato-Tainui, the Crown was focused solely on some form of compensation but little else. 
It became clear in the early scoping negotiations with Waikato-Tainui that some kind of 
apology and historical account was going to be necessary, that money alone and even the 
return of land would not be acceptable. Ngāi Tahu felt the same way and was addressing its 
historical account in a much more thorough fashion by engaging with the Waitangi Tribunal. 
Although there has been some commentary about the use of oral history within the Waitangi 
Tribunal process and the “historical frictions” and alleged “retrospective utopias” which 
marked the Tribunal process, there has been little discussion regarding the formulation of 
history within the Treaty settlement process and its importance to iwi such as Waikato-Tainui 
and Ngāi Tahu.85 Recently Maureen Hickey analysed the importance of Crown apologies in 
the general Treaty settlement process. The emphasis which Hickey places on the importance 
83 Janine Hayward, “Three’s a Crowd?: The Treaty of Waitangi, the Waitangi Tribunal, and Third Parties”  New 
Zealand Universities Law Review, 20(2): 239–251  (2002). 
84 One exception is Ben White’s 1994 Master of Resource Management thesis, “Sites of Contestation: 
Perceptions of Wilderness in the Context of Treaty Claim Settlements,” Lincoln University.  
85 W.H. Oliver, Claims to the Waitangi Tribunal (Wellington: Department of Justice, 1991); Miranda Johnson, 
“Honest acts and dangerous supplements: Indigenous oral history and historical practice in settler societies,” 
Postcolonial Studies,Vol. 8, No. 3, 261-276; Belgrave, Historical Frictions; Waitangi Revisited: Belgrave?; 
McAloon, Jim. “By Which Standards? History and the Waitangi Tribunal,” New Zealand Journal of History, 40, 
2 (2006), 194-213; Giselle Byrnes, “By Which Standards? History and the Waitangi Tribunal: A Reply,” New 
Zealand Journal of History, 40, 2 (2006), 214-229; W.H. Oliver, “A Reply To Jim McAloon,” New Zealand 
Journal of History, 41, 1 (2007), 83-87.  
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of the apology to the settling group is reflected in the experiences of Waikato-Tainui and 
Ngāi Tahu negotiators and claimants in their own negotiations.86 Julie Bellingham’s excellent 
M.A thesis analysed the development of historical accounts and apologies from a 
historiographical perspective, but it was limited in its use of Crown and Māori claimant 
sources.87 A particularly useful article regarding the “politicisation of the past” and the 
expressly political histories that emerge from Crown and Māori claimant settlement 
negotiations was recently co-authored by Richard Hill.88  
The four reports produced by the Waitangi Tribunal from 1991-1995 (and the many 
other research reports produced by Ngāi Tahu and the Crown for the hearing), the work of 
Ngāi Tahu historians such as Sir Tipene O’Regan and Te Maire Tau, and Ngāi Tahu affiliated 
historians such as Harry Evison, has resulted in an extensively comprehensive history of Ngāi 
Tahu’s relations with the Crown.89 Waikato-Tainui’s history related to the wars of the 1860s 
had been addressed in greater detail over the years by historians.90 Claudia Orange has 
commented that the acceptance of the injustice of Waikato-Tainui’s historical grievances 
allowed for negotiations to get underway quicker than Ngāi Tahu. While the notion of 
progress can always be relative, Waikato-Tainui did not perceive that their negotiations 
86 Maureen Hickey, “Crown Apologies,” in Janine Hayward & Nicola R. Wheen (eds.), Treaty of Waitangi 
Settlements (Wellington: BWB, 2012), 69-84. 
87 Julie Bellingham, “The Office of Treaty Settlements and Treaty history : an historiographical study of the 
historical accounts, acknowledgements and apologies written by the Crown, 1992 to 2003,”  M.A. Thesis: 
VUW, 2006.  
88 Richard Hill and Brigitte Bonisch-Brednich, “Politicizing the Past: Indigenous Scholarship and Crown-Māori 
Reparations Processes in New Zealand.” Social and Legal Studies, (2007), 163-181.   
89 Ngāi Tahu  Report (Wellington: Waitangi Tribunal, 1991), 3 Vols; The Ngāi Tahu  Claim: Supplementary 
Report on Legal Personality (Wellington: Waitangi Tribunal, 1991); Ngāi Tahu  Sea Fisheries Report 
(Wellington: Waitangi Tribunal, 1992); Ngāi Tahu  Ancillary Claims Report (Wellington: Waitangi Tribunal, 
1995); Tipene O’Regan, “The Ngāi Tahu  Claim,” in I.H. Kawharu (ed.), Waitangi: Māori and Pākehā 
perspectives of the Treaty of Waitangi (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1989); Harry Evison, The Long 
Dispute, European Colonisation and Māori Land Rights in Southern New Zealand (Christchurch: Canterbury 
University Press, 1997).   
90 Michael King, Te Puea: A Life (Auckland, Penguin, 1977); Pei Te Hurunui Jones, “Māori Kings” in The 




                                                          
proceeded “swiftly” as Orange claims. 91 Waikato-Tainui’s grievances were not accepted by 
the Crown until officials pushed for its acceptance. Waikato-Tainui engaged in direct 
negotiations, although they did try to return to the Tribunal when negotiations were in hiatus. 
In that sense although Waikato-Tainui’s claim was accepted to a greater degree than Ngāi 
Tahu’s, hence their alleged early willingness to negotiate, there was more known about Ngāi 
Tahu’s claim by the time each began their negotiations. Before turning to the sources 
analysed for this investigation, the contents of Waikato-Tainui and Ngai Tahu’s settlements 
will be detailed. 
Waikato-Tainui and Ngāi Tahu’s settlements 
 
Waikato-Tainui and the Crown signed an Agreement in Principle on 21 December 
1994 and a Deed of Settlement six months later on 22 May 1995. The Waikato-Tainui 
settlement was nominally worth $170 million. This included approximately $100 million 
worth of land from various government departments in the Waikato-Tainui raupatu area, $65 
million in cash with which to purchase further lands, approximately $3 million covered the 
cost of the decommissioned Te Rapa Airbase (the decommissioned military base at 
Hopuhopu was transferred at zero value to the overall quantum), and $2 million for funding 
the negotiations. The cash that Waikato-Tainui received was coupled with the Right of First 
Refusal (RFR), which provided Waikato-Tainui with the right to be the first to purchase or 
refuse Crown properties as they became available for privatisation in their region.92 Waikato-
Tainui negotiators also negotiated interest payments that added up to approximately $20 
million. Interest was paid to Waikato-Tainui from the date their Heads of Agreement was 
signed to the date their full quantum was paid at a rate of 8.8716% approximately four and a 
91 Orange, The Illustrated History of the Treaty of Waitangi, 221. 
92 Waikato-Tainui Raupatu Deed of Settlement, 22 May 1995, Sections 4 and 10. 
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half years later.93 While Waikato-Tainui wanted to have Department of Conservation land 
included in its settlement or at least co-management arrangements for land in the Waikato-
Tainui raupatu region, there was substantial opposition from both the Department of 
Conservation and the conservation movement outside of government. Waikato-Tainui did 
manage to have a permanent seat on the Waikato Conservation Board included as a part of its 
settlement. At nearly the exact same time that the Crown agreed to a settlement with 
Waikato-Tainui in late 1994, the government established that the fiscal limit for settlements 
was a total of $1 billion. Since they were the first major iwi to settle its historical land based 
(raupatu) grievances Waikato-Tainui negotiators remained adamant that the settlement 
include a relativity clause—the clause provides that when the total value of historical Treaty 
settlements exceeds $1 billion in 1994 present value terms, Waikato-Tainui may request 
further payments from the Crown to ensure that the real value of its settlement remains at 
17% of total settlements.94  
 Ngāi Tahu and the Crown signed an Agreement in Principle on 5 October 1996 and a 
Deed of Settlement was signed a year later on 21 November 1997. Ngāi Tahu’s settlement 
was also nominally worth $170 million but its base value was marginally less since it was 
paid at the value of the New Zealand dollar in October 1996 while Waikato-Tainui’s 
settlement was paid at the value of the dollar in December 1994. Ngāi Tahu also negotiated 
the inclusion of interest payments so that interest would accrue from the date of the signing of 
the Heads of Agreement until their full compensation of $170 million was paid, nearly five 
years later at the rate of 8.8716%.95 Ngāi Tahu’s settlement was coupled with a RFR and in 
addition Ngāi Tahu was also able to negotiate a Deferred Selection Process (DSP) which 
allowed Ngāi Tahu to select assets for purchase which the Crown did not originally want to 
93 Waikato-Tainui Raupatu Deed of Settlement, 22 May 1995, Section 11. 
94 Waikato-Tainui Raupatu Deed of Settlement, 22 May 1995, Section 19.9 and Attachment 9.   
95 Ngāi Tahu Deed of Settlement, 21 November 1997, Section 2.6. 
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sell, unlike the RFR which was triggered only when the Crown wanted to dispose of assets. 
Some properties taken under the DSP were still required for use by the Crown, for example 
the Christchurch and Queenstown Police Stations, and they provided a cash flow for Ngāi 
Tahu.96 Additionally Ngāi Tahu was able to negotiate for a provision that allowed them to 
use an additional $80 million of their own money on top of the $170 million quantum to 
purchase properties under the DSP. Ngāi Tahu also negotiated the inclusion of a relativity 
clause that was only marginally less than the 17% achieved by Waikato-Tainui, 16.1%, but 
their interest payments were slightly larger.97 
Unlike Waikato-Tainui’s settlement, which only related to their historical grievances 
related to war and the confiscation of land, and not their claims to the Waikato River and 
West Coast Harbours, Ngāi Tahu’s settlement encompassed all of their claims.98 Ngāi Tahu 
was able to negotiate provisions in their settlement for a guaranteed Ngāi Tahu seat on every 
Regional Conservation Board in its region as well as a dedicated seat on the New Zealand 
Conservation Authority. The Crown agreed to gift the conservation aspects of the Ngāi Tahu 
settlement so their monetary value would not be subtracted from the $170 million base 
quantum. In the area around the bottom of the South Island near Stewart Island (Rakiura), 
Ngāi Tahu was able to secure the freehold title unencumbered with a marginal strip or 
Queen’s chain for the Crown Titi Islands and Rarotoka Island. At Codfish Island (Whenua 
Hou) Ngāi Tahu negotiated co-management arrangements that provided Ngāi Tahu with a 
96 Sir Tipene O’Regan has described the RFR process as an inverse of the Crown’s pre-emption policy in which 
only the Crown could purchase from Ngāi Tahu. “We could only sell to the Crown. Well, if the Crown wants to 
sell, it can only sell to us!” Sir Tipene O’Regan, “Te Kereme: The Claim, Lecture Two,” Macmillan Brown 
Lecture Series 1998, MB archive.  
97 Ngāi Tahu Deed of Settlement, 21 November 1997, Sections 5, 9 and 18; ‘The Settlement,’  
<http://www.ngaitahu.iwi.nz/About-Ngai-Tahu/Settlement/>, accessed 27 April 2013.  




                                                          
significant role in the management of the island. The beds of Lakes Waihora, Mahinapua and 
Muriwai were also returned. 99   
On the West Coast of the South Island Ngāi Tahu sought further control of the 
Arahura River area where most of the country’s pounamu (greenstone) was located. As part 
of the settlement all of the country’s pounamu was transferred to Ngāi Tahu ownership. The 
bed of the Arahura River had been vested in the Mawhera Incorporation, a Ngāi Tahu Māori 
landowners trust, in 1976, but its boundaries remained unsurveyed and were only defined by 
natural features. The Ngāi Tahu settlement allowed for the creation of an historic reserve 
known as the Waitaiki Historic Reserve in the upper catchment of the Arahura Valley, which 
was vested at no cost in the Mawhera Incorporation. Public access would be protected and the 
Department of Conservation would continue to own all the huts and bridges in the area but 
the Mawhera Incorporation would be able to exercise effective control and management over 
its lands in the area. Ngāi Tahu was able to acquire Aoraki (Mount Cook) as a part of its 
settlement but the Mountain was to be immediately gifted back to the nation.100 Ngāi Tahu 
also negotiated for the provision of 72 nohoanga entitlements, which are seasonal campsites 
reserved exclusively for Ngāi Tahu for over half of the year. Finally there were a number of 
individual ancillary Ngāi Tahu claims that were also settled by the return of individual 
parcels of land that were not vested in Ngāi Tahu as a tribal entity, but in the Ngāi Tahu 
individuals themselves. These were approximately 50 discrete sites around the South 
Island.101  
99 Ngāi Tahu Deed of Settlement, 21 November 1997, Sections 11 and 13; ‘The Settlement,’  
<http://www.ngaitahu.iwi.nz/About-Ngai-Tahu/Settlement/>, accessed 4 May 2013. 
100 Ngāi Tahu have not yet formally exercised their right to receive back Aoraki. Ngāi Tahu also negotiated a 
number of Statutory Acknowledgments, Deeds of Recognition and Topuni Reserves over various natural sites 
around their rohe: Ngāi Tahu Deed of Settlement, 21 November 1997, Section 12. 
101 Ngāi Tahu Deed of Settlement, 21 November 1997, Sections 3, 13 and 14.  
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Waikato-Tainui and Ngāi Tahu’s settlements would establish the benchmarks by 
which most future settlements would be negotiated over the following decades and continue 
today. They developed out of what has been described as the modern Treaty of Waitangi 
Claims process and were one product of what has been termed the ‘Māori Renaissance.’102 
The agreements were far from what Māori groups had wanted but they were nonetheless 
significant settlements. They were compromises aimed at achieving a measure of 
reconciliation and some closure for those that been carrying historical grievances from 
generation to generation.  
Sources 
 
This thesis was enabled by the Office of Treaty Settlements, which provided access to 
its archives. These sources were supplemented by the collections held by Te Rūnanga o Ngāi 
Tahu and the Waikato-Tainui College of Research and Development.103 In addition, Sir 
Douglas Graham, the Minister of Treaty Negotiations for most of the 1990s, provided 
unrestricted access to his own personal files held at Archives New Zealand, Wellington.104 
Throughout the thesis nearly all Crown officials are unidentified. Officials do what their job 
description requires them to do—give advice to the Minister and the government and once 
decisions are made by Cabinet, implement those decisions. Any letter, memorandum or paper 
that was signed out to the Minister went through many hands and had managerial input and 
reflected an institutional view not the personal views of the authors which is one of the 
102 Therese Crocker, “Introduction: Principles for Crown Action on the Treaty of Waitangi, 1989,” Treaty of 
Waitangi Research Unit, Historical Document Series 6, Wellington, 2011, 5; James Belich, Paradise Reforged: 
A History of the New Zealanders from the 1880s to the Year 2000 (Auckland: Penguin, 2001), 466-487.  
103 Te Runanga o Ngāi Tahu archives were held at their former Central Christchurch offices on Hereford Street 
and at the Macmillan Brown Library at the University of Canterbury. The Waikato-College of Research and 
Development is located at Hopuhopu near Ngaruawahia. 
104 The Crown, the Waikato-Tainui College of Research and Development and Te Rūnanga o Ngāi Tahu all 
required that I sign a confidentiality agreement before accessing their archives. In each agreement, every party 
required that I send them a draft for comment and the Crown specifically requested anonymity for all of its 
officials. While their comments were useful and influenced certain aspects of this thesis, I have retained 
complete editorial control.  
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reasons that almost all Crown officials have remained anonymous. Ministers, Secretaries of 
Ministries, principal negotiators and Waikato-Tainui and Ngāi Tahu advisors (where they 
have agreed to be named) have not been kept anonymous.  Generally documents were split 
into approximately four different formats: memoranda, briefing and Cabinet papers, 
correspondence, and minutes of meetings. These primary sources were supplemented by 
contemporary newspapers such as the Evening Post, Waikato Times, New Zealand Herald, 
the Dominion and The Press and periodicals such as The Listener and North and South. 
While the focus of this investigation was not television current affairs and news programs, 
the TVNZ Archives at Avalon Studios, Lower Hutt as well as the NZ Film Archive in 
Wellington also had many relevant primary sources which informed this analysis.  
A rather crucial set of OTS files related to the Waikato-Tainui negotiations from 
January 1993 to September 1994 have been lost, but I have been able to fill this gap with 
sources from Waikato-Tainui’s archives, Sir Douglas Graham’s archives and interviews with 
surviving players. Many key players in the development of both Waikato-Tainui and Ngāi 
Tahu’s negotiations are still alive and this primarily document-based analysis has been 
supplemented by a series of interviews with Crown and Māori negotiators and advisors. I 
interviewed both Crown officials and negotiators and advisors for Waikato-Tainui and Ngāi 
Tahu:  
• Sir Douglas Graham (The Principal Crown Negotiator for both negotiations)  
• Sir Tipene O’Regan (Principal Ngāi Tahu Negotiator)  
• Denese Henare (Senior Legal Advisor Waikato-Tainui)  
• Brent Wheeler (Financial Advisor Waikato-Tainui) 
• Te Maire Tau (Historical Advisor Ngāi Tahu) 
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• Sid Ashton (Ngāi Tahu Māori Trust Board Secretary and Te Rūnanga o Ngāi 
Tahu CEO) 
• Richard Meade (Financial Advisor Ngāi Tahu) 
• Shane Solomon (Legal and Historical Advisor Waikato-Tainui)  
• Anake Goodall (Advisor and Claims Manager Ngāi Tahu) 
•  Nanaia Mahuta (daughter of Principal Waikato-Tainui Negotiator Sir Robert 
Mahuta)  
• Alex Frame (ToWPU Director) 
• 4 ToWPU officials and a CLO official.  
While the interviews required written consent from the interviewees they were not tape-
recorded or transcribed as this thesis was not meant to be based primarily on oral histories. 
Where references are made to interviews they are sourced from notes that I took during the 
interviews and double checked with the interviewees. The interviews were conducted to 
provide context for the primary document-based analysis and for filling in gaps such as those 
noted above.  
For the official monthly meetings, minutes were produced by both the Crown and the 
respective claimant negotiating group. These were subject to revisions from both sides and an 
agreed set of minutes were produced for each meeting. This set of minutes was the Crown’s 
official record of the meeting. Waikato-Tainui and Ngāi Tahu respectively also produced 
their own record of the minutes of the meeting. These were not subject to revision by the 
Crown and were often not shared with the Crown unless there was a substantial disagreement 
over a negotiation issue or over the accuracy of the Crown’s version of the meeting. The 
Crown’s minutes of meetings were always shorter than either Waikato-Tainui or Ngāi Tahu’s 
versions of the meetings. Sometimes the Crown could use just one page to provide minutes 
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for the meeting whereas either Waikato-Tainui or Ngāi Tahu could use up to ten pages for the 
exact same meeting. 
At individual meetings between Graham and Waikato-Tainui Principal Negotiator 
Robert Mahuta there would be no record of the meeting from the Crown or from Graham 
himself. Graham’s archive was a much more official collection that consisted of barely any of 
the filenotes that Mahuta and O’Regan kept. O’Regan and Mahuta both kept copious notes of 
phone calls and meetings. One of Mahuta’s advisors, Shane Solomon, was a prolific 
notetaker and cartoonist. One large section of the Ngāi Tahu archive formerly held in central 
Christchurch was exclusively the files of the long-serving former Secretary of the Ngāi Tahu 
Māori Trust Board and CEO early in Te Rūnanga o Ngāi Tahu’s history, Sid Ashton. Their 
archives provide a singular view of certain meetings because there was no evidence of the 
meeting from the Crown archive. Mahuta, Solomon and O’Regan were scathing at times of 
the Crown in their own file notes but Ashton could be just as angry. One of his filenotes from 
a mid-1996 meeting had in large hand-written bold letters: “We must remember the CROWN 
is the enemy.”105 The singular point of view provided by such a perspective could potentially 
influence the value of the source since the only information had come from that one source, 
but the same concern could apply to the perspectives of Crown officials.  
In general, larger meetings would have more sources of information and could be 
corroborated in better ways. Sometimes there would be numerous different accounts of one 
large meeting from both the Crown and either Waikato-Tainui or Ngāi Tahu. This would not 
often be the case as the best case scenario was at least one version from the Crown and one 
from Waikato-Tainui or Ngāi Tahu. Much larger meetings that involved public consultation 
would have publications such as newspapers producing their own accounts as well as video 
105 Sid Ashton, handwritten notes, 3-4 April 1996, Vhi 49(l), TRONT archive.  
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accounts of the signing. These types of meetings provided the best circumstances for the 
proliferation of sources. The changes that could be made to meeting minutes were generally a 
result of compromise but at least one of the early minutes in the Waikato-Tainui negotiations 
was altered unilaterally. When Labour Minister of Justice Bill Jeffries was involved in the 
negotiations in 1990, the Crown’s own copy of the March meeting minutes has written on the 
first page that “these were altered by the Minister [Jeffries].”106 It was unclear exactly which 
alterations had been made but luckily for that specific meeting there was also a Waikato-
Tainui version of the meeting.  
It is understandable why the Crown would want in some cases to provide as little 
detail as possible in its minutes, for confidentiality purposes. The minutes could be subject to 
Official Information Act requests. The Crown might want to preserve its negotiating position 
and tactics for future negotiations. The production of sources in contemporary history such as 
the Waikato-Tainui and Ngāi Tahu negotiations is intensely political for both sides. Waikato-
Tainui and Ngāi Tahu on the other hand provided an almost intimate level of detail which 
was also understandable from their own positions, having to bring up previous Crown 
comments and promises of action that were not followed through. While it is clear that there 
are many other sources of information other than minutes, such as filenotes and memoranda, 
in the case of these negotiations the accuracy of the minutes was important for not only future 
historians but the negotiations themselves. The minutes needed to be precise for the sake of 
the Crown’s institutional knowledge as staff turnover is inevitable in any workplace and was 
heightened at the time at ToWPU/OTS. Waikato-Tainui and Ngāi Tahu on the other hand had 
a deep archive of institutional knowledge across the different strata from the principal 
negotiators at the top, such as Mahuta and O’Regan, down to advisors. This documented 
106 5 March 1990 meeting (Crown version), TC 30 Vol. 7, OTS archive. 
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institutional knowledge was extremely beneficial to both Waikato-Tainui and Ngāi Tahu. 
Looking at it from this view the Crown had to rely overtly on its own recent oral histories 
while Waikato-Tainui and Ngāi Tahu excelled at documenting their negotiating experience. 
Issues surrounding memory and Treaty settlements will be very important moving into the 
future. Finality is often an important mark of settlements, people always ask: will this be the 
end? Can we move on? For a settlement to endure it must not only provide economic and 
political stimuli, but the journey to the settlement also must remain etched in the memory of 
not only the generation that negotiated it but those following it. In that way Waikato-Tainui 
and Ngāi Tahu’s own archives will be especially valuable for justifying the settlement to 
future generations in case doubts develop.   
Waikato-Tainui and Ngāi Tahu’s Treaty settlement negotiations with the Crown were 
significant for each party that was involved. Ngāi Tahu, Waikato-Tainui and the Crown 
underwent some significant changes by the end of their negotiations. Infused with economic 
and political resources, Ngāi Tahu and Waikato-Tainui were no longer operating under the 
old Māori Trust Board structure and each organisation developed its own governing 
arrangements. While the Crown limited the extent of rangatiratanga there were still 
prominent gains that were made—especially by Ngāi Tahu which resolutely sought and 
achieved legislative recognition to govern its own people to a certain extent. Both groups 
negotiated important historical accounts and apologies from the Crown and settlements that 
were less than full and final. The precedents of the Waikato-Tainui and Ngāi Tahu 
settlements established the benchmarks that would govern every settlement that followed. 
The Crown also had changed significantly since the negotiations with Waikato-Tainui and 
Ngāi Tahu had begun. The Crown was now committed to negotiating Treaty settlements with 
Māori groups around the country. Although the Crown guarded its own sovereignty and its 
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right to govern it also provided some significant concessions to Waikato-Tainui and Ngāi 
Tahu. The Crown very slightly loosened its grip on power on issues such as finality and 
management of conservation areas amongst others. These Treaty settlement negotiations 
started the ball rolling and while they were far from perfect from the view of any participant, 
as a process of reconciliation they have changed New Zealand forever.  
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Chapter 1: The Politics of Negotiations: kawanatanga and rangatiratanga 
 
This chapter will explore the Waikato-Tainui and Ngāi Tahu negotiation process from 
the Fourth Labour government in the late 1980s to just before the first substantial settlement 
offers were made to Waikato-Tainui in 1994 and Ngāi Tahu in 1996 by the Fourth National 
government. It will argue that the Crown framed the political parameters of the negotiations 
by challenging Waikato-Tainui and Ngāi Tahu attempts to re-assert rangatiratanga, as well as 
hapū who challenged the iwi-driven process established by the Crown. Although each iwi 
approached rangatiratanga within their negotiations in different ways, there was a shared 
desire to challenge the Crown’s governing power to the fullest extent possible.  
Although the negotiations for the settlement of Waikato-Tainui and Ngāi Tahu's 
Treaty claims began at approximately the same time, both groups arrived at negotiations 
through different paths. While Ngāi Tahu had their claims heard by the Waitangi Tribunal 
process from 1987 to 1989, Waikato-Tainui sought to engage in direct negotiations with the 
Crown.  Waikato-Tainui was the first group to enter direct negotiations. This occurred at a 
time when, under the Fourth Labour government, the emerging Crown policy for settling 
Treaty claims sought to reaffirm the position of the Crown according to existing 
understandings of kawanatanga as the sovereign authority. Māori would have their 
rangatiratanga restored as a form of iwi self-management. Negotiations between the Crown 
and Waikato-Tainui began in mid-1989 with three preliminary scoping sessions only months 
before the Coalcorp case was heard in the Court of Appeal. Following Waikato-Tainui’s 
victory in Court, the Crown was directed to commence formal negotiations which began in 
early 1990. These negotiations largely focused on fulfilling the spirit and intent of the 1946 
Waikato Maniapoto Claims Settlement Act, but within the context of a return of some lands 
to Waikato-Tainui. When the Labour government made a financially limited offer before the 
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1990 election, Waikato-Tainui negotiators rejected it. After a hiatus of approximately a year, 
Waikato-Tainui resumed negotiations, this time with the newly elected National government 
under the leadership of Prime Minister Jim Bolger in November 1991. Negotiations with 
Ngāi Tahu began in September 1991, eight months after the release of the Tribunal's report.  
The second and final phase of Waikato-Tainui’s negotiations and the first phase of 
Ngāi Tahu’s negotiations, from 1991-1994, ran parallel to each other as both were eager to 
finalise their settlement. While both experienced the frustrations of dealing with a 
government that was largely developing policy ad hoc, if a full policy had been put in place it 
would have been viewed as a decree from above or involved years of consultation. Waikato-
Tainui and Ngāi Tahu also met resistance to key elements of the redress they sought. A 
central point of disagreement that was common with both negotiations was the extent to 
which Māori autonomy – rangatiratanga – would be acknowledged within the settlement. 
Waikato-Tainui and Ngāi Tahu framed their negotiations with the Crown as an attempt to re-
assert rangatiratanga. The Crown’s view was still framed in some ways in the mindset of the 
1940s, although there were some significant differences. As in the 1940s, redress would be 
provided in the form of money, but issues regarding the recognition of autonomy were not 
negotiable. The 1989 Principles for Crown Action, as limited as they may have been from the 
view of some activists and academics, were different from the policies of the 1940s since 
they included the return of land.  
From the earliest point in their negotiations, Ngāi Tahu sought a legal personality as 
recognition of their rangatiratanga.107 This would replace the Ngāi Tahu Māori Trust Board 
structure which they viewed as impinging on their rangatiratanga because of the limited 
control of funds and assets that was inherent in the system. The Trust Board was ultimately 
107 Alexandra Emma-Jane Highman, “Te Iwi of Ngāi Tahu: An Examination of Ngāi Tahu ’s Approach to, and 
Internal Expression of, Tino Rangātiratanga,” M.A Thesis, University of Canterbury, 1997.  
46 
 
                                                          
accountable to the Minister of Māori Affairs, rather than to the Ngāi Tahu people. 
Negotiations with the Crown Law Office and the Law Commission over the use of the term 
“rangatiratanga” extended over a year before the Te Rūnanga o Ngāi Tahu Bill was 
introduced to Parliament in 1993. Substantial internal opposition from some hapū affiliated 
with Ngāi Tahu and prominent opponents of the Ngāi Tahu negotiating team (including 
members of Parliament) delayed the legislation. These disagreements reflected the differing 
views towards the role of rangatiratanga in Ngāi Tahu’s governing structure. Eventually, in 
1996, the legislation was finally passed.108 
Treaty settlement negotiations have been described by Robert Joseph as having the 
effect of ‘unsettling Māori communities’ due to the prescriptive rules on mandate and 
representation applied by the Crown. Joseph correctly points out that many Treaty 
settlements negotiated in New Zealand have resulted in representation challenges in either the 
Waitangi Tribunal or the courts. While the Crown’s focus on ‘large natural groupings’ allows 
for a quicker settlement process, Joseph notes, it significantly constrains Māori groups that 
operate more at the whanau and hapū level.109 During Waikato-Tainui and Ngāi Tahu’s 
negotiations the ‘large natural groupings’ policy had not been formally established, but the 
Crown was clear that it would only negotiate with the leaders of major iwi in the case of 
Waikato-Tainui and Ngāi Tahu. Other claimants negotiated much more specific small scale 
settlements during the early 1990s, but these were small and discrete claims.110 In the case of 
Waikato-Tainui and Ngāi Tahu, iwi negotiators did not go through formal mandating 
processes that exist today. The named claimants for both iwi, Robert Mahuta for Waikato-
Tainui and Henare Rakiihia Tau Senior for Ngāi Tahu, were intimately involved in the 
108 Te Runanga o Ngāi Tahu Act 1996.  
109 Robert Joseph, ‘Unsettling Treaty Settlements: Contemporary Māori Identity and Representation Challenges’ 




                                                          
negotiation process. Throughout the negotiations hui-ā-iwi were held by both Ngāi Tahu and 
Waikato-Tainui to confirm their negotiating status. There was nonetheless opposition from 
hapū within both iwi who wanted to negotiate hapū settlements themselves. The political 
nature of Treaty settlements ensured that the Crown and iwi-level leadership would dominate 
the parameters of the process. Eventually there was considerable support for the iwi-level 
approach advocated by the Crown from many within both Waikato-Tainui and Ngāi Tahu.  
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Part I: Waikato-Tainui’s negotiations with the Fourth Labour government 
and Fourth National government 
Early attempts at negotiation and the 1989 Coalcorp case 
 
In late 1986 Robert Mahuta on behalf of the Tainui Māori Trust Board (TMTB) and 
Nga Marae Toopu (a group of marae aligned with the Kīngitanga), and 33 hapū aligned to the 
TMTB, submitted a claim to the Waitangi Tribunal regarding grievances related to the 
confiscation of Waikato lands by Orders in Council of 1865. Mahuta was the adopted son of 
the fourth Māori King, Koroki, and the sister of Queen Te Atairangikaahu or Te Arikinui. Te 
Arikinui succeeded her father, King Koroki, in 1966. Mahuta was also the Chairman of the 
Tainui Māori Trust Board.111 Waikato-Tainui sought the return of as much Crown land as 
possible to compensate the iwi for the confiscation of land. Their key negotiating principle 
remained “i riro whenua atu me hoki whenua mai/ as land was taken so land must be 
returned” and thus the focus of their claim was the return of land. They submitted an 
amended claim to include claims to the Waikato River and harbours around Kawhia and 
Raglan in March 1987, and a claim which specifically sought to halt the pending alienation of 
State-Owned Enterprises land.112  
At the same time, the New Zealand Māori Council (NZMC) brought proceedings 
against the Crown to review the State-Owned Enterprises (SOE) Act 1986. The NZMC 
wanted to clarify the meaning and effect of sections 9 and 27 which provided some 
safeguards for Māori claims to SOE lands and assets. In mid-1987 the Court of Appeal found 
in favour of the NZMC that sections 9 and 27 had real force, and directed the Crown to 
negotiate with Māori to develop more effective safeguards. By the end of 1987 an agreement 
111 Paul Diamond, When Māori Leaders Speak, 67. 
112 Robert Mahuta, TMTB & Nga Marae Toopu, WAI 30 (1986-1987), TC30 Vol. 2, OTS archive. 
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was reached which resulted in the Treaty of Waitangi (State Enterprises) Act 1988.113 It 
introduced a protection mechanism, a memorial on the land title, to protect against the 
disposal of Crown assets that were still the subject of Treaty claims.114 Waikato-Tainui had 
considered bringing their own separate case to Court in 1987 at the same time as the NZMC 
to prevent the alienation of SOE lands in the Waikato-Tainui region, but they were given an 
oral undertaking by the Solicitor-General in March of 1987 that the government would halt 
the sale of all surplus assets in the Waikato region.115  
In early 1988 Mahuta wrote to the Minister of State-Owned Enterprises, Richard 
Prebble, requesting that the March 1987 oral undertaking given by the Solicitor-General be 
put into writing. Prebble denied that any promises had ever been given and that further future 
amendments to the SOE legislation would address any issues Mahuta had. While there was 
nothing mentioned about a definite date for a future meeting, Prebble agreed that the Crown 
would eventually seek to enter into negotiations with Waikato-Tainui.116 While negotiations 
remained on hold, at the end of 1988 Robert Mahuta, Waikato-Tainui legal advisor Denese 
Henare and TMTB member Hare Puke continued to send letters to Prebble’s successor, 
Minister of State-Owned Enterprises Stan Rodger, requesting that the sale of Crown 
properties, forests and Coalcorp be discontinued.117 On December 22 1988 Deputy Prime 
Minister Palmer and Rodger met with Mahuta and other TMTB representatives. Mahuta 
handed a letter to the Ministers that detailed the need to ensure that no further Crown lands, 
113 Ward, An Unsettled History, 35-36; Geoffrey Palmer to Graham Latimer, 20 July 1987; Latimer to Palmer, 
28 July 1987; Palmer to Latimer, 21 September 1987; Latimer to Palmer, 5 October 1987: all NT140 F(iii)7, 
Box 133,  MB archives.  
114 Treaty of Waitangi (State Enterprises) Act 1988, section 27B.  
115 Carmen Kirkwood to Palmer, 26 February 1988, TC30 Vol. 2, OTS archive; McCan, Whatiwhatihoe: The 
Waikato Raupatu Claim, 251-252. 
116 Mahuta to Richard Prebble, 10 March 1988; Prebble to Mahuta, 31 March 1988: all TC30 Vol. 2, OTS 
archive & R Vol.1, Box 3, W-T archives; McCan, Whatiwhatihoe: The Waikato Raupatu Claim, 258. 
117 Denese Henare to Palmer, 21 November 1988; Hare Puke and Mahuta to Palmer, 22 December 1988: all 
TC30 Vol. 2, OTS archive & RC1 Vol.1-2, Box 24, W-T archives; McCan, Whatiwhatihoe: The Waikato 
Raupatu Claim, 257-258. 
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including Coalcorp assets, were sold in the Waikato rohe (region) along with 
recommendations for possible approaches to compensation to settle Waikato-Tainui claims to 
confiscated lands.118 
 Rodger apologised in a letter to Denese Henare in early January 1989 for the long 
delay. There was a Cabinet shuffle in the second half of 1988 as various Ministers resigned 
and were replaced. Rodger agreed that the negotiations would begin in 1989 but declined 
Waikato’s request to halt the sale of Coalcorp asests. Rodger said he appreciated that land 
would be important in a redress package and emphasised that there still remained abundant 
sources of Crown land in the Waikato rohe to satisfy their claims. The sale of Coalcorp 
would proceed, he said, because only the licences to extract coal would be sold. The land 
would remain safeguarded under the protection mechanism developed in the Treaty of 
Waitangi (State Enterprises) Act 1988. Rodger noted that while the option of having their 
claims heard by the Waitangi Tribunal remained open should negotiations fail to be 
successful, there should be no court action during the negotiations in a spirit of “good 
faith.”119 The TMTB, however, did not agree that only the land was subject to Waikato-
Tainui claims: they also had rights to the coal. After repeated threats of court action 
throughout 1987 and 1988, Rodger's letter only served to push the TMTB to finally lose 
patience with the Crown. It soon filed proceedings in the High Court to halt the sale of 
Coalcorp.  For Waikato-Tainui negotiators, the ownership of land and coal were inextricably 
connected, as David McCan has shown in Whatiwhatihoe. Waikato-Tainui approached the 
issue with the re-assertion of their rangatiratanga as a focus, and a holistic approach to the 
118 Hare Puke, Henare & Mahuta to Palmer, 22 December 1988; Henare to Stan Rodger, 22 December 1988: all 
TC30 Vol. 2, OTS archive & RC1 Vol.1-2, Box 24, W-T archives; McCan, Whatiwhatihoe: The Waikato 
Raupatu Claim, 258. 
119 Rodger to Henare, 1 January 1989, TC30 Vol.2, OTS archive; McCan, Whatiwhatihoe: The Waikato 
Raupatu Claim, 259. 
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ownership and management of land. Both the land and whatever was underneath the land 
were connected and thus their claims to land also included claims to coal.120   
 Although the proposed sale of Coalcorp loomed large over the build-up to the 
negotiations in 1989, the Crown continued to build momentum to begin negotiations with 
Waikato. Waikato put its position in writing to the Crown in December 1988, but their 
energies were largely centred on preventing the sale of Coalcorp. Mahuta continued to 
maintain that their claims were to the coal as well as the land, and requested that the sale of 
Coalcorp be postponed until negotiations were completed, much less begun.  The Crown, for 
its part, stuck to the principle that only the land, not natural resources such as coal, was 
subject to the protection mechanism provisions of the Treaty of Waitangi (State Enterprises) 
Act 1988. Since negotiations had not yet begun, the Crown was not yet willing to concede 
which of Waikato-Tainui's claims were valid as that would occur during the direct 
negotiations. As a result, there was little consideration by the Crown of a moratorium on the 
sale of state assets in general in the Waikato-Tainui region, much less specific Coalcorp 
assets.121  
 The Crown’s policy had been to refuse to negotiate if claimants took action in Court. 
However, a Treasury official made an innovative proposal that the Crown relax its strict 
policy on refusing to negotiate while litigation proceeded. The official argued that providing 
some leniency would allow the two sides to negotiate on matters that were unrelated to the 
issue of coal. This would demonstrate that there had been some effort made by the Crown 
120 McCan, Whatiwhatihoe: The Waikato Raupatu Claim, 251-296.  
121 “Waikato Negotiations: Report to Cabinet,” 11 January 1989, OTS archive TC30 Vol. 3; McCan, 
Whatiwhatihoe: The Waikato Raupatu Claim, 258-259. 
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when the matter was considered by the Court.122 The Crown Law Office (CLO) agreed and 
eventually so did Cabinet.  
Scoping negotiations: July and August 1989 
 
In late 1988, ToWPU was established. Alex Frame – former Senior Law Lecturer at 
Victoria University of Wellington - was appointed as its Director. In mid-1989 Frame 
travelled to Waikato with a small team of ToWPU officials for early discussions with 
Waikato-Tainui representatives.123 Waikato-Tainui’s initial negotiations with the Crown 
began with these informal scoping sessions that were held from May to August 1989 at 
Tapuwae o Hounuku, a farm near Kawhia managed by the TMTB.124 The all-male 
negotiating team of Frame and three other men each respectively from ToWPU, CLO and 
Treasury, was countered by an all-female negotiating team for Waikato-Tainui: Raiha 
Mahuta, Julie Wade, Iti Rawiri, Mere Taka and Dr. Pare Hopa. The gender composition of 
the teams was not the most significant aspect of the negotiations, but it was particularly noted 
in the private correspondence of the TMTB.125 It is unclear exactly how the Waikato-Tainui 
negotiating team was chosen, but each was either a member of the TMTB or had strong 
affiliations with the Kīngitanga.  
This first set of negotiations was integral for laying down the future framework that 
would govern the negotiations. Waikato-Tainui negotiators used it as an opportunity to 
122 Treasury official 1 to Alex Frame, 04 April 1989, TC30 Vol.2, OTS archive. 
123 Minutes of a meeting held between the Crown and Waikato negotiators, 21 June 1989, TC30 Vol.5, OTS 
archive & RC1 Vol.1-2, Box 24, W-T archives, 10, 11; Minutes of a meeting held between the Crown and 
Waikato negotiators, 4 July 1989; Minutes of a meeting held between the Crown and Waikato negotiators, 5 
July 1989, TC30 Vol.6, OTS archive & RC1 Vol.1-2, Box 24, W-T archives; Treasury official 1, “Waikato 
Negotiations: 2nd Week of Scoping Phase”, 7 July 1989, TC30 Vol.6, OTS archive. 
124 McCan, Whatiwhatihoe: The Waikato Raupatu Claim, 264. 
125 Treasury official 1 to Treasury official 2, 23 June 1989, TC30 Vol.5, OTS archive; Raiha Mahuta to Robert 
Mahuta & TMTB, “Scoping Discussions,” 17 May 1989, RC1 Vol.1, Box 24, W-T archives. This was certainly 
a curious aspect of these scoping negotiations—why had the Crown team been only men and the Waikato-
Tainui team only women? 
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discuss long held grievances. There were a series of fundamental disagreements. The Crown 
remained firm on the view that the findings of the 1920s Sim Commission into Waikato-
Tainui grievances still applied: the confiscation of Waikato land in the 1860s was excessive, 
but that confiscation was both necessary and lawful under the relevant legislation.126 At least 
two of the Crown officials and possibly all four believed that the confiscation legislation was 
nonetheless unjust.  
The first topic of the meeting was the backlash that Waikato-Tainui had received from 
the general public when it began to pursue its claims. Waikato-Tainui sought to engage in a 
campaign with the government to educate the public on the historical grievances of Waikato-
Tainui. However, it soon became apparent that the Crown and Waikato-Tainui themselves 
were in disagreement on many issues, except for some broad outlines of the war and 
confiscation. Waikato-Tainui believed that the invasion of the Waikato and the subsequent 
confiscation were illegal. Waikato-Tainui attempted to point to the 1981 Bentinck-Stokes’ 
report (produced by JG Bentinck-Stokes for the Secretary of Māori Affairs) that raupatu was 
“unlawful,” and the Tribunal’s findings in the 1985 Manukau Harbour Report that indirectly 
condemned the invasion of the Waikato.127 Waikato-Tainui’s reliance on the Bentinck-Stokes 
report was contested by the Crown, but the findings of the Manukau Harbour Report were 
accepted. Frame referred to Michael Litchfield’s 1985 article in the VUW Law Review which 
126 In the 1920s, the government established the Sim Commission to investigate some of the major Māori 
grievances against the government, one of which was the confiscation of land in the Waikato. The Sim 
Commission concluded that the confiscations were unjust but that Waikato-Tainui had been deserving of some 
kind of punishment because they had rebelled against the Crown: Mark Hickford, “Strands from the Afterlife of 
Confiscation, Property Rights, Constitutional Histories and the Political Incorporation of Māori, 1920s,” R 
Boast and R Hill (eds.) Raupatu: The Confiscation of Māori Land (Wellington: VUW Press, 2009), 183-203. 
127 Although the Bentinck-Stokes report was written regarding the Taranaki confiscations, his conclusions about 
the lawfulness of the 1863 Settlements Act applied to all the areas of land confiscated under that legislation: JG 
Bentinck-Stokes, “Report on Legal and Historical Aspects of the Taranaki Confiscations,” 20 May 1981, Wai 
143, A26; Waitangi Tribunal, Report of the Waitangi Tribunal on the Manukau Claim (Wai-8), (Wellington: 
Government Printer, 1985), 31-33. 
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found that although the confiscations were unjust they were not illegal.128 In contrast, the 
Bentinck-Stokes Report was seen to be based on rather flimsy use of all the legal and 
historical evidence available at the time. 
Waikato-Tainui felt that they had a good relationship with the Crown, but that the key 
point in achieving a durable settlement was in convincing the public. Nevertheless, there 
were substantive issues for the negotiations to address. Waikato-Tainui sought the remaining 
land in the Crown’s hands in the Waikato-Tainui rohe as redress for the military invasion of 
the Waikato and the confiscation that followed, compensation for the Crown’s exploitation of 
the coal resource during the length of the twentieth century, and lost development 
opportunities. This was sizeable redress.  The Treasury official, in his report to his superiors, 
commented that the Waikato-Tainui negotiators understood that redress in full would not be 
fiscally possible. Waikato-Tainui wanted to remain realistic but it nonetheless pressed the 
Crown not to trivialise their historical grievances by thinking they could be paid off with a 
small sum of money. ToWPU officials and the Crown Law representative believed that the 
most likely result of the negotiations was an interim settlement.129  
Although there was a need for a level of agreement with regard to the historical 
“facts” the Crown tried to stay away from getting bogged down into the details: rather, Frame 
stated that both sides could agree that there was significant damage which resulted from the 
confiscations and the negotiations should be focused on addressing that grievance. Waikato-
Tainui on the other hand made it clear that the details were very important and that Waikato-
Tainui’s input into the formulation of historical rationales for the settlement was necessary. 
Frame and the Treasury official warned Waikato-Tainui that, in their assessment, Cabinet 
128 Alex Frame, “Waikato Negotiations: First Confidential Report,” 30 May 1989, OTS archive, TC 30 Vol. 4; 
Michael Litchfield, “The Confiscation of Māori Land,” VUW Law Review Vol. 15 No. 4 1985, 337-362. 
129 Treasury official 1 to Treasury official 2, 23 June 1989, TC30 Vol.5, OTS archive. 
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would not accept that the invasions were illegal, just that they were excessive and unjust. 
Waikato-Tainui negotiators continued to return to the alleged illegality of the confiscation. 
Crown officials tried to stress that together the two parties needed to determine how best to 
convince Cabinet to provide ample compensation and that would not occur by insisting on the 
illegality argument.130 The June 1989 meeting ended with Waikato-Tainui in effect lecturing 
the Crown on the wrongs committed and the long-standing effects they had on their 
communities. While the Crown was willing to listen there was clearly some discomfort as the 
meeting ended. This could have been because of the awkward situation in which sympathetic 
Crown officials found themselves: empathising with Waikato-Tainui but nonetheless serving 
in an official capacity as a representative of the entity that had committed the “sins” in the 
first place.131 At a Canadian academic conference, Mohawk political theorist Taiaiake Alfred 
commented that in the case of Canada “there needs to be struggle in order to lay out a path to 
co-existence, and that the process of being uncomfortable is essential for non-indigenous 
people to move from being enemy to adversary to ally.”132 The Canadian situation described 
by Alfred applied well to the situation in which Crown officials found themselves during 
these scoping negotiations. The discomfort experienced by Crown negotiators was necessary 
to enable the Crown to understand the depth of historical pain felt by Waikato-Tainui.  
Little happened for the rest of 1989 as Waikato-Tainui focused its energy on the 
pending alienation of Coalcorp land and assets. After filing their case early in 1989, the 
TMTB’s Coalcorp case was heard by the Court of Appeal in August 1989.133 The Court of 
Appeal found in favour of the TMTB and issued an injunction against the sale of Coalcorp. 
130 Minutes of a meeting held between the Crown and Waikato negotiators, 4 July 1989; Minutes of a meeting 
held between the Crown and Waikato negotiators, 5 July 1989, TC30 Vol.6, OTS archive & RC1 Vol.1-2, Box 
24, W-T archives; McCan, Whatiwhatihoe: The Waikato Raupatu Claim, 264. 
131 Minutes of a meeting held between the Crown and Waikato negotiators, 20 June 1989, OTS archive, TC 30 
Vol. 4.  
132 Paulette Regan, “A Transformative Framework for Decolonizing Canada: A Non-Indigenous Approach,” 
Presented at the IGOV Doctoral Student Symposium, 20 January 2005, 3. 
133 McCan, Whatiwhatihoe: The Waikato Raupatu Claim, 273-275. 
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The President of the Court of Appeal, Sir Robin Cooke, advocated a negotiated settlement 
and thought that the TMTB should receive a substantial portion of the coal resources in its 
region, albeit less than half.134 In early March 1990 the Crown and Waikato-Tainui 
negotiating teams finally met again.135 One of Waikato’s demands had been that someone 
with more political leverage represent the Crown such as a Cabinet Minister or the Attorney-
General, so Justice Minister Bill Jeffries led the negotiations with the aid of Alex Frame and 
two other ToWPU officials.136 Unfortunately the Treasury official who had been involved in 
the scoping negotiations had died. Waikato-Tainui’s only holdover from the scoping 
negotiations was Dr. Pare Hopa and she was joined by Robert Mahuta, Denese Henare, Hare 
Puke and Hinga Maggie.137 Much like the first scoping negotiations, all of these 
representatives were either members of the TMTB or strongly affiliated with the Kīngitanga. 
Henare was the TMTB’s primary legal advisor while the rest were active TMTB members. 
Henare was involved in the Waikato confiscation claim from throughout the 1980s until the 
settlement was completed in 1995.138  
Finality and the Waikato Maniapoto Claims Settlement Act 1946: 1990 
 
Debates surrounding the extent to which previous arrangements with the Crown fully 
settled historical claims, including the Waikato-Maniapoto Māori Claims Settlement Act 
134 Tainui Maaori Trust Board v Attorney-General [1989] 2 NZLR 513. McCan, Whatiwhatihoe: The Waikato 
Raupatu Claim, 279-282. While the Crown has used a diverse range of assets as redress, it still refuses to use 
natural resources other than pounamu.  
135 McCan, Whatiwhatihoe: The Waikato Raupatu Claim, 297-301. 
136 Mahuta to Henare, 9 January 1990, RC1Vol 1, Box 3, W-T archive.  
137 Mahuta to Alex Frame, 3 March 1990, TC30 Vol. 7, OTS archive.  
138 She was the niece of prominent Nga Puhi rangātira Sir James Henare. When Denese Henare first considered 
working for the Tainui Māori Trust Board she sought her uncle’s advice. Sir James Henare told her that she 
should work for the Trust Board because it was their Treaty that had burdened Waikato, alluding to the origin of 
the Treaty of Waitangi in areas controlled by Nga Puhi and others at the top of the North Island. Interview with 
Denese Henare, 26 May 2011.  
57 
 
                                                          
1946, dominated the negotiations in the first half of 1990.139 Mahuta claimed that the 1946 
settlement was only a partial settlement because the return of land was not included. After 
losing the Coalcorp case the Crown kept to the position that the 1946 Act had been seen at 
the time as full and final. For the Crown, the 1946 settlement was to be the starting point of 
the current negotiations. Mahuta had gone to great lengths to convince those within Waikato-
Tainui that the 1946 settlement was inadequate, especially those that had been directly 
involved.  Mahuta argued that the 1946 settlement was forced upon the iwi. Justice Minister 
Bill Jeffries and ToWPU officials disagreed. Jeffries and his officials argued that the 1946 
settlement was the best that could be negotiated in the context of the times. As a result the iwi 
had accepted the offer, and the settlement had not been forced upon Waikato-Tainui. Te Puea 
had commented at the time that the return of land was still necessary, but that the settlement 
at the time was appreciated.140 
In reports to Cabinet in late 1989, Frame wrote that the question of re-opening the full 
and final settlements of the 1940s was not completely necessary. In the months to come, 
Frame maintained that while those agreements were full and final by law, he readily admitted 
that they had not achieved what they had set out to do. This was the point of the negotiation 
process: to fulfil the spirit of those agreements rather than re-negotiating the entire Waikato-
Tainui claim.141 Based on his interactions with Ministers, Frame believed that the ‘spirit’ 
argument would be the only way to persuade Cabinet to offer additional compensation and 
the return of land. The value of the £10,000 annual grant provided in the 1946 settlement that 
established the TMTB had eroded severely by the mid-1960s. The TMTB and other Māori 
139 The 1946 Waikato-Maniapoto Claims Settlement Act provided a limited amount of compensation to address 
the confiscation of Waikato lands in the 1860s, but did not include the return of land.  
140 Two separate minutes of a meeting held between the Crown and Waikato negotiators, 5 March 1990, TC30 
Vol.7, OTS archive, one by James Ritchie and the second, “The Crown”. The Crown version of the minutes is 
much shorter and thus there is little detail. On the Crown copy it says "these were altered by the Minister 
[Jeffries]." Michael King, Te Puea: A Life, 222-225; Paul Diamond, A Fire in Your Belly: Māori Leaders Speak, 
124-125; McCan, Whatiwhatihoe: The Waikato Raupatu Claim, 215, 304-305. 
141 Alex Frame, “The 1940s Settlement of Major Māori Claims”, 6 November 1989, TC30 Vol.7, OTS archive. 
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Trust Boards, such as the Ngāi Tahu Māori Trust Board, had lobbied the Crown since the 
mid-1960s to index the annual grant to the rate of inflation and provide compensation for the 
decades of under payment. The Crown responded by providing the grants in perpetuity. 
During their negotiations with Waikato-Tainui, the Crown contracted a statistician to write a 
report on the effect of inflation on the annual grants provided to Māori Trust Boards such as 
the TMTB. The value of the TMTB’s loss was approximately $8 million.142 
Frame presented to Cabinet some of the different reasons why the Crown could argue 
in favour of, and against more negotiations. On one end of the spectrum was the Crown's 
response to a suggestion in 1979 that the Taranaki claim be re-opened—the 1940s era 
settlements were full and final; on the other was Mahuta's demand for all of the Crown's land 
that remained in the Waikato, plus compensation for the rest of the land that had been 
confiscated but could not be returned because it was now in private ownership. Frame put 
forth Waikato owning the bed of the Waikato River as a possible substitute for what he 
termed the “orphan factor.” Repeatedly throughout the scoping phase, Waikato-Tainui 
negotiators had put forward the idea that Waikato-Tainui felt like orphans as a result of the 
confiscation of land. Frame stated that “the 1946 settlement has not fully achieved its purpose 
because it fails to address the feeling of alienation from the land.” Sir Robin Cooke stated in 
the 1987 New Zealand Māori Council v. Attorney-General case that the payment was trivial 
and the Tribunal would probably condemn the confiscations. Prime Minister Peter Fraser had 
even remarked in Parliament in 1946 that Waikato had not considered the settlement full or 
142 Frame to Jeffries, 10 May 1990, TC30 Vol.8, OTS archive; John Robinson, ‘Indexation of Payments to 
Māori Trust Boards,’ 11 January 1990, TC30 Vol.7, OTS archive; McCan, Whatiwhatihoe: The Waikato 
Raupatu Claim, 215, 303-304. 
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final.143 Nonetheless Frame knew that Treasury, Cabinet and the CLO would insist that the 
1946 agreement was a full and final settlement. 
In March 1990 Justice Minister Bill Jeffries and Mahuta engaged in a series of 
correspondence which focused on factually rebutting the other on the history of the 1946 
settlement and whether it was full and final. Jeffries maintained that it had to be a starting 
point for the negotiations and that the return of land could be a part of fulfilling the spirit and 
intent of the 1946 settlement. The Crown’s proposal for settlement was to use the 
approximately $8 million of payments lost to inflation specifically to purchase land, either 
surplus to the Crown or privately, to meet Waikato-Tainui’s demand for land.144 Waikato-
Tainui was concerned that what was “already being contemplated in general Maaori policy 
should be offered to Waikato in the guise of a negotiated settlement of its tribal claim.”145 
Waikato-Tainui were not seeking to update their annual grants to inflation, as all other Māori 
Trust Boards were set to receive, but a fresh set of negotiations that would fully address their 
claims.  
The limited sum that the Crown was offering would prevent any further developments 
in the negotiations at this time. Treasury’s role was prominent in these early negotiations. 
Treasury found little chance of an “enduring settlement” because Waikato negotiators were 
not willing to admit any finality to any negotiated agreement. “They want a continuing 
reminder for both the Crown and their people of the wrong done to them. An enduring 
settlement is unlikely at this stage or for a long time to come.”146 Treasury though made no 
143 Frame, “Tainui Negotiations”, 5 February 1990, TC30 Vol.7, OTS archive. 
144 Mahuta to Jeffries, 15 March 1990; Jeffries to Mahuta, 21 March 1990; 29 March 1990, TC30 Vol.7, OTS 
archive & RC1, Vol.3, Box 7, W-T archives. 
145 Mahuta to Jeffries, 13 March 1990, TC30 Vol.7, OTS archive & RC1, Vol.3, Box 7, W-T archives, 2; 
McCan, Whatiwhatihoe: The Waikato Raupatu Claim, 304-305. 
146 Treasury official 3 to ToWPU official 1 and Frame, 10 May 1990, TC30 Vol.8, OTS archive. 
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mention of possibly addressing the continuing reminder with a substantial lump sum that 
would provide the amount of land that Waikato-Tainui were seeking in their settlement. 
Then, in August 1990, Waikato-Tainui representatives provided a submission to the 
United Nations (UN) Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of 
Minorities in Geneva and attested to the continuing colonial legacy of the confiscations and 
the refusal of the current government to engage in substantive negotiations.147 One of the 
conditions of the negotiations was that public statements would not be released without 
notifying the other party and the international stage upon which Waikato-Tainui chose to 
voice its displeasure with the Crown caused a significant backlash both from the public and 
the Crown.148 As David McCan has commented, Waikato-Tainui negotiators perceived that 
despite the direction from the Court of Appeal to engage in direct negotiations there was a 
lack of commitment from the Crown. Mahuta felt that direct negotiations with the Crown had 
not advanced the Waikato-Tainui claim, and as a result human rights organisations such as 
the UN were the next option.149  
The day before Waikato’s presentation to the UN, Jeffries requested permission from 
Cabinet to present an offer to the iwi in exchange for the lifting of the injunction on the sale 
of Coalcorp. The offer was much larger than the original $8 million in arrears payments 
offered first—approximately $17-20 million—but it was still far below Waikato-Tainui’s 
expectations. The Crown proposed a settlement that consisted of $10 million in surplus 
Coalcorp properties, 60 house lots, 12 farm lots, a hostel and some other properties, without 
147 “Submission to Working Group on Indigenous Peoples,” 1 August 1990, TC30 Vol.9, OTS archive; McCan, 
Whatiwhatihoe: The Waikato Raupatu Claim, 307-310. 
148 Frame to Jeffries, 7 August 1990, TC 30 Vol. 9, OTS archive; Ross Baker to Geoffrey Palmer, 14 July 1990, 
TC 30, Vol.9, OTS archive. Robert Joseph has commented on the use of the politics of shame by indigenous 
groups around the world but especially in New Zealand and Canada: ‘The Government of Themselves: 
Indigenous Peoples’ Internal Self-Determination, Effective Self-Governance and Authentic Representation: 
Waikato-Tainui, Ngāi Tahu and Nisga’a.’ Ph.D Thesis (Law), University of Waikato, 2006, 157-159. 
149 McCan, Whatiwhatihoe: The Waikato Raupatu Claim, 307-308. 
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ownership of the coal, on top of the $8 million that the Crown proposed to transfer to 
Waikato in arrears for payments to the Trust Board.150 After Waikato-Tainui made their 
public protest at the UN the offer was still sent out as it had been approved by that Cabinet 
meeting the day before the UN presentation. The best that Mahuta could say was if that offer 
was construed as an interim settlement, it would be acceptable, but in no way could the 
Crown’s offer be traded for lifting the injunction on the sale of Coalcorp. Mahuta 
recommended at TMTB meetings and at a hui-ā-iwi at Turangawaewae that the iwi should 
reject the settlement. The Crown’s offer was therefore refused because of the limited nature 
of the settlement offered by Cabinet. As a result the amount of land available for purchase 
was too insignificant for Waikato-Tainui to trade the leverage that had been gained from the 
Coalcorp victory. From the point of view of Waikato-Tainui, the proposed settlement would 
do little to enhance Waikato-Tainui rangatiratanga. 151 
As Labour entered the 1990 election scheduled for 27 October, Mahuta claimed in a 
speech to the NZ Planning Council in late September 1990 that although there was a slim 
chance that Labour would still be in power by the end of the year, he and Waikato-Tainui 
would still be there to negotiate. He stated further that: "[t]he Government should either treat 
Waikato as if they did sign the Treaty of Waitangi; or else treat them as if they were a 
sovereign nation. The other option - seemingly the one the Government is pursuing - is to 
treat Waikato as nobodies."152 When Mahuta returned to the Waikato to face the people and 
tell them they had come back empty handed from the negotiation process with the Crown a 
150 TOW (90) 23, 31 July 1990, TC30 Vol.9, OTS archive; Jeffries to Mahuta, 6 August 1990, TC30 Vol.9, OTS 
archive; Jeffries to Mahuta, 15 October 1990, TC30 Vol.10, OTS archive. Last two also RC1, Vol.4, Box 7, W-
T archives; McCan, Whatiwhatihoe: The Waikato Raupatu Claim, 310-311. 
151 Mahuta to Jeffries, 19 October 1990, TC30 Vol.10, OTS archive & RC1, Vol.4, Box 7, W-T archives; 
McCan, Whatiwhatihoe: The Waikato Raupatu Claim, 312. 
152 The paramount leader of Tainui at the time of the Treaty was Te Wherowhero and although he had signed the 
1835 Declaration of Independence, he had not signed the Treaty of Waitangi in 1840. 
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kaumatua remarked to him, “It is better to have nothing than to be nothing.”153 Led by Mike 
Moore, Labour lost the 1990 election in a landslide to Jim Bolger and the National Party.154 It 
was now up to the Crown officials who had begun the process under Labour to continue their 
work under National.  
153 Mahuta, “Speech to the NZ Planning Council,” 27 September 1990, TC30 Vol.9, OTS archive; Sir Douglas 
Graham. “The Treaty and Treaty Negotiations,” in Margaret Clark’s The Bolger Years: 1990-1997 (Wellington: 
Dunmore Publishing, 2008), 172; Richard Hill, Māori and the State: Crown-Māori Relations in New 
Zealand/Aotearoa, 1950-2000, 253.  
154 Jack Vowles and Peter Aimes, Voters’ Vengeance: The 1990 Election in New Zealand and the fate of the 
Fourth Labour Government (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1993).  
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Fourth National Government: Negotiations with Waikato-Tainui 
 
After the Labour government was defeated it was initially unclear how the new 
National government planned to address Treaty claims. Despite claims to the contrary in his 
autobiography, Jim Bolger had been critical of the legislative and judicial advances made in 
the 1980s and it was not apparent that he would continue the work that had just begun under 
Labour.155 His first Minister of Māori Affairs, Winston Peters, was not very encouraging for 
those who appreciated the increasing place of the Treaty of Waitangi within New Zealand’s 
legislative and legal systems. Peters had gained a great measure of popularity by appealing to 
the entrenched supporters of a monocultural New Zealand. Peters was originally placed in 
charge of all Treaty negotiations, including those that had begun with Waikato-Tainui and 
were set to begin with Ngāi Tahu. Due to a combination of lack of interest and political 
scandals he never actively became involved. 
The Minister of Justice, Doug Graham, was responsible for the Treaty of Waitangi 
Policy Unit as it was a Unit within the Department of Justice.  For the end of 1990 and most 
of 1991 he was not officially in charge of Treaty matters, but this situation changed when 
Peters was sacked in October 1991.156 After Peters was sacked, Graham was appointed as 
Minister in Charge of Treaty Negotiations. Graham was more encouraging than Peters, but 
Graham had voted against providing the Tribunal with powers to inquire into historical 
claims in 1985 so it was not guaranteed that he would be willing to continue the work begun 
155 McCan, Whatiwhatihoe, 284; Ward, An Unsettled History, 34; Jim Bolger, A View from the Top (Auckland: 
Viking Press, 1998), 175. 
156 Tom Brooking, The History of New Zealand (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 2004), xxxii; 




                                                          
under Labour. Graham later would comment that he only voted against the legislation 
because he had to follow his Party as a backbencher.157   
Early in 1991 Mahuta requested a meeting with Prime Minister Jim Bolger and his 
Ministers and asked when negotiations might be able to resume. Mahuta thought that the 
negotiations with the Labour government had not advanced as a result of a lack of agreement 
on the principles and process guiding the negotiations. In his last letter to outgoing Labour 
Justice Minister Bill Jeffries, Mahuta had pointed out that Waikato and the Crown agreed on 
four out of six negotiating principles and thus there was definitely some agreement. The 
suggested agenda for the negotiations which ToWPU and Waikato officials had negotiated in 
1989 had been rejected by Cabinet, and thus it was not so much officials that were to blame 
for that lack of agreement but Cabinet itself.158 
Before negotiations formally began, a ToWPU official provided a memorandum for 
Graham which addressed some of the key issues that led to the breakdown of the Waikato-
Tainui negotiations. His advice reflected the comments made by Mahuta to Bolger. “At times 
the Crown has mistakenly used the offer to address Waikato's grievance as a quid pro quo for 
lifting of the injunction [on Coalcorp]. This, like focusing on cash compensation, indexation 
of Waikato's annuity, and tagging any settlement to the 1946 Waikato-Maniapoto Māori 
Claims Settlement Act has impeded progress in the negotiations.” The official further alluded 
to the question of “Tainui's understanding of the settlement, particularly its ‘fullness and 
finality’” and that the Waitangi Tribunal did not consider any of the 1940s settlement to be 
beyond scrutiny or revision. The fact that the Crown had stuck to its position of only 
modernising the 1946 settlement severely limited the Crown's options and "insulated the 
157 Interview with Graham, 22 May 2011; Graham was reported to have had lunch nearly every week through 
the 1980s and 1990s with a prominent lawyer who specialised in Treaty matters, Paul Temm; Ward, An 
Unsettled History, 34. 
158 Mahuta to Jim Bolger, 4 January 1991, TC30 Vol. 10, OTS archive.  
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Crown from any acknowledgment of the injustice done to Waikato."159 Peters, before he was 
sacked, had asked for a review of the 1989 Principles with the expectation that the Principles 
would be watered down. ToWPU officials recommended that the National government adopt 
the same Principles for Crown Action on the Treaty of Waitangi that Labour had produced in 
1989 and build on those original proposals.160  
The Crown’s negotiating team for the Waikato-Tainui negotiations was led by 
Graham after Peters’ dismissal. Waikato-Tainui proposed an A and B team structure, and 
Graham agreed. The A team comprised Graham as the principal with Secretary of Justice 
David Oughton, the CEO of what was then Manatu Māori but was soon to be renamed Te 
Puni Kōkiri (TPK)161, Wira Gardiner, and a Treasury official. The B Team consisted of an 
official from ToWPU, a lower ranking official from Treasury and a Crown Law official. A 
contractor, Paul Hendry, was brought in later in the process to help with the SOE and other 
Crown enterprises—he met with all the relevant CEOs and walked them through the 
implications of the Crown’s proposals for their balance sheets.162  
Waikato-Tainui’s negotiating team was led by Mahuta. Their A Team consisted of 
long-time TMTB legal advisor Denese Henare and commercial advisor Brent Wheeler. 
Wheeler was an economist from Wheeler Campbell Securities Ltd who had previously 
worked as an economic analyst for the New Zealand Treasury and the Office of the Minister 
159 TOWPU official 2, early 1991, AAKWW5105781226, Archives NZ, 1-2.  
160 ToWPU official 3 to Doug Graham, 26 March 1991, RC V5, B8, Waikato-Tainui archives. 
161 In 1989 the Department of Māori Affairs was replaced with two organisations: Manatu Māori (the Ministry 
of Māori Affairs) and Te Tira Ahu Iwi (the Iwi Transition Agency). Following the National Party’s victory in 
the 1990 election, further restructuring was proposed and Manatu Māori and Te Tira Ahu Iwi were combined to 
form Te Puni Kokiri, the Ministry of Māori Development: Richard Hill, Māori and the State: Crown-Māori 
Relations in New Zealand/Aotearoa, 1950-2000, 241-243, 248-252. 
162 In mid-1992 Hendry joined forces with Brent Wheeler, Waikato’s primary commercial advisor, and proffered 
his resignation to the Crown for the obvious conflict of interest which it would create in relation to Waikato’s 
negotiations with the Crown.  
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for State Owned Enterprises.163 Waikato-Tainui’s B Team was initially Shane Solomon and 
Mike Ashby, but Ashby was later replaced by John Te Maru. At this point Dr. Ngapare Hopa 
was also an informal member of the Waikato-Tainui negotiating team. Denese Henare had 
perhaps the most critical views regarding the Crown of the entire Waikato-Tainui negotiating 
team. Late in the negotiation she was especially concerned with the hasty nature of the final 
process and the potential for legal challenges.164 In addition to the formal meetings involving 
scores of officials and advisors from each side who complemented the official team 
memberships and the monthly officials-level meetings established at the beginning of the 
process, late in the negotiations Mahuta and Graham would also occasionally meet without 
any advisors present to try to hammer out sticking points in the negotiations. 
After the first two formal meetings in late 1991 and early 1992, Waikato-Tainui 
advisors recommended to Crown negotiators that the structure of the negotiations would be 
better served by having Mahuta and Graham act only as principals who would ratify 
decisions made by their officials and advisors that dealt with the minutiae of the negotiations. 
They thought it would be best to create working groups to limit the time Mahuta and Graham 
163 Brent Wheeler Full CV, http://www.brentwheeler.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/Brent-Wheeler-Full-
CV.pdf, accessed 28 March 2013.  
164 “Meeting between Crown and Waikato negotiators,” 13 December 1994, TC30 Vol. 41, OTS archive; 
“Meeting between Crown and Waikato negotiators,” 29 November 1994, RC1, Correspondence Vol 37, 
December 1994, Box 15., W-T archives, 5; “Meeting between Crown and Waikato negotiators,” 13 December 
1994, TC30 Vol. 41, OTS archive; “Meeting between Crown and Waikato negotiators,” 29 November 1994, 
RC1, Correspondence Vol 37, December 1994, Box 15., W-T archives, 3; Henare to Mahuta & John Te Maru to 
Mahuta, 14 December 1994, RC1, Correspondence Vol 37, December 1994, Box 15, W-T archives; Interview 
with Brent Wheeler, 24 May 2011; ToWPU official 4 to Graham, 15 December 1994, AAKW W5105 7812 22, 
Archives NZ; Treasury official 4 to Treasury official 5, 15 December 1994, TC30 Vol. 42, OTS archive; Henare 
to ToWPU official 4, 19 Deccember 1994, TC30 Vol. 42, OTS archive, 1; Henare to Mahuta, 19 December 
1994; Peter Rowe to Mahuta, 19 December 1994: both RC1, Correspondence Vol 37, December 1994, Box 15, 
W-T archives; Diamond, 134; Mahuta to Henare, 19 December 1994, RC1, Correspondence Vol 37, December 
1994, Box 15, W-T archives; Shane Solomon, “Meeting with Denese,” 17 November 1994, RC December - 
August 1994, Box 32, W-T archives. 
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(the principals) had to spend on individual issues. The Crown agreed and the new negotiating 
format began in earnest in March 1992.165 
Without any detailed Treaty policy the government was often accused by Waikato-
Tainui of purposefully delaying the negotiations. The Crown for its part believed that it was 
responding to arguments from Waikato-Tainui without any preconceived notions. Although 
the Crown was generally opposed to interim settlements, it was forced to placate Waikato-
Tainui with various mechanisms such as offering the return of land from late 1991 onwards 
as a gift and gesture of good will. Before the two parties formally met, the Crown informed 
Waikato-Tainui that the decommissioned Hopuhopu Army Base was available for transfer to 
the iwi to meet Waikato-Tainui’s principle that as land was taken so land must be returned (“i 
riro whenua atu me hoki whenua mai”).166 At first, Waikato-Tainui were stunned that the 
Crown was actually returning land and did not believe Graham when he made the 
announcement at Whaataapaka marae in late 1991.167 Although the return of the base initially 
engendered some substantial good will between the two parties, eventually the significant 
financial liabilities that the base carried eroded some of that good will.168 
  
165 Meeting between Waikato and Crown B Teams, 26 March 1992, TC30 Vol. 19, OTS archive. Later in the 
negotiations the frequent informal contact between Mahuta and Graham became a concern for both Waikato-
Tainui and Crown advisors who were worried that negotiations were being conducted without their input. At 
times ToWPU was concerned that certain changes to previous agreements that had been agreed to at the 
principal’s level were being changed by advisors: ToWPU official 4 memorandum, 22 November 1994, TC30 
Vol. 40, OTS archive. Solomon & Mahuta memos, 22 November 1994;Henare to Mahuta, 22 November 1994; 
RC December - August 1994, Box 32, W-T archives; ToWPU official 4 to Henare & Henare to ToWPU official 
4, 11 December 1994, TC30 Vol. 41, OTS archive. 
166 Mahuta to Jim Bolger, 24 June 1991, AAKW W5105 7812 26, Archives NZ; Bolger to Mahuta, 19 July 
1991, RC Vol 5, Box 8, W-T archives; Mahuta to Graham, 31 July 1991, TC30 Vol. 13, OTS archive. 
167 Interview with Graham, 22 May 2011.  
168 ToWPU official 4 to Mike Ashby, 21 January 1992; ToWPU official 4, 22 January 1992; DoSLI official 1 to 
ToWPU official 4, 3 March 1992, TC30 Vol. 16 & 19, OTS archive. 
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The return of Hopuhopu and hapū dissent 
 
Heta Tarawhiti of Waikato-Tainui hapū Ngāti Whawhakia had gifted the land at 
Hopuhopu to the Anglican Church in 1853 for educational purposes. The area was initially 
used to build a Church and school that local Māori children attended. Once the wars of the 
1860s developed, the area was abandoned. The Anglican Church retained ownership until it 
was taken under the Public Works Act during World War II. When Waikato-Tainui began 
expressing an interest in having Hopuhopu returned to the iwi in the late 1980s, the Anglican 
Church supported their endeavour. The opposition to the return of Hopuhopu to the Tainui 
Māori Trust Board was from two separate parties. The descendants of Heta Tarawhiti sought 
the return of the land to the original owners’ descendants. The other opponents of the return 
were conservative elements in the National Party. The Chairman of the Rotoiti branch of the 
National Party, Ross Baker, wrote to Prime Minister Jim Bolger demanding an explanation as 
to “why the Minister of Justice is giving the Hopuhopu military camp to the Tainui people?” 
Baker believed that Waikato-Tainui had rebelled in the 1860s and deserved punishment. In 
addition he pointed to the “full and final” settlement of 1946. A similar complaint was made 
in a letter to the Waikato Times regarding the return of Hopuhopu and in a letter to Doug 
Graham. Bolger replied to Baker that Waikato-Tainui’s claims were valid and the return of 
Hopuhopu was an appropriate step to take in commencing negotiations.169  
 It was ultimately decided that Hopuhopu (and later Te Rapa) would be vested in Te 
Wherowhero, the first leader of the Kīngitanga, to ensure that it could not be alienated. This 
stemmed from the previous historical experience of various Waikato-Tainui hapū who had 
169 DoSLI official 2 to Frame, 4 October 1990, TC30 Vol 9, OTS archive; AJ Clarke to Mahuta, 13 June 1991, 
RC Vol 5, Box 8, W-T archive; Kirsty Babbington, “Tainui Battle Took 100 Years,” Waikato Times, 7 
September 1991, TC30 Vol.14 OTS archive; Jean Rhodes, “Hopuhopu Land Deal,” 7 September 1991, Waikato 
Times; Ross Baker to Jim Bolger, 1 September 1991; Bolger to Baker, 27 September 1991: all TC30 Vol.14, 
OTS archive; John Luten to Doug Graham, 28 July 1992, TC30 Vol 25, OTS archive. 
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portions of confiscated land returned by the Compensation Court. Rather than return the land 
into tribal ownership, lands were returned to individuals who could sell their lands without 
hindrance. Most of the lands that were eventually returned to King Pōtatau following the 
opening of the King Country, were gradually sold by individuals during the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth century. Mahuta commented in a letter to Denese Henare: "This is what 
we are trying to stop by vesting the land in Te Wherowhero and then appointing custodial 
trustees to ensure that the land is never able to be alienated as it was previously."170 The 
desire by Waikato-Tainui negotiators to vest settlement assets into a collective structure 
reflected the aspirations of Waikato-Tainui to re-assert their rangatiratanga. The decision was 
made following consultation with the TMTB and Ngā Marae Toopu.  
Mahuta wrote in a memorandum sometime in the middle of 1991 that the question of 
who or what the land would be vested in remained to be decided by the TMTB, with the input 
of the wider Waikato-Tainui community. Did they want the land in freehold fee simple title 
or under Māori Land title? What were the implications for any future development at 
Hopuhopu? Who would they register as the owner of Hopuhopu: “[The] Trust Board, Ngā 
Marae Toopu, [the] descendants of the original owners, Te Wherowhero?”171 Mahuta was 
going to seek a kaumatua hui to seek direction on these points. Mahuta’s opinion on the issue 
of alienability was influenced by the research conducted at the Centre for Maaori Studies and 
Research (CMSR) at the University of Waikato of which he was the Director. Investigations 
of international experiences of Treaty settlement processes in Alaska, Canada and the United 
States strongly influenced his desire for inalienable title. The case of Alaska was an 
especially strong influence on his thoughts as not only had a number of academics based in 
Alaska such as Nicholas Flanders been research fellows at the CMSR, but Mahuta had also 
170 Mahuta to Henare, June 1993, RC Vol 30 1993, Box 11, W-T archives. 
171 Mahuta, “Hopuhopu and Te Wherowhero,” 1 August 1991, RC Vol 5, Box 8, W-T archives. 
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spent a semester teaching at the University of Alaska in 1985.172 Later when ToWPU asked 
Waikato-Tainui negotiators how people would receive benefits, Mahuta responded there 
would be a list of beneficiaries and that it would be up to individuals to make a choice of 
which of the 33 hapū they associated with. Mahuta hoped that it would "shake people out of 
their apathy" and emphasised later in a meeting with Crown officials that “as we suffered 
collectively so we should benefit collectively.”173 
Following debates within the Tainui Māori Trust Board the decision was made to vest 
Hopuhopu in the first King, Te Wherowhero. Waikato-Tainui negotiators wanted special 
legislation used to specifically vest Hopuhopu in Te Wherowhero because they were 
concerned that a vesting of land in an ancestor under the Māori Affairs Act 1953 was not 
possible. The CLO did not want to use special legislation and pressed for a vesting under the 
Māori Affairs Act. In November 1992 the Minister of Lands made an application to the 
Māori Land Court to vest Hopuhopu in Te Wherowhero. In December 1992 the Māori Land 
Court under Section 437 of the Māori Affairs Act vested Hopuhopu in Te Wherowhreo and 
the TMTB as “trustee for the benefit of the Waikato Tainui tribes” until a separate Trust had 
been established to own and manage the land.174  
Despite the vesting made in late 1992 regarding the assets received from the Crown, 
the vesting of Hopuhopu was still being debated within Waikato-Tainui in mid-1993. By then 
the Crown had also offered to transfer to Waikato-Tainui the Te Rapa Air Base outside of 
172 Nicholas Flanders, “Lessons for the Māori from the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act,” undated & 
Charles K. Ray (University of Alaska) to Mahuta, 10 May 1985: Alaska folder, W-T archives; Flanders, “The 
Alaska Native Corporation as Conglomerate: The Problem of Profitability,” Human Organisation, Vol. 48 
Number 4, Winter 1989, 299-312. 
173 Shane Solomon, Meeting between Waikato-Tainui and ToWPU officials, 21-22 April 1994, RC Vol 33, Box 
13, W-T archives.  
174 Berryman v Te Arikinui Te Atairangikaahu – Hopuhopu Military Camp and Te Rapa Airforce Base (1993), 
18 Waikato Maniapoto Appellate MB 173. 
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Hamilton.175 Two hapū, Ngāti Whawhakia and Ngāti Wairere, argued that since the 
Hopuhopu and Te Rapa military bases were located in their communities the land should be 
directly vested in them. Ngāti Whawhakia and Ngāti Wairere took their case to the Māori 
Appellate Court to attempt to halt the vesting of the land but they were rejected by the Court. 
The Court stated that “we accept that the Crown’s intention was to return the lands as part 
settlement of the Tainui raupatu lands claim” and that “the settlement was with Tainui and 
not any individual hapū.”176 The Court’s decision reflected the government’s preference for 
negotiating with larger groupings such as iwi rather than hapū, although the return of the 
settlement assets to hapū in theory may have been the best solution to effect 
rangatiratanga.177 Although the Māori Appellate Court approved the return of Hopuhopu to 
the iwi, it did not expressly approve of the use of the Māori Affairs Act to vest the Hopuhopu 
lands and the matter would remain unsettled for some time.178 The lack of substantial 
progress outside of the transfer of Hopuhopu (with its significant liabilities) and Te Rapa did 
little to help Mahuta’s position from within Waikato and the liabilities and the negotiations 
increasingly sapped Waikato’s limited financial resources.  
Waikato-Tainui advisor John Te Maru was optimistic that during the two previous 
years of “intense tribal debate” Waikato had reached the consensus that returned land should 
175 Berryman v Te Arikinui Te Atairangikaahu – Hopuhopu Military Camp and Te Rapa Airforce Base (1993), 
18 Waikato Maniapoto Appellate MB 173. 
176 Berryman v Te Arikinui Te Atairangikaahu – Hopuhopu Military Camp and Te Rapa Airforce Base (1993), 
18 Waikato Maniapoto Appellate MB 173, 3. 
177 Joseph, “Unsettling Treaty settlements: Contemporary Māori Identity and Representation Challenges,” 156-
160. It should be said that the practical difficulties of negotiating with the thousands of hapū throughout New 
Zealand also influenced the Crown’s preferences.  
178 Ngāti Whawhakia and Ngāti Wairere later appealed the Māori Appellate Court’s decision to the High Court 
in June 1995 and the issue was not settled until the passing of settlement legislation that finally formally vested 
the lands in Te Wherowhero in late 1995: Ngapare Hopa to Graham, 28 November 1994, TC30 Vol.40, OTS 
archive; “Hopuhopu and Te Rapa,” 27 June 1995, RC SS June to September 1995, Box 39, W-T archives; Bill 
Patterson to Graham, 22 September 1995 & Mahuta to Graham, 25 September 1995, both: June to September 
1995, Box 19, W-T archives; Graham to Mahuta, September to October 1995 (SS) Box 40, W-T archives.  
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be vested in Te Wherowhero to ensure that the properties could never be alienated.179 Mahuta 
informed the Crown that the delays in reaching a settlement had severely corroded the 
robustness of the TMTB's mandate alluding to the challenges in the Māori Appellate Court 
from Ngāti Whawhakia and Ngāti Wairere dissidents.180 In internal hui Mahuta stated that it 
was the Crown’s delays which had delayed Waikato-Tainui’s wider negotiation process.181 
The politics of delays and policy development 
 
The return of Hopuhopu and Te Rapa dominated the negotiations as the Crown 
developed a strategy to tackle the larger claims such as Waikato-Tainui and Ngāi Tahu from 
1991-1994. At the second formal meeting of Waikato-Tainui and the National government in 
February 1992, Graham stated that he wanted time to consider Waikato's land for land 
principle and “a strategy for selling it to his Cabinet colleagues.” Graham stressed that he 
understood that the land for land principle was the centre of Waikato’s demands and that a 
way could be found to accommodate both Waikato and the general public. First, the Crown 
needed to find out what land and assets it held on its own balance-sheets. The Crown was still 
uncertain of exactly what it owned. Graham commented during the meeting: “Where will 
both the Crown and Waikato end up from the honour point of view? What is the obligation of 
the Crown? To what extent should the Crown assist Waikato to have an economic base to 
provide for its own future?”182 The fundamental premise of the negotiations was still clearly 
being developed mid-way through the process. Mahuta commented quite bluntly in an 
internal memorandum: “For all of us on the negotiating team I know it is frustrating during 
179 John Te Maru, “Hopuhopu and Te Rapa,” 23 September 1993, RC Vol 32, Box 12, W-T archives; Brent 
Wheeler to ToWPU official 4, 22 November 1993, RC Vol 32, Box 12, W-T archives.  
180 Solomon and Henare memorandums: RC Vol 33, Box 13, W-T archives; Meeting between Crown and 
Waikato negotiators, 14 April 1994, AAKW W5105 7812 22, Archives NZ; Mahuta to Graham, 10 February 
1993, RC Vol 30 1993, Box 11, W-T archives, 1. 
181 Meeting of the Tainui Māori Trust Board, 16 May 1992, RC Vol 11 1992, Box 11, W-T archives;; Brent 
Wheeler to ToWPU official 4, 22 November 1993, RC Vol 32, Box 12, W-T archives.  
182 Meeting between Crown and Waikato negotiators, 21 February 1992, TC30 Vol. 18-19, OTS archive; 
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these sessions when the Minister flies off on a tangent and wants to discuss everything but 
what is on the agenda. I take it from what he is saying, however, that regardless of what the 
facts may reveal any final decision is going to be 'political' rather than being based on what is 
fair to Waikato.”183 
Graham and sympathetic Ministers (such as Prime Minister Bolger and Minister of 
Fisheries and Māori Affairs, Doug Kidd) and officials were in a difficult situation as they 
were treading completely new ground with the development of a Treaty settlement policy. In 
addition, the lengthy review and set of intra-governmental debates were very much a by-
product of the painfully slow speed at which governments often work and review policy 
especially. For Waikato-Tainui there was no true alternative to negotiating directly with the 
Crown, other than waiting for a Tribunal hearing, and following that hearing negotiations 
would still be the only option. As Mahuta stated at a hui, “It was the only game in town.”184 
As a result of the general delay in the negotiation process, Waikato-Tainui’s advisors were 
also put under considerable pressure internally by some factions within Waikato-Tainui. As 
1992 ended Waikato-Tainui negotiators and beneficiaries were becoming increasingly 
frustrated with what they saw as the glacial pace of negotiations.185 Commercial advisor 
Brent Wheeler attempted to explain in a letter to Pumi Taituha, a kaumatua and member of 
the Tainui Māori Trust Board, that the slow pace of the negotiations was largely a result of 
“poor understanding of the issues” and because the machinery of government is extremely 
slow. “In addition government reforms of C[rown]R[esearch]I[institute]s, health care and 
education have had to be prevented from dwindling the Crown's assets in the raupatu rohe.” 
Other than the proposed transfer of Hopuhopu, in many ways the Waikato-Tainui 
183 Mahuta to Nga Marae Toopu, 24 February 1992, RC Vol 29, Box 11, W-T archives.  
184 Meeting of the Tainui Māori Trust Board, 4 July 1992, RC Vol 11 1992, Box 11, W-T archives. 
185 One set of caricatures by an unknown Waikato-Tainui advisor depicted Mahuta as a bulldog, frothing at the 
mouth—clearly someone who was aggressive and trying to push forward the negotiations. Graham was depicted 
as a snail, stretching things out and going at a very slow pace. Interview with Shane Solomon, 28 May 2011.  
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negotiations had not advanced during 1992 and the criticisms internally were building. By 
international standards progress was being made quickly, but the Waikato-Tainui negotiators 
and the people themselves had been waiting for many years. Some Waikato-Tainui 
negotiators had been involved in the 1984 Hikoi ki Waitangi; others had been in the battle 
over the Huntly Power Station in the 1970s and other events before that.186 The perception of 
progress was certainly relative. 
The concern amongst Waikato-Tainui negotiators of the slow pace of the negotiations 
was greatly heightened as the 1993 elections neared. Mahuta believed that the Crown had 
“adjourned the negotiations by its inaction…Until the Crown sorts out its own position all 
Maaori claimants will suffer the frustrations that our people are currently experiencing.” 
Mahuta’s opinion had not softened anymore by the very end of 1993. “Either the rules are 
secret or there are no rules at all and the participants are forced to make them up as they go or 
respond to announced changes in game plan because of other players with undisclosed 
intentions...No private sector corporate could survive processes so convoluted, 
procrastinatory and demanding as these are.”187 Mahuta was referring to the role that key 
players in government could have on the negotiations, such as Treasury and the Minister of 
Finance especially. Mahuta’s comments reflected the difficulty of engaging in negotiations 
with no concrete system in place to govern the process. 
As 1993 ended one of Waikato-Tainui’s principal commercial advisors, Brent 
Wheeler, sent a letter to ToWPU officials expressing Waikato-Tainui’s disappointment with 
the state of the negotiations at the end of another frustrating year. "We note that given 
186 Robert Macdonald, The Fifth Wind, (Auckland: Hodder & Stoughton, 1989); Robert Mahuta, “Tainui, 
Kīngitanga and Raupatu.” 
187 ToWPU official 4 to Graham, 3 October 1993, AAKW W5105 7812 22, Archives NZ; Mahuta to Graham, 
28 September 1993, RC Vol 32, Box 12, W-T archives; M Roderick, “Land claim talks ‘stalled’”, New Zealand 
Herald, 7 December 1993.  
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uncertainties about the mode and practicalities of government over the coming period, there 
may be some difficulties in formulating and implementing policy expeditiously." The Crown 
always stated during the negotiations that it refused to adopt a piece-meal approach to 
compensation or the return of land, and instead vied for swift resolution that was full and 
final. The slow rate of progress had considerably dampened the enthusiasm of the wider 
Waikato-Tainui community.188 As 1994 began, Waikato-Tainui negotiators did not perceive 
that the two parties were any closer to an agreement than they had been when negotiations 
began with National in 1991.  
188 Brent Wheeler to ToWPU official 4, 22 November 1993, RC Vol 32, Box 12, W-T archives. 
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Part II: Ngāi Tahu’s negotiations with the Fourth Labour Government and 
Fourth National Government  
Waitangi Tribunal hearings and the development of the first land-bank 
 
In August 1986 Henare Rakiihia Tau on behalf of the Ngāi Tahu Māori Trust Board 
submitted a claim to the Waitangi Tribunal about the government’s announcement to transfer 
Crown land interests to State-Owned Enterprises. Over the following year and a half seven 
further amendments to their statement of claim were made that set out Ngāi Tahu’s 
grievances arising from land purchases and the lack of reserves provided by the Crown, and 
the loss of access to food gathering areas (mahinga kai) including both sea and inland 
fisheries.189 Tau was the Deputy Chairman of the Ngāi Tahu Māori Trust Board. Tau was the 
head (upoko) of the Ngai Tuahuriri hapū of Ngāi Tahu based around Tuahiwi Marae near 
Kaiapoi outside of Christchurch. Tipene O’Regan was the Chairman of the Ngāi Tahu Māori 
Trust Board, and he and Tau formed an effective partnership in leading the Ngāi Tahu claim 
in the 1980s. O’Regan was also the Chairman of the Mawhera Incorporation, a Ngāi Tahu 
landowners trust on the West Coast of the South Island that was established in 1976.190 From 
August 1987 to October 1989 the Ngāi Tahu claim was heard by the Waitangi Tribunal.  
At the conclusion of Ngāi Tahu’s Waitangi Tribunal hearings in October 1989 the 
Presiding Officer Judge Ashley McHugh expressed concerns with the continuing alienation 
of Crown land in the South Island. Following the Tribunal hearings Tau and O’Regan 
brought the Presiding Officer’s comments to the attention of the Crown and asked that a 
system be established where the Ngāi Tahu Māori Trust Board would be consulted before any 
Crown land was alienated.191 By mid-December 1989 the Solicitor-General and Acting 
189 Waitangi Tribunal, The Ngāi Tahu  Report, 3-10. 
190 Ann Parsonson, “The Whale that Awoke,” 257. 
191 Judge Ashley McHugh, “Concluding Remarks,” 10 October 1989; David Palmer to Minister of Lands Peter 
Tapsell: C-27-4-02 Vol. 1, OTS archive. 
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Deputy-Director General of Lands, following discussions with Tau Senior and O’Regan, 
proposed an early warning system (or land-bank) under which the Ngāi Tahu Māori Trust 
Board would be notified prior to the alienation of Crown land in the Ngāi Tahu rohe. The 
system originally was confined to Department of Lands Crown land but the Acting Deputy 
Director-General of Lands stated to O’Regan that he hoped that other Crown agencies would 
also become subject to the system. If the Crown land was not subject to offer-back 
requirements under the Public Works Act 1981, a representative of the Ngāi Tahu Māori 
Trust Board (NTMTB) was informed of the pending sale.192 The NTMTB would then have to 
decide whether it wanted to retain the land as part of a future settlement. O’Regan sought a 
blanket ban on the sale of all Crown land in the Ngāi Tahu rohe but he understood that the 
early warning system was a fair compromise. The Crown provided funding for the NTMTB 
to employ a specialist to aid the Trust Board in its selection of properties for inclusion.193 
The Commissioner of Crown Lands was tasked with coordinating the system in 1990 
(its first year of operation) and encountered some difficulties. One of the issues related to 
government departments ignoring the new directive to warn a third party, the Ngāi Tahu 
Māori Trust Board, before disposing of their surplus assets. There was also a fear that 
government Departments would not be compensated for the loss of revenue from the sale.  
Eventually a Cabinet directive was developed to refund to individual departments and SOEs 
the loss of revenue from placing Crown properties in Ngāi Tahu’s land-bank, and later other 
192 Public Works Act 1981, Section 40: When land taken under the Public Works Act was no longer required for 
a public purpose, Section 40 of the Act provided an offer-back mechanism to the previous owner for purchase. 
193 DoSLI official 3 to David Palmer, 14 December 1989; O’Regan to Tapsell, 15 December 1989; Tapsell to 
O’Regan, 20 December 1989; Tapsell to Geoffrey Palmer, 20 September 1989: C-27-4-02 Vol.1, OTS archive. 
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land-banks. Departments and SOEs were paid full market value for the properties by the 
Ministry of Justice.194 
Fourth National Government: Negotiations with Ngāi Tahu 
 
By the time the main Ngāi Tahu report was released in early February 1991 the size of 
ToWPU had marginally increased but the coordination of Treaty policy was very difficult 
across the different Crown agencies and departments, despite the fact that the Crown Task 
Force on Treaty of Waitangi Issues met regularly. The general thrust of the report was 
accepted by both the Crown and Ngāi Tahu as a basis for the negotiations. Each had their 
problems with some of the Tribunal’s findings but agreed to set their disagreements aside 
during the negotiations.195 The report was the largest and most comprehensive report 
produced by the Tribunal at that time. Its analysis was extended past the middle of 1991 as 
officials from the CLO, Treasury, Manatu Māori, and the Department of Conservation (DoC) 
became involved in its examination.196 Ngāi Tahu’s negotiations formally began in 
September 1991, seven months after the Waitangi Tribunal’s Ngāi Tahu Report was released. 
Monthly meetings were held until the negotiations broke down in mid-1994. These 
meetings were very formal gatherings led by each side’s main negotiator, Tipene O’Regan 
for Ngāi Tahu and Graham for the Crown. They were similar in structure to Waikato-Tainui’s 
negotiations with the Crown. The named claimant for Ngāi Tahu’s Waitangi Tribunal claim, 
194 DPMC official 1 to Prime Minister’s Private Secretary, 3 November 1989; Commissioner of Crown Lands, 
“The Ngāi Tahu  Consultative Process,” December 1989; STA (91) M 19/5; ECC (91) M 38/1; CAB (91) M 
27/10: all C-27-4-02 Vol.1, OTS archive. 
195 Minutes of a Meeting between Ngāi Tahu  and Crown Negotiators, 18 September 1991, C-27-8-01 Vol. 4, 
OTS archive; Framework Agreement between Ngāi Tahu  and the Crown, 27 November 1991, C-27-2-02 Vol. 
3, OTS archive. 
196 Treasury official 6 to ToWPU official 5, “Proposed Plan of Action for Dealing with Waitangi Tribunal’s 
Ngāi Tahu  Report,” 17 April 1991; Treasury official 3 to ToWPU official 5, “Ngāi Tahu  – Action Plan,” 24 
April 1991; Treasury official 3 to ToWPU official 5, “Ngāi Tahu  – Proposed Plan of Action,” 26 April 1991; 
CAB (91) M 19/22; ToWPU official 6, “Ngāi Tahu  Negotiations – Interim Synthesis Report,” 2 September 
1991 all C-27-8-01 Vol. 4, OTS archive. 
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Henare Rakiihia Tau Senior, was a co-negotiator.  Nick Davidson was appointed as Ngāi 
Tahu’s lead legal consultant when Paul Temm stepped aside after acting as lead counsel for 
Ngāi Tahu during the Tribunal Hearings. Davidson was a prominent lawyer from the law 
firm Bell Gully Buddle Weir. A commercial development consultant, Stephen Jennings, was 
also appointed. Jennings was an economist for investment bank Credit Suisse First Boston 
and formerly worked for the Treasury. The Secretary of the Ngāi Tahu Māori Trust Board 
(NTMTB), Sid Ashton, also played a prominent officials level role for Ngāi Tahu.197 Ashton 
had been the Secretary of the NTMTB since the mid-1970s and played an active role in Ngāi 
Tahu’s Waitangi Tribunal hearings in the late 1980s. The Crown’s A Team consisted of 
Graham and Secretary of Justice David Oughton. The B Team initially was made up of a 
diverse array of officials from various different government departments and headed by 
ToWPU.198 Dozens of officials would come and go during the negotiations, the only constant 
on the Crown’s side throughout was Graham.199  
There were a number of specific redress issues to address in Ngāi Tahu’s negotiations 
for which the Tribunal had made recommendations: Ngāi Tahu management and ownership 
of Whenua Hou (Codfish Island), the return of pounamu, the Arahura Valley, the Crown Titi 
Islands, Lake Waihora and many other specific sites. The negotiations regarding the extent of 
financial compensation (which will be explored in detail in Chapter 2); and lands contained in 
Ngāi Tahu’s land bank (some of which will be explored in Chapter 3) were also prominent 
on-going issues during the first three years of negotiations from 1991-1994. While those 
issues were pressing and began to be addressed early in the negotiations, the first major issue 
on the table for Ngāi Tahu was the creation of a legal entity that would enable Ngāi Tahu 
197 “Ngāi Tahu Annual Hui, 22-24 November 1991,” NT140 M14 ©, MB archive.  
198 “Crown Negotiating Team for the Ngāi Tahu Claim,” 11 September 1991, NE-12-027-00-02 Vol. 1, OTS 
archive.  
199 Davidson, “Lunch with [TPK official 1],” 13 February 1996, Vhi 48 (j), TRONT archive. 
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control over Ngāi Tahu affairs. The Ngāi Tahu Māori Trust Board structure that had been in 
place since their 1944 settlement was viewed as impinging on Ngāi Tahu’s rangatiratanga, 
because it was accountable to the Crown rather than to the Ngāi Tahu people and marae.    
The establishment of Te Rūnanga o Ngāi Tahu and rangatiratanga 
 
The drive to establish an entity that had a legal personality in the late twentieth 
century stemmed from the desire for a rūnanga-based organisation. As Te Maire Tau has 
noted, “Ngāi Tahu’s response to the loss of land was to organise themselves into hapū and 
village rūnanga.” These rūnanga sought redress from the government and organised 
themselves to tackle what would become known by the early twentieth century as the Ngāi 
Tahu claim, Te Kereme.200 Marae across the large Ngāi Tahu region worked together but 
there was no unifying structure due to a lack of funding. The 1920 Native Land Claims Royal 
Commission chaired by Robert Noble reported on only one of the eight purchases that took 
place from 1844-1864, Kemp’s purchase.201 The Commission recommended £354,000 as 
compensation and in 1928 the Ngaitahu Trust Board was established to receive the funds. It 
was not until 1944, when the Ngāi Tahu Claim Settlement Act was passed, that Ngāi Tahu 
were allocated £10,000 annually over a thirty year period or a total of £300,000. The 
settlement spurred the creation of a centralised Ngāi Tahu structure, the Ngāi Tahu Māori 
Trust Board.202 The 1946 Ngāi Tahu Trust Board Act authorised the Board to administer the 
funds received in the 1944 settlement but it was limited in its recognition of Ngāi Tahu 
rangatiratanga. The Board, like all other Maori Trust Boards of the time, would ultimately be 
accountable to a Minister of the Crown rather to the members of Ngāi Tahu. In 1955 the Ngāi 
200 Te Maire Tau, “Ngāi Tahu – From ‘Better Be Dead and Out of the Way’ to ‘Be Seen and to Belong,’” 228. 
201 In 1848 Henry Tacy Kemp, acting in the role of Crown Land Purchasing Officer, purchased approximately 
20 million acres of land in present-day Canterbury and provided only miniscule reserves to Ngāi Tahu: Waitangi 
Tribunal, Ngāi Tahu Report, 51-82, 387-524. 




                                                          
Tahu Trust Board Act was repealed and replaced with the Māori Trust Boards Act that 
applied Ngāi Tahu (and Waikato-Tainui)’s Trust Board structure to some Māori groups 
around the country. By the early 1980s members of the Ngāi Tahu Māori Trust Board 
considered developing a governing structure that would incorporate input from Ngāi Tahu 
rūnanga.203  
Due to growing dissatisfaction within Ngāi Tahu with the Trust Board structure and 
as a precursor to a more robust legal personality, some members advocated forming an 
Incorporated Society of Rūnanga at a hui at Arowhenua in 1988. By the end of 1989 an 
Incorporated Society, Te Rūnanganui o Tahu, came into being. Its charter stated that the 
purpose of the body was “to protect, to advance, to develop and to unify the interests of Ngāi 
Tahu in the true spirit of tino rangatiratanga implicit in the Treaty of Waitangi.”204 It operated 
separately but in concert with the Ngāi Tahu Māori Trust Board.  
In 1990 the Labour government passed the Rūnanga Iwi Act that provided established 
tribal authorities with extensive governing powers. It was shortly thereafter repealed by the 
new incoming National government because it was claimed that too many Māori people had 
severed their connections with their respective iwi and as such the tribal authorities would not 
be representative of the majority of Māoridom. Ngāi Tahu was firmly opposed to its repeal, 
noting that it had given some recognition of tino rangatiratanga for Māori. Ngāi Tahu 
believed that those aspects should not be repealed, rather the Rūnanga Iwi Act should be 
amended. After the repeal of the act, the Waitangi Tribunal and the Court of Appeal noted the 
lack of recognition by the Crown of a legal personality for Ngāi Tahu and that recognising 
their legal personality would go some way towards restoring the guarantee of tino 
203 Stephanie Kelly, "The Ngāi Tahu Māori Trust Board", University of Canterbury, MA Thesis, 1991, 36.  
204 Crofts, Charles, "Kaiwhakahaere Report", Ngāi Tahu Māori Trust Board Annual Report, 1996, 26-27, 
TRONT archive.  
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rangatiratanga which was inherent in the signing of the Treaty.205 Ngāi Tahu’s desire for a 
legal personality was to ensure that it had full control of their own social and economic 
affairs following settlement unlike the previous Māori Trust Boards which had been 
subservient to the Crown.206 The Ministerial control of the Māori Trust Boards was so strong 
that the Boards were unable to spend $200 without the Minister’s approval.207 Ngāi Tahu 
sought a rūnanga-based organisation. Ngāi Tahu leaders would be accountable first and 
foremost to their rūnanga, marae and the whanau of Ngāi Tahu, rather than the Crown.  
 In a mid-1991 memorandum to Doug Graham regarding the issue of Ngāi Tahu's legal 
personality, O’Regan stressed that the issue was extremely important in terms of not only 
fulfilling the Crown's need to recognise Ngāi Tahu's tino rangatiratanga but providing a legal 
personality would also address what O’Regan referred to as the Crown's oft-cited nightmare 
of successive Ngāi Tahu generations returning to re-assert their claim. Unlike the early 
Waikato-Tainui negotiations that were dominated by full and final discussions regarding the 
1946 Waikato-Maniapoto Māori Claims Settlement Act, Ngāi Tahu’s negotiations did not 
address the spirit or intent of their 1944 settlement. This may have been as a result of both the 
Tribunal’s finding that the 1944 settlement was very limited in its scope and terms of 
reference, and the Crown’s earlier experience with the issue during Waikato-Tainui’s 
negotiations in 1989 and 1990. By enabling Ngāi Tahu to have stronger control of its fate in 
any post-settlement situation, O’Regan stated, the settlement would have a strong sense of 
205 Hill, Māori and the State: Crown-Māori Relations in New Zealand/Aotearoa 1950-2000, 241-43; Tipene 
O’Regan, “Submission to the Repeal of the Runanga Iwi Act 1990,” C-27-2-04 Vol. 1, OTS archive; Waitangi 
Tribunal, The Ngāi Tahu Claim: Supplementary Report on Ngāi Tahu  Legal Personality (Wellington: GP 
Books, 1991). 
206 Tipene O’Regan, “The Ngāi Tahu Claim,” in Waitangi (ed.) Hugh Kawharu (Auckland: Oxford University 
Press, 1989), 259. 
207 Gabrielle Huria, “The Bill: Ngāi Tahu putting a stamp on our identity and tribal rights,” Te Karaka, 
Raumati/Summer 1996, 6.  
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finality. Ngāi Tahu emphatically did not want to follow the problematic post-settlement 
situations that had developed internationally.208  
 As the negotiations began in September 1991 Ngāi Tahu indicated to the Crown that 
the establishment of their legal personality was a key starting-point for the negotiations. A 
draft of a bill to recognise Ngāi Tahu's legal personality was sent to the iwi on 8 November 
1991 and was reviewed by the Ngāi Tahu team. Ngāi Tahu recommended significant 
revisions. There was clearly some Crown discomfort with the use of the term rangatiratanga 
as Ngai Tahu had recommended the “Ngāi Tahu Rangatiratanga Recognition Bill.” Manatu 
Māori officials had changed the name of the bill to the “Ngāi Tahu Bill.” Ngāi Tahu's legal 
advisor, Nick Davidson, affirmed that the title contained the term rangatiratanga for a specific 
purpose, and that its meaning was quite literal and necessary for the bill. The recitals formed 
a key part of the legislation as they canvassed the historical basis for the legislation. The 
recitals were a condensed history of Ngāi Tahu’s attempts to have its rangatiratanga 
recognised over the years. The Crown had completely omitted the recitals from the first draft 
of the bill. Davidson believed the recitals were necessary to place the bill in its historical 
perspective.209 
 In the next draft of the bill Manatu Māori had still not inserted rangatiratanga into the 
title, without explanation. Davidson wrote to both the Secretary of Justice and to the Manatu 
Māori official that the changes that he had provided the week before were absolutely 
necessary. While some recitals had been inserted, they had only a bare resemblance to the 
recitals originally provided by Ngāi Tahu. Graham advised Manatu Māori that while Ngāi 
Tahu continued to assert that the term rangatiratanga was necessary in the recitals, title and 
208 O’Regan to Graham, 30 June 1991, C-27-2-04 Vol. 1, OTS archive.  
209 Winston Peters to Graham, 2 August 1991 & Nick Davidson to Manatu Māori official 1, 13 November 1991: 
both C-27-2-04 Vol. 1, OTS archive.  
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purpose of the bill, he had convinced Ngāi Tahu to agree subsequently that the term 
kawanatanga also had to be included as a quid pro quo. A reference to Article I and Article II 
of the Treaty of Waitangi would then be the best vehicle for this.210 
 The Crown Law Office (CLO) too was particularly concerned with the use of the term 
rangatiratanga in the proposed legal personality bill. The Crown had been arguing throughout 
all of its Court proceedings with Māori claimants that it was the executive and not the Courts 
which could alone determine Treaty policy. One CLO official feared that by guaranteeing 
tino rangatiratanga to Ngāi Tahu within its rohe it would challenge the Crown in the Courts 
over the use and ownership of resources. With the recent support from the Courts for some 
Māori claimants the CLO feared that it would be best to oppose the use of the term 
rangatiratanga. CLO noted further that the Tribunal had not recommended that the Crown 
recognise Ngāi Tahu's rangatiratanga specifically through legislation so that it was not 
necessary in this way. Although the Crown could, and at times did, ignore the Waitangi 
Tribunal’s recommendations, it could also use the Tribunal’s recommendations to its own 
advantage when necessary. CLO believed that the establishment of a legal personality was 
possible without the use of the term rangatiratanga.211 
 Another CLO official had a similar opinion. She also felt that Ngāi Tahu’s proposed 
bill went far beyond what was necessary for establishing Ngāi Tahu's legal personality. Once 
again the use of the term rangatiratanga was of particular concern and she stressed that there 
were not only legal implications but also constitutional ones. By affirming Ngāi Tahu's 
rangatiratanga it was feared that the Crown would be interpreted by the Courts as giving Ngāi 
Tahu the right to regulate its own laws and justice system and that this would create serious 
210 Nick Davidson to David Oughton & CLO official 1, 20 November 1991, C-27-2-04 Vol. 1, OTS archive; 
Graham to TPK official 2, 21 November 1991, C-27-2-04 Vol. 1, OTS archive. 
211 CLO official 2 to Graham, 25 November 1991, C-27-2-04 Vol. 1, OTS archive. 
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constitutional issues. While she stressed that she understood that the Crown should not be 
seen as imposing upon Ngāi Tahu in any way there needed to be some accountability 
measures in place. The notion of the “principles of the Treaty of Waitangi” had come under 
some criticism by government MPs and thus she thought that the term rangatiratanga would 
face even more opposition. At their monthly meetings until the end of 1991 Ngāi Tahu 
negotiators stressed that the inclusion of direct references to rangatiratanga were necessary in 
their legal personality legislation, and especially the reference to Article II of the Treaty of 
Waitangi in Te Reo Māori.212 
 The Solicitor-General, JJ McGrath, was concerned about including a term such as 
“rangatiratanga” in legislation when there had not been an agreed definition of the word by 
both negotiating parties. The Solicitor-General, supported by ToWPU officials, 
recommended a consultation between the Crown and Māoridom to determine the definition 
of “rangatiratanga” with much the same structure as the negotiating process. In this way a 
proper definition could be found. A ToWPU official noted the Solicitor-General’s desire for a 
consultation to provide a concrete definition of the term “rangatiratanga” and supported the 
idea. She did note, however, that “in regard to the precedent effect of an agreement between 
the Crown and Ngāi Tahu on this matter, it must be noted that Ngāi Tahu's meaning of 
rangatiratanga may not accord with views held by other iwi.”213 
 After having met with Graham on 4 December 1991 O’Regan sought to address the 
Crown’s concerns with Ngāi Tahu's draft bill. Crown officials’ concerns regarding 
“justiciability and 'self-government” would be addressed by deleting the first part of the long 
title to the Bill, which had read: “To recognise the tino rangatiratanga of Ngāi Tahu Whānui.” 
212 CLO official 3 to ToWPU official 7, 25 November 1991, C-27-2-04 Vol. 1, OTS archive; “Meeting between 
Crown and Ngāi Tahu  Negotiators,” 27 November 1991, C-27-2-03 Vol.1, OTS archive. 
213 JJ McGrath to Graham, 6 December 1991; ToWPU official 7 to David Oughton, 9 December 1991: both C-
27-2-04 Vol. 1, OTS archive, 1. 
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Also deleted would be one of the recitals which stated that “Ngāi Tahu asserts that its tino 
rangatiratanga resides in its papatipu rūnanga represented in Te Rūnanganui o Tahu 
Incorporated.” O’Regan stressed that while the two passages above could be removed, they 
could not delete the first two recitals which stated that "the tino rangatiratanga of Ngāi Tahu 
existed prior to Ngāi Tahu signing the Treaty of Waitangi in 1840” and “the Treaty of 
Waitangi confirmed and guaranteed the tino rangatiratanga of Ngāi Tahu" because Ngāi Tahu 
could not have signed the Treaty of Waitangi if it did not hold tino rangatiratanga over the 
land and its people. He stated further that it was a fact that the Treaty of Waitangi confirmed 
and guaranteed the tino rangatiratanga because it stated so in the Māori version of the Treaty 
of Waitangi. O'Regan also wondered whether a more “bare bones” piece of legislation could 
address their legal personality or if a deed between Ngāi Tahu and the Crown could be 
executed which acknowledged Ngāi Tahu's rangatiratanga outside of Parliament and would 
therefore be non-justiciable. Graham informed O'Regan that the legal personality bill would 
not be introduced to Parliament before the end of the year. The Crown was still concerned 
regarding the use of the term "rangatiratanga" and felt that it would need to be discussed with 
Crown Law and Parliamentary Counsel.214  
 A special meeting was arranged in February 1992 to focus on the development of 
Ngāi Tahu's legal personality legislation and specifically the term rangatiratanga but its 
inclusion was repeatedly rejected by Te Puni Kōkiri (TPK), in addition to the CLO. 
According to Ngāi Tahu advisor Nick Davidson, TPK’s views on the matter were the only 
negative reactions to Ngāi Tahu's proposals at the special meeting, not the CLO. TPK 
officials contended that there was no way to specifically define rangatiratanga whereas Ngāi 
Tahu negotiators stressed that Ngāi Tahu would have its own way of defining rangatiratanga. 
214 O’Regan to Graham, 11 December 1991 & Graham to O’Regan 17 December 1991: C-27-2-04 Vol. 1, OTS 




                                                          
Its definition was not contingent on acceptance by all Māoridom. Later in the meeting the 
same TPK officials were also reported as emphasising that Māori participation in 
conservation and management decisions should be kept to a minimum.215 At the regular 
monthly March 1992 meeting between the Crown and Ngāi Tahu the CEO of TPK, Wira 
Gardiner, reported that due to staff turnover at the Ministry little work had been completed on 
Ngāi Tahu’s legal personality legislation.216 By the third and fourth draft of the legal 
personality bill there was not a single reference to rangatiratanga contained in the recitals or 
in the bill.217 It would be another four years until Ngāi Tahu's legal personality was 
recognised by Parliament. This delay stemmed largely from the internal dissention within 
Ngāi Tahu, coupled with the stalling power of the Parliamentary Select Committee process.  
Internal opposition from Waitaha, Tuhuru and Ngāti Mamoe 
 
 It was in early 1992 that internal opposition to Ngāi Tahu negotiators began to 
manifest itself. ToWPU began to receive letters from dissident groups within some hapū from 
the West Coast of the South Island and Southland—identifying themselves as Ngāti Mamoe, 
Tuhuru and Waitaha—who claimed that the Ngāi Tahu Māori Trust Board had not involved 
them in discussions over the development of a legal personality.218 O'Regan was concerned 
that after going through all the trouble of fighting off external challenges, Ngāi Tahu would 
now have to combat constant internal challenges. He predicted that the Crown would not 
215 One of Ngāi Tahu’s advisors mused: "How do these people live with themselves?" To be fair the officials 
were acting in the role of public servant so maybe that advice was expected of them. Nick Davidson, “Vogel 
House Meeting,” 10 February 1992, Vh 12 (c) Box 150, TRONT archive. 
216 “Minutes of 1 March 1992 meeting between Ngāi Tahu and the Crown,” C-27-8-01 Vol. 1, OTS archive. 
217 “Draft Legal Personality Bill,” 25 February 1992, C-27-2-04 Vol. 2, OTS archive; Davidson to O’Regan, 28 
February 1992, Vhi 12 (g) Box 150, TRONT archive.   
218 ToWPU official 4 ToWPU official 6 file notes, February and March 1992, C-27-2-04 Vol. 2, OTS archive. 
Tuhuru and Waitaha were also challenging the allocation of fisheries quota. See Tipene O'Regan, “Old Myths 




                                                          
negotiate if that dissent existed.219 “I believe that the Government would run a mile from 
recognition of Ngāi Tahu if there was open internal dispute. Indeed, there is grave danger that 
a settlement could not be achieved by Ngāi Tahu with these parties rampaging through the 
process - leaving aside the legal personality legislation.”220 Up until this point, the Crown 
was negotiating with who it thought were the recognised leaders of the tribe. The issue of 
internal dissention only starts to be an issue when these objections began to be raised. 
Subsequently the Crown begins to state openly that it will only negotiate with the larger 
group, and that it is for the iwi to sort out their internal problems. 
 The representative for Tuhuru, Eli Weepu, contacted Graham and ToWPU officials to 
request legal personality legislation for Ngāi Tahu on the West Coast, “Tai Poutini Tangata 
Whenua.”221 Tuhuru had a competing view of rangatiratanga and believed that the Ngāi Tahu 
leadership had undermined their autonomy. They rejected Ngāi Tahu’s mandate to negotiate 
for them.222 In August 1992 lawyers for Tuhuru contacted the NTMTB to notify them that 
they would be taking their case to the Māori Land Court (MLC) to determine the issue of 
mana whenua on the West Coast. Their case was rejected by the MLC.223 Tuhuru then turned 
to the Waitangi Tribunal and requested an urgent hearing regarding the legal personality 
legislation but their claim did not meet the criteria for urgency.224 NTMTB representatives 
reported back to the iwi that the legal personality bill had been presented to hapū around the 
South Island and North Island at ten hui and that other than some Ngāti Mamoe, Tuhuru and 
219 O’Regan to Negotiating Team, 27 January 1992, MB Archives. 
220 O’Regan to Negotiating Team, 17 January 1992, Vhi 9B (k), TRONT archive. 
221 Eli Weepu to Graham and ToWPU official 3, 9 March 1992, C-27-2-01 Vol. 2, OTS archive.  
222 Te Runanga o Tuhuru to Doug Kidd [Minister of Māori Affairs], 22 May 1992; ToWPU official 7 to 
O’Regan, 27 July 1992: C-27-2-01 Vol. 2, OTS archive. 
223 Mohammed Shabadet to Charles Crofts, 25 August 1992, NT140 Mi (u), Macmillan Brown archives 
224 Edward Taihakerei Durie to Tuhuru, 22 December 1992, C-27-2-01 Vol. 2, OTS archive. Tuhuru attempted 
to submit a claim for urgency again in mid 1994: ToWPU official 8 to Graham, 8 June 1994, C-27-2-02 Vol. 3, 
OTS archive.  
89 
 
                                                          
Waitaha critics it had been received well.225 The first hui was held in Hokitika but those 
Tuhuru opposed to the Ngāi Tahu negotiators did not appear.226 At the annual Ngāi Tahu hui-
a-tau (annual meeting) held at Kaikoura marae in November 1992, a large majority supported 
the introduction of the Te Rūnanga o Ngāi Tahu Bill to Parliament.227 The Crown's position 
on Tuhuru was that Ngāi Tahu negotiators had a mandate to negotiate, and they expressed 
their preference for iwi negotiators in meetings with Ngāi Tahu.228 A paper was prepared by 
ToWPU for Cabinet in early September 1992 which sought permission to introduce 
legislation regarding Ngāi Tahu's legal personality. The paper stressed that the legislation 
would provide some certainty to the Crown regarding who it was engaged in negotiations 
with and a sense of finality to the settlement.229  
Internal opposition from some Ngāi Tahu hapū effectively delayed agreement on Ngāi 
Tahu’s legal personality. This opposition was assisted by Ngāi Tahu MPs Sandra Lee and 
Whetu Tirikatene-Sullivan who held the legislation up in Parliament.230 Lee was the 
Auckland Central MP from 1993-2001 for the Alliance Party. She affiliated to Ngāti Mamoe 
and Ngāi Tahu but was not involved in the Ngāi Tahu Māori Trust Board. Tirikatene-
Sullivan, also of Ngāi Tahu, was a Labour MP and held the Southern Māori seat from 1967-
1996. Her father, Eruera Tirikatene, was the main negotiator of the 1944 settlement 
negotiations.  Lee and Tirikatene-Sullivan were both vehemently opposed to O’Regan and 
the Ngāi Tahu Māori Trust Board.  O’Regan attempted to appeal to Tirikatene-Sullivan 
225 Meeting of the Ngāi Tahu Māori Trust Board, 6 and 9 November 1992, NT 140 A39 Box 11A, MB archives.  
226 Ngāi Tahu Māori Trust Board to Māori Affairs Select Committee, 29 September 1993, NT140 M4 (g) Box 
298, MB archives.  
227 “Hui a tau o Ngāi Tahu,” 5-7 November 1993, MB Archives; NZPD, 1996: 11947.  
228 ToWPU official 8 to CLO official 3, 26 May 1994, C-27-2-01 Vol. 2, OTS archive. Tuhuru were supported 
by the National Māori Congress: Charles Crofts to Api Mahuika, 11 February 1993, MB archives.  
229 Cabinet Memorandum Treaty of Waitangi Issues (92) 37, C-27-2-04 Vol. 2, OTS archive. 
230 Sandra Lee to Graham, 20 March 1992; Lee to Sid Ashton (NTMTB Secretary), 26 March 1992: NT140 Mi 
(u), MB archives.  
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directly to support the legislation but she maintained her opposition for many years.231 
O’Regan addressed the issue of legal personality in letters to Graham but there was little that 
Graham could do. Graham had introduced the legislation to Parliament but he could not force 
it through on his own. In March 1993 it was accorded urgency in Parliament.232 Once the Bill 
was introduced to Parliament, parts of the legislation came under review in the Māori Affairs 
Select Committee.233 Tirikatene-Sullivan and Lee were both on the Committee and they 
delayed the passage of the Bill. In a meeting with the Crown, Ngāi Tahu negotiators noted 
that Lee’s role in the delaying the legislation represented a conflict of interest. The Crown 
emphasised that there was “no deliberate attempt…to delay passage of the Bill” but it could 
not guarantee that the Bill would be passed even in 1994.234 
In March 1994 Tirikatene-Sullivan and Lee were invited to a meeting with members 
of a Ngāi Tahu hapū, Ngāi Tuahuriri, at the Tuahiwi Marae to discuss negotiations and the 
legal personality legislation. Tirikatene-Sullivan and Lee expressed their disappointment at 
the hasty speed at which the bill was progressed. O’Regan and the Ngāi Tahu Māori Trust 
Board on the other were frustrated with the consistent delays. O’Regan believed that 
Tirikatene-Sullivan and Lee had provided some misinformation to John Crofts, a 
representative of Ngāi Tuahuriri, who subsequently sent a letter to ToWPU officials asking 
that the legislation be delayed. The following day O'Regan had a meeting with other NTMTB 
members and a retraction of the letter was organised. O'Regan tried to explain to members of 
the board that the legal personality was the platform upon which Ngāi Tahu would build its 
settlement and regain a measure of rangatiratanga.235 O'Regan thought that the letter to the 
231 O’Regan to Whetu Tirikatene-Sullivan, 1 April 1992, MB archives.  
232 O’Regan to Graham, 1 February 1993; Minutes of 5 March 1993 meeting between Ngāi Tahu  and the 
Crown, C-27-2-02 Vol. 2, OTS archive. 
233 Minutes of 28 July 1993 meeting between Ngāi Tahu and the Crown, C-27-2-02 Vol. 2, OTS archive. 
234 Minutes of 26 January 1994 meeting between Ngāi Tahu and the Crown, C-27-2-02 Vol. 3, OTS archive. 
235 “Ngāi Tahu Māori Trust Board In Committee Minutes,” 8-10 April 1994, NT140 M14 (c), MB archives.  
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Crown had contributed irreparable damage to advancing the legislation through Parliament. 
When O’Regan corresponded with Graham in May 1994 regarding the delays in advancing 
the legislation, Graham stated that the situation had not been created by the Crown but by 
internal divisions within Ngāi Tahu.236 While in the case of the legal personality legislation it 
seemed that Graham was quite willing to support the bill, Ministers and officials could also 
use these internal divisions to justify whatever delays occurred on other issues such as the 
financial dimensions of the settlement.  
In early 1994 an internal review of the structure of Ngāi Tahu’s negotiations had 
emerged as a topic of discussion at Ngāi Tahu hui-a-tau. CS First Boston’s role in Ngāi 
Tahu’s negotiations and its role with the privatisation of the Electricty Corporation of New 
Zealand (ECNZ), a SOE, had come under some criticism by members of the Ngāi Tahu 
Māori Trust Board. Garry Moore and Mark Knowles, a Christchurch accountant and solicitor 
respectively, were asked by Ngāi Tahu to provide advice on not only CS First Boston’s 
potential conflict of interest but also the structure of negotiations in general. The pressure on 
negotiators during an extended period of marginal progress had begun to significantly ratchet 
up in 1994. Legal remedies as alternatives to negotiations were increasingly being 
considered, especially through forestry assets in the Ngāi Tahu rohe as well as common law 
action regarding the acquisition of Banks Peninsula.237  
Moore and Knowles’ report criticised both the Crown and specifically Graham for 
their role in the lack of progress but also the high cost of advisors to the Ngāi Tahu 
Negotiating Group. The report was meant to remain an internal document for Ngāi Tahu but 
it was quickly leaked to the press. Ngāi Tahu negotiators and advisors were put under 
236 Graham to O’Regan, 3 June 1994, C-27-4-01 Vol.3, OTS archive.  
237 “Ngāi Tahu hui-a-tau,” 21-22 January 1994, MB140, B(x)6 Box 53, MB archives; Davidson to Harry Evison, 




                                                          
considerable pressure for their alleged financial gain from the negotiating process. Graham 
was particularly concerned that Moore and Knowles had not been properly identified at a 
formal Crown-Ngāi Tahu meeting that they both attended. The incident only added to the 
tensions that existed between the Crown and Ngāi Tahu negotiators, and exacerbated the 
divisions within Ngāi Tahu.238 By November 1994 the negotiations between the Crown and 
Ngāi Tahu broke down, and would not resume until 1996. 
The legal personality bill predictably languished in such a context despite some 
efforts by the Chairman of the Māori Affairs Select Committee, Labour MP Koro Wetere.239 
When the Ngāi Tahu Negotiating Team decided to attempt to recommence negotiations in 
early 1996, they informed the Crown that the passage of the Ngāi Tahu legal personality bill 
was the most important aspect of the possibility of resuming negotiations.240 With the support 
of Prime Minister Jim Bolger, Minister of Māori Affairs Doug Kidd, and Graham on 17 April 
1996 the Te Rūnanga o Ngāi Tahu Bill was given its final reading in Parliament. When Royal 
Assent was given on 24 April 1996 the Ngāi Tahu Māori Trust Board was dissolved and 
replaced with Te Rūnanga o Ngāi Tahu.241 The new organisation was now accountable to the 
Ngāi Tahu rūnanga and people rather than to the Crown.  
Conclusion 
 
Waikato-Tainui and Ngāi Tahu submitted their claims to the Waitangi Tribunal only 
months apart in 1986, but their paths to negotiation were markedly different. Ngāi Tahu 
participated in Waitangi Tribunal hearings for two years from 1987 to 1989 while Waikato-
Tainui struggled to convince the Crown to begin direct negotiations. Finally in mid-1989 
238 Garry Moore & Michael Knowles, “Ngāi Tahu negotiations,” 30 June 1994, C-27-2-02 Vol. 3, OTS archive; 
Graham to O’Regan, 10 August 1994, C-27-2-02 Vol. 3, OTS archive. 
239 Ashton to all Ngāi Tahu negotiators and advisors, 7 March 1995, MB archives.  
240 Nick Davidson to OTS Director, 13 February 1996, TRONT archive. 
241 Te Runanga o Ngāi Tahu Act 1996. 
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Waikato-Tainui’s direct negotiations with the Fourth Labour government began, although 
they ended in August 1990 without a settlement. Ngāi Tahu’s negotiations with the Fourth 
National government began in September 1991, and Waikato-Tainui’s negotiations with 
National formally commenced only two months later in November 1991. Although the 
grievances of each iwi were as diverse as their paths to negotiations, both Waikato-Tainui 
and Ngāi Tahu placed their negotiations within the desire to re-assert rangatiratanga.  
In both negotiations the Crown maintained its overaching control of the process and 
limited both iwi’s efforts at re-asserting rangatiratanga by emphasising that any negotiations 
regarding sovereignty were off the table. For Waikato-Tainui this meant limits on the legal 
form in which lands would be returned, and at first, a focus on the finality of the 1946 
settlement. Ngai Tahu struggled to portray the establishment of Te Runanga o Ngāi Tahu as 
emblematic of the pursuit of rangatiratanga, a term which seemed to make Crown Law 
especially uncomfortable. The Crown also established that it would only negotiate with iwi 
leaders. Dissident hapū from within Ngāi Tahu and Waikato-Tainui opposed their iwi 
negotiators. For Ngāi Tahu the greatest level of dissent stemmed from the long struggle to 
establish a legal personality. Opposition from Waikato-Tainui hapū was focused on the 
vesting of settlement assets such as Hopuhopu and Te Rapa. From 1991-1994 both Waikato-
Tainui and Ngāi Tahu struggled to advance their negotiations as the Crown developed policy 
and settlement offers ad hoc. The political nature of Treaty settlement negotiations was 
evident in the limits that were placed on the wider negotiations early in the process, and the 
politics of negotiations was readily apparent as debates developed over the level of financial 




Chapter 2: The Economics of Ngāi Tahu and Waikato-Tainui’s 
Treaty settlements 
 
 Central to the tensions that arose during the course of the negotiations for both the 
Waikato-Tainui and Ngāi Tahu Treaty settlements was the question of how the total value of 
the settlements would be ascertained and dealt with. While the Crown approached the 
negotiations from the perspective that earlier settlements of the 1940s only required updating, 
negotiators for Waikato-Tainui and Ngāi Tahu believed that the amount returned to them had 
to reflect the value of what they had lost. Both iwi understood that full reimbursement would 
have been impossible, but they believed that some rationalisation or formula was necessary. 
The respective negotiations established some of the basic parameters by which the Treaty 
settlements were intended to provide recompense for past loss, and the extent to which they 
were intended to facilitate improved socio-economic position for Māori, through better 
education and employment. The settlements that were ultimately negotiated have been 
estimated as less than 1% of the value of the assets that were improperly acquired from the 
ownership of these groups.242 Although Ngāi Tahu spent more time than Waikato-Tainui in 
attempting to obtain a settlement that more accurately reflected what they perceived as the 
financial value of their losses, the question of quantification featured as a central part of both 
negotiations. For both, the question was whether the amount offered by the Crown was 
sufficient to secure an agreement to the Crown's requirement that Treaty settlements be a full 
and final settlement of their historical Treaty claims. In achieving full and final settlements, 
the Crown's focus was not only on limiting the amount made available in these settlements, 
but doing so in a way that set acceptable precedents for settlements to come.   
242 Damian Stone, ‘Financial and Commercial Dimensions of Settlement,’ in Nicola Wheen and Janine Hayward 
(eds.) Treaty of Waitangi Settlements (Bridget Williams Books, 2012), 145.  
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The question of the quantification of loss for Waikato-Tainui first arose in 1989 
during the Coalcorp case, when a Crown valuer estimated that the then current value of all 
the land in the raupatu area was approximately $6 billion.243 By 1995 it had grown in value to 
around $12 billion. Waikato-Tainui negotiators demanded that the approximate present day 
value of the lands confiscated by the Crown be included in the Deed of Settlement and 
legislation.244 From the beginning of the negotiations the Waikato-Tainui position was that 
they wanted all the Crown land remaining in the Waikato-Tainui raupatu area, which would 
form adequate compensation. But as the Crown’s asset base dwindled within that area from 
the beginning of the negotiations in 1989 to settlement in 1994, the monetary value of 
Waikato-Tainui’s preferred settlement diminished. For this reason, they did not attempt to 
advocate for a value for their settlement based on valuation studies, as Ngāi Tahu did. Ngāi 
Tahu’s valuation studies arrived at various estimates for the value of the reserves that were 
never granted by the Crown during the land purchases of 1844-1864. Each estimate was in 
the billions. As Ngāi Tahu continued to negotiate with the Crown over the question of how 
their settlement should be valued in the first half of 1992, Waikato-Tainui continued to 
explore how to transfer as much land as possible to Waikato-Tainui within the raupatu area. 
The transfer of the decommissioned Hopuhopu Army Base in late 1991 and early 1992 began 
this process. Gradually Waikato-Tainui’s land for land principle was accommodated within 
the Crown’s fiscal parameters.  
The Crown's position during these negotiations was based on the assumption that the 
settlements remained a political decision because it was impossible for Treaty grievances to 
be fully compensated. This symbolised the dominance of the Crown’s sovereignty over the 
rangatiratanga espoused by Waikato-Tainui and Ngāi Tahu. While these questions were 
243 “Affidavit of Ross Calderwood,” Tainui Māori Trust Board v Attorney-General [1989] 2 NZLR 513 (CA).  
244 McCan, Whatiwhatihoe, 263.   
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played out in the course of negotiations, it was another settlement - the fisheries settlement, 
signed in September 1992 – that ultimately set the benchmark for the settlements with Ngāi 
Tahu and Waikato-Tainui. Only two days before the fisheries settlement was signed, Cabinet 
set an undefined cap on the total amount of money available for all settlements. Following the 
signing of the fisheries settlement, the figure of $170 million began to appear in the meeting 
minutes between ToWPU and Waikato-Tainui advisors as well as personal one-on-one 
meetings between Principal Waikato-Tainui negotiator Robert Mahuta and Justice Minister 
Graham.245 After the fisheries settlement, the Crown developed its policy for establishing the 
total sum available for all Treaty settlements, which became known as the 'fiscal envelope'. 
Later, after the fiscal envelope was officially dropped as Crown policy, rather than focus on 
the total amount available, the Crown focused on using overall financial limits to determine 
how Treaty settlements might be related to each other.246 Ultimately, not only did the amount 
set aside for the fisheries settlement become the maximum amount the Crown would set aside 
for both Waikato-Tainui and Ngāi Tahu, this would also become entrenched in the relativity 
clauses that established how these settlements would be related to future settlements with 
other Māori groups. These issues - the quantification of loss and the development of the fiscal 
envelope policy – were among the major questions addressed throughout the Waikato-Tainui 
and Ngāi Tahu negotiations. 
Waikato-Tainui and Ngāi Tahu maintained that their settlements could not be full and 
final because the redress offered by the Crown represented a mere fraction of the total 
financial loss. Waikato-Tainui and Ngāi Tahu settlement negotiators often faced repeated 
questioning from their respective communities arguing the same point—settlements would 
have to be significantly enlarged to be considered full and final. Throughout Waikato-
245 Denese Henare to Mahuta, 4 March 1993; Mahuta file note, 18 May 1993: both RC Vol 30 1993, Box 11, W-
T archives. 
246The term fiscal envelope was progressively phased out and the Crown would begin to refer to the financial 
redress available for a settling group as the quantum policy. 
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Tainui’s negotiations the issue of finality remained prominent at all times. During these 
negotiations it was unclear how financially significant the settlement would be. Waikato-
Tainui negotiators and advisors consistently pressed on the Crown that finality was 
impossible under the fiscal constraints that the Crown, with Treasury advising it, had placed 
on the process.  Ngāi Tahu was equally concerned with the durability that a limited settlement 
would have throughout its negotiations. At first the focus was on the limited compensation or 
quantum that would be provided. Later, after Waikato-Tainui’s 1995 settlement which only 
addressed Waikato-Tainui’s claims to confiscated land and not their claims to West Harbours 
or Waikato River, Ngāi Tahu pushed for a similar settlement that would only address their 
land-based grievances and thus could be confidently presented to Ngāi Tahu members. The 
Crown refused and Ngāi Tahu’s settlement was required to cover all of its claims.  
While the Crown maintained that their settlements would have to be full and final, 
both Waikato-Tainui and Ngāi Tahu were able to negotiate a provision in their settlements 
that ensured that they would not be final for many years: the relativity clause. For every 
dollar that the Crown spent over the fiscal cap of $1 billion (1994 dollars) that was allocated 
for Treaty settlements, Waikato-Tainui could request 17% as a top-up to their settlement. 
Having negotiated their settlement nearly two years after Waikato-Tainui’s settlement, Ngāi 
Tahu was able to negotiate a 16.1% top-up for every dollar spent over the $1 billion threshold 
as the value of its settlement was marginally less as Ngāi Tahu had been paid in October 
1996 dollars rather than the December 1994 dollars Waikato-Tainui received and thus the 
purchasing power of their $170 million was less. In the end the relativity clause would 
provide a powerful rationale for Waikato-Tainui and Ngāi Tahu negotiators to press their 
respective members to accept the final settlements on offer. The relativity clauses would also 
serve as a challenge to the Crown’s need for financial certainty.  Although the clauses did not 
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represent a distinct challenge to the Crown’s sovereignty, it did affect its kawanatanga or 
right to govern, and enhanced Ngāi Tahu’s rangatiratanga.  
Alan Ward has argued that both settlements were not necessarily viewed by the 
Crown as worth $170 million, but rather as approximately 17% of the total amount available 
for all settlements—the fiscal envelope.247 Certainly by the time Waikato-Tainui and Ngāi 
Tahu demanded relativity clauses, the Crown acquiesced to their requests to facilitate both 
settlements. When the Crown made a $170 million settlement offer to Waikato-Tainui in 
1994, the Cabinet paper approving the offer and the Heads of Agreement noted that the sum 
represented 17% of the total amount available for all settlements. In Trick or Treaty? Graham 
stated that the total value of Crown lands available for transfer was about $100 million, the 
decommissioned Te Rapa Airbase was valued at approximately $5 million, and $65 million 
would be provided to purchase additional lands, and they only happened to add up to $170 
million.248 This was a result of the development of the Crown’s Proposals for Treaty 
settlements from 1992-1994, but the original influence of the $170 million figure had to have 
been from the fisheries settlement. Graham asked his ToWPU officials to refer specifically in 
their draft Cabinet paper regarding the Waikato-Tainui offer to the fact that the Fisheries 
settlement had set the benchmark at $170 million.249 The Crown would retrospectively 
provide a rationalisation of the Waikato-Tainui settlement as 17% of the total amount 
available, and Waikato-Tainui gladly used that rationale to obtain the relativity clause, but the 
origin of the $170 million figure was most likely from the fisheries settlement since the 
figures were identical.  
  
247 Ward, An Unsettled History, 54-55. 
248 Graham, Trick or Treaty?, 74. 
249 ToWPU official 9, “File Note, Re: Meeting”, 4 October 1994, TC30 Vol. 37, OTS archive. 
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Part I: Ngāi Tahu, quantification of loss and the fiscal envelope 
Divergent views: Ngāi Tahu “rights” vs. Treasury “needs” 
 
Ngāi Tahu and the Crown began their negotiations in September 1991 with the 
intention of arriving at a quickly negotiated settlement. Alongside discussions about the 
establishment of Ngāi Tahu’s legal personality, negotiations focussed on how loss would be 
valued and what redress could be provided. Because the Crown pressed Ngāi Tahu to make 
an opening proposal as negotiations got under way, Ngāi Tahu commissioned considerable 
research to establish the value of Ngāi Tahu’s loss. The Crown did not believe that research 
was necessary because of the political nature of the agreement, but agreed to consider the 
results of Ngāi Tahu’s investigations. 
Although the Waitangi Tribunal report was a thorough examination of Ngāi Tahu’s 
claims against the Crown, there were no specific recommendations for settling Ngāi Tahu’s 
economic loss. At the commencement of the hearings both the claimants and the Crown had 
asked the Tribunal to make findings on the issues and determine whether there had been 
breaches of any Treaty principles, but to defer the question of remedies to allow for a 
negotiated settlement. During the Tribunal hearings Ngāi Tahu argued that the Crown had 
promised to reserve for Ngāi Tahu a tenth of the land that was sold. The Tribunal was unable 
to locate specific evidence of Crown promises made to that effect, but it nonetheless found 
that the Crown had breached Treaty principles by providing insufficient reserves to Ngāi 
Tahu—approximately 24,500 acres out of a total of approximately 34 million acres. While 
the Tribunal did not specifically find that a tenth of the total land area sold by Ngāi Tahu 
should have been reserved for them, it did note that had 3.4 million acres250 been reserved for 
250 One tenth of the approximately 34 million acres sold between 1844 and 1864. 
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Ngāi Tahu it “would have been greatly to their advantage.” 251 It was upon these findings that 
Ngāi Tahu based their negotiating principles. At the centre of Ngāi Tahu’s negotiating 
principles was establishing the value of their loss as the current value of one tenth of the land 
that Ngāi Tahu sold between 1844 and 1864. The main point of contention was the question 
of whether the Crown had been obligated to provide a tenth of the land sold for Ngāi Tahu’s 
use. Internally Ngāi Tahu negotiators had calculated the value of 3.4 million acres at 
approximately $1.3 billion.252 This figure was too high for the Crown and even what Ngāi 
Tahu perceived to be a significant compromise was rejected because the amount of 
compensation was still far too large. The Crown had opposed Ngāi Tahu’s arguments on 
“tenths” during the Tribunal hearings and they continued to oppose Ngai Tahu’s arguments 
during the negotiations.   
Ngāi Tahu's case during the negotiations focused on the loss of property rights. They 
sought compensation for a number of grievances. The largest grievance, economically, 
related to the difference between the reserves that were awarded from 1844-1864 
(approximately 24,500 acres) and the reserves that Ngāi Tahu argued should have been 
awarded (approximately 3.4 million acres). Ngāi Tahu also pointed to the significant gap 
between Ngāi Tahu’s expectations for payment at the time and the marginal amounts paid by 
the Crown, redress for insufficient health and educational endowments, and restricted access 
251 Waitangi Tribunal, The Ngāi Tahu Report, (Wellington: Waitangi Tribunal, 1991), 828-829. “Given that 
Ngāi Tahu undoubtedly owned the land, the vesting in them of an area which amounted to about 1133 acres per 
person, particularly when compared with the much more extensive runs thought appropriate to the needs of 
European settlers, could scarcely be regarded as generous. The tribunal cites this merely by way of example and 
not because we see it as the appropriate measure of the land which should have been left with Ngāi Tahu. Ngāi 
Tahu clearly had a need of land which would have been suitable for pastoral or other forms of farming. But Ngāi 
Tahu also had a strong affinity, in some cases of a spiritual nature, to other notable features of the landscape. 
Prominent is Aoraki (Mount Cook). Their trails throughout their extensive domain, including those over the 
great mountain range, their lakes and rivers, were all taonga, all greatly prized. Instead, these people, the tangata 
whenua, whose homeland it was, were against their will reduced to subsist on a mere 12 acres per person. Their 
rangātiratanga denied; their future both tribally and individually bleak; their Treaty rights ignored. All this with 
the knowledge or connivance of successive governors acting on behalf of the Crown.” 
252 1991 dollars.  
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to mahinga kai.253 Ngāi Tahu strove to establish a baseline for the value of its historical loss 
but this was difficult to do. Malcolm Hanna, a valuation consultant, was engaged by Ngāi 
Tahu to produce an assessment. His preliminary report found the total unimproved value 
current at that time of the eight land blocks was $13 billion in 1990 terms. Hanna produced a 
report on the principles and procedures for the assessment of compensation for land claims. 
He did not think the Crown would follow along with the idea of tenths. The largest sum could 
be obtained by using the Public Works Act to provide compensation for land not provided as 
reserves. Since the Public Works Act applied to land that was taken by the Crown, Hanna 
recommended using the difference between reserves actually awarded by the Crown and the 
reserves Ngāi Tahu believed they should have been awarded to calucuate the compensation. 
Hanna acknowledged that the Crown would not be likely to agree to that calculation.254 
Although the negotiations overall were primarily conducted through ToWPU 
officials, discussions over the quantification of Ngāi Tahu’s loss were managed primarily 
through Treasury officials. Treasury’s role was to limit the fiscal impacts of Treaty 
settlements on the financial state of the government as a whole. Treasury concentrated on 
restoring the capacity of Ngāi Tahu on a “needs” basis: Treasury sought to determine how 
much compensation would be necessary to take Ngāi Tahu collectively out of poverty.255 
Treasury refused to recognise what Ngāi Tahu perceived to be an economically conservative 
view on property rights. Initially Graham approved of some level of quantification, what was 
referred to during meetings and correspondence as the “peg in the ground” but he continually 
253 O’Regan to Ashton, 16 October 1991, Vhi 10 (a) Box 149, TRONT archive; 1-2; Davidson, “Establishing 
Principles for the Negotiations on Reserves Not Awarded,” 14 October 1991, Vhi 10 (a) Box 149, TRONT 
archive; Malcolm Hanna, “Report to the Ngāi Tahu  negotiating team concerning principles & procedures for 
the assessment of compensation for land claims, December 1991,” Vhi 14 (e) Box 150, TRONT archive; 
Commissioner of Crown Lands, “Reserves Not Awarded working party,” C-27-3-01 Vol. 1, OTS archive. 
254 Malcolm Hanna, “Public Works Act,” 18 December 1991, Vhi 14 (e) Box 150, TRONT archive.  
255 Nick Davidson, “Establishing Principles for the Negotiations on Reserves Not Awarded,” 14 October 1991, 
Vhi 10 (a) Box 149, TRONT archive. 
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stressed that Cabinet would be looking for a political decision on the total claim rather than 
examining and quantifying each grievance. 
Treasury’s focus on needs inevitably shifted the historical focus away from tenths and 
on to calculations of what “needs” might actually represent in reality. Treasury was interested 
in developing a demographic and socio-economic picture of the composition of Ngāi Tahu 
tribal members. O’Regan forwarded to Treasury two limited studies which he noted were 
investigated “before the worst effects of restructuring were visited on our people.” “Recent 
policy has substantially increased unemployment and disadvantage in housing, further 
education and health. As yet we have not fully documented these effects. We are still reeling 
from their impact.”256 The neo-liberal economic reforms of the mid to late 1980s undertaken 
by the Fourth Labour government continued under the Fourth National government in the 
1990s. The reforms increased Māori unemployment, and affected Māori involvement in both 
the economic and political spheres. As Cybele Locke has noted the neo-liberal reforms were 
felt more harshly by Māori (and Pacific Islanders) than by Pākehā New Zealanders. In 1992 
Māori unemployment was at 25.8% while the Pākehā unemployment rate was 8.1%.257 
O’Regan thus took the chance to show Treasury the historical continuity of dispossession that 
bound the current Ngāi Tahu generation to the grievances of the past.  
All of this correspondence regarding the composition of Ngāi Tahu occurred despite 
Ngāi Tahu's insistence on using a rights-based approach rather than a needs-based approach. 
As O’Regan stated in correspondence with Treasury officials, “We could see the 'Needs' 
argument coming some three years ago.” Commentators such as Michael Belgrave have 
made similar retrospective observations about the Crown’s focus on “needs” rather than 
property rights. Belgrave has commented on the manner in which Treasury “emphasised the 
256 O’Regan to Treasury official 7, 23 December 1991, C-27-3-01, OTS archive, 2.  
257 Cybele Locke, Workers in the Margins: Union Radicals in Post-War New Zealand (Wellington: Bridget 
Williams Books, 2012), 13. 
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re-establishment of the tribal estate as the primary focus of settlements” and suggested that 
“redress could be achieved relatively inexpensively.”258 O’Regan had to engage in 
discussions with Treasury to convince them that Ngāi Tahu had a large population. Under the 
needs based model proposed by Treasury, the more Ngāi Tahu people there were the greater 
the compensation would be. In a bid to avoid fighting an unwinnable war with the Treasury 
over what Ngāi Tahu needs were O'Regan recommended hiring a mutually acceptable person 
to define Ngāi Tahu's social needs.259  
As Treasury and Ngāi Tahu engaged in negotiations regarding financial redress, 
discussions continued over the quantification of Ngāi Tahu’s loss within ToWPU.260 ToWPU 
officials conceded that the estimation of the dimensions of the ‘redress envelope’ would be 
difficult. There was no clear-cut methodology for determining what would be appropriate.261 
A ToWPU official attempted to bridge the gap between the Treasury and Ngāi Tahu positions 
by emphasising the need for restoration, pressing specifically in a memorandum to draw the 
Cabinet’s attention to the instructions from Lord Normanby to Hobson in 1839. Normanby 
had explicitly instructed Hobson to not enter into any contracts with Māori that would be 
injurious to them. The ToWPU official sought to restore Ngāi Tahu to the position it may 
have been in had Treaty breaches not occurred by “re-affirming it with an economic base and 
thus enhancing its rangatiratanga.”262  
258 Belgrave, Historical Frictions, 320, 325-326. 
259 O’Regan to Treasury official 7, 27 December 1991, C-27-3-01 Vol. 1, OTS archive, 3; O’Regan to Treasury 
official 7, 30 December 1991, Vhi 10 (d) Box 149, TRONT archive. 
260 “Framework Agreement between Crown and Ngāi Tahu  negotiators,” 27 November 1991, C27/2/02 Vol 1.  
261 (Graph) “Sequencing Work Required to Settle Ngāi Tahu  Claim,” 4 November 1991, C27/2/02 Vol 1., 2-3; 
Dangerfield to O’Regan, 20 & 24 December 1991, C-27-3-01 Vol. 1, OTS archive; O’Regan to Treasury 
official 7, 27 December 1991, C-27-4-01 Vol. 1, OTS archive;  
262 Memorandum for Cabinet, “Proposed Objectives and Approaches to Redress for the Ngāi Tahu  
Negotiations,” 13 September 1991, C27-2-02 Vol. 1, OTS archive, 2-3; Lord Normanby to Captain Hobson, 14 
August 1839, Great Britain Parliamentary Papers 1840 in Vincent O’Malley, Bruce Stirling and Wally Penetito 
(eds.), The Treaty of Waitangi Companion: Māori and Pākehā from Tasman to Today (Auckland: Auckland 
University Press, 2010), 35-36; Orange, Treaty of Waitangi, 29-31. 
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A Treasury official had some substantial criticisms of the principles proposed by 
ToWPU, specifically those which would try to restore Ngāi Tahu to a position that it would 
have been in had the Crown not breached the Treaty:  
[I]t would imply the Crown aims to provide redress to a value equivalent to the 
estimated total loss incurred by Ngāi Tahu; the Crown has no accurate idea of the size 
of that loss or, indeed, whether it can be estimated on anything other than a highly 
subjective basis (historical research as objective undermined) but the order of 
magnitude is likely to be very large relative to the Crown’s ability to pay; the risk, 
therefore, is that the Crown would be committing itself to achieve an unobtainable 
objective.263[parantheses are from the original memorandum] 
  
Despite Treasury’s comments, Ngāi Tahu had accepted from the beginning that it did not 
expect full compensation but merely an agreement between themselves and the Crown on 
what the extent of their loss had been. Only when the extent of the loss had been established 
would it be possible to begin justifying whatever gap existed between the value of Ngāi 
Tahu’s total loss and the compensation that would be provided. By dismissing Ngāi Tahu’s 
dollar estimation of its own loss (which was in the billions) as simply the basis for “highly 
subjective…historical research” Treasury attempted to cast doubt on the severity as well as 
the veracity of Ngāi Tahu’s loss. A value framework to govern how much was going to be 
necessary for a settlement would remain important to the overall trajectory of the 
negotiation.264 
O’Regan commented to other Ngāi Tahu negotiators and advisors: “We are 
establishing a Rights base and the Crown is trying to establish a Needs base. We're avoiding 
population arguments and relying very much on the ‘present and future needs of Ngāi Tahu’ 
line that the Tribunal developed. At the moment we don't think they can escape ‘10ths across 
the board’.” While the use of the term “present and future needs of Ngāi Tahu” sounded like 
a needs based approach, Ngāi Tahu were still focused on their rights approach. Unfortunately 
263 Treasury official 6, “Principles for Ngāi Tahu Negotiations,” November 1991, C27/2/02 Vol 1, 1-2. 
264 Interview with ToWPU official 1, 27 July 2011.  
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for Ngāi Tahu the Crown refused to accept the notions of tenths because it would make the 
Crown liable for sums which it could not afford although it arrived at somewhat similar 
calculations for the value of Ngāi Tahu’s loss.265 It was within the context of these “rights” 
versus “needs” debates that Ngāi Tahu made its first formal settlement proposal to the 
Crown. 
Ngāi Tahu’s February 1992 Settlement proposals 
Early in 1992 Graham asked that Ngāi Tahu provide a written proposal to the Crown 
which detailed Ngāi Tahu’s preferences for settlement. Ngāi Tahu’s commercial consultant, 
Stephen Jennings, addressed in an internal memorandum the different ways that a Ngāi Tahu 
proposal for compensation could be presented to the Crown. Jennings wrote: 
We all agree that we need to vigorously resist Treasury's approach. At the same time, 
however, we must recognise that Treasury's advice to the Minister of Finance will 
have a major bearing on the Crown's final position regarding the reserves not awarded 
component of the settlement. It is important, therefore, that we monitor Treasury's 
needs-based work and try (behind the scenes) to influence the direction of that work. 
We should also provide Treasury with data they require where this will assist our 
ultimate end (e.g. data which increases the measured size of Ngāi Tahu).   
 
Jennings was essentially advocating the control of the flow of information on which Treasury 
might base its calculations of what Ngāi Tahu’s needs were. This would have included 
demographic data that detailed the population and incomes of Ngāi Tahu members. Jennings 
was a Treasury official during the 1980s and may have believed that he could personally 
persuade Treasury officials. Furthermore Jennings stressed that Treasury's needs based 
approach could result in a larger settlement than a rights based approach if the benchmarks 
were tied to mean or median community income levels. A settlement of “$1.5 billion would 
be required to provide an annual per capita gain of $1,500 to 60,000 NT, assuming a 6 
265 O’Regan to Ashton, 16 October 1991, Vhi 10 (a) Box 149, TRONT archive; 1-2; Davidson, “Establishing 
Principles for the Negotiations on Reserves Not Awarded,” 14 October 1991, Vhi 10 (a) Box 149, TRONT 
archive; Hanna, “Report to the Ngāi Tahu negotiating team concerning principles & procedures for the 
assessment of compensation for land claims, December 1991,” Vhi 14 (e) Box 150, TRONT archive; 
Commissioner of Crown Lands, “Reserves Not Awarded working party,” C-27-3-01 Vol. 1, OTS archive. 
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percent after tax return on the total asset base received.” Jennings also noted that Treasury's 
attitude towards a settlement would also be influenced by their perception of Ngāi Tahu’s 
financial accountability. The question was where to begin the bidding? $1.3 billion was the 
most conservative estimate established by Ngāi Tahu’s valuation studies and Jennings 
recommended that figure as the opening bid.266  
Ngāi Tahu and the Crown held a formal negotiation session three days before Ngāi 
Tahu delivered its proposals for settlement to the Crown. Both sides remained in 
disagreement regarding the basis for establishing financial redress. Ngāi Tahu felt that “a 
needs-based solution would be more expensive to the Crown than a rights-based solution.” 
Although the Crown was generally uncomfortable with the question of a valuation of Ngāi 
Tahu's loss, at this meeting Graham “felt agreement was required as to what Ngāi Tahu have 
lost and advised that a prima facie position was probably all that was needed.”267 These 
statements reflected the continuing stress that Ngāi Tahu placed on its rights-based solution, 
and the Crown’s continuing hesitancy with estimating the value of the lands Ngāi Tahu had 
not been awarded during the mid-1800s. 
Ngāi Tahu made its proposal for the total value of their settlement in a letter from 
O’Regan to Graham on 7 February 1992. Ngāi Tahu sought $1.3 billion as compensation for 
all of their claims. Ngāi Tahu stated that their approach to settlement was based upon 
principles which emerged from Tribunal report that the “Crown acted unconscionably and in 
repeated breach of the Treaty of Waitangi...The tribe is clearly entitled to a very substantial 
redress from the Crown...The Crown's obligation to effect redress in this case is indeed a 
heavy one.” O’Regan also noted that the remaining lands in the Crown's possession would 
not provide Ngāi Tahu with an economic base, even if the transfer of all Crown land was a 
266 Stephen Jennings to Ngāi Tahu Negotiators, 3 February 1992, VH i 10 (g) Box 149, TRONT archive, 3. 




                                                          
possibility. While the Crown and Ngāi Tahu were conducting the negotiations through 
different principles, Ngāi Tahu tried to stress that there also existed some commonalities.268 
O’Regan couched his statement in the language of needs-based solutions that Treasury 
advocated, claiming that to achieve a final and durable settlement the “size and composition 
of the assets package will need to be such that the overriding objective of restoring Ngāi Tahu 
economic health and self-sufficiency is achieved.” O’Regan stated that a "very conservative 
valuation approach, based on current land values within Ngāi Tahu's rohe" was 
approximately $1.3 billion. O’Regan believed that the capital value of the reserves that were 
not awarded was far in excess of that figure, which is the value of both the land and all the 
improvements on the land such as buildings, farm stock or crops. O’Regan conceded that 
compensation of that magnitude would not be possible so he requested just the land value of 
the reserves that were not awarded--$1.3 billion. Ngāi Tahu envisioned having a diverse 
range of Crown assets such as forestry cutting rights and land, commercial property owned 
by the Crown, properties already in their land-bank, Landcorp land, SOE shares, Housing 
Corporation properties and mortgages, indigenous forests, coal mining licences, Crown 
pastoral leases and any remaining compensation as cash to make up their proposed $1.3 
billion settlement. Ngāi Tahu were also interested in obtaining shares in State-Owned 
Enterprises if they were privatised in the future such as The Power Company Limited, Trans 
Power NZ and Electricity Corporation of New Zealand (ECNZ). The land owned by these 
State-Owned Enterprises was covered by the 1988 Treaty of Waitangi (State Enterprises) 
Act, but if the entire business was privatised or even partially privatised as Mighty River 
Power was in 2012 Ngāi Tahu was interested in purchasing shares. O’Regan stressed that 




                                                          
Ngāi Tahu were willing to discuss any payment deferral mechanisms to accommodate the 
Crown's fiscal limitations.269 
The Crown disagreed with the entire Ngāi Tahu proposal. An internal Crown 
memorandum signed by the Justice Secretary, but presumably with heavy Treasury input, set 
out the Crown position with regard to Ngāi Tahu's valuation of its loss. The Secretary stated 
that Ngāi Tahu’s calculations had “some serious limitations in terms of providing a practical 
basis for a settlement.” 270 The Crown argued that there was “no objective way of establishing 
the extent to which the estimated current value of the reserves not awarded would have been 
similar if the land had been retained by Ngāi Tahu, instead of being developed by others.” 
Although estimating the value of the reserves that were not awarded was a difficult task, there 
could have been an effort made by the Crown to average out the value of land and identify 
the value of land around which substantial Ngāi Tahu kainga and mahinga kai sites existed. 
While the estimated current market value of those lands would have been difficult to 
calculate, there could have been a lower baseline value established to determine the least that 
the lands could have been worth without any development whatsoever such as farming or 
housing subdivisions. The Secretary alluded to the benefits that individual Ngāi Tahu had 
received from the loss of their land: “some of the betterment of the original land that should 
have been reserved for the tribe, has been distributed indirectly to the tribe as a member of 
the various local communities which have benefited from the development of former Ngāi 
Tahu land.” Finally the Justice Secretary claimed that Ngāi Tahu’s valuation of their loss 
“takes no account of the value of any government assistance provided over the years 
specifically to assist Ngāi Tahu or Māori people.” He stated that it was not fiscally possible to 
269 “Meeting between Crown and Ngāi Tahu negotiators,” 29 April 1992, C-27-2-02 Vol. 2, OTS archive, 




                                                          
provide Ngāi Tahu with assets totalling $1.3 billion.271 Ngāi Tahu’s focus on the valuation of 
their loss was understandable from their point of view. Ngāi Tahu whanau and marae had 
demanded a rationalisation from the Crown regarding their settlement. The Crown for its part 
had to be realistic about what could be provided in terms of both the immediate financial 
consequences for the Crown’s own balance sheets, and the precedent effect that such a large 
settlement could have on settlements with all of the other iwi. A compromise between the two 
positions was necessary.  
Only days after receiving Ngāi Tahu’s proposal, the two sides met for a formal 
negotiation session. Graham stated that the Crown could not provide $1.3 billion as a 
settlement. The Crown proposed $100 million. Ngāi Tahu rejected the Crown’s $100 million 
offer. Graham pressed that there was no precedent for these types of negotiations and the 
Tribunal's report regarding an economic base had been rather vague. Graham stated that 
“Ngāi Tahu have been deprived of opportunity and this now has to be corrected. To quantify 
this is extremely difficult.” The Crown stated that a settlement would have to be reached 
which the Crown, Ngāi Tahu and the people of New Zealand believed was fair. The Crown 
acknowledged that some compensation was necessary but as one of its negotiating principles 
it stressed that any settlement would have to take into account the practical and economic 
impact the settlement would have on the country as a whole.  
The Crown wishes to negotiate a figure which it believes is fair and will allow Ngāi 
Tahu the opportunity to develop in a productive stage and out of grievance mode. 
Ngāi Tahu has put forward a figure of $1.3 billion, which is said to be an 
understatement of the loss, but is beyond the Government's ability to pay. Combined 
wisdom is required to reach a figure which may be based on nothing more than an 
inside feeling that it is fair...There is concern as to what the Crown can do to restore 
its own honour and enhance Ngāi Tahu's mana so it has a base on which to build.  
 
The Crown’s response was certainly reasonable. Ngāi Tahu responded that they were haunted 
by previous governments that had refused to deal with the Ngāi Tahu claim. Ngāi Tahu also 
271 Secretary of Justice, “Ngāi Tahu”, 11 February 1992, C-27-3-01 Vol. 1, OTS archive. 
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noted that they were concerned that the guilty party, the Crown, was acting in the role of the 
judge, a sentiment which would re-occur throughout the negotiations. Ngāi Tahu was 
concerned about the durability of what they perceived to be the Crown’s financially limited 
settlement offer. Their fiscally limited settlement in 1944 was also meant to be durable, but it 
was inadequate even before it devalued with inflation. As a result Ngāi Tahu remained 
cautious about the size of the quantum offered by the Crown.272 
In a letter to Graham the day after the meeting O’Regan stated that the Crown's 
proposal for a package valued at $100 million was substantially below Ngāi Tahu's “most 
reasonable expectations.” O’Regan continued: “We continue to believe that achieving the 
durability sought both by Ngāi Tahu and the Crown will depend on the adoption of a 
principled approach, based on the findings of Waitangi Tribunal on 'Reserves not Awarded' 
and linked to a mutually accepted valuation of Ngāi Tahu's loss.” In light of the significant 
gap between Ngāi Tahu and the Crown on the issue of settlement quantum Ngāi Tahu 
proposed to devote considerable effort to find a level that would suit both parties, but warned 
that Ngāi Tahu still intended “to review that identification against Ngāi Tahu's losses before 
making a formal response to your proposal.”273 
According to Ngāi Tahu legal advisor Nick Davidson, a Department of Conservation 
(DoC) official informed him that the $100 million offer by the Crown originated solely from 
Treasury.  
[The official] then went on to make a comment about the considerable distance 
between the Crown and Ngāi Tahu on the initial numbers. He seemed to indicate that 
we were about $350 million apart. He said that the Crown's initial offer of $100 
272 “Meeting of Ngāi Tahu and Crown negotiators,” 11 February 1992, C-27-2-03 Vol.1, OTS archive, 2. 
273 O’Regan to Graham, 12 February 1992, C-27-3-01 Vol. 1, OTS archive, 1-2; Ngāi Tahu  legal advisor Nick 
Davidson stayed with Graham and a few other Crown officials following the meeting for some drinks and was 
able to have some candid conversations regarding the recent proposal for settlement that Ngāi Tahu  had sent the 
Crown. "There was no specific mention of the letter we tabled on Friday other than one brief comment from the 
Minister not directed at me specifically but to the effect that perhaps we had got the decimal point in the wrong 
place. I apologised for the fact that laser printers sometimes throw fullstops too far to the left." 
111 
 
                                                          
million had not been at all well-handled. According to him the number had been 
dreamt up by Treasury. I had always tended to the view that it was a Doug Graham 
number.274 
 
A Treasury official had been asked during a Cabinet committee meeting how Treasury had 
arrived at the $100 million figure. The Treasury official refused to provide an explanation. 
Finance Minister Ruth Richardson then allegedly became frustrated at the increased level of 
scrutiny. “It was [in the DoC official’s] view that the episode in the Cabinet committee had 
been quite damaging to the Crown's internal processes. He put the blame at Treasury's 
doorstep.”275 Davidson later stated that Graham was also critical of Treasury. Davidson 
commented to the Ngāi Tahu negotiating team in a memorandum:  
I felt that the tone of [Graham’s] reference to [Treasury officials] was less than 
glowing. He then went into a diatribe about hordes of people carrying out complicated 
calculations and statistical analyses in order to reach doubtful conclusions about how 
much money it would take to restore the wellbeing of any individual. He thought that 
these sorts of exercises tended to do nothing but produce a figure which was in capital 
terms so excessive that it was irrelevant. At the end of the day, he said, it came down 
to the art of the political possible.276  
 
After the Crown's rejection of Ngāi Tahu's $1.3 billion proposal, O’Regan wrote to 
Graham again on 27 February 1992 to make another proposal which would take into account 
the economic and fiscal constraints of the government. O’Regan again stressed that to ensure 
finality and durability a substantial sum had to be provided.277 Ngāi Tahu's new proposal 
consisted of halving the amount of their $1.3 billion proposal to approximately $650 million 
in the same diverse set of assets proposed in their first proposals. O’Regan struggled to 
understand why Ngāi Tahu was forced to bear the burden of New Zealand's “unsatisfactory 
economic performance over the last 20 years” after the Crown had accepted most of Ngāi 
Tahu's grievances. O’Regan alluded to the difficulties of negotiating a Treaty settlement in a 
time of economic uncertainty. Since the early 1970s New Zealand’s economy had 
274 Nick Davidson, “Meeting with DoC official,” 26 June 1992, Vh 10 gg Box 149, TRONT archive. 
275 Nick Davidson, “Memo,” 26 June 1992, Vhi 10 (gg) Box 149, TRONT archive. 
276 Nick Davidson, “Note of a meeting at Vogel House,” 9 February 1992, Vh 12 c Box 150, TRONT archive, 5. 
277 O’Regan to Graham, 27 February 1992, C-27-3-01 Vol. 1, OTS archive, 1-3. 
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struggled.278 O’Regan believed that the Crown was forcing Ngāi Tahu to share “a 
disproportionate burden of these economic costs” in addition to the suffering experienced by 
individual Ngāi Tahu from economic restructuring during the 1980s and 1990s under neo-
liberal economic reforms. If Ngāi Tahu was being forced to bear the costs of New Zealand's 
economic situation, O’Regan also wanted Ngāi Tahu to gain from any improvement in New 
Zealand's future economic performance. O’Regan proposed that the sum that Ngāi Tahu were 
paid yearly by the Crown would depend on New Zealand's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
growth relative to the mean Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) GDP growth. “Specifically, we propose that no payment be made if New Zealand's 
GDP growth in any given year is less than 40 percent of the mean OECD GDP growth rate 
and that $50 million be paid if NZ's GDP growth exceeds the mean OECD growth rate.” Ngāi 
Tahu stated that their new offer entailed major concessions on behalf of Ngāi Tahu while 
recognising the Crown's economic constraints, but that it could still prove final and 
durable.279 One of the most frustrating aspects of the rejection of the Ngāi Tahu settlement 
proposals from Ngāi Tahu’s perspective was that the Crown refused to provide its response in 
writing. Ngāi Tahu negotiators never received an answer to their first or second February 
1992 proposals.280 
For a few months from the end of February to June 1992 Ngāi Tahu and Crown 
negotiators argued over the reliability of Ngāi Tahu’s estimates of its historical loss. A 
valuation exercise was established with Ngāi Tahu and a Crown appointed valuer from 
Valuation New Zealand (VNZ) to investigate the value of the reserves that were not awarded 
to Ngāi Tahu.281 The exercise was marked by ongoing disagreements between the Ngāi Tahu 
278 James Belich, Paradise Reforged: A History of the New Zealanders from the 1880s to the Year 2000, 394-
413; Cybele Locke, Workers in the Margins: Union Radicals in Post-War New Zealand, 12-13.  
279 O’Regan to Graham, 27 February 1992, C-27-3-01 Vol. 1, OTS archive, 1-3. 
280 Interview with Sir Tipene O’Regan, 5 May 2011.   
281 Treasury official 6 to Treasury official 7, 17 February 1992, C-27-3-01 Vol. 2, OTS archive.  
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and VNZ valuation experts on the relative reliability of sources of information and the 
methodology used for arriving at an estimate.282 For the Ngāi Tahu valuation expert some of 
the key components focused on trying to establish land values at the time of purchase, the 
influence of wool prices and the presence of gold mining.283 The VNZ expert sought to 
minimise the number of contextual factors the investigation considered and downplayed the 
low prices that were paid by the Crown for Ngāi Tahu land.284 The Crown generally ignored 
the results of the investigation which arrived at a value of Ngāi Tahu loss set in the billions. It 
remained difficult for the parties to advance the negotiations with a valuation exercise since 
the settlement offer would remain a political decision made almost solely by the Crown.285  
In June 1992 ToWPU attempted to put together an offer that doubled the $100 million 
settlement developed by Treasury. Treasury, however, offered little support. ToWPU and 
TPK both agreed with a paper commissioned by ToWPU and written by an external 
economist, Brian Easton, which found that the new offer would help Ngāi Tahu solidify an 
economic base. The paper by Easton argued that any economic liabilities would be 
counteracted by the increase in investment that it would provide for the region, and thus more 
jobs for the South Island. Treasury argued that despite the views of ToWPU, TPK and 
Easton, the new package would not represent “a durable or equitable” settlement. It began by 
noting that in the past settlements had not proved full and final but neglected to note that this 
may have been because of the lack of Crown willingness to provide any substantial 
compensation and in the case of Ngāi Tahu’s 1944 settlement, been largely perceived to have 
282 VNZ official 1 to Treasury Secretary and Treasury official 6, 17 February 1992, C-27-3-01 Vol. 2, OTS 
archive.  
283 VNZ official 2 to Stephen Jennings, 3 and 9 March 1992, Vhi 14, TRONT archive.  
284 Valuation report to Ngāi Tahu negotiators, 28 April 1992, Vhi 14, TRONT archive.  




                                                          
been imposed.286 Treasury questioned how Ngāi Tahu was going to distribute their 
compensation, what the socio-economic status of the community was relative to the rest of 
the Māori population, and questioned why the assets which Ngāi Tahu were set to receive in 
the fisheries settlement were not included in the assessment. In the cover letter to Graham, 
ToWPU officials noted that Treasury emphasised that their separate views be particularly 
noted in the report but ToWPU expressed some frustration at Treasury’s observations stating 
that it was far from clear how the fisheries settlement would be distributed (it had not yet 
been finalised) and that Ngāi Tahu’s fisheries claims were completely separate from these 
land-based claims. ToWPU officials were frustrated with Treasury’s intransigence remarking, 
“it seems to us that on a preliminary view Treasury’s arguments re durability mean in the 
final analysis that in their eyes a settlement is impossible.” The Cabinet Strategy Committee 
took Treasury’s advice and rejected the $200 million proposal advocated by Easton, ToWPU 
and TPK. 287 
The two parties were too far apart on the issue of compensation. As the discussions 
over the quantification of Ngāi Tahu’s loss dragged on through 1992 they were disrupted by 
the Fisheries Settlement and the subsequent gradual development of the fiscal envelope 
policy from 1992 to 1994. On 21 September 1992, Cabinet agreed to the establishment of a 
“Settlement Fund.” 288 The pan-Māori fisheries settlement, often referred to as the “Sealord 
Deal,” was signed two days later on 23 September 1992. Coupled with the interim $20 
million fisheries settlement of 1989, the settlement was worth a total of $170 million. Clause 
4.6 of the fisheries Deed of Settlement stated that the settlement amount of $170 million 
286 Ngāi Tahu’s argument was not accepted by the Crown, which cited the support of Southern Māori MP Eruera 
Tirikatene and a number of Ngāi Tahu marae in 1944.  
287 ToWPU official 3 and ToWPU official 6 to Graham, 16 June 1992; CSC (92) 89; Minister of Justice to 
Chairperson Cabinet Strategy Committee, “Ngāi Tahu Negotiations, 12 June 1992, all:  C-27-1-02 Vol. 2, OTS 
archive. 
288 CAB (92) M38/11, para C viii, C-27-1-02 Vol. 2, OTS archive. 
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would be deducted from a Treaty of Waitangi Settlement Fund. In essence the fisheries 
settlement was to be deducted from a settlement fund, the amount of which had not yet been 
decided (and indeed was not decided until December 1994).289 The $170 million figure 
would become the upper limit benchmark for Treaty settlements. 
Ngāi Tahu and the Crown’s internal development of the fiscal envelope: 1992-1994 
The idea of an overall fiscal limit for all settlements had always been a significant 
issue for the Crown to consider because of the financial impact that Treaty settlements could 
have on the country as a whole. The fiscal limit was first formally referred to in the 
“Settlement Fund” Cabinet paper that was produced two days before fisheries settlement. 
Graham introduced Ngāi Tahu to the fiscal envelope concept at an intense weekend 
negotiating session held in Wellington in early August 1992 to break the dead-lock that had 
developed over the quantification issues. The Crown informed Ngāi Tahu negotiators of its 
policy to impose a fiscal limit on all Treaty settlements. There was a lack of support for such 
an arrangement from Ngāi Tahu negotiators.290  
Following the fisheries settlement in 1992, the Crown embarked on a two-year 
internal development of a Treaty settlement policy with the involvement of officials from 
Departments across the public sector, led by ToWPU, Treasury, TPK, DoC and the Crown 
Law Office (CLO).291 Nearly a year after sending their first proposal to the Crown, O’Regan 
wrote to Graham in early February 1993 expressing Ngāi Tahu’s disappointment with the 
pace of negotiations and the lack of agreement. O’Regan essentially offered the same 
proposal that Ngāi Tahu had sent at the end of February 1992. O’Regan expressed Ngāi 
289 Fisheries Deed of Settlement, 23 September 1992, Clause 4.6 
290 CLO official 2 to Treasury, 16 July 1992, C-27-4-01 Vol. 2, OTS archive; “Hotel de Vin meetings,” 4 
August 1992, NT140, F(i)3; Interview with ToWPU official 3, 18 April 2011.  
291 A Ph.D thesis by a historian and former OTS official regarding the development of Treaty settlement policy 
at a national level will explore some of this development in some detail when it is completed in the next couple 
of years.  
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Tahu’s objection to the envelope approach which the Crown was developing to settle Treaty 
claims. Graham began the negotiations by stating that he did not want to engage in a sort of 
“Dutch auction.” O’Regan accused Graham and Crown officials of creating a negotiation 
process that was far worse; O’Regan termed it a “lolly scramble.” In O’Regan’s view the 
Crown was forcing Māori into conflict with each other by pitting iwi against iwi for the 
limited financial compensation that was available overall. He also accused the Crown of 
taking on the same colonial positions that government officials Walter Mantell and James 
Mackay had taken to create Ngāi Tahu’s grievances in the nineteenth century.292 While there 
was only a measured response to O’Regan’s letter from Graham, internally Crown officials 
were frustrated at Ngāi Tahu’s allegations of colonial attitudes.293 Some officials were 
working very hard to persuade Ministers to be more generous and some were not as helpful, 
but both groups bore the brunt of Ngāi Tahu’s frustrations. In comments to the New Zealand 
Herald, O'Regan stated that he did not believe that Graham had developed the fiscal envelope 
policy as a divide and conquer tactic but that a distinction had to be made between the 
“honourable motives of one individual Cabinet minister and the behaviour of the State 
machine.” Former Minister of Māori Affairs and fisheries co-negotiator Matiu Rata did not 
think that limits on compensation would ensure finality. Rata pointed out that “the package 
[fiscal envelope policy] idea was referred to in the settlement deed of the Sealord fisheries 
claim, but the Government had not discussed it with Māori groups.”294 
At a formal Ngāi Tahu-Crown negotiation session in late March 1993, the Crown 
noted that further work was still to be done on the envelope. “Ngāi Tahu again complained at 
the lack of consultation over the envelope concept and reminded the Crown of its Treaty 
292 Waitangi Tribunal, The Ngai Tahu Report, 347-790; Harry C. Evison, New Zealand Racism in the Making: 
The Life & Times of Walter Mantell (Lower Hutt: Panuitia Press, 2010). 
293 O’Regan to Graham, 1 February 1993, C-27-2-02 Vol. 2, OTS archive; ToWPU official 3, “Analysis of the 
Ngāi Tahu report of the Negotiation Process and Position,” 4 March 1993, C-27-2-02 Vol. 2, OTS archive. 
294 Adella Ferguson, “Treaty package claimed,” New Zealand Herald, 18 May 1993. 
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obligations ‘actively to protect’ Ngāi Tahu’s interests. Ngāi Tahu noted there may be 
constraints to the envelope as an effective tool for use in the settlement of claims, particularly 
if it is to include wāhi tapu and fiscally neutral matters. Consultation should take place if the 
envelope is to be more than an internal management mechanism for the Crown.”295 Ngāi 
Tahu was expressing its concern with the Crown’s unilateral development of “the envelope 
concept” as a whole, but especially those aspects that did not involve compensation. The 
Crown argued that the length of time it would have taken for the development of the fiscal 
envelope policy would have been extended even further if consultation with Māori around the 
country was necessary. Ngāi Tahu charged that the policy was not “an internal management 
mechanism”, but a tool for the settlement of claims and as such Ngāi Tahu, and other iwi, 
should be consulted regarding its development. The envelope approach quickly exasperated 
Ngāi Tahu negotiators, who were being increasingly pressured by their own constituency. In 
some ways Ngāi Tahu negotiators had dug themselves a hole by creating such high 
expectations for Ngāi Tahu members. The Crown was developing its policy in isolation from 
claimants as well as the public—the process was completely internal. Government policy 
cannot always be developed with the help of those who it affects most, but in this case it was 
especially difficult for Māori negotiators such as Ngāi Tahu.  
At the end of 1993 O’Regan’s annual report to the NTMTB summarised the 
difficulties that the negotiating group experienced with the Crown during the previous year. 
O'Regan stated that the Crown had attempted to propose the idea of the “envelope” to Ngāi 
Tahu but that Ngāi Tahu negotiators had rejected the concept. “There has clearly been a battle 
going on within the Crown about the concept itself and about the overall quantum of financial 
provision that the Crown is willing to make towards Treaty settlement. The danger of 
creating a lolly scramble, by which the Māori tribes fight with each other over available 
295 “Meeting  between Ngāi Tahu and Crown Negotiators,” 31 March 1993, C-27-2-02 Vol. 2, OTS archive 
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settlements, is very real.” O'Regan stated that Ngāi Tahu understood that it could not receive 
full compensation from the Crown for its loss, but that it required the Crown to provide at 
least some basic type of rationalisation. “The Crown's inability to make up its own mind 
about the issue of quantum on a basis which is even morally defensible, let alone financially 
defensible, has been a huge problem to the negotiation.” The one small note of optimism 
which O'Regan noted in relation to the negotiations was that the improvement in the 
economy could favour a more reasonable fiscal approach by the Crown.296  
The work commissioned by Ngāi Tahu to estimate the value of its loss was set aside 
by the Crown. The fisheries settlement and the fiscal envelope policy would establish a new 
benchmark and set a fiscal cap, divorced from iwi estimates of loss. Waikato-Tainui would 
have to cope with the precedent of the fisheries settlement, and the gradual development of 
the fiscal envelope policy just as Ngāi Tahu did. Like O’Regan, Mahuta was also a co-
negotiator on behalf of Māori for the fisheries settlement. Both O’Regan and Mahuta, in their 
roles as chief negotiators for their iwi, would have to work under the fiscal parameters 
established by the Settlement Fund and the fisheries settlement signed two days later in 
September 1992. 
Part II: Waikato-Tainui’s Treaty settlement, the fiscal envelope and the 
relativity clause 
Waikato-Tainui, the fiscal envelope and finality 
 
During the same period, Waikato-Tainui also came to oppose the fiscal envelope 
policy. From the commencement of their negotiations with the Labour government, the 
predominant focus for Waikato-Tainui was on securing the remaining Crown-owned land in 
the area for their settlement, in line with their key negotiating principle that “as land was 
296 O’Regan, “Chairman’s Report,” Ngāi Tahu Annual Report 1993, NT140 C4, Box 54, MB archive, 7-9. 
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taken so land must be returned” (“i riro whenua atu me hoki whenua mai”). This remained 
the case with the National government as well. From November 1991 (when their 
negotiations with National began) to September 1992 (when the fisheries settlement was 
signed), Waikato-Tainui and the Crown largely worked through the logistics of the transfer of 
Hopuhopu and tried to develop an agreement under which further land would be transferred 
to Waikato-Tainui. Nonetheless Waikato-Tainui negotiators also concentrated on establishing 
the value of their loss, and attempted to insert the estimated value of this loss into their Deed 
of Settlement. Waikato-Tainui had not concerned itself with the type of valuation exercises 
that Ngāi Tahu had commissioned for its own claim. Nonetheless, both negotiations were 
equally influenced by the effect of the fiscal envelope policy. The problems associated with 
the fiscal envelope policy became tied up with Waikato-Tainui’s settlement during its final 
settlement negotiation. 
Denese Henare, the senior legal advisor for Waikato-Tainui, had early concerns about 
the effect that the fiscal envelope policy would have on the amount Waikato-Tainui would 
receive through its settlement, particularly how it might affect the return of land. In relation 
to clause 4.6 of the 1992 fisheries Deed of Settlement which referred to a “settlement fund,” 
Henare sought a written undertaking from Minister of Justice and principal Crown negotiator 
for both the fisheries and Waikato-Tainui negotiations, Doug Graham, that this clause would 
in no way preclude or undermine the "land for land" principle which was central to Waikato-
Tainui's raupatu claims.297Although Graham gave his assurances, Waikato-Tainui soon 
became confined to the fiscal precedent of the fisheries settlement. Although the nature of the 
settlements differed, the $170 million figure would become a benchmark for a settlement of 
the scale of Waikato-Tainui.  
297 Henare to Graham, 29 September 1992, TC30 Vol. 25, OTS archive.  
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In early March 1993 Graham informed Mahuta that Cabinet was close to formally 
announcing the fiscal envelope policy, and that Waikato-Tainui would be offered a $170 
million settlement. Graham advised Mahuta to develop a proposal for the assets Waikato-
Tainui desired as part of their settlement. Mahuta envisioned that each of the 33 hapū 
affiliated with the Tainui Māori Trust Board would receive two farms. In addition the Crown 
would also transfer to the iwi the Maramarua and Onewhero Crown Forests, all Coalcorp 
surplus lands, and commercial railways surplus lands in Hamilton. The Crown would also 
provide funding to establish two Endowed Colleges at the University of Auckland and 
University of Waikato and at international universities in the United States and United 
Kingdom.298 At the same time Mahuta also asked financial advisor Brent Wheeler to 
calculate the potential profit on a $170 million investment.299 Wheeler wrote a long 
memorandum to Mahuta setting out the possibilities for settlement within the Crown's new 
fiscally restrictive parameters. Wheeler thought that the “logic” of the unofficial $170 million 
proposal was based on fiscal prudence rather than a mathematical formula.300 
In mid-May 1993 Graham and Mahuta met alone in Wellington without any advisors 
or officials present. Graham stated that he understood that only a land for land approach 
would be accepted by the wider Waikato-Tainui people but that the Waikato-Tainui 
settlement would have to be taken from the total fiscal cap which would be set at $1 billion. 
Graham again informed Mahuta that Waikato-Tainui would be offered a $170 million 
settlement. Mahuta had indicated to Graham that the offer would need further consideration if 
Graham was “talking about full and final.”301 The question of whether the Crown’s offer was 
enough to settle the claim for all time soon came to define debates between the parties. The 
298 Mahuta to Henare, 2 March 1993, RC Vol 30 1993, Box 11, W-T archives. 
299 Wheeler estimated returns of 7-9%: Henare to Mahuta, 4 March 1993, RC Vol 30 1993, Box 11, W-T 
archives.  
300 Wheeler to Mahuta, 20 May 1993, RC Vol 30 1993, Box 11, W-T archives. 
301 Mahuta, “Diary Note,” 18 May 1993, RC Vol 30 1993 Box 11, W-T archives. 
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day after Mahuta and Graham met privately, Crown and Waikato-Tainui advisors also met. 
The advisors’ discussion focused on whether the proposed settlement fund would affect the 
amount of land Waikato-Tainui might obtain through the settlement. The Secretary of Justice 
claimed that Waikato-Tainui's principles that “as land was taken so land must be returned” 
were still accepted and possible under the Crown's new arrangements. The concern from 
Waikato-Tainui’s advisors was on the finality of a fiscally limited arrangement which would 
not allow for the return of all Crown lands in the region: could the proposed settlement be 
durable if an inadequate amount of land was transferred? The advisors also commented that 
furthermore if the settlement was seen to be imposed rather than negotiated, would it be 
accepted by the Waikato-Tainui people?302 The $170 million figure was far below the total 
value of government land remaining in the Waikato-Tainui confiscation area.303 The Crown 
explained to Waikato-Tainui negotiators that compensation could not be linked to the loss of 
land but that the level of compensation would be an entirely political decision—Ministers 
with the help of their officials would determine what was a fair but fiscally affordable 
settlement. In this case that political decision was establishing the fisheries settlement $170 
million quantum as the benchmark, and applying the quantum to the Waikato-Tainui raupatu 
claim despite the significant differences between the two sets of claims.304  
After Graham informed Mahuta privately of the planned $170 million offer in May 
1993, the negotiations came to a standstill. The development of the fiscal envelope policy 
would extend over another year and a half. Waikato-Tainui’s negotiations with the Crown 
were also interrupted by the 1993 election. After National won the election, Mahuta wrote to 
302 “Meeting between Crown and Waikato Advisors,” 19 May 1993, RC Vol 30 1993 Box 11, W-T archives. 
Unfortunately the OTS has been able to find any of the files related to the Waikato negotiations from January 
1993 to the end of September 1994 so I cannot determine whether comments on the meeting appeared in the 
correspondence of Crown officials. No evidence of the meeting exists in Graham’s files.  
303 The value of government land in the Waikato-Tainui confiscation area varied from over a $1 billion in 1989 
to under $1 billion by 1994. 
304 Mahuta, “Diary Note,” 18 May 1993, RC Vol 30 1993 Box 11, W-T archives. 
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the new Minister of Finance, Bill Birch in December 1993.305 Mahuta asked that the 
government urgently arrange a meeting of the Ministers of Finance, Māori Affairs, Justice, 
Prime Minister and Māori leaders to discuss the Crown’s fiscal envelope policy.306 
In mid-February 1994 the pan-Māori hui sought by Mahuta was secretly held by 
Graham and Māori Affairs Minister John Luxton. The fiscal envelope policy was introduced 
to a large gathering of Māori leaders in Rotorua, but there was no press coverage. Graham 
announced that the fiscal limit for Treaty settlements would be $1 billion for all claims, 
including the fisheries settlements negotiated in 1989 and 1992. The Crown announced that 
the fiscal envelope concept was a mechanism for the Crown’s own fiscal management. The 
Crown did not seek the agreement of Māori to either the concept of the fiscal envelope or the 
total amount of compensation proposed. Nonetheless the Crown held that the envelope would 
need to be large enough to result in fair and durable settlements that would provide certainty 
to all parties. The settlements would need to be fair between individual claimants and the 
Crown, and between claimants themselves. Ngāi Tahu was not invited by the Crown and 
learned about the hui through other channels. In the end Ngāi Tahu Māori Trust Board 
(NTMTB) member Charles Crofts and NTMTB Secretary Sid Ashton were able to attend.  
All Māori leaders that attended, including Waikato-Tainui represented by Mahuta, 
rejected the notion of a fiscal limit for Treaty settlements.307 The reality of the Crown’s 
stance had set in for Waikato-Tainui and Mahuta as he made clear in a memorandum to 
Denese Henare shortly after the February 1994 hui. “My understanding is that Bill Birch has 
insisted on the cap and within that the Minister and TOWPU have put together the various 
envelopes which they are now offering piecemeal to the various claimants. Whilst I agree that 
305 Jack Vowles, Towards consensus? (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1995).  
306 Mahuta to Birch, 13 December 1993, RC Vol 32, Box 12, W-T archives.  
307 Sid Ashton, “Pan-Māori Forestry Hui,” 12 February 1994, Vhi 15 (n), TRONT archive; Shane Solomon, 
“CFRT hui,” RC Vol 33, Box 13, W-T archives. 
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it is difficult for us to get an overall handle on the lands being offered to Waikato, at least this 
is some progress on what the former Labour government offered.”308  
After the fiscal envelope hui, Waikato-Tainui and the Crown did not formally meet 
until April 1994. During this first negotiation session of 1994 there was discussion of the 
implications of a fiscally limited settlement on the potential durability of the settlement. 
Graham stated that any settlement would have to be full and final.309 Both of Waikato-
Tainui’s legal advisors, Denese Henare and Shane Solomon, were distressed by the Crown’s 
focus on finality. Their most significant concern was the extinguishment of Waikato-Tainui’s 
customary rights for an amount that they considered was less than what their Treaty claims 
deserved. Given that the 1946 settlement had also been “final”, there was perhaps not so 
much cause for unease.310 Nonetheless Mahuta remained concerned. At the April 1994 
meeting Graham had asked Mahuta to put the present offer of $170 million back to the 
Waikato-Tainui people. Mahuta responded to Graham and ToWPU officials that presenting 
such a limited settlement would be difficult. He stated: “Any attempt at this point to extract 
agreement on a 'full and final' commitment is not on!”311 Once it became apparent that the 
issue of finality was necessary for the Crown’s own internal processes, Mahuta tried to 
convince Graham that finality would be difficult to guarantee.  
In mid-September 1994 the Crown’s Treaty settlement policy, including details about 
the $1 billion cap for all settlements and conservation and natural resource claims was leaked 
to the media. Mana News had obtained copies of the draft Crown policy booklet being 
developed for release to the public and they reported that natural resources and conservation 
lands would not be available as redress. Soon thereafter, in early October 1994, Waikato-
308 Mahuta to Henare, 17 March 1994, RC Vol 33, Box 13, W-T archives. 
309 “Meeting between Crown and Waikato negotiators, 14 April 1994,” AAKW W5105 7812 22, Archives NZ 
310 Solomon and Henare memoranda, 14 April 1994, RC Vol 33, Box 13, W-T archives.  
311 Mahuta to ToWPU official 4, 18 April 1994, RC Vol 33, Box 13, W-T archives.  
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Tainui produced a categorical rejection of the Crown’s fiscal envelope policy and challenged 
its position on natural resources and conservation land in Kia Hiwa Raa, a Tainui Māori Trust 
Board publication.312 Waikato-Tainui would continue to challenge the Crown’s position on 
the fiscal envelope throughout their negotiations, even as they negotiated a settlement. 
In September 1994, Henare provided a stringent critique of the Crown's full and final 
position in a memorandum to Mahuta. She recounted Mahuta’s comments at the March 1990 
meeting of Waikato-Tainui and the Crown. Mahuta had responded to a focus on finality by 
Justice Minister Bill Jeffries by asking: “where in the world were there examples of full and 
final settlements which had not been affected by change?” Henare commented that: 
[t]his Government and previous Governments have been concerned to preserve their 
own set of principles to enable them to avoid legal and Treaty principles. The 
acknowledgement that the ToW [Treaty of Waitangi] is the nation's founding 
document is capable of easy acceptance when the Crown interprets for itself the rights 
and obligations under the Treaty. This is the political response which has led to 
Crown Law arguing for deconstruction of the Treaty at Waitangi Tribunal 
hearings...If the Crown 'downs its tools' because it insists on full and final when also 
arguing economic and political capacity then that will be a decision for it to make. 
History will view that decision as unreasonable.313  
 
To Henare the notion of a full and final settlement was arbitrary if it was not connected 
directly to some kind of evaluation of loss, and based instead on a feeling shared by Ministers 
that a settlement was fair. Henare questioned why the Crown could not use the legal and 
Treaty principles that had been formed by the landmark court cases involving the New 
Zealand Māori Council in 1987 and the Tainui Māori Trust Board in 1989, and the early 
work of the Waitangi Tribunal, in determining its principles for settlement. To Henare the 
Crown’s unilateral development of the proposed amount of compensation of quantum 
ignored the important Treaty principles that had been formed. 
312 Kaa Hiwa Raa, October 1994; Mana News, “Crown settlement policy,”15 September 1994, AAKW W5105 
7812 4, Archives NZ.  
313 Henare to Mahuta, 19 September 1994, RC Vol 34, Box 13, W-T archives, 2. 
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Following Henare’s memoranda on finality, Mahuta wrote a series of letters to 
Graham in late September 1994, in which he began to set out a case based on the value of the 
land Waikato-Tainui sought for return through the settlement. According to Mahuta the 
terminology of full and final agreements was anachronistic and the negotiations would be 
better served without it. Mahuta tried to explain to Graham that it was impossible to bind the 
next generation. Nonetheless Mahuta stressed that Waikato-Tainui also wanted a durable 
settlement that would endure for generations. In order to achieve such durability, Mahuta 
proposed a settlement valued at $990 million to allow for “tribal restoration and the purchase 
of land in the private market.” Mahuta believed that the $990 million figure was the capital 
value (land and improvements) of the remaining lands in the Crown's ownership in the 
Waikato-Tainui confiscation area. According to a ToWPU official’s calculations the figure 
was closer to $760 million. Mahuta stated that any proposed settlement below that value 
would not be accepted by the Waikato-Tainui people. ToWPU officials and Graham were 
surprised by Mahuta’s request for a $990 million settlement. The lead ToWPU official for the 
Waikato-Tainui negotiations warned Mahuta that it was unlikely that Cabinet would agree to 
the $990 million proposal as it so overtly challenged the parameters of the fiscal envelope. 
Graham was already experiencing difficulties obtaining Cabinet’s approval for the $170 
million proposal.314 Mahuta did not press the issue following the negative response from the 
Crown, but the concern with ensuring that the settlement was ratified by Waikato-Tainui 
communities remained. In an October 1994 memorandum Shane Solomon noted following a 
meeting between Crown and Waikato-Tainui negotiators that “the problem would be when 
[Graham] states to cabinet that it will be full and final and [Mahuta] states to the people that it 
314 Mahuta to Graham, 23 & 24 September 1994, RC Vol 34, Box 13, W-T archives; ToWPU official 4 to 
Mahuta, 28 September 1994, RC Vol 34, Box 13, W-T archives; CAB (94) 876; CSC (94) 121; CSC (94) 129, 
AAKW W5105 7812 22, Archives NZ.  
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will not be.” Solomon believed that consistency was necessary above all since each group 
knew that "neither can bind the future."315  
About a month after aspects of the Crown’s Treaty settlement policy was leaked to the 
media, the Crown made its first formal settlement offer to Waikato-Tainui in mid-October 
1994. Justice Minister Doug Graham instructed a ToWPU official that was drafting the 
Cabinet paper “to include the Sealords settlement and set its value at $170 000 000.”316 In the 
final version of the Cabinet paper the nominal value of the land returned and cash to purchase 
further land would total $170 million. Cabinet noted that the $170 million figure “constitutes 
the maximum fiscal element of a final and durable settlement of the Waikato-Tainui raupatu 
claim” and that “a settlement would represent compensation for 7% of the land 
confiscated.”317 It is unclear how Cabinet calculated that the value of 7% of the land that was 
confiscated was $170 million.318 Further fiscal matters were still to be added to the settlement 
such as the payment of interest on the unpaid sum and the Right of First Refusal (RFR).319 
The settlement excluded the rivers and harbours aspects of the Waikato-Tainui claim.320 
Waikato-Tainui were forwarded a draft copy of the government’s natural resources policy 
which did not recognise any Māori ownership interests in natural resources.321 Graham 
wanted to ensure that the Crown's Treaty settlement policy and the announcement of a 
315 ToWPU official 4, “Meeting between Crown and Waikato negotiators,” 12 October 1994, TC30 Vol. 38, 
OTS archive; Solomon, “Meeting between Crown and Waikato negotiators,” 12 October 1994, RC Vol 34, Box 
13, W-T archives, 3. 
316 ToWPU official 9, “File Note, Re: Meeting”, 4 October 1994, TC30 Vol. 37, OTS archive.  
317 CAB (94) M 37/7; CAB (94) M 37/8; ToWPU official 9, “”, 4 October 1994; ToWPU official 4, “file note”, 
7 October 1994, TC30 Vol. 37, OTS archive.  
318 If the $6 billion figure from 1989 is taken as the value of all the land confiscated in the Waikato raupatu area 
then 7% would be $420 million. 
319 The issue of interest was discussed early on by Tipene O'Regan, he mentioned that such limited 
compensation would have to accrue interest if it was not paid out all at once: Jonathan Underhill, "Treasury 
setting land claims limit,” 7 March 1993, Sunday Star Times.  
320 The rivers and harbours had initially been on the negotiating agenda, but were gradually phased out during 
the negotiations with National in the early 1990s when it became apparent that a settlement of both the land and 
harbours and rivers claim would be too complicated to complete in a short amount of time. 
321 Graham to Mahuta, 19 October 1994, TC30 Vol. 38, OTS archive. In addition, non-fiscal matters such as the 
provision of a guaranteed seat on the Waikato Conservation Board were yet to be included.  
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settlement with Waikato-Tainui would occur concurrently. For the Crown the $170 million 
benchmark figure and the development of the fiscal envelope were connected, because 
Waikato-Tainui’s settlement would entrench the precedent set by the fisheries settlement.322 
When Waikato-Tainui responded to the first draft Heads of Agreement sent by the 
Crown, the different positions on the issue of finality were apparent from the revisions 
Waikato-Tainui requested. The Crown’s draft stated that the "Crown has acted honourably 
and reasonably, that the settlement satisfies both the moral and legal obligations of the Crown 
under the Treaty of Waitangi and its principles or otherwise in relation to the Claims and that 
the settlement is fair, final and durable." Waikato-Tainui would only state that the "Crown 
has acted." Waikato-Tainui’s version of the Heads of Agreement would state that the 
settlement had achieved only "certainty and durability...because the current legislation cannot 
provide for settlement that is full." 323 Waikato-Tainui attempted to address the discrepancy 
between their own view of the limited settlement on offer and the Crown’s view with a 
relativity clause. 
 
322 ToWPU official 9, “File Note, Re: Meeting”, 4 October 1994, TC30 Vol. 37, OTS archive.  
323 Mahuta to Graham, “HoA Draft,” 25 October 1994, TC30 Vol. 38, OTS archive.  
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Waikato-Tainui and the relativity clause 
 
It is unclear exactly when Waikato-Tainui first proposed the relativity clause to the 
Crown and who within the Waikato-Tainui negotiating team first had the idea. One source 
believed that financial advisor Brent Wheeler had come up with the idea.324 The clause 
stemmed from concern within Waikato-Tainui that the Crown had provided a fiscally limited 
settlement, had not recognised the significance of their claims and their willingness to settle 
first. Although the relativity clause would not be developed formally until the Heads of 
Agreement was first drafted in October 1994, it was discussed earlier in the negotiations. In 
April 1994 Mahuta stated during a meeting with the Crown that the principle of “full and 
final” was “an out dated concept...use Waikato as benchmark, all other claims will be relative 
to ours or all bets are off.”325 Waikato-Tainui were concerned that the $170 million figure 
was not based on a calculation of loss, but rather the precedent of the fisheries settlement and 
the Crown’s desire to limit the total amount paid to all Māori groups through Treaty 
settlements. After receiving the first draft of the Heads of Agreement from the Crown in late 
October 1994, Waikato-Tainui responded with changes that included a rudimentary form of 
the relativity clause: “The Crown acknowledges that the Waikato-Tainui claim is the biggest 
claim to settle as lands taken at the point of a musket is more grievous than lands taken 
through an unfair purchase. All other settlements will be relative to the Waikato-Tainui 
claim. This claim will be re-opened at any time if that is relativity is compromised.”326 From 
late October to mid-November 1994, Waikato-Tainui negotiators and advisors attempted to 
have a variation on the quote above placed into the Heads of Agreement to ensure the 
relativity of Waikato-Tainui’s claim to all other claims, but there was resistance from the 
324 Interview with Nanaia Mahuta, 12 January 2011.  
325 Shane Solomon, “Meeting with the Crown”, 21-22 April 1994, RC Vol 33, Box 13, W-T archives.  
326 Mahuta to Graham, “HoA Draft,” 25 October 1994, TC30 Vol. 38, OTS archive.  
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Crown. The CLO felt that such a statement would pre-judge the negotiations of other 
claimants in the future.327  
Mahuta continued to pressure the Crown to enlarge its offer because a limited offer 
would be rejected by the Waikato-Tainui people as Labour’s 1990 settlement offer had been. 
After Solomon and Waikato-Tainui financial advisor Brent Wheeler met with Graham and 
ToWPU officials in November 1994 to discuss the Crown’s offer, Wheeler faxed the 
proposed limited acreage to Mahuta who commented: “no way will the people accept this as 
full and final!”328 Wheeler thought that the "price" being offered by the Crown was "woefully 
inadequate and unnecessarily (on the Crown's part) conservative." Nonetheless, according to 
Wheeler, the Waikato-Tainui negotiators and the people themselves had to decide if there 
was a price at which a full and final settlement would be possible, or if it was a matter of 
principle that could not be overcome. If there was a price, it would need to be determined.329  
Despite the concerns of the leadership with the fiscally limited offer, Waikato-Tainui 
negotiators still recommended that the iwi consider the offer. Waikato-Tainui marae were 
informed at the start of November 1994 that the upcoming month would be busy with 
mandating processes to decide whether or not to accept the Crown's settlement offer. The 
October and November issues of Kia Hiwa Raa had outlined the historical issues of raupatu 
and the negotiations to that date. Mahuta stated that the Crown only had 90,000 acres 
remaining in the raupatu rohe and of that total 47,000 acres was Department of Conservation 
(DoC) land that the Crown claimed was unavailable for transfer. Mahuta contended that the 
327 Mahuta to Graham, 18 November 1994, TC 30 Vol. 40, OTS archvie & RC Vol 36, November 1994, Box 14, 
W-T archive; Solomon to ToWPU official 3, 3 November 1994, TC30 Vol. 39, OTS archive.  
328 ToWPU official 4 to Graham, 7 November 1994, TC30 Vol. 39, OTS archive; Mahuta, “file note”, 8 
November 1994, RC1, Correspondence Vol 36, November 1994, Box 14, W-T archives; Richard Knight, 
"Waikato tight lipped on possible govt offer to settle land claim", 8 November 1994, Waikato Times; "Waikato 
chairman gives no clues over land settlement proposal", 10 November 1994, Waikato Times. 
329 Brent Wheeler to Mahuta, 15 September 1994, RC Vol 33, Box 13, W-T archives. 
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DoC land was still the subject of negotiations.330 Mahuta was forthright with marae 
representatives about the short opportunity that the iwi had to negotiate an agreement with the 
Crown. While this could have been seen as a way to pressure beneficiaries Mahuta was 
merely stating what was perceived by many to be a harsh political reality: “It is likely that 
this will be the first and last offer this current Government will make before the next general 
election...The Crown wishes to achieve at least one significant settlement and views the 
Waikato raupatu claim as the largest Maaori claim. The Crown seeks to settle the claim 
before next year's election campaign takes control of Wellington, and before MMP which is 
likely to prevent any settlements of Maaori claims occurring at least in this generation.”331 
Although Mahuta turned out to be incorrect, the political environment of Treaty settlements 
surely would have been greatly affected if Waikato-Tainui had not signed their settlement to 
set the process in motion.  
In mid-November 1994 the Crown provided a second draft of the Heads of 
Agreement to Waikato-Tainui but it did not contain many of the changes that Waikato-Tainui 
had sought. ToWPU, perhaps reflecting CLO advice, recommended that Graham should 
accept Waikato-Tainui’s cosmetic changes but reject the requested change regarding finality 
and fairness.332At Tainui Māori Trust Board hui members had repeatedly expressed concerns 
with the full and final nature of a fiscally limited settlement that would not allow for the 
transfer of the lands remaining in the Crown’s ownership in the Waikato.333 
At a meeting of the Tainui Māori Trust Board in late November 1994 the issue of 
finality was discussed at length with members of the Board holding different views on the 
330 Kia Hiwa Raa, October 1994; Kia Hiwa Raa, November 1994. 
331 Mahuta to Maraes, 1 November 1994, RC1, Correspondence Vol 36, November 1994, Box 14, W-T 
archives.  
332 Mahuta to Graham & ToWPU official 4 to Graham, 11 November 1994, TC30 Vol. 39, OTS archive. 
333 Mahuta to Graham, 14 November 1994, TC30 Vol . 39, OTS archive.  
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meaning of “full and final”. Board member Carmen Kirkwood referred to the negotiations as 
an “evolutionary process with a full and final settlement”, one that would take longer than 
just the present generation. Kirkwood felt that the agreement may record the settlement as 
full and final but that the negotiations would not be complete until Waikato-Tainui received 
back the approximately 1.2 million acres that it had lost. This point by Kirkwood 
encapsulated how amorphous the concept of full and final could be to different people. 
Waikato-Tainui advisor Shane Solomon re-emphasised the relative nature of full and final 
settlements: “Full and final has never happened anywhere else but here. Full and final 
settlements have been re-opened.” The Board felt that it could not be considered a “full and 
final settlement because there are lands in [the] Waikato that the Crown wants to hold onto.” 
Different members of the Board accepted that it could be referred to as a “full settlement” but 
it would not be “final” until Waikato-Tainui’s goals were met. Board member Rovina 
Maniapoto-Anderson concluded that “there are 2 issues of full and final.” “Firstly, as far as 
the Government is concerned and secondly, as far as we are concerned. As far as the 
Government is concerned, that is all they have got.”334 These debates over finality show the 
difficulties that Waikato-Tainui negotiators faced from within their own communities to 
accept the limited settlement on offer.  
When Waikato-Tainui and Crown advisors met in mid-November 1994 the discussion 
turned to the need for Waikato-Tainui to have the equivalent of 90,000 acres transferred. 
Otherwise, Waikato-Tainui advisors stated, the settlement would not be considered full or 
final by the iwi. Off the record Crown officials were at pains to emphasise that the issue of 
finality was a political necessity for Cabinet.335 After a meeting of Waikato-Tainui and 
Crown advisors and officials, Waikato-Tainui advisor John Te Maru asked ToWPU officials 
334 Tainui Māori Trust Board, “Raupatu Hui,” 23 November 1994, 94 Aug-Dec (SS) Box 32, W-T archive. 
335 Solomon & Mahuta memoranda, 22 November 1994: RC1, Correspondence Vol 36, November 1994, Box 
14, W-T archives.  
132 
 
                                                          
to “provide a clear definition as to what any full, final and durable settlement may refer to 
especially its relationship to raupatu land claims and any associated property rights, including 
natural resource rights.” The concern with full and final issues led to Waikato-Tainui asking 
the Crown to explore possible interim settlements because they felt that the Crown’s 
proposed settlement would be rejected by the Waikato-Tainui people.336 
During the second half of November 1994 the relativity clause and the issue of 
finality began to appear frequently. At a late November 1994 meeting between ToWPU 
officials and Waikato-Tainui advisors, the lead OTS official advised their Waikato-Tainui 
counterpart that she would seek direction on whether the Crown was “willing to consider 
‘benchmarking’ the compensation package to Tainui to 20% of the total settlement ‘package’ 
relating to Treaty of Waitangi issues.” At that time Waikato-Tainui had understood the total 
amount provided for land claims to be $850 million, with a subsequent offer of $170 million 
to Waikato-Tainui.337 By the third draft of the Heads of Agreement the Crown had agreed to 
insert a provision for some kind of relativity clause: “The quantum represents 17% of the 
total envelope (or approximately 20% of land claim settlements).”338 The clause was now 
embedded into the agreement and would appear in future drafts but permission to include the 
clause would not occur until the night that the Heads of Agreement was signed.339 
While the Crown’s fiscal limit on the total value of Treaty settlements had been 
rejected in many ways by Waikato-Tainui and other Māori groups by December 1994, the 
Bolger government received its first official rejection early that month when Te Arikinui and 
paramount Ngati Tuwharetoa leader Sir Hepi Te Heu Heu refused to attend the Crown's 
presentation of its Treaty settlement policy at Premier House on 7 December 1994. Although 
336 John Te Maru to ToWPU official 4, 25 November 1994, 94 Aug-Dec (SS) Box 32, W-T archive. 
337 Ibid. 
338 Graham to Mahuta, “HoA Draft,” 29 November 1994, TC30 Vol. 40, OTS archive.  
339 Graham to Mahuta, “HoA Draft,” 9 December 1994, TC30 Vol. 41, OTS archive. 
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Waikato-Tainui was in the middle of intense negotiations with the Crown, TMTB members 
publicly criticised the $1 billion cap but acknowledged the courage of the Crown for 
attempting to settle Māori grievances. Mahuta stated that if the government wanted the 
settlements to be full and final then the Crown would need to increase the limit. The New 
Zealand Herald editorial criticised the manner in which the fiscal envelope policy was forced 
upon Māori. A diverse group of politicians of different political stripes and authors opposed 
the fiscal cap in mid-December 1994: Labour Treaty Issues Spokesperson David Caygill, 
Alliance co-leader Sandra Lee, National MP Michael Laws, author Alan Duff, former Prime 
Minister David Lange and National Party Māori Vice-President Cliff Bidwell. The Sunday 
Star Times was one of the few newspapers which commended the Crown for at least building 
a starting point for negotiations.340 The National Business Review also supported the Crown’s 
new policy, although economist Gareth Morgan provided a stringent critique of the limits and 
unilateral development of the fiscal envelope from within the NBR’s pages early in February 
1995.341 
The fiscal envelope policy was widely criticised at the time. The fiscal limit proposed 
by the Crown was too small to account for all of the Treaty settlements that would need to be 
negotiated and it was officially abandoned in the coalition agreement following the 1996 
election. The criticism of the fiscal limit was and continues to be reasonable, but the media 
seemed to focus overtly on the fiscal cap, as opposed to the whole package of proposals. 
340 Andrew Stone, “Cool welcome for ‘fiscal envelope’”, 9 December 1994, New Zealand Herald; "Govt land 
claim offer an 'insult'", 9 December 1994, Waikato Times; "Flexing the Envelope", 9 December 1994, New 
Zealand Herald , "National Māori vice-president [Cliff Bedwell] criticises cap", 10 December 1994, Waikato 
Times; Andrew Stone, "Debate on treaty plans constructive, moderate", 10 December 1994,  New Zealand 
Herald ; Michael Laws, "Arrogant land proposal doomed", 11 December 1994, New Zealand Herald; 
“Settlement starter", 11 December 1994, Sunday Star Times; Alan Duff , "Brave move, but $1b too low", 13 
December 1994, Waikato Times; David Lange, "Government ignores responsibilities”, 19 December 1994, 
Waikato Times.   
341 Solomon to Te Maru, 11 January 1995; Solomon, “file note,” 24 January 1995, RC1, Correspondence Vol 
37, December 1994, Box 15, W-T archives ; "Fiscally fair and timely", National Business Review, Vol 25 No 43 




                                                          
Other major issues were the lack of consultation with Māori during the development of the 
policy and the policy’s focus on grievances stemming from confiscation rather than the 
Native Land Court, and the uncompromising position of the Crown which refused to 
recognise ownership interest in natural resources (other than pounamu), and severely limited 
the transfer of conservation land.342 Nonetheless Crown officials who were involved in the 
Waikato-Tainui negotiations and general Treaty settlement policy maintain that another 
settlement after the fisheries settlement would not have been possible without a fiscal cap. 
Many of the same officials stressed that a considerably larger sum was recommended by 
ToWPU and TPK officials, but Treasury advice dominated the debates over a fiscal limit.343 
Only days before the signing of the Heads of Agreement in late December 1994 
Henare and Mahuta remained concerned about the finality of the settlement. Henare wrote to 
Mahuta: 
As you are aware, I do not agree with the Crown's offer because of its full and final 
nature; what Waikato is being asked to surrender, the very limited rights in respect to 
the lands being returned; the lack of redress and leverage by a 'full and final 
settlement' and generic policy to the Waikato River, the Crown's approach to coal, 
minerals and the conservation lands... 
 
Henare wanted the Crown to agree to a much larger settlement that would allow for the 
transfer of all remaining Crown lands in the region. The refusal of the Crown to include 
natural resources and conservation lands was indicative of the limits of the settlement on 
offer from Henare’s perspective. She felt that the Crown’s uncompromising position would 
result in a settlement that would not endure for generations. The Crown stressed that the 
agreement had been negotiated “honourably, reasonably...fair, final and durable.” To Henare 
the notion of a fair and reasonable agreement was impossible if there was undue pressure and 
342 Mutu, The State of Māori Rights, 21-25; Aroha Harris, Hikoi: Forty Years of Māori Protest (Wellington: 
Huia Publishers, 2004) 124-133; Belgrave, Historical Frictions, 330-331; Walker, Ka Whawhai Tonu Matou, 
301-304; Ward, An Unsettled History, 52-53. 
343 Graham, Trick or Treaty?, 55-67; Graham, “The Treaty and Treaty Negotiations,” 166-169; Interview with 
ToWPU official 4, 24 May 2011; Interview with ToWPU official 1, 27 July 2011; Hill, Māori and State: 
Crown-Māori Relations in New Zealand/Aotearoa 1950-2000, 262. 
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what she viewed as an "abuse of process" because of the Crown’s overriding control of the 
process.344 Mahuta also remained doubtful whether the quantum was large enough to provide 
the “fullness and finality” sought by the Crown.345  
By mid-December 1994 the signing of a settlement with Waikato-Tainui was still not 
assured when two of Mahuta’s advisors, Denese Henare and Peter Rowe, as well as internal 
opposition from within the iwi (Dr. Ngapare Hopa, Eva Rickard, Ngāti Whawhakia and Ngāti 
Wairere hapū), recommended that their negotiators not accept the Crown’s settlement 
proposal.346 Mahuta appreciated Henare's concern and has commented elsewhere about how 
much he appreciated Henare’s advice.347 Henare's concerns were completely valid and she 
performed over and beyond her role but Mahuta admitted that after such a long struggle it 
was perhaps the right time to settle: 
I am aware that you are not too happy with the process thus far and the way in which 
the politicians are continually trying to hijack the negotiations. At the same time I 
detect a groundswell of opinion amongst our people who are saying 'now is the time 
to seek a settlement of raupatu. Negotiate the best deal we can but let us settle this 
aspect of raupatu now.' This will give us breathing space before we lodge our next 
onslaught which is the river and West Coast harbours claim. I know that this is a far 
from perfect deal but it will enable Waikato to gain some semblance of control over 
its future. Perhaps the years of struggle are finally taking their toll on me, hence my 
willingness to support settlement. I am conscious of the games the Crown continues to 
play and your own repeated warnings of the implications our settlement might have 
on the rest of Maaoridom and the Treaty. 
 
344 Henare to ToWPU official 4, 19 Deccember 1994, TC30 Vol. 42, OTS archive, 1; Henare to Mahuta, 19 
December 1994; Rowe to Mahuta, 19 December 1994: both RC1, Correspondence Vol 37, December 1994, Box 
15, W-T archives. 
345 Mahuta to Henare, 19 December 1994, RC1, Correspondence Vol 37, December 1994, Box 15, W-T archives 
346 Henare to Mahuta, 19 December 1994; Rowe to Mahuta, 19 December 1994: both RC1, Correspondence Vol 
37, December 1994, Box 15, W-T archives. 
347 Diamond, A Fire in the Belly! Māori Leaders Speak, 134.  
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Mahuta hoped that Henare would be able to travel to Hopuhopu to stay overnight and be 
present at Turangawaewae on the 21st of December for the meeting planned with Graham.348 
Waikato-Tainui’s Treaty settlement and the reactions from Māoridom 
 
Waikato-Tainui’s Heads of Agreement set out the major features of the settlement. 
The overall quantum of $170 million consisted of land-banked properties, some Crown 
properties that were leased back at market rates to government departments, Te Rapa airbase 
(Hopuhopu was transferred at zero value to the overall quantum), and cash with which to 
purchase land. Department of Conservation land was specifically excluded from the 
settlement. The Heads of Agreement contained the Right of First Refusal (RFR), which 
provided Waikato-Tainui with the right to be the first to purchase Crown properties as they 
became available for disposal or privatisation. Waikato-Tainui negotiators also negotiated 
interest payments that added up to approximately $20 million. Interest was paid to Waikato-
Tainui from the date their Heads of Agreement was signed to the date their full quantum was 
paid at a rate of 8.8716% approximately four years later.349  
With the support and authorisation of Cabinet, Graham travelled to Turangawaewae 
Marae to present the Crown’s offer in late December 1994. He advised those present that 
although it was not as much as they had wanted, it was still the best deal possible that any 
government had ever offered and believed that they should approve it. He then opened the 
floor for questions.  Most of the questions centered on the need for more compensation, the 
rights of hapū and the perception that Treaty rights would be negated by the settlement. Many 
questions came from those opposed to the settlement, mostly from Ngāti Wairere and Ngāti 
348 Mahuta to Henare, 19 December 1994, RC1, Correspondence Vol 37, December 1994, Box 15, W-T 
archives. 
349 A fax from Solomon to ToWPU official 4 regarding the interest: "Mr Mahuta would like you to consider 
interest accruing from the date the Heads of Agreement are signed. Enjoy your day - Shane." Solomon to 
ToWPU official 4, 18 December 1994, TC30 Vol. 42, OTS archive; Waikato-Tainui Raupatu Deed of 
Settlement, 22 May 1995, Section 11. 
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Whawhakia, but there were also a few appeals from the crowd for calm and a defence of 
Mahuta. Those present at the Turangawaewae hui voted individually 252 to 84 in support of 
the Heads of Agreement. 51 out of 56 marae representatives and 31 of 33 hapū were 
supportive.350 
In the end Mahuta and Queen Te Atairangikaahu had advised their people to accept 
the offer. Even then, the settlement nearly fell through at the final hour late in December 
1994. Due to a miscommunication the Crown was informed by a Waikato-Tainui advisor that 
Waikato-Tainui would reject the offer, when Mahuta instructed his advisors to accept the 
offer. The agreement was only salvaged because of the positive personal relationship that had 
been developed between Graham’s officials and Mahuta’s main advisors. Constructive 
relationships between officials and advisors could be very beneficial to ensure successful 
negotiations. This was emblematic of the fact that above all it was personal relationships that 
were the key to successful negotiations.351 Michael Belgrave has commented that it was the 
personalities of Mahuta, Graham and O’Regan that drove their negotiations but the 
relationships between the officials and advisors below the principals were just as 
important.352  
On 21 December 1994 the negotiations went into the evening as Waikato-Tainui 
negotiators sought to have the relativity clause included in the agreement. Graham and 
Mahuta went for a walk around the oval at the Hopuhopu Sports Facility. Both Denese 
Henare and the lead Treasury official wanted to accompany their respective leaders, but their 
requests were rejected. Mahuta and Graham would finalise the deal alone with a pair of 
350 “Turangawaewae hui voting results,” 21 December 1994, TC30 Vol. 42, OTS archive; “Turangawaewae 
hui,” 21 December 1994, RC1, Correspondence Vol 37, December 1994, Box 15, W-T archives. 
“Turangawaewae hui,” 21 December 1994, RC December - August 1994, Box 32, W-T archives; John Te Maru, 
“file note”, 1 January 1995, RC1, Correspondence Vol 38, Jan - Feb 1995, Box 16, W-T archives.  
351 Interview with Shane Solomon, 28 May 2011, Interview with ToWPU Official 4, 24 May 2011.  
352 Michael Belgrave, Historical Frictions, 332. 
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cigars.353 Graham telephoned Prime Minister Jim Bolger to confirm that he could include the 
relativity mechanism that Cabinet had not yet approved and Bolger confirmed that it could be 
included.354 The relativity clause effectively cemented the agreement and provided Waikato-
Tainui with a powerful defence within their community against charges of finality; but this 
served to alienate some Māori groups outside of the rohe. Finally, the relativity clause was 
also included: “[T]he redress represents 17% of the value of the redress set aside by the 
Government for historical claims under the Treaty of Waitangi.” While the Heads of 
Agreement set out the general outline of the settlement, the specific details remained to be 
negotiated for the final Deed of Settlement such as the methodology for the RFR and the 
relativity clause. In addition, the two parties also still needed to determine the market value of 
Crown land that was set to be transferred and negotiate the leases that would follow between 
Waikato-Tainui and government departments.355 Mahuta invited Graham and his team for a 
trip up to Taupiri Mountain that night to share a moment of reflection following the intense 
and protracted negotiations.356 
The media reported on both the celebration of supporters of the settlement as well as 
the protests of opponents. Although Mahuta and Graham were generally the lead items on the 
news, Waikato-Tainui critic Eva Rickard was featured in the newspapers and on TV1 News 
353 Interview with Sir Douglas Graham, 23 May 2011; Interview with ToWPU official 4, 24 May 2011.  
354 Diamond, A Fire in the Belly, 138; Bolger, A View from the Top, 178. 
355 “Waikato-Tainui Heads of Agreement,” 21 December 1994, TC30 Vol 42, OTS archive. These were being 
proposed because much of the land that was set to be transferred to Waikato-Tainui was education lands or 
research stations which had previously had such agreements with the government. At the most basic level the 
negotiations regarding the valuation framework and structure of the leases were an extension of Waikato 
attempting to negotiate more valuable frameworks while the Crown tried to maximize its own benefits from the 
proposed system. Leases had to be negotiated differently with the myriad different departments and the general 
valuation framework would have a large influence on how the Waikato quantum was spent overall. This was 
very significant to the whole implementation side of the treaty settlement endeavour. The Crown wanted a 
process that minimised its contingent liabilities, that is the improvements that were situated on Crown land. 
Waikato on the other hand needed a methodology which based valuation on income potential. Waikato wanted 
to ensure that there were no perpetual leases negotiated within the confines of its settlement: “Meeting between 
Crown and Waikato negotiators,” 4 April 1995, RC1, Correspondence Vol 39, Mar - Apr 1995, Box 17, W-T 
archives; John Te Maru, “file note,” 5 April 1995, RC1, Correspondence Mar - Apr 1995, (SS) Box 35, W-T 
archives. 
356 Graham, Trick or Treaty?, 76. 
139 
 
                                                          
on the night of 22 December 1994. TV1 News introduced the news item as the “Treaty of 
Waikato, that’s the historic document to settle the biggest Māori land claim under the Treaty 
of Waitangi.” While the Waikato Times’ editors were supportive of Waikato-Tainui and the 
Crown for signing the settlement the Evening Post  cynically titled their editorial on the 
signing of the Heads of Agreement: “Full and final settlement?” Prime Minister Jim Bolger, a 
ToWPU official and Crown official Shane Jones participated in interviews on the radio and 
extolled the great courage that Mahuta, Te Arikinui, and the Waikato-Tainui community 
showed in settling the raupatu land grievance. Mahuta was quoted in the Waikato Times at the 
end of the year stating that the deal was for “Waikato Māori. It was our land that was taken 
and the Government should not use it as a precedent.” This point was later reflected in the 
final Deed of Settlement. One of the Crown’s acknowledgments stated “that the decision of 
Waikato in relation to the Settlement is a decision that Waikato take for themselves alone and 
does not purport to affect the position of other tribes.”357 John Te Maru defended the 
settlement but refused to state that it was an acknowledgment of the fiscal envelope. 
Waikato-Tainui's negotiating position was that as land was taken so it should be returned and 
that is what had happened in their eyes.358 Their settlement had resulted in the transfer of land 
to Waikato-Tainui, but from their point of view they had been forced into the Crown’s 
proposals for settlement. 
On 29 January 1995 a pan-Māori hui was held in Turangi at the behest of Sir Hepi Te 
Heu Heu. The hui rejected the Crown's proposals for settlement in their entirety. 
357 Waikato-Tainui Deed of Settlement, 22 May 1995, 5.  
358 TV1 6pm News, 22 December 1994, TVNZ Avalon archives; Paul Bensemann, "Courage of making a start”, 
Waikato Times, 22 December 1994; Richard Knight, "Waikato's land struggle over", Waikato Times, 22 
December 1994; Reuben Wharawhara, '"No mandate' on Waikato deal", 23 December 1994, New Zealand 
Herald;  "'Full and final' settlement?", 23 December 1994, The Evening Post; "Move to scrap deal", 23 
December 1994, Waikato Times; "Waikato - still writing itself a place in history" 23 December 1994, Waikato 
Times; Richard Knight, "Settlement deal draws flak from Māori factions", 29 December 1994, Waikato Times; 
Richard Knight, "Mission impossible's new dawn" 30 December 1994, Waikato Times; Radio sources, check 
TC30 Vol. 42. Eddie Durie to Mahuta & Durie to Graham, 22 December 1994, TC30 Vol. 42, OTS archive; 
RC1, Correspondence Vol 37, December 1994, Box 15, W-T archives.  
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Representatives of iwi around the country spoke against the fiscal envelope but most of the 
other parts of the proposals were not discussed even though the meeting rejected all aspects 
of them. The opinions on Waikato-Tainui's signing of a heads of agreement with the Crown 
were far more divided. Waikato-Tainui hapū that opposed Mahuta and the TMTB—
represented by Eva Rickard, Gareth Seymour-Ormsby and Ngapare Hopa—spoke against 
Waikato-Tainui's settlement and condemned the TMTB’s consultative process as 
undemocratic. Seymour-Ormsby put forward a resolution at the hui to “condemn the TMTB's 
acceptance of the fiscal envelope.” The Chairperson of the hui, Whanganui eader Archie 
Taiaroa, countered with the motion that it would not be tabled because the issue was not the 
“business of the hui.” “This was met by cries of 'yes it is!'...however the resolution proceeded 
no further.” A representative of the TMTB, Tui Adams, specifically read out the TMTB's 
rejection of the fiscal envelope policy at the Turangi hui. The junior legal advisor for 
Waikato-Tainui, Shane Solomon, felt that Kuru Waaka of the Te Arawa Māori Trust Board 
brought what Solomon described as a "calming influence to the hui" by stating that it was up 
to each iwi to decide for themselves how they would negotiate with the Crown. Waaka 
pleaded to those in attendance to understand that Waikato-Tainui had not made the decision 
to settle lightly and that the conditions for Waikato-Tainui were different than all other 
groups in the country. Waaka stated that it was about “considering the best interests of the 
tribe for the present and seeking solutions for the future.” The hui then concluded with all 
present endorsing Sir Hepi Te Heu Heu's motion to reject the Crown's proposals.359 The 
mood of the Turangi hui reflected the same tone as the Crown’s fiscal envelope hui that 
occurred around the country in the first half of 1995—fronted mainly by TPK staff led by 
then CEO Wira Gardiner. The fiscal envelope hui around the country were very hostile to the 
359 Solomon, “Turangi hui”, RC1, Correspondence Vol 38, Jan - Feb 1995, Box 16, W-T archives, 6-7. 
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Crown, and rejected the Crown’s proposals for settlement in at times forceful and dramatic 
ways.360 
Waikato-Tainui’s alleged association with the fiscal envelope remained a pressing 
issue and was discussed at a meeting of Waikato-Tainui negotiators and their advisors in 
January 1995. Mahuta was concerned that Waikato-Tainui were being used by the Crown to 
support their proposal for the fiscal envelope. The Crown claimed that Waikato-Tainui had 
acquiesced to the policy despite the iwi’s public opposition. Graham had stated on Radio 
Pacific that Waikato-Tainui had accepted the fiscal cap. Waikato-Tainui negotiators travelled 
around the Waikato-Tainui rohe to explain the settlement to the dozens of marae affiliated 
with the TMTB. In addition to the Waikato rohe the negotiators also travelled to Auckland, 
Hastings, Wellington, Parihaka, Papakura/Otara, Maketū and Christchurch to explain the 
settlement to those Waikato-Tainui beneficiaries living outside of the rohe. In the end there 
were at least a hundred hui from October 1994 to May 1995. Most of the Waikato-Tainui 
negotiators’ time was spent trying to separate their agreement with the Crown from the 
Crown’s fiscal envelope proposals. 361  
In early February 1995 the Institute for NZ Studies held a conference in Wellington 
analysing Treaty claims entitled "Unfinished Business" at which a series of Crown Ministers, 
Labour politicians, academics, lawyers, claimants and prominent Māori figures (including 
Mahuta) presented their views on the Treaty settlement process.362 Shane Solomon reported 
that most of the students attending felt that Waikato-Tainui had "sold them out" and that 
Waikato-Tainui had acquiesced to the fiscal cap. There was a misconception that Waikato-
360 Wira Gardiner, Return to Sender: What really happened at the fiscal envelope hui (Auckland: Reed Books, 
1996). 
361 ToWPU official 4, “Meeting between B teams,” 30 January 1995, 12-030-00-35, OTS archive; Solomon, 
“Meeting between B teams,” 30 January 1995; RC1, Correspondence, Jan - Feb (SS) 1995, Box 34, W-T 
archives, 2; Solomon, “Meeting of Waikato negotiators,” 8 February 1995, RC1, Correspondence Vol 38, Jan - 
Feb 1995, Box 16, W-T archives.   




                                                          
Tainui approved of the fiscal envelope. Solomon repeatedly pointed those who questioned 
Waikato-Tainui to the October 1994 issue of Kaa Hiwa Raa which outlined the firm 
opposition of Waikato-Tainui to the fiscal envelope policy.363 
While Waikato-Tainui struggled to separate its own settlement from the fiscal cap, the 
Crown debated the effect that the settlement might have on its own universally rejected 
policy. Before meeting with Waikato-Tainui negotiators in early March 1995, internally 
Crown officials debated whether the signing of the settlement would signal to other iwi that 
Waikato-Tainui had accepted the fiscal envelope. Waikato-Tainui legal advisor Denese 
Henare pressed for the final Deed of Settlement to contain a more explicit rejection of the 
fiscal envelope.364 CLO officials sought to minimise the importance of the fiscal envelope 
policy to Waikato-Tainui negotiators. In a draft of meeting minutes CLO officials sought to 
remove the discussions of Waikato-Tainui's difficulties separating the fiscal envelope from 
the settlement.365 Late in the negotiations a teleconference between Waikato-Tainui and 
Crown advisors produced an agreement to explicitly state that Waikato had rejected the fiscal 
envelope policy.366 
Mahuta accepted that the Crown could not state that Waikato-Tainui's claim was the 
largest, but that the relativity clause would preserve that fact nonetheless. He believed that the 
relativity clause would challenge the Crown’s fiscal limits: 
My view is that the relativity clause is of the utmost importance...[because] it allows 
the settlement not to be full and final and preserves our position...being the first to 
settle must mean we are taking a risk in fixing the value of our settlement, without the 
luxury of benchmarking against what other Tribes will receive. This must be the trade 
off for the Crown in activating the process. If anything in these negotiations, the 
relativity guarantee is the most significant term to secure. It destroys both the cap 
363 Solomon, “Wellington Unfinished business conference,” 9-10 February 1995, RC1, Correspondence, Jan - 
Feb (SS) 1995, Box 34, W-T archives.  
364 “Crown B Team meeting,” 2 March 1995, 12-030-00-35, OTS archive. 
365 “Waikato and Crown B Teams meeting,” 2 March 1995, 12-030-00-35, OTS archive; CLO official 4 to 
ToWPU official 4, 10 March 1995, 12-030-00-35, OTS archive. 
366 “Telephone Conference: 11:30am, Advisers – Crown and Waikato,” 18 May 1995, RC1, Correspondence 
May 1995 Vol 40, Box 18, W-T archives. 
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concept (for ourselves and other tribes) and provides a mechanism to re-visit the 
settlement in the future. 
 
 ToWPU officials and Graham had both indicated to Solomon that their claim was the largest 
but that it could not be explicitly stated.367  
In correspondence with his advisors Mahuta stated that it was critical for Waikato-
Tainui that the relativity clause be included in the Deed of Settlement. Mahuta believed that 
the Crown was trying to back out of the arrangement and stressed to his advisors that they 
should press the Crown on the issue:  
I have negotiated with the Crown on a 'land for land' basis. The Crown wanted to set 
the value of redress for this claim and insisted that the clause setting out the value of 
redress be quantified as a percentage of all historical claims. It was their policy at the 
time to put a figure on all of the Treaty claims registered with the Crown (the fiscal 
envelope policy). The Crown seems to be changing the rules again now that their 
policy has been rejected at recent hui with iwi. It has always been my understanding 
that the Crown has considered that the Waikato raupatu claim would result in the 
largest settlement.368 
Once the Crown had imposed the fiscal cap, and began setting out its own views on how 
much the Waikato-Tainui settlement would represent from the total amount available for all 
settlements, Waikato-Tainui had developed the idea of the relativity clause. It now fought to 
retain its benefits within the parameters set by the Crown. One of Waikato-Tainui's financial 
advisors commented that the Crown was not legally bound to provide the relativity clause. 
Indeed at the same time internally the Crown was debating the relativity clause as the 
government sought to attempt to predict its repercussions on negotiations with other 
claimants.369 
367 Solomon to Te Maru, 3 May 1995, RC1, Correspondence May 1995, (SS) Box 38, W-T archives, 3-4. 
368 Mahuta to the Advisors, 4 May 1995, RC1, Correspondence  May 1995 Vol 40, Box 18, W-T archives. 
369 Tom Moke to Mahuta, 6 May 1995, RC1, Correspondence  May 1995 Vol 40, Box 18, W-T archives; CSC 
(95) 66, NE 10-030-00-02 pt.2, OTS archive; CSC (95) 67 & CSC (95) M 15/7, AAKW W5105 7812 23 
Waikato: 1995 Pt.3, Archives NZ. 
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Crown officials and Waikato advisors met in early May 1995 under a considerable 
amount of pressure because Waikato-Tainui negotiators wanted the signing of the Deed of 
Settlement to coincide with the annual coronation ceremony for Queen Te Atairangikaahu on 
22 May.370 ToWPU stated in a memo to Waikato-Tainui legal advisor Gerard Brown in May 
1995 that the relativity clause was facing opposition from within the Crown, especially the 
CLO and Treasury, because it would leave open issues for which the Crown desired 
finality.371 The Crown also denied that they had ever stated that the Waikato-Tainui claim 
was the largest. Solomon pointed out that he had diary notes which specifically stated that the 
Crown commented that in fact it was. Waikato-Tainui negotiators pointed out to their Crown 
counterparts that the relativity clause was incredibly important to the wider Waikato-Tainui 
community and that the signing of the settlement hinged on its inclusion.372 Despite the 
Crown’s apprehensions Waikato-Tainui was able to preserve its relativity clause and provide 
a strong argument for its own people that the settlement was not full and final.  
By the end of July 1995 the Crown had decided under Waikato-Tainui pressure that 
the definition of total redress amount in the Waikato-Tainui relativity clause would exclude 
gifts less than 5% of the total $170 million quantum (such as the Hopuhopu Army Base 
valued at approximately $4 million), the Crown's negotiating and implementation costs, 
legislative changes affecting property rights, and the interest that would accrue on the 
settlement from the signing of the Heads of Agreement until the full quantum of $170 million 
was paid.373 While Waikato-Tainui was constrained by the fiscal envelope policy, there were 
370 John Te Maru, “Meeting of B Team,” 18 April 1995, RC Vol 39, Mar - Apr 1995, Box 17; McCan, 
Whatiwhatihoe: A History of the Raupatu Claim, 316; Pei Te Hurunui Jones, “Māori Kings” in The Māori 
people in the nineteen-sixties (ed.) Erik Schwimmer (Auckland: Hurst, 1968). 
371 Gerard Brown to CLO contractor, 1 May 1995 & O’Regan to Brown, 2 May 1995, RC1, Correspondence 
May 1995, (SS) Box 38, W-T archives; ToWPU official 4 to Brown, 3 May 1995, RC1, Correspondence May 
1995 Vol 40 Box 18, W-T archives.  
372 Solomon, “Meeting of Advisers, Rudd Watt and Stone,” 5 May 1995 & OTS official 1 to Mahuta, 5 May 
1995, RC1, Correspondence  May 1995 Vol 40, Box 18, W-T archives.  
373 CSC (95) 121; CSC (95) M 27/8, AAKW W5105 7812 22, Archives NZ.  
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financial aspects of their settlement that were not included in their settlement quantum. As a 
result Waikato-Tainui’s settlement was nominally valued at $170 million but it was worth 
much more. Those exceptions to the fiscal envelope policy benefitted Waikato-Tainui by 
providing them with a larger quantum.  
Part III: Ngāi Tahu’s Treaty settlement 
The litigation phase of Ngāi Tahu’s negotiations: 1995 
 
As Waikato-Tainui proceeded to sign its Heads of Agreement in late December 1994, 
Ngāi Tahu’s negotiations completely broke down. The beginning of the breakdown of the 
negotiations can be pinpointed to early August 1994 when the Crown asked that their 
monthly meetings be delayed until the announcement of the Crown’s new Treaty settlement 
policy at the end of the year. Ngāi Tahu had become increasingly agitated with the lack of 
progress occurring at the monthly meetings but they perceived that the continuation of 
discussion was still key to the negotiation of a final settlement.  The negotiations officially 
broke down in December 1994.374 Ngāi Tahu would state that the Crown had unilaterally cut 
off the negotiations during the period of the breakdown from the end of 1994 until the start of 
1996.375 
In November 1994 an interim settlement was offered to Ngāi Tahu, which the 
negotiators took back to the iwi and it was rejected. It proposed that Ngāi Tahu receive 
freehold title to Rarotoka Island but with the imposition of a marginal strip376, Tutaepatu 
374 Price, The Politics of modern history-making: the 1990s negotiations of the Ngāi Tahu  tribe with the Crown 
to achieve a Treaty of Waitangi claims settlement, Macmillan Brown Series, 1994; Graham, Trick or Treaty?, 
79-84. 
375 O’Regan to Graham, 10 February 1995, Vhi 17(f) TRONT archive; Steve Evans, “Crown forced Ngāi Tahu  
to take legal steps,” The Independent, 23 June 1995.  
376 A marginal strip is an area of land, usually 20 metres, which extend along and abut the landward margins of 
parts of the foreshore and the beds of other water bodies that meet certain minimum size requirements. The 




                                                          
Lagoon, and $10 million worth of land-banked properties in exchange for a revised land-bank 
system. 377  Ngāi Tahu was certainly not averse to the idea of an interim settlement, long 
advocating that a series of interim settlements would be better than the idea of a full and final 
settlement, but this offer was less than adequate from the point of view of Ngāi Tahu 
negotiators.378  
ToWPU and TPK officials had struggled to convince Treasury officials that the terms 
of the interim offer were beneficial to the Crown. ToWPU and TPK officials stressed that all 
of Treasury’s problems with regard to the conditions of acceptance of the “on account” 
settlement were addressed in the interim offer. These problems related mainly to the 
condition that Ngāi Tahu waive all other forms of redress such as approaching the Waitangi 
Tribunal or Court of Appeal. In the end Treasury recommended that Graham not propose the 
“on account settlement” because it would not provide the finality or certainty which the 
Crown sought as one of its objectives. ToWPU and TPK officials stressed that in the midst of 
stalled negotiations Crown negotiators had a chance to show that the extended negotiations 
had not been conducted without some sort of tangible result. Cabinet approved the “on 
account” settlement and merely acknowledged Treasury’s reservations, which was a rare 
event at that time.379 
In the end neither Treasury nor Ngāi Tahu approved the “on account” settlement 
offer. While Treasury declined to approve the “on account” offer because of the lack of 
“certainty” which it would provide the Crown, Ngāi Tahu refused the offer because of the 
377 For all other iwi with land-banks, the properties contained in the land-bank would have to be used in any 
Treaty settlement. Ngāi Tahu was able to purchase lands in the land-bank with their own funding and on-sell for 
a profit. Ngāi Tahu was then allowed to add additional lands to the land-bank. This was only tenable in the large 
rohe of Ngāi Tahu that consists of most of the South Island.  
378 Pete Barnao, “Ngāi Tahu settlement ‘far away’,” Otago Daily Times, 26 October 1994; Graham to O’Regan, 
2 November 1994, C-27-2-02 Vol. 3, OTS archive; O’Regan to Graham, 20 December 1994, C-27-2-02 Vol. 3, 
OTS archive. 
379 “Ngāi Tahu negotiations work strategy and programme Cabinet Select Committee Memorandum,” 25 
October 1994, C27-1-02 Vol. 2, OTS archive. 
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lack of “certainty” which it would provide Ngāi Tahu. Ngāi Tahu’s reservations related to the 
limited offer which had neglected issues such as the importance of Ngāi Tahu’s unique land-
banking system380, Whenua Hou and the Crown Titi Islands, and had not provided enough 
concessions on pounamu, Rarotoka Island and title to the Arahura Valley. Whenua Hou and 
the Crown Titi Islands, Rarotoka Island and title to the Arahura Valley were shortcomings 
related to the Department of Conservation’s (DoC) own reservations rather than Treasury’s 
concerns, and were reflective of the distinct challenges that existed within the Crown’s own 
policy development process.381 DoC would begin to play a prominent role in Ngāi Tahu’s 
negotiations from 1994 onwards, taking on the role often played by Treasury as key internal 
government critic of the Treaty settlement process. 
Throughout 1995 Ngāi Tahu engaged in litigation against the Crown with at one point 
twelve concurrent lawsuits in place.382 Returning to the Courts had always remained open to 
Ngāi Tahu as an option. Throughout the early negotiating period Ngāi Tahu negotiators had 
maintained the threat, which became more apparent as the negotiations progressed towards 
the breakdown in 1994.383  The Courts had been the site of boundary disputes between Ngāi 
Tahu and Rangitane and other northern South Island iwi and hapū, and also a series of 
lawsuits involving the Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries Commission. By the end of 1994, Ngāi 
Tahu had turned the focus of litigation towards the Crown: the Attorney-General, Landcorp, 
the Department of Conservation and Coalcorp.  
380 Under which Ngāi Tahu was able to purchase lands with its own funds and on-sell privately at a profit, and 
then add further surplus Crown properties into their land-bank. 
381 O’Regan to Graham, 20 December 1994, C-27-2-02 Vol. 3. 
382 Chris Finlayson, “Ngāi Tahu negotiations” in Margaret Clark’s The Bolger Years: 1990-1997 (Wellington: 
Dunmore Publishing, 2008), 181-195; OTS Director to Graham, 30 March 1995, NE-10-027-00-02 Pt.1, OTS 
archive. 
383 Davidson and O’Regan, “Meeting between Nick Davidson, Tipene O’Regan Rob Laking and Doug 
Graham,” 2 June 1994, TRONT archive.  
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The first Court action had been the commercial rights which Ngāi Tahu believed it 
should have priority over the whales around the Kaikoura area. The Crown also had given an 
undertaking that it would not issue any more pounamu licences pending the transfer of 
ownership of pounamu to Ngāi Tahu, but as the negotiations dragged on this undertaking did 
not provide enough comfort for Ngāi Tahu. In early 1995 proceedings were filed against the 
Crown to restrain it from issuing these licences because Ngāi Tahu felt that the Crown had 
not honoured its undertaking.384 Although Ngāi Tahu were not successful in all areas of 
litigation, they received favourable judgments in both the pounamu and whales cases against 
the Crown, and were able in the end to force the Crown back to the negotiating table.   
Specific government assets such as Landcorp, Coalcorp and SOE properties were one 
focus of Ngāi Tahu’s lawsuits. Disagreements over Landcorp centred on the number of 
Landcorp farming properties Ngāi Tahu would be allowed to visit to decide on their 
suitability for inclusion in their final settlement. Ngāi Tahu wanted the opportunity to visit all 
Landcorp farming properties in their part of the South Island. The Crown stressed that 
visiting five farms would be more ‘reasonable’ in their eyes. Ngāi Tahu believed it should 
have a larger quantum than the Crown was proposing and as a result wanted to view all the 
available farms owned by Landcorp. After significant lobbying some information was shared 
by Crown officials regarding stock numbers, but valuations were not forthcoming since 
Treasury claimed that it was sensitive commercial information. Like many issues facing Ngāi 
Tahu and the Crown the issue of quantum was at the core of the problem. Proceedings were 
also filed against the Crown in relation to the Coal Export Project being planned on the West 
Coast of the South Island. Coalcorp was developing coal mines focused specifically on the 
export market, and Ngāi Tahu sought to have their interests protected in such a project. In 
384 “Meeting of Te Runanganui o Tahu,” 29 January 1994, NT140 M14 ©, MB archives; Minister of Justice to 
Cabinet Strategy Committee, 19 July 1995, “Ngāi Tahu: Overview of Ngāi Tahu Claims and Legal/Redress 
Proceedings,” NE-12-027-00-2 Vol. 1, OTS archive.  
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June 1995 Ngāi Tahu amended their claim to the Waitangi Tribunal in which they sought 
binding recommendations for the return of all SOE properties in the Ngāi Tahu rohe.385 They 
had also sought access to forestry assets held by the Crown Forestry Rental Trust.386 There 
was a significant fear from within the Crown that the Tribunal would use its binding powers 
to return Crown Forests in the Ngāi Tahu rohe to Ngāi Tahu with a very significant financial 
award made possible under the terms of the Crown Forest Assets Act.  
The option for Ngāi Tahu to take their case back to the Waitangi Tribunal  always 
remained a possibility, and it was occasionally threatened in the first year of the negotiations 
in 1991-1992 by Ngāi Tahu to stress to the Crown its own leverage. This threat was finally 
carried out in late 1994 and a meeting with the Tribunal was planned for early 1995. It was 
originally meant to be presided over by Judge Ashley McHugh, who had presided in the 
original inquiry and was seen by many as sympathetic to Ngāi Tahu because of his role as 
Presiding Officer of the Ngāi Tahu Waitangi Tribunal inquiry. At the last second the 
Chairperson of the Waitangi Tribunal, Chief Judge Eddie Durie, replaced McHugh. Citing a 
lack of funding and time, Durie refused to hear the Ngāi Tahu case. Ngāi Tahu subsequently 
filed proceedings against Durie for refusing to hear their urgent inquiry, and against the 
Attorney-General for not providing enough funding for the Waitangi Tribunal.387  
Ngāi Tahu clearly presented a very difficult decision for Chief Judge Durie. Ngāi 
Tahu had been one of the first major hearings of the post-1985 era and four separate reports 
had been published between 1991 and 1995 regarding the Ngāi Tahu claim. The backlog of 
other claims was quite substantial and Durie considered that Ngāi Tahu had already been 
385 Under the Treaty of Waitangi (State Enterprises) Act 1988 State Owned Enterprises properties were marked 
with a protection memorial that ensured that if a claim was well-founded then the Tribunal could make a 
binding order for the mandatory resumption of the property for transferral to the settling Māori group. 
386 Minister of Justice to Cabinet Strategy Committee, 19 July 1995, “Ngāi Tahu: Overview of Ngāi TahuClaims 
and Legal/Redress Proceedings,” NE-12-027-00-2 Vol. 1, OTS archive.  
387 Steve Evans, "Ngāi Tahu to file in High Court over South Island forestry claim," The Independent, 31 March 
1995; Durie files, Volumes 1-3, TP-02-027-00-01, OTS archive.  
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given a large amount of the Tribunal’s attention and resources. Nevertheless the option for 
Ngāi Tahu to return to the Tribunal had always existed, and from the point of view of the 
majority of Ngāi Tahu beneficiaries, not only (now) Sir Tipene O’Regan, returning to the 
Tribunal was clearly the best course of action at that time.388 The negotiations had come to a 
complete standstill. Coupled with the series of lawsuits in the High Court a return to the 
Tribunal was a natural extension of the Ngāi Tahu strategy.  
The litigation strategy employed by the Ngāi Tahu negotiators was not universally 
accepted amongst the diverse Ngāi Tahu community. Tensions with the negotiating group 
largely simmered during the litigation phase but after litigation had stretched on for a year 
Ngāi Tahu individual Richard Parata voiced his highly critical disapproval of the tactics of 
continued litigation. Parata was never a member of the negotiating team but like all other 
members of Ngāi Tahu he could communicate with negotiators.  Parata stressed that the Privy 
Council and High Court would certainly decide on the basis of precedent. As Waikato-
Tainui’s settlement was nearly finalised, $170 million would be the realistic precedent. 
Amongst many critical comments, he thought that the Crown did not so much break off 
negotiations as was forced to.  
My opinion is that Ngāi Tahu may have misinterpreted the break off of negotiations 
with the Crown. Much weight has been put on the mischievous intent of the Crown 
rather than they were out of their depth and grossly inefficient. The Crown broke off 
negotiations because they could not answer all the complex issues presented by Ngāi 
Tahu. They needed to go to ground. As it turns out they made a mess of things with 
the 'Fiscal Envelope'. The point I am making is that Ngāi Tahu have the opportunity 
to capitalise on this position. ie Ngāi Tahu were the guinea pigs. Incidentally there is 
in Crown circles a lot of sympathy for Ngāi Tahu's position.  
 
Parata further pointed out that despite the series of judicial proceedings the Crown never cut 
off Ngāi Tahu’s main source of funding, the unique land banking agreement with which they 
were able to purchase lands with their own funds. To Parata this was a vivid example of the 
388 “Ngāi Tahu hui-a-tau,” 2-3 November 1994, NT 140 B(x)9, Box 53. 
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measured response that the Crown made to Ngāi Tahu’s aggressive litigation strategy but it 
was one that he believed would not last forever. While Parata’s opinion was not accepted by 
all Ngāi Tahu negotiators, it would continue to gain traction. Rakiihia Tau Snr defended the 
legal action as necessary because he had no trust in the political process. Tau Snr believed 
that the courts would be the only forum under which justice could be obtained and thus the 
litigation needed to continue.389 
After the precedent-setting nature of Waikato-Tainui’s 1995 settlement began to 
become clear, Ngāi Tahu negotiators gradually accepted that they would have to maximise 
their gains within the limited fiscal parameters that they perceived had been set.390 By the 
start of 1996 intervention by Prime Minister Jim Bolger had succeeded in bringing the two 
sides together. Bolger had a positive relationship with O’Regan and since the relationship 
between Graham and O’Regan had effectively soured Bolger took command of the situation. 
Bolger would play a major role in recommencing the negotiations in 1996 and Department of 
Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPMC) officials played a prominent role through this period.391 
O’Regan and other Ngāi Tahu negotiators expressed their fear of the negative pressure of two 
DPMC officials on the re-commencement of negotiations and their potentially troubling 
influence on Bolger especially.392 Once negotiations had recommenced the Crown 
negotiating team was led by an official who previously worked at TPK and the Treasury for a 
389 Richard Parata to Davidson & Parata to O’Regan, 6 & 17 October 1995, Vhi 51 (f), TRONT archive, 3; 
Rakiihia Tau Senior to Parata, 21 October 1995, Vhi 51 (f), TRONT archive, 2. 
390 Tipene O’Regan to Ngāi Tahu  negotiators, “The Post Envelope Vacuum,” 31 March 1995, MB archive; 
Wira Gardiner on Kim Hill’s radio show, 25 January 1996, NE-12-027-00-02 Vol. 1; Davidson to Ngāi Tahu  
Negotiating Group, 15 September 1995, Vhi 51 (f), TRONT archive; Richard Meade to Sid Ashton, Charles 
Crofts, Anake Goodall, 15 December 1995, Vhi 51 (g), TRONT archive, 1. 
391 “Good Morning NZ with Geoff Robinson,” 4 August 1995, NT140 M4 (c), MB archive; O’Regan to DPMC 
official 2, 3 August 1995, NT140 M4 (d), MB archive, 2; Interview with Sir Tipene O’Regan, 4 May 2011. 
Bolger to O’Regan, 7 March 1996, NE-12-027-00-02 Vol. 2, OTS archive, 1; O’Regan, “Meeting with Bolger,” 
7 March 1996, Vhi48 (u), TRONT archive. 
392 O’Regan, “TOR MTG. WITH PM,” 17 March 1996, TRONT archive. Later the two would earn the dubious 
distinction of being referred to by a Ngāi Tahu  advisor as “[John] Halderman and [John] Erhlichman”, two of 
former American President Richard Nixon’s closest and most notorious advisors. Richard Meade, “Impending 
Principals’ Meeting(s),” 9 June 1997, TRONT archive.  
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number of years. She was joined by a CLO official, who had worked on Treaty and especially 
Ngāi Tahu related issues throughout the 1990s, and a Treasury official who would later 
become Director of OTS. While Sir Tipene O’Regan and Rakiihia Tau Snr remained the Ngāi 
Tahu principals and remained intimately involved in the negotiations, they left the minutiae 
of negotiation to Ngāi Tahu officials. Claims Manager Anake Goodall was joined by long-
time legal advisor Nick Davidson, commercial advisor Richard Meade and NTMTB 
Secretary Sid Ashton.  
From recommencement of negotiations to Heads of Agreement, Ngāi Tahu’s 
negotiations: 1996 
 
In May 1996 Ngāi Tahu negotiator Sir Tipene O’Regan and Bolger met throughout 
the month trying to establish the parameters for the negotiations. A point of contention was 
the separation of Ngāi Tahu’s land claim from mahinga kai and environmental issues, as the 
Crown had separated Waikato-Tainui’s land claims from its river and harbour claims, but the 
Crown would not budge on the issue. Even the precedent of $170 million was still not 
completely agreed upon. Ngāi Tahu had accepted the nominal figure of $170 million but they 
desired it in 1994 dollars as Waikato had received its settlement. The Crown maintained that 
it would only provide Ngāi Tahu with a settlement in 1996 dollars. Ngāi Tahu also desired an 
on-account settlement as an expression of the Crown’s goodwill. But because the Crown was 
focused on a final settlement the government was uninterested in an interim settlement of any 
kind that would contradict the Crown’s stated desire and need for ‘comprehensiveness’.393 
393 C T Materials (14); Ashton, “Crown – Ngāi Tahu meeting of Principals Tuesday 28 May 1996,” Vhi 51b (k), 
TRONT archive; Anake Goodall, “Note of a meeting held in the Prime Minister’s Office,” 28 May 1996, Vhi 
51b (k), TRONT archive. 
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The on-account settlement only occurred after direct lobbying to Prime Minister Bolger by 
O’Regan.394  
Only days after O’Regan lobbied Bolger for an interim settlement, Graham returned 
to Cabinet for the approval of a potential on-account settlement. It was approved. In internal 
memoranda O’Regan noted that there was little risk for Ngāi Tahu in recommencing the 
negotiations at that moment and thus it would be best for the tribe for negotiations to start 
again. In early June 1996 O’Regan received a letter from OTS that negotiations had officially 
recommenced.395 On 14 June 1996 an agreement on the on-account settlement had officially 
been reached. Ngāi Tahu would receive ownership of pounamu and Rarotoka Island 
(including its foreshore and seabed without a marginal strip), shared management of 
Tutaepatu Lagoon and $10 million. While the contentof the on-account settlement was 
reported in the media there was still little public knowledge of what else the Crown might 
agree to. The Dominion reported: “The best clue so far on the state of the negotiations is 
perhaps the face of Ngāi Tahu's chief negotiator. ‘I saw Tipene O'Regan on Lambton Quay 
today,’ a Government treaty official said last week.  ‘I don't know how his talks are going, 
but he had a huge grin. I'd have to imagine they're going very well.’"396 One of the key 
factors to recommencing negotiations was an on-account settlement more favourable to Ngāi 
Tahu than what had been offered at the end of 1994.397 
394 Sir Tipene O’Regan, “Negotiating with Politicians,” in Margaret Clark’s The Bolger Years: 1990-1997 
(Wellington: Dunmore Publishing, 2008), 174-180, 179-180; Bolger, A View from the top, 179-181. 
395 O’Regan, “Recommencing negotiations,” 30 May 1996, Vhi 51b, TRONT archive; OTS official 2 to 
O’Regan, 4 June 1996, C T Materials (16), OTS archive. 
396 “The Ngāi Tahu (sic) wait in the wings,” The Dominion, 19 June 1996.  
397 C T Materials (14); Ashton, “Crown – Ngāi Tahu  meeting of Principals Tuesday 28 May 1996,” Vhi 51b 
(k), TRONT archive; Anake Goodall, “Note of a meeting held in the Prime Minister’s Office,” 28 May 1996, 
Vhi 51b (k), TRONT archive; O’Regan, “Recommencing negotiations,” 30 May 1996, Vhi 51b, TRONT 
archive; OTS official 2 to O’Regan, 4 June 1996, C T Materials (16), OTS archive; OTS official 2 to Bolger, 5 
August 1996, NE-10-027-00-02 Pt.1, OTS archive; Anake Goodall, “File Note of meeting with Prime Minister,” 
6 August 1996, TRONT archive; Ashton, “Handwritten Notes,” 13, 15, 19, 20 August 1996, Vhi 52 (g), 
TRONT archive; Ashton, “memo”, 16 September 1996, find thing, TRONT archive, 2; Goodall to Doug Kidd, 
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Ngāi Tahu had agreed before recommencing their negotiations that the inclusion of all 
their claims and a $170 million quantum would be the baseline for negotiations. Nonetheless 
Ngāi Tahu continued to advocate for a settlement that would only cover their land-based 
claims, and a settlement larger than $170 million. Ngāi Tahu also sought a relativity clause. 
The Crown understood that Ngāi Tahu would seek the relativity clause because of Ngāi 
Tahu’s reservations of the full and final nature of such a fiscally limited settlement. In 
addition the relativity clause was necessary to appease the Ngāi Tahu constituency on the 
wider issue of finality.398 There was nonetheless opposition from the Crown to providing the 
relativity clause to Ngāi Tahu. As the negotiations were recommencing a Cabinet paper 
produced by OTS and Treasury stated that the risks of the relativity clause outweighed the 
benefits and officials advised against providing it.399 The positions for each side largely 
remained firm throughout August 1996 and there was little movement in the negotiations. 
The election was scheduled for 12 October 1996 and it began affecting the nature of the 
negotiations as the Crown (and Ngāi Tahu) were pressured to sign an agreement or wait until 
after the election. Treasury was in favour of waiting until after the election while OTS wanted 
negotiations to continue.400  
While there were a series of issues that affected the flow of negotiations in September 
1996, perhaps the most important issue was the purchase of Wigram airbase which, like 
Hopuhopu and Te Rapa, was about to be decommissioned. Ngāi Tahu had expressed an 
interest in the inclusion of Wigram Airbase in its settlement.401 O’Regan claimed that there 
was still considerable cynicism about the Crown's integrity and the transfer of Wigram would 
19 September 1996, Vhi 52c (u), TRONT archive; OTS official 2 to DPMC official 2, 4 September 1996, NE-
10-027-00-02 Pt.1, OTS archive. 
398 OTS official 2 to Graham, 22 September 1996, NE-10-027-00-02 Pt.1, OTS archive.  
399 “Ngāi Tahu: Redress Package,” 31 March 1996, NE-12-027-00-02 Vol. 3, OTS archive.  
400 Treasury to ToWPU, 30 August 1996 & CAB (96) M 37/15: NE-10-027-00-02 Pt. 1, OTS archive; TOWPU 
Memorandum to Graham, 3 September 1996 & Graham to O’Regan, 25 September 1996: Chapman Tripp 
materials OTS archive. 
401 “Meeting between Ngāi Tahu and Crown negotiators,” 5 June 1996, Chapman Tripp materials, OTS archive.  
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help reaffirm the positive relationship between the Crown and Ngāi Tahu. O'Regan explained 
in a letter to Finance Minister Bill Birch that the transfer of Wigram airbase needed to be 
done outside of the negotiations because if the process for transfer required legislation then it 
could be halted when “it is strained through the Parliamentary sieve."402 This was a reference 
to the Parliamentary delays associated with Ngāi Tahu’s legal personality legislation. The 
Crown assured Ngāi Tahu that Wigram would be transferred as part of their settlement. 
Graham sent O’Regan another Crown offer on 25 September 1996 and asked for a 
response by the 27th of September—the pressure of the election was bearing its force on the 
negotiations. The quantum of $170 million would be supplemented by a Deferred Selection 
Process (DSP), a mechanism which Ngāi Tahu negotiators had sought in addition to the Right 
of First Refusal that was provided in the Waikato-Tainui settlement. The DSP mechanism 
allowed the tribe to buy with its own money Crown assets from a defined 'pool' of assets, 
within twelve months of Settlement Legislation being passed. The Crown refused to include a 
relativity clause.403 The reaction from Ngāi Tahu negotiators varied somewhat. Rakiihia Tau 
Snr rejected Graham’s offer because he claimed that there were “too many denials” of Ngāi 
Tahu positions. O’Regan agreed in many ways with Tau but contended that the shifting of the 
Crown’s positions was still possible. This was confirmed by Anake Goodall who spoke with 
OTS the day after the offer was received.404 
Ngāi Tahu remained adamant the relativity clause be included especially in light of 
their agreement to include all their claims. In internal memoranda Ngāi Tahu advisors stated 
that the relativity clause was “essential” adding that it “costs the Crown nothing if it sticks to 
the envelope (and if it doesn’t intend to stick to the envelope, why is the quantum so 
402 O’Regan to Bill Birch, 17 September 1996, Vhi 52c (p), TRONT archive.  
403 Graham to O’Regan, 25 September 1996: Chapman Tripp materials OTS archive. 
404 Rakiihia Tau Senior to Anake Goodall, 27 September 1996 & O’Regan to Goodall, 27 September 1996: Vhi 
52b (b), TRONT archive.  
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low?)”405 Treasury believed that only Waikato-Tainui was entitled to the relativity clause 
because they were the first to settle. OTS officials understood the importance of the clause to 
Ngāi Tahu and attempted to counter Treasury rationales regarding the relativity clause.406 
Ngāi Tahu sought a relativity clause that was identical to Waikato-Tainui’s 17% but Crown 
officials countered that it should be proportionate to the size of their settlement to the overall 
quantum provided for all claims.407 Since Ngāi Tahu did not receive the settlement in 1994 
dollars that it had wanted, the value of its settlement was only 16.1% of the overall quantum. 
In addition there were mathematical irregularities in the relativity clause provided to 
Waikato-Tainui and if the exact same clause had been provided to Ngāi Tahu, it would have 
been triggered by Ngāi Tahu before Waikato-Tainui. It was unclear from the sources 
consulted exactly how this would have occurred but officials were clearly concerned about 
the old relativity clause provided to Waikato-Tainui.408 Despite Treasury opposition Ngāi 
Tahu was successful and had the relativity clause included in the Agreement in Principle 
signed in October 1996 before the election.409 Like Waikato-Tainui, Ngāi Tahu could not 
have settled without the relativity clause.  
Treasury argued against signing the Heads of Agreement and believed that there were 
too many major unresolved issues that required the mandate of a newly elected government. 
On 30 September 1996 Cabinet authorised Graham to make another offer to Ngāi Tahu 
against Treasury’s advice. This did not mean that the settlement was guaranteed. The same 
Cabinet meeting also authorised Graham to make an offer to Whakatohea negotiators. The 
405 Meade to Ashton and Davidson, 11 September 1996, Vhi 52c (r), TRONT archive.  
406 “Outstanding Issues Requiring Resolution by Principals,”4 September 1996, NE-10-027-00-02 Pt.1, OTS 
archive. 
407 Meade to Ashton and Davidson, 11 September 1996, Vhi 52c ®, TRONT archive; ToWPU official 5 to 
Graham, 22 September 1996, NE-10-027-00-02 Pt.1, OTS archive.  
408 “Outstanding Issues Requiring Resolution by Principals,”4 September 1996, NE-10-027-00-02 Pt.1, OTS 
archive. 
409 OTS, “Heads of Agreement between Ngāi Tahu and the Crown for a Settlement of all of Ngāi Tahu ’s 
Historical Claims,” 7 October 1996, CT File, OTS archive.  
157 
 
                                                          
Crown’s negotiations with Whakatohea reached an Agreement in Principle, the equivalent of 
a Heads of Agreement, but it was rejected by the Whakatohea people during the ratification 
process. 410 The same day O’Regan received notification from Finance Minister Bill Birch 
that the Crown approved of Ngāi Tahu purchasing Wigram outside of the settlement 
negotiations. Ngāi Tahu had indicated throughout this negotiating period that the transfer of 
Wigram was a pre-condition for settlement and this goal had now been met. O’Regan seemed 
to be generally inclined towards settling but advisor Sid Ashton stressed caution, especially if 
the approval of co-negotiator Rakiihia Tau Snr had not been expressly given. In between the 
1st and 5th of October Ngāi Tahu managed to add some major additions to the Crown offer. 
The Crown offered to pay interest on the unpaid sum from the Deed of Settlement until final 
payment, but the Ngāi Tahu negotiators convinced the Crown to pay interest from the date of 
the Heads of Agreement. The Crown also agreed to gift redress for the conservation aspects 
of the settlement and negotiations over specific sites of cultural significance such as the 
Crown Titi Islands, Rarotoka Island, the Arahura Valley, access to mahinga kai sites and 
ancillary claims—that is their monetary value would not be subtracted from the $170 million 
quantum. Chapter 3 will investigate the negotiations regarding the Crown Titi Islands and the 
Arahura Valley. Perhaps most significantly in comparison to Waikato-Tainui, Ngāi Tahu was 
able to arrange to have one dedicated seat on the New Zealand Conservation Authority which 
Waikato-Tainui had sought but they had only received a dedicated seat on the Waikato 
Conservation Board. Ngāi Tahu negotiators had achieved what they believed to be “major 
410 CAB (96) M 37/15 & CAB (96) M 37/22, NE-10-027-00-01 Pt. 1, OTS archive; Ranginui Walker, Opotiki-
Mai-Tawhiti: Capital of Whakatohea (Auckland: Penguin, 2007); Paul Spoonley, Mata Toa: The Life and Times 
of Ranginui Walker (Auckland: Penguin, 2009). 
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bolt-ons” in addition to the $170 million quantum, RFR, interest payments and relativity 
clause that had been provided to Waikato-Tainui.411 
On 5 October 1996 a Heads of Agreement was finally signed between Ngāi Tahu and 
the Crown. Graham commented to O’Regan at the signing of the deal: “I want to thank you 
for allowing me to share your suffering.” He joked that when negotiations began in earnest 
five years previously “Tipene had a full head of hair and I looked like Bill Birch.” He 
continued in the same vein that he had begun the Ngāi Tahu negotiations with reference to 
the innate “fairness” of New Zealanders. “This is the greatest country in the world. We have 
everything going for us and it will only be because of our own stupidity if we do not live in 
harmony, with respect and dignity.” The Dominion Post‘s Hugh Barlow commented that the 
Ngāi Tahu negotiations were marked by more complex factors and influences than the 
Waikato-Tainui negotiations because of the opposition of conservationists and the number of 
internal dissidents. The first point was correct because the claim to the river was excluded 
from the Waikato-Tainui negotiations but there certainly was substantial internal dissent 
against the WaikatoTainui settlement from academics such as Dr. Pare Hopa and Ngāti 
Wairere claimants camped out on disputed land well into 1996. The difference was that Ngāi 
Tahu dissidents Sandra Lee and Tirakatene-Sullivan held positions in the machinery of 
government and were able to more effectively influence the negotiation process. This was not 
the case for Waikato-Tainui dissenters.412 
O’Regan commented at the signing that while the settlement was acceptable it could 
hardly be called fair, which did not impress Graham. Others such as ACT leader Richard 
411 Bill Birch to O’Regan, 30 September 1996, Vhi 53b (g), TRONT archive; Ashton, “Handwritten notes,” 30 
September & 2 October 1996, Vhi 52b (j), TRONT archive; Goodall to OTS official 2, 1 October 1996, Vhi 53b 
(k), TRONT archive; Graham, “Ngāi Tahu: Heads of Agreement,” 5 October 1996, NE-10-027-00-01 Pt. 1, 
OTS archive.  
412 Hugh Barlow, "Freeing the future from grievance", 6 October 1996, The Dominion. 
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Prebble commented to O’Regan “Well, you've out-negotiated the Crown again.” To O’Regan 
the question was no longer about justice, but about realistically achieving something for their 
grandchildren and the generations yet to be born. TV1 news was particularly supportive of 
Ngāi Tahu as it chose to headline with a three-minute story of which half was spent 
discussing the claim with Ngāi Tahu’s own historian, Harry Evison. The news story detailed 
the historical nature of the grievances—the duplicity of Crown agents such as Kemp and 
Mantell—and was generally supportive of Ngāi Tahu’s claims despite their opposition and 
criticism of Māori claims in the past. News broadcasters noted that the approximately 630 
acres of DoC land that was planned to be returned was from a total of 12 million acres of 
conservation land in the Ngāi Tahu region.  On the Holmes Show, Doug Graham spoke to 
host Susan Wood about the settlement. Although she questioned the political motivations 
which the National government had to promote a settlement, it in fact could have just as 
easily hurt National as Dominion columnist Adam Gifford pointed out.413  
OTS hoped to have a final agreement negotiated by March 1997, but the scope of the 
agreement was not yet apparent to Crown officials, and the negotiations would take an 
additional six months.414 Since the Crown’s negotiations with Waikato specifically excluded 
any conservation issues there were a large number of new decisions to be made in terms 
conservation redress and the Crown and Ngāi Tahu had to work without any established 
precedents. Viewed in those terms, the final negotiation between the Heads of Agreement and 
the final agreement was completed in a very short time-span. As O’Regan pointed out in his 
1993 Report to the NTMTB, Treaty settlement negotiations in Canada generally took 10-15 
413 Hugh Barlow, "Freeing the future from grievance", 6 October 1996, The Dominion; Adam Gifford, “Rush to 
settle claims unlikely to help Nats,” The Dominion, 1 October 1996; TV1 News, 5 October 1996 & Holmes 
Show, 6 October 1996, both: TVNZ archives, Avalon, Lower Hutt; Interview with Sir Douglas Graham, 22 May 
2011. 




                                                          
years. Some of the Canadian Treaty settlements in the Arctic were completed in under ten 
years, but the Nisga’a settlement in British Columbia took nearly 25 years.415 Although Ngāi 
Tahu would have to follow the financial benchmark set by Waikato-Tainui, their settlement 
was far more comprehensive than Waikato-Tainui’s since it included claims to rivers, 
harbours and all other aspects of their claim as was noted above.416 Some of these 
conservation aspects will be discussed in Chapter 3. Ngāi Tahu’s negotiations then were just 
as much precedent-setting as were Waikato-Tainui’s.  
After the painstaking negotiations to a final settlement, led by Anake Goodall, there 
was opposition to the settlement from within Ngāi Tahu much as there had been for Waikato-
Tainui. Although Dr. Ngapare Hopa was not the original claimant who submitted the 
Waikato-Tainui claim, she was involved at the negotiating table for the first few years of 
negotiations in the late 1980s and early 1990s and Eva Rickard was a well-known Tainui 
advocate and they both headed the attempted injunction against the Waikato-Tainui 
settlement. Rakiihia Tau Snr was the actual original claimant and attempted to place an 
injunction on the signing of the settlement. Tau Snr’s concern was primarily on behalf of his 
own hapū who believed it should receive its share of the settlement, rather than the entire 
settlement being controlled by the iwi. The lawsuit was eventually dropped but there 
remained the litigation led by the Waitaha opponents of the Ngāi Tahu negotiating team who 
disputed their mandate and the inclusion of Waitaha in the TRONT Act. There was also Ngati 
Apa, Rangitane and other Te Tau Ihu groups in general in the northern South Island, who 
sought to re-open a decision of the 1990 Māori Appellate Court regarding Ngāi Tahu’s 
415 Alex Rose, Spirit Dance at Meziadin: Chief Joseph Gosnell and the Nisga’a Treaty (Vancouver, 2000). 
416 Orange, The Illustrated History of the ToW, 223-226; Walker, Ka Whawhai Tonu Matou, 307-308; Sir 
Tipene O’Regan to Jim Bolger, 31 March 1996, NE-12-027-00-02 Vol. 3, 1-3; Sid Ashton, “Future 
Negotiations,” March or April 1996, TRONT archive.  
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northern boundaries: but their claims, like Waitaha’s, were ultimately rejected. 417 After what 
Graham has described as “physically and emotionally draining” negotiations a final Deed of 
Settlement was agreed by November 1997.418 
Conclusion 
 
The quantification of historical loss was an important issue for Waikato-Tainui and 
Ngāi Tahu during their negotiations. While the Crown made clear that political decisions 
rather than purely quantitative equations would ultimately determine the amount of 
compensation, Ngāi Tahu nonetheless tried to have the quantification of loss as a factor in 
their settlement before the decision was gradually made for the $170 million fisheries 
settlement in 1992 that set the benchmark. Eight months after the fisheries settlement was 
signed, the $170 million figure was put to Waikato-Tainui negotiator Mahuta long before any 
kind of discussion about Waikato-Tainui’s quantum representing 17% of the total redress 
envelope. Graham also had instructed ToWPU officials to point specifically to the fisheries 
settlement, when seeking Cabinet authorisation for Waikato-Tainui’s settlement. Waikato-
Tainui also made references to the value of the lands they had confiscated but did not devote 
the resources that Ngāi Tahu did to the issue. The envelope policy was developed to create 
some certainty for the Crown’s own fiscal planning, and to sell the policy to the public—both 
Māori and Pākehā. Its gradual development in the middle of Waikato-Tainui and especially 
Ngāi Tahu’s negotiations was frustrating for each group as they had to deal with the uncertain 
development of new principles for negotiation. Waikato-Tainui struggled to separate the 
fiscal envelope policy from its own settlement. Ultimately Ngāi Tahu and Waikato-Tainui’s 
settlements were connected to the fiscal envelope policy, but the RFR process (and DSP 
417 Andew Sharp, “Recent juridical and constitutional histories of Māori,” in Andrew Sharp and Paul McHugh 
(eds.) Histories, Power and Loss (Wellington: Bridget Williams Books, 2001), 48-56.  
418 Graham, “The Treaty and Treaty Negotiations,” 172-173. 
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process for Ngāi Tahu), interest payments on the unpaid sum and the relativity clauses 
negotiated by Waikato-Tainui and Ngāi Tahu allowed for the prospect of additional financial 
redress on top of the $170 million nominally provided. The relativity clause could in the end 
provide at least as much again as the initial quantum that was paid--$170 million.  
Both Waikato-Tainui and Ngāi Tahu were able to extend their quantum out past the 
nominal $170 million provided to each group. Mahuta commented at a consultation hui at 
Hukanui Marae in February 1995 that interest was building on the $170 million “$400 an 
hour, 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.”419 Waikato-Tainui accumulated around $20 million in 
interest alone from 1995-2000 as the settlement was paid out over five years. Ngāi Tahu 
accumulated around $25 million since Waikato-Tainui was transferred its compensation in a 
shorter time span than Ngāi Tahu—hence less interest was paid. The Right of First Refusal 
(RFR) also provided significant financial leverage to both Waikato-Tainui and Ngāi Tahu. It 
is unclear exactly how much it was “worth” but one can expect it was at least in the tens of 
millions. The RFR allowed Waikato-Tainui and Ngāi Tahu to have the first right to purchase 
Crown properties when they were privatised. Ngāi Tahu was also able to negotiate a Deferred 
Selection Process (DSP). The Crown’s unilateral control of the fiscal limits of Waikato-
Tainui and Ngāi Tahu’s Treaty settlements was evidence of its overpowering sovereignty in 
relation to Ngāi Tahu and Waikato-Tainui’s rangatiratanga. This was especially emphasised 
in both the planned overall limit of $1 billion for all claims, and the $170 million limit for an 
individual settlement. Nonetheless the RFR, DSP, payment of interest and the relativity 
clauses were all aspects of Waikato-Tainui and Ngāi Tahu’s settlements that were evidence 
of some measure of their rangatiratanga in the negotiating process. 
  
419 Solomon, “Hukanui marae consultation,” 11 February 1995, RC1, Correspondence Vol 38, Jan - Feb 1995, 
Box 16, W-T archives, 2-3. 
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Chapter 3: Settling the land  
 
The importance of land to Māori has been paramount throughout New Zealand’s 
history. In the Māori version of the Treaty of Waitangi, Article Two guaranteed to Māori “te 
tino rangatiratanga,” what Claudia Orange describes as the unqualified exercise of their 
chieftanship, over “ratou w[h]enua o ratou kainga me o ratou taonga katoa,” their lands, 
villages and treasures. The English version of Article Two of the Treaty of Waitangi 
guaranteed to Māori “the full exclusive undisturbed possession of their Lands and Estates.”420 
The intimate connections between the people (“tangata”) and land (“whenua”) have been 
signified in a number of different Māori proverbs such as: “Te toto o te tangata he kai, te 
oranga o te tangata he whenua” (“The lifeblood of a person is derived from food; the 
livelihood of a people depends on land”), and “Toitu he whenua, whatungarongaro he 
tangata” (“The land remains after the people have gone”).421 Paerau Warbrick has 
commented that to Māori the “whenua…is linked with people and the greater cosmos, and 
incorporates the corporeal as well as the ethereal.”422 As Richard Hill has noted, “land was at 
the centre of most claims to the Waitangi Tribunal.”423 Within the framework of the 
importance of land to Māori, the return of land was a key component in both Waikato-Tainui 
and Ngāi Tahu’s negotiations. The specific connections between mana whenua (“control of 
the land”) and rangatiratanga were present in both negotiations. Ngāi Tahu felt their mana 
whenua had been weakened by the loss of their property rights via inadequate reserves and 
restricted access to mahinga kai. For Waikato-Tainui the confiscation of their lands was a 
vivid symbol of the way in which their mana whenua was distinctly challenged.    
420 Claudia Orange, An Illustrated History of the Treaty of Waitangi, 39. 
421 Hirini Moko Mead and Neil Grove, Nga pepeha a nga tupuna (Wellington: Victoria University Press, 2001), 
266, 405.  
422 Paerau Warbrick, “’O ratou whenua’, Land and Estate Settlements,” in Nicola Wheen and Janine Hayward 
(eds.), Treaty of Waitangi Settlements (Wellington: Bridget Williams Books, 2012), 92. 
423 Richard Hill, Māori and the State: Crown-Māori Relations in New Zealand/Aotearoa, 1950-2000, 258. 
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Ngāi Tahu and Waikato-Tainui both sought to halt the alienation of Crown lands in 
their respective areas of interest in the wake of the State Owned Enterprises Act 1986.424 
During Waikato-Tainui’s scoping negotiations in mid-1989 Crown officials were informed 
by Waikato-Tainui negotiators that the continuing alienation of Crown land was a primary 
concern. The Treasury official involved in the scoping negotiations attempted to develop a 
system under which Waikato-Tainui would receive a warning regarding the pending 
alienation of Crown land and potentially halt the sale. If Waikato-Tainui sought the inclusion 
of the Crown land in their settlement, it would be placed in a land-bank for future use. 
Unfortunately there was no support for such a system for Waikato-Tainui from senior Crown 
officials although it is unclear what the specific rationales were. In October 1989, the Ngāi 
Tahu Waitangi Tribunal heard closing submissions. Presiding Officer Ashley McHugh 
brought to the Crown’s attention Ngāi Tahu and the Tribunal’s concerns with the on-going 
alienation of Crown land in the South Island. By early 1990 Ngāi Tahu’s land-bank was 
established. Waikato-Tainui followed with the establishment of their land-bank in early 1993.  
Although the land-banking process was an innovative method to protect against the 
alienation of Crown land, the nature of the process could be frustrating for Ngāi Tahu and 
Waikato-Tainui as there were limits to the amount of land and types of land allowed in each 
land-bank.425 Damian Stone has rightly commented that Crown properties available for land-
banking often consisted of the least profitable and hence least desirable Crown lands 
available.426 In addition, as Alan Ward has noted, it was “not easy for claimants to discern, 
from the information provided, what was important land” in terms of its potential 
profitiability.427 It will be argued in this chapter that many of the issues surrounding the 
424 See pages 19-22.  
425 See pages 32-33 for a brief description of land-banks.  
426 Damian Stone, “The Financial and Commercial Dimensions,” 141-142. 
427 Alan Ward, An Unsettled History: Treaty Claims in New Zealand Today, 36.  
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development and operation of Waikato-Tainui and Ngāi Tahu’s land-banks emerged from the 
Crown’s overriding control of the land-banking process in setting the kind of lands that 
would be available and the total cap on each land-bank.  
The return of land was an important aspect of both Waikato-Tainui and Ngāi Tahu’s 
negotiations, but each iwi approached the ownership of land from different historical 
contexts. Waikato-Tainui’s negotiations were informed by the confiscation of their lands in 
the 1860s, hence their key negotiating principle that “as land was taken so land must be 
returned” (“I riro whenua atu, me hoki whenua mai”). The return of land was marked by 
Waikato-Tainui’s efforts to ensure the land could not be alienated again in the future. 
Waikato-Tainui sought legal mechanisms to retain returned land such as the restoration of 
land under a form of inalienable customary title rather than fee simple title. Ngāi Tahu’s 
focus on the quantification of loss was informed by their own negotiating principles—that 
inadequate reserves had been provided to Ngāi Tahu in the nineteenth century. In the context 
of their negotiations, Ngāi Tahu did not seek unique legal mechanisms to retain lands as 
Waikato-Tainui did.428 The return of lands in fee simple title was adequate from the point of 
view of Ngāi Tahu. Nonetheless both Waikato-Tainui and Ngāi Tahu did seek the return of 
lands without marginal strips.429 Ngāi Tahu especially focused on the return of lands without 
marginal strips for sites of cultural significance—these were specific areas that were 
incorrectly included in the Crown’s purchases such as the Crown Titi Islands.   
The return of sites of cultural significance in Ngāi Tahu’s negotiations was informed 
by the Waitangi Tribunal’s specific recommendations on the Ngāi Tahu claim. Ngāi Tahu 
428  During the negotiations Ngāi Tahu did not explicitly seek a customary form of title. Nonetheless under the 
unique legislative environment created by the Canterbury earthquakes Ngāi Tahu residents of Tuahiwi have 
been seeking to have a form of fee simple title provided which allows for the loosening of rural zoning 
regulations and exemptions from the Rating Act.  
429 Marginal strips are strips of land, usually 20 metres wide, which extend along and abut the landward margins 
of parts of the foreshore and the beds of other water bodies. Marginal strips are created when the Crown 
disposes of land. http://www.linz.govt.nz/survey-titles/cadastral-surveying/publications/marginal-strips.  
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sought the return of fee simple title to sites of cultural significance, many of which were 
conservation areas: Whenua Hou (Codfish Island), Rarotoka Island, the Crown Titi Islands, 
the Arahura River, Aoraki (Mount Cook), the bed of Lake Waihora and others. In areas 
where fee simple title could not be obtained, including especially in the “conservation estate,” 
Ngāi Tahu sought a co-management role. There was significant opposition to the transfer of 
conservation areas and co-management roles from within government, primarily through the 
Department of Conservation (DoC), and also from third-party conservation and recreation 
interests outside of government. Opposition from DoC and third-parties delayed agreement 
on the return of sites of cultural significance. They also affected the return of three high-
country pastoral leases that were held in the Ngāi Tahu land-bank, Elfin Bay, Greenstone and 
Routeburn Stations.  The Ngāi Tahu section of this chapter will focus on the negotiations 
regarding the bed of the Arahura River, Whenua Hou (Codfish Island), the Crown Titi 
Islands, and the three high-country pastoral leases.  
Waikato-Tainui’s direct negotiations occurred without a Waitangi Tribunal hearing, 
and as a result there were no recommendations for the return of specific sites. Waikato-
Tainui’s settlement was ultimately restricted to grievances solely regarding the confiscation 
of land and was not marked by the environmental management issues that at times dominated 
the Ngāi Tahu negotiations which encompassed all of Ngāi Tahu’s claims. Nonetheless 
Waikato-Tainui attempted to have Department of Conservation (DoC) land included in its 
settlement, or at least a co-management role with DoC for the land in the Waikato-Tainui 
rohe but there was similar opposition both within and outside government from conservation 
interests. In addition to conservationists, Waikato-Tainui also had to contend with other third-
parties—former owners of Crown land taken under the Public Works Act—who delayed the 
return of Crown land in the Waikato-Tainui settlement.  
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The political and economic contexts in which Waikato-Tainui and Ngāi Tahu’s Treaty 
settlements were negotiated reflected the Crown’s overriding sovereignty and an environment 
under which the Crown largely controlled the parameters of the process. The Crown’s control 
of the negotiation process extended to the manner in which Crown land was protected from 
alienation, and the legal form it would be returned, but third-parties also played a prominent 
role deciding which specific lands were returned.  
Part I: Ngāi Tahu 
The operation of Ngāi Tahu’s land-bank 
 
Chapter 1 briefly detailed the establishment of Ngāi Tahu’s land-bank in late 1989 
and early 1990 following the conclusion of their Waitangi Tribunal hearings. Although the 
land-bank was advantageous for Ngāi Tahu there still remained limits to the overall 
effectiveness of the system nearly two years after which it was in operation—Crown land 
continued to be alienated. Ngāi Tahu commented to the Crown in late 1991 that in some 
cases Ngāi Tahu was pressured to release Crown land for alienation due to political and 
commercial pressure. An example was the surplus Railcorp lands at Christchurch Railway 
Station that were proposed for commercial development. Ngāi Tahu’s land-bank was also 
restricted to specific government departments and agencies such as the Department of Survey 
Lands and Information (DoSLI), the Ministry of Transport, the Department of Conservation, 
the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Social Welfare and Landcorp. Ngāi Tahu sought 
an early warning system for all Crown land and other assets in the Ngāi Tahu rohe. The 
Crown responded by creating a database of all Crown lands and assets in the Ngāi Tahu rohe 
and making that database available to Ngāi Tahu but it was incomplete. Ngāi Tahu continued 
throughout its negotiations to press the Crown to provide further financial information 
regarding the land and assets it held in the Ngāi Tahu rohe, which reflected the criticisms 
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made on a nation-wide basis by Alan Ward that limited information was provided to 
claimants.430  
The land-bank was also susceptible to subversion as a result of the offer-back 
procedures contained within the system. In one case a DoSLI property was offered back to 
the original owners subject to Section 40 of the Public Works Act 1981, but the offer-back 
was refused. Shortly thereafter the position of the original owners was reversed and they 
purchased the property back and quickly on-sold to a private buyer. Ngāi Tahu believed that 
there had been a “measure of active collusion” involved in the transaction.431 These examples 
represented some of the difficulties that Ngāi Tahu experienced during the early years of the 
Ngāi Tahu land-bank. 
As the negotiations dragged on with little progress in the middle of 1993 Ngāi Tahu 
expressed its concern with the land-bank process. Ngāi Tahu was concerned that the values 
ascribed by the Crown to the properties offered for inclusion in the land-bank often differed 
significantly from the market values of those properties to the detriment of Ngāi Tahu. Ngāi 
Tahu sought an amendment to the land-bank system under which Ngāi Tahu could provide 
input into the valuation of properties intended for transfer. Ngāi Tahu also wanted to involve 
itself in the management of land-bank properties, since they were managed solely by DoSLI 
until settlement and final transfer to the Crown.432 The Crown left open the possibility of new 
mutually agreed valuations of land-bank properties upon settlement, but did not agree that 
Ngāi Tahu should be involved in the management of properties contained in the land-bank 
prior to transfer. The Crown stated that Ngāi Tahu’s land-bank arrangements were superior to 
430 Ngāi Tahu Negotiating Team to Crown “A” Team Negotiators, “Options for dealing with Crown asset sales,” 
10 December 1991, C-27-4-02 Vol.1, OTS archive; O’Regan to Treasury, 24 January 1992, “Landcorp South 
Island Assets,” and O’Regan to Justice Secretary, 4 February 1992, “Information on Crown Assets,” both: C-27-
4-02 Vol. 2, OTS archive; Ward, An Unsettled History, 36. 
431 O’Regan to ToWPU, “Crown Asset Disposal,” 11 December 1991, C-27-4-02 Vol.1, OTS archive. 
432 O’Regan to Graham, 27 August 1993, C-27-4-02 Vol. 4, OTS archive.  
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all other land-banks because Ngāi Tahu were able to move properties in and out of their land-
bank unlike any other land-banks in operation. Additionally, Ngāi Tahu were able to add any 
property in the Ngāi Tahu rohe to their land-bank, whereas all other negotiating groups had to 
prove that the property they desired for inclusion into their land-bank had special importance 
to the claimant group. In the context of Ngāi Tahu’s unique land-banking arrangements, the 
Crown felt that the Ngāi Tahu land-bank was the most generous arrangement in place.433  
The three high-country pastoral leases: Elfin Bay, Greenstone and Routeburn Stations 
 
The properties contained in Ngāi Tahu’s land-bank, and all other land-banks, were 
generally restricted to solely Crown land. Early in the negotiation process, Ngāi Tahu 
expressed an interest in the purchase of a private asset, the Elfin Bay Station high-country 
pastoral lease on the shores of Lake Wakatipu. In May 1992 the Elfin Bay lease was 
advertised for sale.434 In June 1992 Ngāi Tahu requested the purchase of Elfin Bay Station 
and an adjoining high-country pastoral lease, Greenstone Station. The Crown agreed. At the 
time of purchase Ngāi Tahu expected the high-country pastoral leases to immediately be 
transferred to the Ngāi Tahu Māori Trust Board. Ngāi Tahu raised the precedent of the 
transfer of Hopuhopu to the Tainui Māori Trust Board, but the Crown maintained that the 
leases and the former Army Base were different kinds of assets. As a result the leases would 
be placed in the land-bank and transferred upon settlement.435  
As the Greenstone station pastoral lease was being purchased by the Crown for 
inclusion in the Ngāi Tahu land-bank in June 1992, the Minister of Conservation sought to 
433 Graham to O’Regan, 27 September 1993, C-27-4-02 Vol. 4, OTS archive. 
434 Graham to Chairman Cabinet Committee on Treaty of Waitangi Issues, “Settlement of the Ngāi TahuMāori 
Trust Board Claim to the Waitangi Tribunal,” 20 May 1992, C-27-4-07 Vol. 1, OTS archive.  
435 Manager Crown Forest Lands to David Oughton, 19 June 1992; ToWPU official 4 to Graham, 19 June 1992, 




                                                          
retire 4,534 hectares of the Station into the conservation estate.436 Although Ngāi Tahu was 
very hesitant, they agreed.437 Despite Ngāi Tahu’s support for increasing the conservation 
and recreation values at Greenstone Station by agreeing to the retirement of a large area to the 
DoC estate, a number of different conservation and sports recreation groups continued to fear 
Ngāi Tahu’s motives. The Otago Fish and Game Council, a statutorily created sports 
recreation organisation, expressed its opposition to the transfer of the lease for Greenstone 
Station because of the potential negative implications that Ngāi Tahu would have for trout 
angling as the new lessee. The Otago Conservation Board voiced similar opposition charging 
that Ngāi Tahu would erode the conservation values of the area around Greenstone Station.438 
The South Otago Branch of the New Zealand Deerstalkers Association also lobbied the 
government and asked that the entire Greenstone Station be purchased by the Crown for 
recreational sports interests.439 The Southland Fish and Game Council was more moderate 
and asked to be kept informed of developments as they progressed in relation to recreational 
fishing access in the Southland section of Elfin Bay Station.440 These conservation and sports 
recreation third-party interests would play a significant role overall in delaying agreement on 
the return of the high-country leases, and all other conservation aspects of Ngāi Tahu’s 
settlement negotiations.  
In July 1992 following the inclusion of the Elfin Bay and Greenstone Station leases in 
the Ngāi Tahu land-bank, the Crown sought to have a $40 million cap placed on the total 
value of Crown properties in the land-bank. This coincided with the debates that took place 
regarding the overall quantum of Ngāi Tahu’s settlement that were explored in Chapter 2.  
436 Minister of Conservation to Chairman Cabinet Committee on Treaty of Waitangi Issues, “Greenstone 
Pastoral Lease: Exclusion from area to go in the Crown Land Bank,” 19 June 1992, C-27-4-07, Vol. 1, OTS 
archive.  
437 O’Regan to Graham, 6 August 1992, C-27-4-07 Vol. 1, OTS archive. 
438 Les Cleveland to Graham, 30 July 1992, C-27-4-07, Vol. 1, OTS archive. 
439 Kerry O’Donohue to Graham, 29 July 1992: C-27-4-07, Vol. 1, OTS archive. 




                                                          
Ngāi Tahu wanted a much larger quantum for their overall settlement than the Crown 
envisioned, and opposed the $40 million limit but ultimately provided its agreement to the 
cap.441 Then in July 1992 Ngāi Tahu requested the purchase of Routeburn Station, a high-
country pastoral lease adjacent to Elfin Bay and Greenstone Stations. 442 The Crown made 
contingent the purchase of Routeburn Station on the reduction of the land-bank cap from $40 
million to $35 million, and an undertaking from Ngāi Tahu that no further private pastoral 
leases would be requested for inclusion in the land-bank. Although Ngāi Tahu considered the 
Crown’s request for the land-bank limit arbitrary, Ngāi Tahu again agreed.443 In August 
1992, the cap was reduced to $35 million and Routeburn Station was added to the land-
bank.444 
In October 1992 ToWPU officials met with representatives of two major sports 
recreation organisations, Hugh Barr, the President of the Federated Mountain Clubs, and 
Bryce Johnson, the Chairman of the New Zealand Fish & Game Council. Barr stressed that 
there was great concern with the use of Greenstone Valley, Elfin Bay and Routeburn Stations 
as Treaty settlement redress. Barr wanted the government to re-categorise the land contained 
in the stations into three new categories: farming, conservation, and recreational. Both Barr 
and Johnson sought an active role in consulting with the Department of Conservation to 
determine the proportion of the new land categories within the three high-country stations. A 
ToWPU official reported to his superiors that Barr and Johnson “maintained that they did not 
want to interfere with the resolution of Ngāi Tahu's grievances where this concerns 
441 Graham to O’Regan, undated but most likely July 1992; Ngāi Tahu-Crown meeting minutes, 24 July 1992, 
both: C-27-4-02, Vol. 4, OTS archive; CSC (92) 387, C-27-4-07 Vol. 1, OTS archive. 
442 CAB (92) 643; ToWPU official 4 to Graham, “Ngāi Tahu Negotiations: Advance on Settlement,”31 July 
1992, both: C-27-4-07 Vol. 1, OTS archive. 
443 O’Regan to Manager Crown Forest Lands), 13 August 1992, C-27-4-07, Vol. 1, OTS archive.  
444 CAB (92) M23/10a, C-27-4-02 Vol. 4, OTS archive. In July 1993 Ngāi Tahu sought another high-country 
pastoral lease, at Glenmore Station, but the Crown was very hesitant and in the end Glenmore Station was taken 
off the market before it was ever sold. Graham, “Purchase of Glenmore Station for Part Settlement of the Ngāi 
Tahu Claim,” 8 July 1993; ToWPU official 10 to Treasury official 8, “Re Glenmore Station,” 12 July 1993, 
both: C-27-8-01 Vol. 6, OTS archive. 
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commercial interests. They do, however, want to have a chance to represent their 
constituents' interests (and what they see as the wider public interest)...” The ToWPU 
officials stated to Barr and Johnson that Ngāi Tahu had always stressed that they would not 
restrict public access to areas of conservation/recreation value. ToWPU officials also pointed 
out that Ngāi Tahu was bound by the same public access provisions as previous lessees. The 
officials indicated that Ngāi Tahu had a strong commitment to conservation principles, and 
had indicated a desire to enter into joint management projects with the Crown to put these 
into effect.445  
The ToWPU officials recommended that the Fish & Game Council and FMC write 
directly to DoC and ToWPU explaining that they have undertaken assessment work on the 
areas in question, and that they wished to be part of a consultation process to determine 
which parts of the high country leases in question the Crown would retain for 
conservation/recreation purposes and public access rights. Barr and Johnson remained 
sceptical of Ngāi Tahu’s motivations despite the Crown’s assurances.446 Johnson wrote to 
Graham following the meeting with ToWPU officials, and sought an undertaking that 
conservation and sports recreation organisations would be consulted before any settlement 
offers were made to Ngāi Tahu.447 
In July 1993, as a result of political pressure from conservation and sports recreation 
advocates both within and outside government, the Department of Conservation produced a 
report that recommended the retirement of a large proportion of the three high-country 
pastoral leases into the conservation estate. The report stated that large areas of the leases 
445 ToWPU official 4, “Meeting with Fish & Game Council and Federated Mountain Clubs,” 20 October 1992: 
C-27-7-04 Vol. 1, OTS archive 
446 ToWPU official 4, “Meeting with Fish & Game Council and Federated Mountain Clubs,” 20 October 1992; 
Barbara Marshall (FMC) to Graham, 21 October 1992; Bryce Johnson to Graham, 21 October 1992, all: C-27-7-
04 Vol. 1, OTS archive.  
447 Johnson to Graham, 28 October 1992, C-27-7-04 Vol. 1, OTS archive.  
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were high-value conservation lands and were unsuitable for pastoral grazing. Ngāi Tahu was 
concerned that after having already agreed to the retirement of 4,534 hectares into the 
conservation estate from Greenstone Station when it was first purchased in July 1992, further 
sections of the Station would now be similarly affected. ToWPU officials conveyed the 
concerns of Ngāi Tahu to Graham. A ToWPU official commented to Graham that “discussion 
of certain options, namely conditional vesting of land title and unconditional vesting of land 
title, were removed by DOC staff from the draft before it was sent to TOWPU for despatch to 
the NGOs. While this rewrite may suit the views of the NGOs, it may not suit those of 
iwi.”448 ToWPU officials felt that DoC was having a negative effect on Ngāi Tahu’s 
negotiations. 
Ngāi Tahu felt that the pressure from DoC had undermined their aspirations for 
Greenstone Valley tourism development. During formal negotiations with the Crown 
O’Regan commented that “Ngāi Tahu appreciate the conservation values but not the 
proposals contained in the report. They are aware of the botanical values but are concerned 
that the protection of red tussock will damage the economic viability of the area; if so, they 
would require compensation.”449 O’Regan complained to Graham that Ngāi Tahu would not 
accept the three high-country pastoral leases unless they were a viable farming unit. Graham 
stated that the Crown had originally intended to transfer the lease to Ngāi Tahu but that 
consultation with conservation groups had to take place.450 Despite the favourable report 
from DoC, conservation and sports recreation interests continued to press the government 
over the use of the three high-country leases in 1993 and 1994. 
448 ToWPU official 11 to Graham, 15 June 1993, AAKW W5105 7812 5, Archives NZ, 1. 
449 “Meeting between Crown and Ngāi Tahu Negotiators,” 1 July 1993, C-27-2-02 Vol. 2, OTS archive.  
450 Graham to O’Regan, 21 September 1993, NT140, F(i)1 Box 129, MB archives.  
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The negotiation with Ngāi Tahu was completely stalled for most of 1992 well into 
1996 but to conservation and sports recreation organisations a settlement always seemed to 
be imminent. These organisations continually stressed that further consultation was needed 
no matter how much the Crown conferred with conservation groups. From the evidence it 
seems that there was wide consultation.451 In addition to the Federated Mountain Clubs, the 
New Zealand Fish & Game Council and Conservation Boards, other organisations that were 
vocal in their opposition to the use of the high-country pastoral leases were the Royal Forest 
& Bird Protection Society, a conservation group, and Public Access New Zealand (PANZ), a 
sports recreation group. Graham spoke to members of PANZ and corresponded with their 
Director, Bruce Mason.452 Ngāi Tahu had concerns about the effect that PANZ could have on 
the high-country pastoral leases aspect of any final settlement.453 
As Ngāi Tahu’s negotiations slowed as result of the development of the fiscal 
envelope policy in 1993 and 1994, Ngāi Tahu commented to the Crown that the public 
consultation process had been hijacked by special interest groups such as PANZ. 
Conservation groups made the same comments of Ngāi Tahu to the Crown. Catherine 
Wallace of the Environment and Conservation Organisations, an umbrella group of 
conservation organisations in New Zealand, specifically asked Doug Graham that at future 
public consultations Ngāi Tahu not be present.454 At some of the public consultations Ngāi 
451 Graham to Royal Forest & Bird Society, Environmental and Conservation Groups, NZ Fish and Game 
Council, Maruia Society, FMC, NZ Deerstalkers Association and the NZ Conservation Authority, 16 December 
1991; Catherine Wallace to Graham, 4 April 1992; Richard Hill, “Meeting with Fish & Game Council and 
FMC,” 20 October 1992; Denis Marshall to Graham, 7 December 1992: all C-27-7-04 Vol.1;Denis Marshall, 
“Speech to the Federated Mountain Clubs,” 12 June 1993, NT140 G20b, Macmillan Brown archive; BF Webb 
to Sid Ashton, 21 March 1994, NT140 M4 (g), Macmillan Brown archive; DoC official 1, “Consultations for 
Ngāi Tahu ,” 11 May 1994, C-27-7-04 Vol. 1; Graham, “Speech to Public Access NZ,” June 1994, C-27-7-04 
Vol. 1; Graham, “Ngāi Tahu  Negotiations: Preliminary Crown Position on Sites of Recreational and 
Conservation Interest, 17-18 September 1996 in Christchurch and Dunedin”, Vhi 52c (r), TRONT archive.  
452 Bruce Mason to Graham, 12 November 1991; Graham to Mason, 3 December 1991; Mason to Graham, 24 
November 1992; Graham to Mason, 19 February 1993 all: C-27-7-04 Vol. 1, OTS archive; Mason to Graham, 2 
May 1994; Graham to Mason, 25 May 1994;  C-27-7-03 Vol. 1, OTS archive;  
453 “Meeting between Crown and Ngāi Tahu Negotiators,” 18 July 1994, C-27-2-02 Vol. 3, OTS archive.  
454 Catherine Wallace to Graham, 4 April 1992, C-27-7-04 Vol.1. 
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Tahu negotiators felt that a disproportionate amount of time was given to speakers who 
opposed Ngāi Tahu.455 Ngāi Tahu negotiator Edward Ellison had asked Sid Ashton, the Ngāi 
Tahu Māori Trust Board (NTMTB) Secretary, to investigate the alleged racist tendencies of 
the Otago Fish & Game Council because of their opposition to the transfer of the three high-
country pastoral leases.456 At the June 1994 Crown-Ngāi Tahu meeting Ngāi Tahu made it 
known that it had strong reservations with the manner in which the North Canterbury and 
Southland Conservation Boards ran their public consultation processes, and that Ngāi Tahu 
preferred a different body to conduct the consultation with “less vested interest.”457  When 
the negotiations broke down in late 1994, the three high-country leases remained in the land-
bank.  
In 1995 Graham and O’Regan exchanged a number of letters regarding the difficulty 
of dealing with conservation interests. While Graham tried to merely stress that conservation 
interests had to be dealt with, O’Regan tried to counter that Ngāi Tahu’s Treaty rights should 
not be trampled upon by conservationists because of alleged “public interest.” O’Regan 
specifically pointed to the concession that Ngāi Tahu provided by agreeing to the retirement 
of land from the Greenstone Station lease when the lease was first included in the land-bank 
in July 1992.458 Graham’s difficulties were increased by the continuing hard line that 
455 O’Regan to Graham, 8 March 1994 and 3 June 1994; “Minutes of a Meeting between Crown and Ngāi 
Tahunegotiators,” 16 March 1994, C-27-2-03 Vol. 3; “Minutes of Public Consultation Process Hui by the Ngāi 
Tahu Māori Trust Board,” 22 April 1994; C-27-7-04 Vol. 1. 
456 Edward Ellison to Ashton, 2 June 1994, Vhi 16 (t), TRONT archive.  
457 DoC official 2 to ToWPU official 11, 18 January 1994, AAKW W5105 7812 5, Archives, NZ; “Minutes of a 
meeting between Crown and Ngāi Tahu negotiators”, 8 June 1994, C-27-2-02 Vol. 3, OTS archive, 2. Hostile 
consultation processes regarding Treaty settlements and indigenous rights has also been explored by Canadian 
authors: Anthropologist Elisabeth Furniss in the British Columbian context during the same time period in the 
Cariboo-Chicotlin area and by journalist Alex Rose in his history of the Nisga’a claim: Elisabeth Furniss, 
Burden of History: Colonialism and the Frontier Myth in a Rural Community (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1999); 
Rose, Spirit Dance at Meziadin: Chief Joseph Gosnell and the Nisga’a Treaty. 
458 O’Regan to Graham, 20 February 1995; Graham to O’Regan, 17 March 1995; O’Regan to Graham, 20 
March 1995, NE-18-027-00-01, OTS archive.  
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conservationists held in 1995 despite the release of government policy which stated that only 
small and discrete sites of conservation lands were available for settlements.459 
As the negotiations were in the early stages of recommencing in early 1996 the 
Commissioner for Crown Lands produced a report which recommended that 90%, or 
approximately 75,000 acres, of the three high-country pastoral leases be retired into the 
conservation estate. The Commissioner for Crown Lands’ March 1996 report reflected the 
same conclusions reached in the July 1993 DoC report. TPK opposed the report’s proposals 
and commented to ToWPU officials that “such a recommendation appears not to take account 
of the Crown's objective to settle the Ngāi Tahu claim. This para[graph] should note why 
Ngāi Tahu regard the stations as important to their settlement, and any barriers to having 
them included? For example do they have high conservation values?” DoC added some 
significant conservation information to the final Cabinet paper to underscore the conservation 
implications for the three high-country pastoral leases. Due to the contradictory advice from 
TPK and DoC, Cabinet declined to make a decision on the high-country pastoral leases 
stating that it was “a difficult issue which requires further consideration by the Crown and 
should be dealt with later in the negotiations in the context of other outcomes.”460 The 
recommendations of the Commissioner of Crown Lands’ report would later become 
entrenched, and large areas of the pastoral leases were retired into the conservation estate.  
In contrast to conservation and public access groups, the South Island High Country 
Committee of Federated Farmers was particularly supportive of Ngāi Tahu as potential high 
country lessees, especially since the three high-country pastoral leases had been commercial 
459 Office of Treaty Settlements, Crown Proposals for the Settlement of Treaty of Waitangi Claims (Wellington: 
Department of Justice, 1994).  
460 TPK official 3 to OTS official 3, 20 March 1996 & Minister of Treaty Negotiations to Cabinet Strategy 
Committee, “Ngāi Tahu: specific assets with conservation implications,” 31 March 1996, both: NE-12-027-00-
02 Vol. 3, OTS archive; CSC (96) M 10/3a, b&c, NE-12-027-00-02 Vol. 4, OTS archive. 
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properties for many years. The South Island High Country Committee stated that a regrettable 
racial element had been injected into the debate over high country land reform. “Pastoral 
leases are being bought and sold all the time. Therefore, the hard question has to be asked, 
why is PANZ mounting a petition against these transactions and not others? The answer is 
that PANZ senses a political advantage in exploiting fears and prejudices in relation to Māori 
and proposed treaty settlements.” The support of high-country farmers was perhaps not so 
surprising considering their own connections with the high-country which as the Waitangi 
Tribunal had noted was not so different from the connections to the land claimed by Ngāi 
Tahu. Individual high-country farmers such as H.A.P Barker of Queenstown also expressed 
their support for Ngāi Tahu.461 Ngāi Tahu had invested a lot of time and effort into building 
and maintaining a positive relationship with Federated Farmers.  
Prime Minster Bolger expressed sympathy for Ngāi Tahu regarding the leases. In 
August 1996 Bolger told Ngāi Tahu negotiators that the Crown would never have purchased 
the leases if Ngāi Tahu had not requested that they purchase them for inclusion in their 
settlement. Private interests would have purchased the leases, and it would have been 
impossible for the Crown to have obtained them for inclusion in the conservation estate.462 
This seemed to affirm Ngāi Tahu’s negative opinion of conservation interests who had fought 
the Crown and Ngāi Tahu over their planned use of the stations. When the negotiations were 
approaching an Agreement in Principle the conservation and sports recreation organisations 
461 R. Haworth to O’Regan, 4 October 1997, VB 256 (l), TRONT archive; South Island High Country 
Committee of Federated Farmers of NZ, “Farmers Stand by Defence of Ngāi Tahu ,” 23 March 1995, MB 
archive; Waitangi Tribunal, The Ngāi Tahu Report, 1040-1042; Michele D. Dominy, “White Settler Assertions 
of Native Status,” American Ethnologist, Vol. 22, No. 2 (May, 1995), 358-374; H.A.P Barker to Graham, 23 
September 1996, Vhi 54j, TRONT archive.  
462 Ashton, “Wakatipu Titles,” 19 August 1996, Vhi 52 (g), TRONT archive.  
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resumed their heated opposition to the use of the high-country pastoral leases in the Ngāi 
Tahu settlement.463 
Before the signing of the agreement in principle in early October 1996 Bryce Johnson 
of the national Fish & Game Council played a pivotal role in organising consultation with 
conservation groups, after acting as the concerted opposition early in the negotiations. The 
consultations continued throughout the negotiation to a final agreement. Forest & Bird and 
PANZ refused to attend nearly all of these consultations and then released selective quotes 
about the settlement and its provisions. Forest & Bird and PANZ made no mention of the 
75,000 acres of land that Ngāi Tahu was being forced to contribute to the conservation estate 
from the three high-country pastoral leases in their publications.464 The situation would have 
been particularly frustrating for both groups of negotiators, as it was Forest & Bird which 
only in August 1996 had pleaded with the government to engage in consultation with 
conservation groups.465  
Not only was public access guaranteed but it was markedly improved, so much so that 
some commentators worried that the “wander at will” provisions would create unfortunate 
precedents for future settlements. At a meeting of the Select Committee on Māori Affairs to 
discuss their settlement legislation, Ngāi Tahu negotiators were cross-examined by MPs 
during the final day of deliberations over fears that the provisions which were included into 
the high-country pastoral leases aspects of the settlement would be used as a precedent by the 
government in other Treaty settlement negotiations. Ngāi Tahu negotiator Anake Goodall 
said that Ngāi Tahu were not satisfied with the result, but that conservation politics had 
463 Barbara Marshall to Bolger, 12 September 1996, NE-18-027-00-01, OTS archive; "Fears land deal could 
exclude public access", Otago Daily Times, 3 October 1996. 
464 OTS official 2 to Bolger, 5 August 1996, NE-10-027-00-02 Pt.1, OTS archive; Anake Goodall, “File Note of 
meeting with Prime Minister,” 6 August 1996, TRONT archive; Ashton, “Handwritten Notes,” 13, 15, 19, 20 
August 1996, Vhi 52 (g), TRONT archive.  
465 Valerie Campbell to Graham, 4 August 1996, NE-18-027-00-01, OTS archive. 
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played a major part in Crown changes to the terms of the original agreement on high-country 
pastoral leases. NZ First MP Tutekawa Wyllie stated that he understood the Ngāi Tahu 
position but asked: “where are we to go in terms of future settlements if the nature of the 
Ngāi Tahu settlement may be detrimental to the ability of other iwi to settle?” Goodall replied 
that he was painfully aware of their responsibilities and stated that they had tried to hold the 
land under the same terms as neighbouring private landowners. Goodall stated that “It is a 
dark irony that the access requirement was imposed as part of the settlement of a grievance 
over Māori being treated differently because of their race.”466 In the end a large majority of 
the three high-country stations were added to the conservation estate and Ngāi Tahu farms the 
remaining area. While most Treaty settlements represent situations in which land is 
transferred from the Crown to Māori claimants, the retirement of over 75,000 acres of 
previously private high-country pastoral leases resulted in the Crown acquiring land from 
Ngāi Tahu’s Treaty settlement. 
The return of sites of cultural significance 
 
The lands that were contained in the Ngāi Tahu land-bank, including the remaining 
area of high-country pastoral leases, largely represented Ngāi Tahu’s commercial 
aspirations.467 In addition to those lands Ngāi Tahu also sought the return of specific sites of 
cultural significance. The negotiations regarding the Arahura River, the Crown Titi Islands 
and Whenua Hou (Codfish Island) were indicative of the difficulties that Ngāi Tahu 
experienced in reaching an agreement with the Crown on other sites of cultural significance 
such as the return of Rarotoka Island, Aoraki (Mount Cook), the bed of Lake Waihora, 
466 Tina Nixon, “Fear precedent set with Ngāi Tahu deal,” 19 June 1998, The Southland Times; Interview with 
Anake Goodall, 7 May 2011.  
467 It also addressed the need to justify Ngai Tahu’s arguments during the Waitangi Tribunal hearings that Ngai 
Tahu had not intended to sell the mountains of Central Otago and Canterbury, the “hole in the middle” of the 
southern South Island: Waitangi Tribunal, The Ngai Tahu Report, 6. 
180 
 
                                                          
Tutaepatu Lagoon, Kaitorete Spit and others. Third-party interests played a prominent role in 
the negotiations over these important sites, much like the use of high-country pastoral leases, 
and delayed an agreement for over four years.  
The Arahura River 
 
 The Waitangi Tribunal had found that the Crown had “acted in breach of its Treaty 
obligations in failing to meet the wishes of Ngāi Tahu to retain ownership of the pounamu in 
and adjacent to the Arahura and its tributaries.”468 The Waitangi Tribunal had recommended 
that the Arahura River and all its tributaries be vested in the Mawhera Incorporation or 
another body nominated by Ngāi Tahu.469 The Arahura Valley has traditionally been one of 
the principal sources of pounamu (greenstone) for Ngāi Tahu. Pounamu represented both 
power and survival for Ngāi Tahu and was recognised as both a sacred object and a valuable 
commodity. 470  Despite the specific recommendation of the Waitangi Tribunal regarding the 
Arahura River, the process of vesting the River was complicated by conservation interests 
both within and outside government. The Crown and Ngāi Tahu had largely agreed that it 
would be more cost-efficient to identify the catchment area of the Arahura River and its 
tributaries to their respective sources and transfer that catchment to Ngāi Tahu, while 
ensuring the maintenance of conservation values and public access. When DoC consulted 
with conservation NGOs regarding the catchment transfer proposal there was opposition. The 
conservation NGOs were concerned about preserving conservation values and public access 
to the Arahura Valley.471  
468 Waitangi Tribunal, The Ngāi Tahu Report, 725.  
469 Waitangi Tribunal, The Ngāi Tahu Report, 1061. 
470 Russell Beck and Maika Mason, Pounamu Treasures: Nga Taonga Pounamu (Auckland: Penguin, 2012). 
The Crown continued to provide consent to private companies to mine pounamu in the Arahura Valley: 
O’Regan to Graham, 24 January 1992, Vhi 9a(c), TRONT archive.  
471 “Meeting of Crown and Ngāi Tahu negotiators,” 4 February 1992, C-27-8-01 Vol. 1, OTS archive.  
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As a result of public consultation, DoC changed the parameters of the previous 
agreement. In an October 1992 report DoC recommended the establishment of a Reserve 
governed by the Reserves Act 1977. Ngāi Tahu was opposed to the reserve status proposed 
which O’Regan described as incorporating “effective powers of confiscation.” O’Regan 
believed that:  
a formula governed by the Reserves Act which would make us tenants, subject to 
ejection under the current or future legislation, would be demeaning in the extreme 
and is quite inappropriate. It is our belief that the Tribunal recommendation to return 
the title, which is itself a reflection of the importance placed by the Tribunal on this 
taoka472, can be achieved at the same time as providing for the Crown’s objectives of 
maintenance of conservation values and public rights of access. This issue lies at the 
heart of the restoration of the Crown’s mana473. 
 
By linking the Crown’s mana to Ngāi Tahu’s rangatiratanga O’Regan was expressing to the 
Crown the intimate connection that existed between the two processes under the Treaty of 
Waitangi and that by vesting the Arahura catchment in Ngāi Tahu “there could be few more 
tangible ways to confirm Ngāi Tahu’s Tino Rangatiratanga.”474 The DoC position to establish 
a Reserve became entrenched by the Crown, and Ngāi Tahu remained opposed to the reserve 
proposal. In March 1993 Ngāi Tahu re-affirmed its desire for the vesting of the River and its 
tributaries into the Mawhera Incorporation. The Crown maintained that the reserve status was 
the only option available.475 
 In addition to the Tribunal’s recommendations regarding the vesting of the Arahura 
River, the Tribunal also recommended a survey of the entire river and its tributaries. Once 
Ngāi Tahu and the Crown reached an impasse on the issue of vesting, Ngāi Tahu still pressed 
472 In the Ngāi Tahu dialect of the Māori language, the “ng” is often replaced with a “k”. Hence “taonga”, or 
treasured possession, is “taoka”.  
473 The meaning of mana is many and varied but in this case signifies the Crown’s honour.  
474 “Minutes of a meeting between Crown and Ngāi Tahu negotiators,” 30 September 1992, C-27-2-02 Vol. 2, 
OTS archive. 
475 O’Regan to Graham, 25 March 1993, C-27-2-02 Vol. 2; “Minutes of a meeting between Crown and Ngāi 
Tahu  negotiators,” 31 March 1993; O’Regan to ToWPU official 11, 6 April 1993; ToWPU official 11 to 
O’Regan, 8 April 1993; ToWPU official 10 to Graham, 29 June 1993; Graham to O’Regan, 18 October 1993, 
all: C-27-2-02 Vol. 2, OTS archive; “Minutes of a meeting between Crown and Ngāi Tahu  negotiators,” 4 May 
1994, C-27-2-02 Vol. 3, OTS archive. 
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for a survey of the area. The Crown complained that the cost of a survey was prohibitive. 
Ngāi Tahu responded that a survey would be unnecessary if the entire catchment were 
transferred to the Mawhera Incorporation as the Tribunal had recommended.476 For the rest of 
1993 and throughout 1994 until the breakdown of the negotiations in November 1994, the 
opposing Crown and Ngāi Tahu positions on the Arahura River remained firm.  
When negotiations slowly began to recommence in the first half of 1996, the Crown 
recognised that it would have to shift in some way their position on the Arahura River to 
reach an agreement, but so did Ngāi Tahu.477 Ngāi Tahu understood that the Crown refused 
to vest the catchment, and that Ngāi Tahu would have to maximise their opportunities within 
the reserve status of the area. Conservation groups pressed for the classification of the 
Arahura River area as a scenic reserve. Ngāi Tahu countered that if the area was going to be 
classified as a reserve against the wishes of Ngāi Tahu, it should be classified as a historic 
reserve. While both reserves have the same public access provisions in the Reserves Act 
1977, scenic reserves are specifically designed for the use of the public while historic 
reserves are not. Late in the negotiations in September 1996, conservation interests sought to 
have the scenic value of the area recognised in addition to the historic reserve sought by Ngāi 
Tahu.478 Ultimately the Waitaki Historic Reserve was vested in the Mawhera Incorporation. 
Ngāi Tahu was unable to have the entire catchment vested in the Mawhera Incorporation as it 
had originally requested, but Ngāi Tahu was at least able to have the area recognised as a 
historic reserve.479 Much like the wider political structure of the negotiation process and the 
discussions over the economic rationales for compensation, there were limits to the Ngāi 
476 “Minutes of a meeting between Crown and Ngāi Tahu negotiators,” 26 January 1994, C-27-2-02 Vol. 3, OTS 
archive. 
477 DPMC official 3 to Bolger, 28 February 1996, NE-12-027-00-02 Vol. 2.  
478 Goodall, “File note of telephone conservation with [OTS official 2],” 27 September 1996, Vhi 52b (d), 
TRONT archive; Reserves Act 1977, Sections 18 and 19.  
479 Ngāi Tahu Deed of Settlement, 21 November 1997, Section 13.3.2.  
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Tahu control of the process, but small concessions were gained that were important to the 
integrity of the settlement from the Ngāi Tahu perspective.  
Whenua Hou and the Crown Titi Islands 
 
 The Titi islands have been an important part of the Ngāi Tahu economy for centuries. 
The titi or mutton-birds that were and continue to be harvested on the islands were not only a 
traditional food source but also a tradeable commodity.480 When Rakiura (Stewart Island) 
was sold in 1864, twenty-one of the neighbouring islands, those closest to Rakiura, were 
reserved for Ngāi Tahu from the purchase. They became known as the Beneficial Titi Islands. 
The Crown took ownership of the remaining islands which became known as the Crown Titi 
Islands. The Waitangi Tribunal found that the Crown should have reserved all of the islands 
neighbouring Rakiura, and recommended that “beneficial ownership of the Crown Titi 
Islands be vested in such persons or bodies as may be nominated by Ngāi Tahu and be 
subject to a similar management as the beneficial Titi Islands.” Whenua Hou (Codfish Island) 
near Rakiura (Stewart Island) is known as the ancestral home of Rakiura Ngāi Tahu. Whenua 
Hou was one of the original stopping off places for southern Ngāi Tahu on their way to the 
Titi Islands. During the Tribunal hearings Rakiura Ngāi Tahu did not deny that Whenua Hou 
was included in the purchase of Stewart Island, but they complained about being denied 
access to Whenua Hou. The Waitangi Tribunal recommended that “subject to prior 
notification and to arrangements with conservation authorities, free access be available to 
Rakiura Māori to visit the island but consistent at all times with the security of wild-life on 
480 Michael Stevens, “Settlements and ‘Taonga’: A Ngāi Tahu Commentary,” in Nicola Wheen and Janine 
Hayward (eds.) Treaty of Waitangi Settlements (Bridget Williams Books: Wellington, 2012), 135; Michael 
Stevens, “Muttonbirds and modernity in Murihiku: continuity and change in Kai Tahu knowledge,” Ph.D 
Thesis, University of Otago, 2009.  
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the island.”481 The two different sets of recommendations of the Tribunal reflected the 
different forms of land-based redress that Ngāi Tahu and the Crown would develop together.  
The return of the Crown Titi Islands was one of the most integral aspects of the Ngāi 
Tahu claim and Rakiura Ngāi Tahu in particular were very concerned that its return be 
effected.482 Although the Waitangi Tribunal had not recommended the return of Whenua Hou 
to Ngāi Tahu, O’Regan argued that its return would re-affirm the Crown’s commitment to 
recognising Ngāi Tahu’s rangatiratanga. Specifically O’Regan sought to establish what he 
termed a “joint title” approach in which both the Crown and Ngāi Tahu would share title to 
important sites such as Whenua Hou.483  
Early in one of the first formal meetings between the Crown and Ngāi Tahu in late 
1991 there was initially some limited support from DoC for the “joint title” approach 
proposed by Ngāi Tahu, but only if Ngāi Tahu also agreed to co-manage the Crown Titi 
Islands. This support for co-management at Whenua Hou was limited to Ngāi Tahu 
participation in an advisory capacity to the primary control of DoC, rather than the “joint 
title” co-management envisioned by Ngāi Tahu.484 When the Crown consulted with third-
party conservation organisations there was positive support for a Ngāi Tahu advisory role at 
Whenua Hou.485 Conservation organisations opposed Ngāi Tahu’s proposed “joint title 
approach.”486 In June 1992 DoC formally proposed the establishment of a Reserves Board for 
481 Waitangi Tribunal, Ngāi Tahu Report, 1064.  
482 Harold Ashwell to Waitangi Tribunal, 17 August 1991, Vhi 9b(f), TRONT archive; “Meeting between Ngāi 
Tahu, Department of Conservation and Treaty of Waitangi Policy Unit officials,” 1 October 1991, C-27-2-03 
Vol. 1, OTS archive.  
483 “Minutes of Meeting between Ngāi Tahu and Crown Negotiators,” 30 October 1991, C-27-2-03 Vol. 1, OTS 
archive. 
484 “Minutes of Meeting between Ngāi Tahu and Crown Negotiators,” 30 October 1991, C-27-2-03 Vol. 1, OTS 
archive.  
485 “Minutes of Meeting between Ngāi Tahu and Crown Negotiators,” 4 February 1992, C-27-8-01 Vol. 1, OTS 
archive.  




                                                          
Whenua Hou with a majority of the Board reserved for Rakiura Ngāi Tahu while Ngāi Tahu 
still pushed for a “joint title” approach at Whenua Hou.487 
 O’Regan believed that the “joint title approach is relevant in the context of Whenua 
Hou and, may well be relevant across a much wider spectrum of settlement within Ngāi 
Tahu’s rohe. We believe the Australian and Canadian models in this area are instructive and 
find it difficult to understand why NZ should find it so difficult.”488 The link to Treaty 
settlement developments in Canada and Australia was used by Ngāi Tahu throughout the 
negotiations to stress that the precedents for recognising the rangatiratanga of indigenous 
groups in other former British colonies existed, but the idea did not gain much traction with 
the Crown. The co-management arrangements sought by Ngāi Tahu were not accepted by the 
Crown, which wanted to provide Ngāi Tahu an advisory role at the conservation board or 
reserves board level. During the March 1993 negotiations O’Regan noted that Ngāi Tahu 
continued “to be interested in the concept of shared title, for example, as for Ayers Rock 
[Uluru] in Australia.”489 O’Regan tried to stress that Ngāi Tahu did not seek to challenge 
DoC’s role. “In the case of the wider conservation estate this would not mean operational 
control or co-management as management is the business of the DoC. Ngāi Tahu would, 
however, seek control of the Ngāi Tahu cultural context, ie, names etc.” The Crown 
responded that their co-management proposal for Whenua Hou was fully consistent with the 
487 DOC official 2 to O’Regan, 23 June 1992, Vhi 13 (k) Box 150, TRONT archive.  
488 O’Regan to Graham, 25 March 1993, C-27-2-02 Vol. 2, OTS archive.  
489 In 1985 Ayers Rock or Uluru was returned as freehold title to the local Aboriginal community and leased 
back to the Australian government. Uluru is co-managed by a Park Board with an Aboriginal majority: David 
Lawrence, “Managing Parks/Managing ‘Country’: Joint Management of Aboriginal Owned Protected Areas in 
Australia,” Research Paper 2 1996-97, Parliament of Australia.   
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Tribunal’s recommendations and that the concept of ‘joint title” would not be investigated 
further as the approach was unacceptable to the Crown.490  
While Whenua Hou was not available for transfer or as a “joint title” approach, the 
Crown Titi Islands remained available but it was unclear how the transfer would be 
specifically achieved. At first DoC proposed that the Crown Titi Islands be co-managed by 
the Crown and Ngāi Tahu together. Ngāi Tahu continued to seek sole fee-simple ownership 
of the Crown Titi Islands.491 After Ngāi Tahu rejected the Crown’s proposal to co-manage 
the Crown Titi Islands with DoC, the Crown accepted that a transfer would occur. The Crown 
envisioned Ngāi Tahu managing the Crown Titi Islands in the same manner as the Beneficial 
Titi Islands.492 For the large part Ngāi Tahu and the Crown were in agreement regarding the 
vesting of the Crown Titi Islands.493 Ngāi Tahu’s only request for the Crown Titi Islands was 
that the vesting of the Islands occurs without a marginal strip. From Ngāi Tahu’s perspective 
marginal strips were created when the Crown disposed of land, but the return of land in a 
Treaty settlement was a different proposition that did not carry the same obligations. Many of 
the Titi Islands that were being returned had steep seashore cliffs which contained important 
Titi nesting sites that would be covered by the marginal strips. In addition, Ngāi Tahu 
preferred the return of land without any Crown encumbrances. The Crown cautiously agreed 
to Ngāi Tahu’s proposal but stated to Ngāi Tahu that the matter would have to be determined 
490 “Minutes of Meeting between Ngāi Tahu and Crown Negotiators,” 31 March 1993; ToWPU official 11 to 
Graham, 27 April 1993; “Minutes of Meeting between Ngāi Tahu  and Crown Negotiators,” 28 April 1993; 
ToWPU official 10 to Graham, 29 June 1993: C-27-2-02 Vol. 2, OTS archive. 
491 “Minutes of a meeting between Ngāi Tahu and Crown Negotiators,” 1 March 1992, C-27-8-01 Vol. 1, OTS 
archive.  
492 CSC (92) 89, C-27-2-02 Vol. 2, OTS archive.  
493 O’Regan to Graham, 25 March 1992, C-27-2-02 Vol. 2, OTS archive. 
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by public consultation, like other conservation matters such as the Arahura River and the 
high-country pastoral leases.494  
Consultation was planned with the Southland Conservation Board. Ngāi Tahu was 
concerned about the effect that conservation third-party interests might have on the 
negotiation for the return of the Crown Titi Islands.495 The Ngāi Tahu negotiators had 
developed a draft deed for the management structure that would govern the Titi Islands.496 
The Crown wanted to release the draft deed of the Titi Islands management structure to 
another conservation organisation in addition to the Conservation Board, the Royal Forest & 
Bird Protection Society. Ngāi Tahu was concerned that Forest & Bird would oppose the 
waiving of the marginal strip and derail the agreement that had been reached. The Crown 
noted that there were advantages to releasing the deed as it would allow the Crown to allay 
any concerns Forest & Bird may have with the proposal.497  
 The Crown’s consultation with the Southland Conservation Board regarding the 
proposal for a Reserves Board at Whenua Hou and the transfer of freehold title to the Crown 
494 “Minutes of Meeting between Ngāi Tahu and Crown Negotiators,” 31 March 1993, C-27-2-02 Vol. 2, OTS 
archive.  
495 “Minutes of Meeting between Ngāi Tahu and Crown Negotiators,” 28 April 1993, C-27-2-02 Vol. 2, OTS 
archive. 
496 Rakiura Ngāi Tahu were also intimately involved in the negotiations regarding Whenua Hou and the Crown 
Titi Islands. Rakiura Ngāi Tahu were disappointed with the proposal for Whenua Hou and believed that the 
proposals should have allowed for greater Rakiura Ngāi Tahu control of the island. The Rakiura Titi Committee 
was the coordinating committee regarding the Titi Islands and O’Regan and the Ngāi Tahu Māori Trust Board 
consulted with the Committee during the negotiation process. The Rakiura Titi Committee gave its interim 
approval for the draft management structure deed for the Crown Titi Islands in mid-1993. But the Committee 
was split on the vesting of the Titi Islands. Some members of the Committee believed that the Islands should be 
vested locally rather than into Te Runanga o Ngāi Tahu. Eventually agreement was reached that the Islands 
would be vested in Te Runanga o Ngāi Tahu with local direct management of the Islands themselves: “Minutes 
of Meeting between Ngāi Tahu  and Crown Negotiators,” 1 July 1993 & “Minutes of Meeting between Ngāi 
Tahu  and Crown Negotiators,” 28 July 1993, both: C-27-2-02 Vol. 2, OTS archive. O’Regan to Graham, 18 
January 1994 & “Minutes of Meeting between Ngāi Tahu and Crown Negotiators,” 26 January 1994, both: C-
27-2-02 Vol. 3, OTS archive. 
497 It is unclear what Forest & Bird’s immediate response was to the draft deed but in line with their opposition 
to all other aspects of the Ngāi Tahu settlement it was most likely negative. “Minutes of Meeting between Ngāi 
Tahu and Crown Negotiators,” 1 July 1993; “Minutes of Meeting between Ngāi Tahu and Crown Negotiators,” 
28 July 1993;  “Minutes of Meeting between Ngāi Tahu and Crown Negotiators,” 6 October 1993, all: C-27-2-
02 Vol. 2, OTS archive. 
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Titi Islands proved partially successful as the Board narrowly provided its support for the 
proposals. Ngāi Tahu sought to expedite the transfer of the Crown Titi Islands and establish 
the Reserves Board at Whenua Hou following the Board’s approval, but Graham still 
required the Minister of Conservation’s support.498 As the negotiations came to a halt in mid-
1994 the two parties began to explore a possible interim settlement. Ngāi Tahu wanted to 
include Whenua Hou and the Crown Titi Islands in the interim settlement, but the Minister of 
Conservation opposed its inclusion citing the narrow support of the Southland Conservation 
Board for the proposals. The Minister of Conservation was also concerned about the waiving 
of the marginal strip at the Crown Titi Islands. The Crown refused to include either the 
Crown Titi Islands or Whenua Hou in the November 1994 interim settlement since Ngāi 
Tahu’s proposals for the two items of redress were still under consideration by the Crown. 
The Crown’s position on Whenua Hou and the Crown Titi Islands contributed to the rejection 
of the interim settlement by Ngāi Tahu in late 1994, and the subsequent breakdown of the 
negotiations.499 
 When negotiations were recommencing in early 1996, the Crown explored some 
variations in the settlement offer regarding Whenua Hou and the Crown Titi Islands to obtain 
Ngāi Tahu’s approval. Substantial internal Crown debates developed during the 
recommencement process. Te Puni Kōkiri and DoC officials debated conservation issues and 
the potential for those issues to foster or endanger the development of goodwill between 
Crown and Ngāi Tahu negotiators. Comments by DoC officials on the Cabinet paper being 
developed in March 1996 reflected some of the reasons the first on account settlement was 
rejected so vigorously by Ngāi Tahu in November 1994. DoC wanted the Cabinet paper to 
498 “Minutes of Meeting between Ngāi Tahu and Crown Negotiators,” 8 June 1994, C-27-2-02 Vol. 3, OTS 
archive. 
499 O’Regan to ToWPU official 8, 8 August 1994; Graham to Cabinet Strategy Committee, “Ngāi Tahu on-
account settlement,” 24 August 1994; CAB (94) M 40/10, all C-27-2-02 Vol. 3, OTS archive. 
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highlight the significant public opposition that was raised against the Whenua Hou and 
Crown Titi proposals, and that they were only passed by a narrow majority by the Southland 
Conservation Board.500 A TPK official commented:  
We consider TPK should be involved in any inter-departmental discussions on these 
matters as our participation will assist in achieving a better outcome. For example, in 
the past we have contested several elements of the Crown's present negotiating 
position (ownership of pounamu, Whenua, Crown Titi Islands, Rarotoka including 
[the] foreshore and seabed) which are only now being contemplated as part of the 
compromises necessary to reach a settlement.501  
 
While DoC’s concerns about the Southland Conservation Board consultation process were 
included in the final Cabinet paper, the Cabinet paper also set out the limitations of the 
previous interim settlement offer of November 1994.502 OTS officials advocated for revised 
positions that reflected TPK and Ngāi Tahu’s concerns.  
At Whenua Hou, Ngāi Tahu sought equal representation on the Reserves Board and 
the development of transparent and explicit protocols between the Department of 
Conservation and Ngāi Tahu regarding visitation rights. For the Crown Titi Islands, Ngāi 
Tahu’s request for the waiving of marginal strips was necessary to advance the negotiation 
process. The Whenua Hou proposal for Ngāi Tahu that was developed in the first half of 
1996 in preparation for the formal recommencement of negotiations largely met the approval 
of Ngāi Tahu. In addition to equal representation on the Reserves Board that would be 
established to better manage Whenua Hou, a consultative group comprised of Rakiura Ngāi 
Tahu would be formed to provide advice to the Department of Conservation Regional 
Conservator on the issue of entry permits. The fee simple title of Crown Titi Islands without a 
marginal strip requirement was offered for return to Ngāi Tahu, but the Islands would still be 
500 DoC official 2 to OTS official 3, 20 March 1996, NE-12-027-00-02 Vol. 3. 
501 TPK official 3 to OTS official 3, 20 March 1996 & Graham to Cabinet Strategy Committee, “Ngāi Tahu: 
specific assets with conservation implications,” 31 March 1996, both: NE-12-027-00-02 Vol. 3. 
502 CSC (96) M 10/3a, b&c, NE-12-027-00-02 Vol. 4, OTS archive. 
190 
 
                                                          
managed as a nature reserve. Ngāi Tahu sought sole management control of the Islands while 
the Crown wanted to remain involved in the management of the Islands.503   
 As the negotiations neared a Heads of Agreement in late September 1996, Ngāi Tahu 
proposed that the fee simple title of Whenua Hou would be transferred to Ngāi Tahu with 
immediate giftback to the Crown. Due to Crown opposition, the fee simple title would remain 
with the Crown, but Ngāi Tahu then sought an undertaking that if the Island were no longer 
required for conservation purposes it would pass to Ngāi Tahu. This was in effect a Right of 
First Refusal to Whenua Hou. The Crown remained in opposition to Ngāi Tahu’s proposal. 
The Crown’s final offer was that instead of the establishment of a Reserves Board, a sub-
committee of the Southland Conservation Board would be established in its place with equal 
representation between Rakiura Ngāi Tahu and the Southland Conservation Board. The 
Committee would also prepare a policy setting out the conditions under which the Minister of 
Conservation would grant permits for access to Whenua Hou. In exchange Ngāi Tahu would 
receive the fee simple title to the Crown Titi Islands and sole responsibility for the 
management of the Islands.504  
When an agreement was finally reached on Whenua Hou and the Crown Titi Islands 
just before the 1996 election, the traditional conservation and sports recreation third-party 
interest opposition such as the Federated Mountain Clubs (FMC) and the Royal Forest & Bird 
Society continued to oppose any settlement involving conservation areas. The President of 
Forest & Bird, Kevin Smith, continued to express opposition to the transfer of the Crown Titi 
Islands.505 The Southland branch of Forest & Bird expressed its concern with the allegedly 
503 OTS official 3 to DPMC, CLO, Treasury and DoC officials, 18 March 1996; Graham to Cabinet Strategy 
Committee Chair, “Ngāi Tahu: Specific assets with conservation implications,” 31 March 1996, NE-12-027-00-
02 Vol. 3, OTS archive; Bolger to O’Regan, 22 April 1996, NE-12-027-00-02 Vol. 5, OTS archive.  
504 Goodall to Ngāi Tahu Negotiating Team, 19 September 1996, Vhi 52c (u), TRONT archive.  
505 Kevin Smith to Doug Kidd, 3 October 1996, Vhi 54 (f), TRONT archive.  
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“speedy” negotiations underway between the Crown and Ngāi Tahu. Forest & Bird opposed 
the proposed handover of the Crown Titi Islands and the creation of a separate conservation 
board sub-committee for Whenua Hou. Barbara Marshall of the FMC asked that neither the 
Crown Titi Islands nor Whenua Hou be used as redress despite the clear recommendations of 
the Waitangi Tribunal.506 
 The negotiations and settlement provisions regarding the Arahura River, Whenua Hou 
and the Crown Titi Islands were a product of the Waitangi Tribunal’s specific findings and 
recommendations. Substantive negotiations took place over a number of years and were 
subject to numerous consultation processes with third-party conservation organisations. The 
Tribunal’s recommendation that the Crown transfer the fee-simple title of a specific 
conservation area, the Crown Titi Islands, was effected. The Tribunal did not recommend the 
transfer of Whenua Hou, but Ngāi Tahu still sought the title to the Island in a “joint title” 
approach like the Australian arrangements at Uluru/Ayers Rock and late in the negotiation 
the transfer of title with immediate giftback to the Crown. Neither of Ngāi Tahu’s 
propositions with regards to the title to Whenua Hou was accepted by the Crown. 
Nonetheless Ngāi Tahu was able to obtain a significant management role in the Whenua Hou 
Nature Reserve. The return of the Crown Titi Islands without the marginal strip traditionally 
required when the Crown disposes of land and with sole Ngāi Tahu control of the Islands 
reflected the measure of rangatiratanga that Ngāi Tahu had re-established around these 
important sites of cultural significance.  
  
506 Owen Cox to Graham, 27 August 1996, NE-18-027-00-01, OTS archive; CE Henderson to Graham, 4 
September 1996, NE-18-027-00-01, OTS archive; Forest & Bird, “Postpone Ngāi Tahu Settlement, Forest & 
Bird Plea,” 1 October 1996, Vhi 53b (l), TRONT archive; Kevin Smith to Doug Kidd, 3 October 1996, Vhi 54 
(f), TRONT archive. In a similar vein, PANZ claimed that access to climbing Aoraki would be completely 
banned under Ngāi Tahu control while Forest & Bird argued that the government would be giving away the 
entire conservation estate in the South Island: PANZ, “Climbing MT Cook could be banned under secret deals 
with Ngāi Tahu,” 1 October 1996, Vhi 53b (l), TRONT archive. 
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Part II: Waikato-Tainui  
The gradual development and eventual establishment of Waikato-Tainui’s land-bank 
 
The development of Waikato-Tainui’s land-bank took place over a much longer 
period than the relatively quick establishment of the Ngāi Tahu land-bank. During Waikato-
Tainui’s scoping negotiations in July and August 1989, a Treasury official drafted a Cabinet 
paper that would establish the first land-bank or “early warning system.”  The Treasury 
official suggested a system under which the Tainui Māori Trust Board would be warned 
when the alienation of Crown land in the Waikato-Tainui rohe was proposed. The Trust 
Board would then have the opportunity to place the property in their land-bank for future use 
in a settlement. The draft Cabinet paper developed by the Treasury official was never 
finalised and sent to Cabinet. 507  The litigation undertaken by the Tainui Māori Trust Board 
with regards to coal assets in their rohe in late August 1989 effectively caused a brief delay in 
negotiations. Presumably the delay was the reason the early warning system was not 
developed any further in the early scoping negotiations.508  
After the Tainui Māori Trust Board’s victory in the Coalcorp case, Waikato-Tainui’s 
negotiations with the Crown continued in March 1990 with Robert Mahuta and Justice 
Minister Bill Jeffries as respective lead negotiators. The continuing alienation of Crown land 
in the Waikato-Tainui rohe remained a significant concern for Waikato-Tainui negotiators. In 
a May 1990 report to the Core Group of Officials in the Crown Task Force on Treaty of 
Waitangi Issues, ToWPU officials stated that “restraint [in the alienation of Crown land] was 
considered necessary to comply with the view of the Court of Appeal in the Coalcorp case 
that any attempt to shut out in advance claims to surplus lands is not consistent with Treaty 
principles.” After the establishment of Ngāi Tahu’s land-bank in early 1990, ToWPU 
507 Treasury official 1 to ToWPU official 3, 7 August 1989, TC30 Vol. 6, OTS archive.  
508 Tainui Māori Trust Board v. Attorney General (1989); McCan, Whatiwhatihoe, 273-296. 
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officials pressed Cabinet to put the land-bank system in place for Ngāi Tahu to the Tainui 
Māori Trust Board. ToWPU officials believed that the continuing alienation of Crown land 
had the potential to jeopardise the negotiations and potentially push Waikato-Tainui to re-
initiate litigation to prevent the alienation of further Crown land. At the very least, the 
establishment of a land-bank would be construed as a gesture of good will from the Crown.509 
Despite the recommendations of ToWPU, Cabinet refused to establish the early warning 
system and instead focused on developing the settlement offer that was rejected by Waikato-
Tainui later in 1990.  
In the absence of any system by 1991 Waikato-Tainui negotiators and advisors turned 
to asking for written undertakings from the new National Minister of SOEs, Doug Kidd, and 
Minister of Justice Doug Graham that Crown assets should not be sold in the Waikato 
raupatu rohe. Before negotiations formally began with National, Waikato-Tainui’s legal 
advisor, Denese Henare, wrote repeatedly to warn Graham and the ToWPU Director about 
Crown properties that were offered for sale.510 While claimants should have been expending 
their time and energy on the task of negotiation, often Waikato-Tainui negotiators and 
advisors were forced to expend their limited resources ensuring that the Crown’s asset base 
was not diminished any further.  
Graham sought to institute a land-bank system for Waikato-Tainui and other large 
claimant groups such as Muriwhenua and Taranaki. Formal negotiations had recommenced 
between the Crown and Waikato-Tainui negotiators in November 1991 and by mid-1992 
ToWPU officials began to develop Waikato-Tainui’s land-bank. While Waikato-Tainui 
509 Minister of Justice to Chairperson, Core Group of Officials, Crown Task Force on Treaty of Waitangi Issues, 
“Sale of Crown lands within Tainui raupatu,” May 1990, TC30 Vol. 8, OTS archive.  
510 Henare to Kidd, 5 June 1991, AAKW W5105 7812 26, Archives NZ; Henare to Graham & Maurice 
McTigue, 8 November 1991, RC Vol 5, Box 8, W-T archives; Henare to McTigue, 13 November 1991, TC30 
Vol. 16, OTS archive. 
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appreciated the efforts being made by the Crown to develop an early warning system, the 
proposal still contained a presumption of sale which was not appropriate for Waikato-Tainui's 
land for land principle that no further Crown assets should be sold within the raupatu rohe. 
Waikato-Tainui attempted to include assets in their land-bank which were unavailable for 
Ngāi Tahu.511  
Waikato-Tainui argued that as their total rohe was much smaller, the Crown would 
need to provide a greater diversity of assets. Waikato-Tainui wanted to include Crown 
Research Institute (CRI) land, Housing New Zealand (HNZ) properties, Area Health Boards 
and educational properties. In addition to the ability to include these lands in their land-bank, 
Waikato-Tainui requested that the Crown maintain its stock of HNZ properties in the rohe 
until negotiations were complete.512 Treasury did not agree that HNZ or Area Health Boards 
were Crown assets and was especially concerned about how the precedent of no net 
diminution would affect HNZ’s commercial operations. How would HNZ follow their 
directives which instructed them to sell all surplus lands? As a result of the smaller size of the 
Waikato-Tainui rohe, ToWPU officials also proposed that there be no cap on the Waikato-
Tainui land-bank but Treasury maintained that it was necessary for claimants to understand 
that the Crown's funds were not limitless. Treasury’s final concern was that the Crown would 
be held financially responsible for deferred maintenance. Despite the negative experience of 
Waikato-Tainui with Hopuhopu, Treasury decided that claimants would have to receive the 
properties as is. In reaction to Treasury opposition, a ToWPU official responded that 
Waikato-Tainui “would have to have some kind of land-bank at some point.” Treasury 
511 Mahuta to Graham, 15 June 1992, TC 30 Vol. 23, OTS archive.  
512 Mahuta to Graham, 15 June 1992, RC Vol 11 1992, Box 11, W-T archives.   
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replied that it wanted a separate Treasury comment in the land-bank paper, which aided in its 
eventual rejection in Cabinet in mid-1992.513 
After ToWPU’s failed attempts at establishing a land-bank for Waikato-Tainui in 
1992, Graham sought to re-engage with Treasury, Cabinet and Waikato-Tainui over the issue 
in early 1993. Graham wrote to Mahuta to discuss what the cap for the Waikato-Tainui land-
bank might be. While any engagement was welcomed while the negotiations were essentially 
in hiatus, legal advisor Denese Henare wrote to Mahuta expressing her concern about 
Graham’s request for a discussion regarding the cap for the land-bank. Although the 
development of the land-bank was welcomed by the Waikato-Tainui negotiators, Henare 
interpreted the development as the Crown approaching the issue “piece-meal.” To Henare the 
land-bank was merely an instrument for preserving the Crown's capacity to provide 
reparations, not a part of the final settlement arrangement. At this point the right of first 
refusal had yet to be developed, so Henare was not correct in the long term but in the short 
term her frustration stemmed from the Crown's insistence on a cap for the land-bank. “The 
Waikato position is that we will have all you have got put into the land bank, which is 
effectively the 163,000 acres of properties within the Crown dossier.” There were also some 
significant concerns about receiving the lands on an "as is, where is" basis, especially as a 
result of the TMTB's negative experience with Hopuhopu. The goodwill established by the 
return of Hopuhopu had been tainted by the significant financial liabilities that the base 
carried upon transfer. Henare recommended that Mahuta discuss it privately with the Minister 
rather than a potentially “provocative letter” to ensure Graham was kept on side.514  
513 Treasury official 9 to ToWPU official 4, 21 July 1992, TC30 Vol. 24, OTS archive; Minister of Justice to 
Cabinet Strategy Committee, “Proposals for an Early Waikato System for Tainui,” 23 July 1992, TC30 Vol. 24, 
OTS archive. I have not been able to locate the Cabinet paper that rejects the proposals, but the system is not 
established until 1993 so it is clear Cabinet rejected the proposals earlier in 1992.  
514 Henare to Mahuta, 13 April 1993, RC Vol 30 1993, Box 11, W-T archives.  
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ToWPU recommended to Cabinet that the cap for the Waikato-Tainui land-bank be 
set at $35 million while Treasury advocated that it should be set at $16 million to ensure 
funding was also made available for other Treaty claim settlements and land-banks. 
Unusually, ToWPU won out in the end. In contrast to Ngāi Tahu’s land-bank, the properties 
also would have to be the first used in any future settlement. While it was clear that Waikato-
Tainui wanted all of the Crown’s remaining land placed in the land-bank, Mahuta nonetheless 
wrote a thankful letter to the Crown. In early May 1993 Graham replied that he was happy to 
inform Mahuta that the land-bank was formerly established and had a $35 million cap, with 
one minor rider that was symbolic of the gulf between the power of each party in the 
negotiation: “The Crown reserves the right to cancel the land bank and free the properties for 
sale.”515 
One of the first assets available for Waikato-Tainui’s land-bank were 200 Electricity 
Corporation New Zealand (ECNZ) houses located in Meremere and Huntly. These ECNZ 
properties had protection memorials on their title.516 Waikato-Tainui advisors cautioned 
ECNZ that they should not proceed with the auction to sell the properties but ECNZ did not 
heed their warnings. After receiving no bids ECNZ offered the properties to the Crown for 
inclusion in the Waikato-Tainui land-bank.517 The land-banking of the ECNZ surplus assets 
was supported by Treasury but only because of the advanced nature of Waikato-Tainui's 
negotiations with the Crown. Some officials from Treasury attempted to argue that because 
515 CAB (93) 259; CAB (93) M 15/26; TOW (93) 6: AAKW W5105 7812 22, Archives NZ; Graham to Mahuta, 
12 May 1993, RC Vol 30 1993, Box 11, W-T archive; Mahuta to Thomas, 20 May 1993, RC Vol 31, Box 12, 
W-T archive.  
516 Section 27B of the Treaty of Waitangi (State Enterprises) Act 1988 stated that if the Tribunal found that 
specific SOE land had been acquired in breach of the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi it could order the 
government to reacquire the land at market value and return it to the Māori claimants: Treaty of Waitangi (State 
Enterprises) Act 1988, Section 27B. 
517 Reuben Wharawhara, “Board Warns of land claims on ECNZ houses,” Waikato Times, 7 August 1993; 
Mahuta to ToWPU official 4, 21 June 1993; ToWPU official 4 to John Te Maru, 17 August 1993, all: RC Vol 
31, Box 12, W-T archives.  
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the bulk purchase had resulted in the Crown purchasing at half the value, the Crown should 
receive some kind of compensation. ToWPU officials were clearly unimpressed by the idea.  
Such an approach is inconsistent with the principles for land banking and with the 
proposed operation of the Treaty of Waitangi Settlement Fund. The cap on the land 
bank provides incentives for the claimants to select properties up to its value on the 
basis of the sum of the prices paid for those properties. Claimants carry the risk that 
the properties will reduce in value while in the land bank. The Crown loses nothing if 
the properties increase in value. We consider to impose a charge against the cap on 
the land bank of any more than the price paid by the Crown would be an act of bad 
faith.518  
 
ToWPU officials obviously felt strongly about the issue and successfully countered Treasury. 
Once the land-bank was established the TMTB slowly evaluated surplus Crown 
properties for inclusion in the land-bank. Graham complained in a letter to Mahuta regarding 
the delays in evaluating properties. Mahuta responded that the Crown had provided 
incomplete information with regards to the extent of the Crown’s asset base in the Waikato-
Tainui rohe. In June 1993 the Crown enquired whether Waikato-Tainui sought to add certain 
properties into the land-bank. Mahuta wrote a frustrated reply to ToWPU officials: 
Given the current state of confusion, maybe all housing stock should go into the 
Land-bank before we are pestered to make decisions based on scanty information...As 
you can see from the tenor of this note, I came out of my meeting with the Minister 
feeling somewhat annoyed that matters have not really progressed very far. If the 
Crown has no intention to settle with Waikato then perhaps that needs to be said so 
that we can all reassess our positions. We are incurring too much time, energy and 
costs on non-fruitful endeavours.519 
In 1994 Mahuta continued this argument and emphasised the Crown's lack of funding for 
evaluating surplus properties for land-banking which had inhibited the TMTB's other 
operations. Mahuta added that it was “important from the TMTB's perspective (and in the 
longer term that of the Crown) to ensure it is assets rather than liabilities which are being 
land-banked. The Hopuhopu and Te Rapa experiences are a constant reminder of this. 
518 ToWPU official 4 to Treasury official 9, 11 October 1993, AAKW W5105 7812 22, Archives NZ. 
519 Mahuta to ToWPU official 4, 21 June 1993, RC Vol 31, Box 12, W-T archives.  
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Accordingly, prudence suggests that the Board must and will continue to be careful in its 
scrutiny of properties to be transferred.”520 Mahuta noted that without any type of agreement 
on the implementation of the settlement the “exercise has something of the ring of shuffling 
paper from one government department to another.” Mahuta stated that it was important to 
Waikato-Tainui, and from Mahuta’s point of view also for the Crown, that properties with 
liabilities not be used in the settlement. This would simply represent a repetition of history 
similar to the return of lands by the Compensation Court in the nineteenth century after the 
original confiscation of land when mainly unusable land was returned.521 
As the Crown continued to raise concerns with the delays in Waikato-Tainui’s 
evaluation of properties, Mahuta continued to express his concern with the quality of Crown 
properties offered for inclusion. Graham stressed that Waikato-Tainui did not have to 
approve each and every property. Henare pointed out that Waikato-Tainui’s concerns with 
Graham’s recommendation was the potential for an unsuccessful negotiation in which 
Waikato-Tainui acquiesces to the disposal of land. Graham countered that it was not only 
surplus properties which could be used in any settlement, but any properties in the Crown's 
dossier. This changed the situation as it was different from anything discussed previously. 
Mahuta took this point one step further and asked whether non-Crown lands would be 
available for purchase with settlement funds, which Graham confirmed. This was necessary 
because of the significant liabilities which most properties in the Crown dossier carried. 522  
520 Mahuta to Graham, 8 March 1994, AAKW W5105 7812 22, Archives NZ/RC Vol 33, Box 13, W-T 
archives.  
521 Mahuta to Graham, 8 March 1993, RC Vol 33, Box 13, W-T archives; Mahuta diary note, 10 March 1993, 
RC Vol 33, Box 13, W-T archives; Danny Keenan, Wars without end (Auckland: Penguin, 2009), 264-282; 
Craig Innes and James Mitchell, “Alienation of Māori granted lands within Te Rohe Pōtae Parish extension, 
1863-2011,” Report Commissioned by the Waitangi Tribunal (Wai 898, #A30), 2013.  
522 Solomon and Henare memoranda, 14 April 1994, RC Vol 33, Box 13, W-T archives; ToWPU, “Meeting 
between Crown and Waikato negotiators,” 14 April 1994, AAKW W5105 7812 22, Archives NZ. 
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Issues with information regarding the Crown’s asset base continued as the 
negotiations neared completion and echoed some of the earlier frustrations of Waikato-Tainui 
negotiators. Certain properties sought by Waikato-Tainui were initially restricted from 
transfer, as the Crown began to decide which properties would need to remain in Crown 
ownership. In October 1994 Waikato-Tainui had received the latest schedule of Crown assets. 
The schedule contained properties which the Crown was not initially willing to transfer as 
part of a settlement such as the land underneath the Hamilton Courthouse, the University of 
Waikato, most primary schools in the Hamilton area, Waikato Hospital, and the Whatawhata 
and Ruakura Research Stations. Waikato-Tainui advisor John Te Maru commented, “Unless 
the position has changed, we might expect another schedule soon with even less lands on it or 
some form of Crown advice that certain properties are no longer available.”523 Although 
Graham previously stated to Mahuta that all lands in Crown ownership were available to 
form a part of the Waikato-Tainui settlement, there were some limits. Waikato-Tainui 
successfully managed to obtain land under some primary schools, the Hamilton Courthouse, 
the University of Waikato, and Ruakura and Whatawhata Research Stations, but not Waikato 
Hospital. All of the areas that were transferred were subsequently leased back to the Crown 
or its agencies.524  
Waikato-Tainui and the return of land 
 
The return of land was a central component in the Waikato-Tainui negotiation 
process. While some Crown lands were offered for return, lands from the DoC estate were 
completely excluded. Waikato -Tainui was focused on not only the return of land, but also 
ensuring the land that was transferred could be retained. Waikato-Tainui negotiators and 
523 Wheeler to Mahuta, 15 September 1994, RC Vol 34, Box 13, W-T archives, 1; Te Maru to Mahuta, 15 
September 1994, RC Vol 34, Box 13, W-T archives, 2. 
524 Waikato-Tainui Raupatu Deed of Settlement, 22 May 1995, 10-15, Attachment 3.  
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advisors advocated for the return of land under customary title, rather than the fee simple title 
that was proposed, and also sought the return of lands that were not subject to marginal strips. 
Waikato-Tainui were concerned that their land settlement would not affect their claims to the 
Waikato River and West Coast Harbours that had been separated early in the negotiations. 
These issues reflected Waikato-Tainui’s overriding concerns with the return and retention of 
land under circumstances that would enhance the rangatiratanga of the iwi in the Waikato.  
Waikato-Tainui and the return of DoC land 
 
The return of sites of cultural significance did not occur in Waikato-Tainui’s 
settlement. As a result DoC’s involvement in the Waikato-Tainui negotiations was limited 
since the settlement would only address issues regarding the confiscation of land, rather than 
specific conservation sites. Nonetheless Waikato-Tainui sought land from the conservation 
estate or if the return of DoC land was not possible, then a co-management role in DoC 
areas.525 Late in the negotiations Mahuta attempted to have full title to the DoC estate 
included in the settlement. Those DoC lands would then be leased back to the Crown at 
peppercorn rentals which would be reviewed every 25 years. Mahuta stated in a letter to 
Graham: “It is not the intention to develop Conservation lands. We are however, interested in 
joint management of the estate and the jobs or training opportunities that might arise. Such an 
arrangement would satisfy our 'Land for Land' principle while at the same time meet the 
Crown's desire to maintain the lands for public use and access.” As Ngāi Tahu had also done 
during its negotiations, Waikato-Tainui negotiators stressed that international examples of co-
management regimes in Australia and Canada had provided precedents and would be 
valuable to use in the New Zealand context.526 Furthermore, Waikato-Tainui condemned the 
525 Wayne Taitoko to Mahuta, 7 October 1994, RC1, Correspondence Vol 35, Box 14, W-T archives. 
526 Stacey Anne Shortall, “Aboriginal self-government in Aotearoa-New Zealand: a view through the Canadian 
lens,” Thesis (LL.M.), University of Alberta, 1996. 
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Crown's own record of conservation and alluded to the poor job it had done in the Waikato 
region to that date. Waikato-Tainui stressed that the iwi would work with involved 
stakeholders such as conservation boards and regional and local authorities and would strive 
to enhance the conservation value of the lands as well as the public's access to them.527 
Graham stated that the conservation estate was not available and instead offered Waikato-
Tainui representation on the Waikato Conservation Board.528 The issue of the DoC estate was 
consistently brought up during the consultation process by both supporters and opponents of 
Mahuta within Waikato-Tainui. It was a very important issue for the iwi that could have 
derailed the settlement because Waikato-Tainui wanted an increased kaitiaki role in the 
overall management of the DoC estate.529 
The DoC position was very firm although it was challenged by ToWPU. The lead 
ToWPU official on the Waikato-Tainui negotiations tried to work with DoC, but they 
maintained their opposition. The Director-General of DoC replied to ToWPU inquiries 
regarding the use of the conservation estate in either the transfer of land or co-management,  
that there were significant and wide ranging implications if any of the conservation estate 
were transferred to Waikato-Tainui, even if DoC lands were immediately gifted back. The 
Director-General referred to the difficulties involved in the return of Mount Hikurangi to 
Ngati Porou. Issues regarding public access to Mount Hikurangi following its return to Ngati 
Porou made the Director-General apprehensive. He pointed to the spectre of co-management 
with Māori claimants and questioned whether the Crown or public was ready for such a 
527 Mahuta to Graham, 4 November 1994, TC30 Vol. 39, OTS archive; Solomon to Mahuta, 7 November 1994, 
RC1, Correspondence Vol 36, Box 14, W-T archives.  
528 “Meeting between Crown and Waikato negotiators,” 26 October 1994, RC1, Correspondence Vol 35, 
October 1994, Box 14, W-T archives; “Meeting between Crown and Waikato negotiators,” 26 October 1994, 
TC30 Vol. 38, OTS archive, 2; Mahuta to Graham, 26 October 1994, TC30 Vol. 38, OTS archive; Graham to 
Mahuta, 27 October 1994, RC1, Correspondence Vol 35, October 1994, Box 14, W-T archives.  
529 Wayne Taitoko to Mahuta, 7 October 1994, RC1, Correspondence Vol 35, Box 14, W-T archives; Mahuta to 
TMTB Maraes, 1 November 1994 and “Hui-a-Iwi,” 13 November 1994, both: RC1, Correspondence Vol 36, 
Box 14, W-T archives. 
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change. He also referred to the potential negative effect on “investment security for 
businesses.”530 DoC’s position in Cabinet prevailed, and there was no involvement from DoC 
in Waikato-Tainui’s settlement.531 
Waikato-Tainui’s desire for customary title  
 
The legal form in which lands would be returned also troubled Waikato-Tainui 
negotiators and advisors. Legal advisor Denese Henare felt that special legislation 
specifically vesting returned land into Waikato-Tainui was necessary. When the parties were 
approaching a Heads of Agreement in late 1994 and it became apparent that further lands in 
addition to Hopuhopu and Te Rapa would be transferred, Henare again pressed for special 
arrangements to govern the return of land to Waikato-Tainui.  Henare corresponded with 
ToWPU officials about the possibility of the return of land under customary title that would 
not be governed by the provisions of the Public Works Act. Henare feared that Waikato-
Tainui would not have absolute control over its land if it was subject to possible future 
confiscation of land through administrative means such as public works takings. ToWPU 
officials had raised the issue of customary title with Graham but he did not believe the 
concept could be used. Graham repeated his opposition publically at a February 1995 
academic conference on Treaty settlements held in Wellington. Henare had wanted to engage 
in formulating relationships between rangatiratanga and the statutory and regulatory powers 
of central and local government, but the traditional aversion by the New Zealand government 
to any delegation of sovereignty was paramount.532 
530 Director-General of DoC to ToWPU official 4, 18 November 1994, TC30 Vol. 40, OTS archive. 
531 CAB (94) M 49/30, TC30 Vol. 42, OTS archive.  
532 ToWPU official 4, “Waikato negotiations,” 13 December 1994, TC30 Vol. 41; ToWPU official 4 to Henare, 
3 January 1995, RC1, Correspondence Vol 39, Mar - Apr 1995, Box 17, W-T archives; Shane Solomon, “Notes 
from conference,” 9-10 February 1995,  RC1, Correspondence SS, Jan - Feb 1995, Box 34, W-T archives; Doug 
Graham, “Address by the Minister in Charge of Treaty of Waitangi negotiations,” in Geoff McLay (ed.) 
Unfinished Business (Wellington: NZ Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, 1995), 141-147.  
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Although Graham had rejected the suggestion of placing the land being returned to 
Waikato-Tainui in a form of tribal or customary title, Henare and Waikato-Tainui legal 
advisor Shane Solomon still sought ways to instil into the proposed legislation the special 
spirit and intent of this particular transfer of land from the Crown. Solomon looked to the 
developments in Australia with regards to native title at both the federal and state levels for 
inspiration but admitted that the Crown would probably oppose such proposals. In terms of 
conservation land Waikato-Tainui negotiators had fought for the Australian “Uluru” model, 
but the Crown rejected the model. The Crown offered a reserved position on the Waikato 
Conservation Board.  Solomon wanted the legislation that governed the returned land to 
reflect the tenure of the land as it was in 1863--something Solomon admitted was very 
difficult.  
What is being sought there is the nature of the 'ownership' back in 1863-65. There 
should be no confusion that we are seeking the lands to be returned in the state they 
were in back then - ie the University lands to be returned with no improvements. The 
'ownership' issue relates to the vesting of the lands under the Kingiitanga, thus the 
compulsory taking of those lands by the Crown. It also relates to the tribal interest in 
the lands. Prior to the wars and confiscations, lands vested in Te Wherowhero 
(subsequently reaffirmed through the years). The Confiscations removed lands away 
from both the kingiitanga and therefore the Tribe. Today, the return of the lands must 
benefit all of the tribe who suffered, not just those who are fortunate enough to have 
Crown owned lands left to settle the grievance. The vast majority are not so 
fortunate.533 
 
The debates over the form in which land would be returned and to which organisation the 
land would be returned remained pressing throughout the negotiation process. During a 
February 1995 meeting with Waikato-Tainui advisors, Crown officials expressed their 
concern that if certain lands were rendered inalienable, it would affect the iwi’s commercial 
flexibility following settlement. Waikato-Tainui financial advisors countered that although it 
would not be possible to mortgage inalienable land, the income from valuable leases could 
still be mortgaged. Waikato-Tainui advisors stated that the inalienable status of the land 
533 Solomon to Henare, 9 April 1995, RC Mar - Apr 1995, (SS) Box 35, W-T archives.  
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provided comfort to the people that the returned lands would remain in the ownership of the 
iwi.534 
Mahuta also discussed the issue of a special title over lands returned with Graham 
directly during the period of negotiations between the signing of the Heads of Agreement in 
December 1994 and the Deed of Settlement in May 1995. After consideration by Graham, he 
maintained that land could be put into Te Wherowhero title as Hopuhopu and Te Rapa were, 
but that the land would still be in fee simple title, not any kind of “customary” title. Mahuta 
also was concerned about other land issues—the imposition by the Crown of marginal strips, 
and the desire by Waikato-Tainui to maintain the protective Treaty of Waitangi (State 
Enterprises) Act 1988 memorials on land along the Waikato River.535  
Marginal strips 
 
 Waikato-Tainui’s concerns with the manner in which land was returned led to 
Waikato-Tainui negotiators expressing their reservation with the return of land accompanied 
by marginal strips. Ngāi Tahu had felt that the imposition of marginal strips was another form 
of land alienation and Waikato-Tainui had similar concerns. Waikato-Tainui negotiators 
viewed marginal strips as another form of confiscation. The Crown was adamant that 
marginal strips would remain adjacent to former SOE lands along the river and foreshore, 
even after the protection memorials were lifted and the land possibly transferred to Waikato-
Tainui. OTS explained to Waikato-Tainui legal advisor Denese Henare that when the lands 
were first transferred to a SOE a marginal strip was imposed. The marginal strip would 
remain even after the land was disposed of privately by the SOE or via transfer to Waikato-
Tainui in any Treaty settlement. OTS stated that for other non-SOE lands the Crown still 
534 “Meeting between Crown officials and Tainui advisors,”16 February 1995, RC Jan-Feb, Box 16, W-T 
archives and NE-12-030-00-35, OTS archive.  
535 Mahuta, “Meeting notes”, 14 April 1995, RC Vol 39, Mar - Apr 1995, Box 17, W-T archives 
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retained the right to create a marginal strip whenever it disposed of land: “[M]arginal strips 
will be imposed, where relevant, when the Crown transfers land to [Waikato-]Tainui under 
the settlement.”536  
The Waikato-Tainui opposition to marginal strips was so strong that the Deed of 
Settlement noted Waikato-Tainui’s concerns. The Crown would maintain its power to retain 
and create marginal strips, but it agreed to record Waikato-Tainui’s dissent. Section 5.4.3 of 
the Deed of Settlement stated: “That the Crown recognises that the issue of the creation of 
marginal strips on land to be transferred to the Land Holding Trustee is of serious concern to 
Waikato.” The settlement clause noted further that “the Crown acknowledges that Waikato 
intend to advance their concerns about the creation of marginal strips to the Minister of 
Conservation.”537  Waikato-Tainui continued to express their opposition to the imposition 
and retention of marginal strips during the Māori Affairs Select Committee Hearings before 
legislation was passed in November 1995.538 Waikato-Tainui were unsuccessful in advancing 
their concerns about the creation of marginal strips with the Minister of Conservation, and the 
issue would remain to be negotiated in Waikato-Tainui’s Waikato River Treaty Settlement.539  
The removal of protection memorials on SOE lands along the Waikato River 
 
Another concern regarding the return of land for Waikato-Tainui negotiators was the 
separation of their land claim from Waikato-Tainui claims to the Waikato River and the three 
West Coast Harbours: Aotea, Kawhia and Whaingaroa (Raglan). The Crown wanted to have 
536 OTS Director to Henare, 3 April 1995, RC1, Correspondence March-April 1995 (SS) Box 37, W-T archives; 
Shane Solomon, “Telephone Conference,” 18 May 1995; Mahuta, “Notes on Draft Deed of Settlement,” 18 May 
1995, RC1, Correspondence  May 1995 Vol 40, Box 18, W-T archives.  
537 Waikato-Tainui Raupatu Deed of Settlement, 22 May 1995, Section 5.4.3.  
538 “Waikato-Tainui Raupatu Claims Settlement Bill: Submissions on behalf of Waikato-Tainui,” 25 August 
1995, RC1, Correspondence June-September 1995 Vol 41 Box 19, W-T archives. 
539 Office of Treaty Settlements and the Ministry for the Environment, “Initial Departmental Briefing on the 
Waikato-Tainui Raupatu Claims (Waikato River) Settlement Bill,” 9 February 2009, 
http://www.parliament.nz/resource/0000095966.   
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the Treaty of Waitangi (State Enterprises) Act 1988 protection memorials removed from 
State Owned Enterprises (SOE) lands along the Waikato River.540 Waikato-Tainui were 
concerned that their claim to the Waikato River was unjustly being affected by their land 
claim. Waikato-Tainui stated that retaining the memorials on river-side SOE properties was 
integral to the river and harbours claim, but the Crown contended that the memorials would 
be removed from the titles of SOE lands along the river by their land settlement. Waikato-
Tainui felt that the rangatiratanga of their river and harbours claim was being challanged by 
the Crown.541  Late in the negotiation process, only weeks before the signing of the Deed of 
Settlement, Mahuta requested that the memorials remain on the SOE properties along the 
Waikato River but Graham refused. Despite Waikato-Tainui’s objections, Graham stated that 
the memorials would be removed from the SOE properties along the river.542 The Crown’s 
position on the memorials for the river-side SOE properties led to further Waikato-Tainui 
concerns about their continuing Treaty of Waitangi rights to the river and harbours.  
Despite Graham’s public assertions that settlements were intended to fulfil the 
Crown’s obligations under the Treaty of Waitangi rather than erase or undermine them, 
Waikato-Tainui negotiators still wanted to ensure that the Crown's obligations under the 
Treaty of Waitangi continued after settlement.543 Waikato-Tainui felt that their land-based 
raupatu settlement would only extinguish Waikato-Tainui's Treaty of Waitangi rights in 
relation to the grievance of raupatu. Waikato-Tainui legal advisors wrote to ToWPU officials:  
540 CLO official 4 to ToWPU official 4, 9 December 1994, TC30 Vol. 41, OTS archive.  
541 The CLO was worried that the inclusion of the term rangātiratanga in the legislation would suggest that 
“that the exercise of raNgātiratanga enables a future claim to be made over the raupatu lands" but OTS tried to 
assure CLO that was not the case: CLO official 4 to ToWPU official 4, 10 March 1995, NE-12-030-00-35, OTS 
archive, 4. 
542 Treasury official 5 to Bill Birch, “Waikato-Tainui: Update on Heads of Agreement and  expected progress 
from here,”20 January 1995, NE 10-030-00-02 pt.1, OTS archive; Tom Moke to Mahuta, 8 March 1995, RC 
Vol 39, Mar - Apr 1995, Box 17, W-T archives  
543 Doug Graham, “Address by the Minister in Charge of Treaty of Waitangi negotiations,” 141-147. 
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This settlement is a limited recognition of the Crown's obligations by way of redress 
(the return of land) for the specific injustice of the Raupatu, and those special rights 
(the rangatiratanga of Waikato under the Treaty) are not, and must not, be affected by 
this Settlement. The danger to Waikato of not making specific reference in this Deed 
to the rangatiratanga of Waikato under the Treaty is that Waikato is open to an 
argument, at some time in the future, that this Settlement is a settlement of Waikato's 
rangatiratanga, that Waikato has accepted a position which limits Waikato's 
rangatiratanga to a return of land.544  
The issue of finality was still a large concern for Waikato even though the river and harbours 
had been excluded from their claim. Mahuta stressed to Graham in an early May 1995 
meeting that the issue of the Crown’s affirmation of Waikato-Tainui’s rangatiratanga, 
especially in relation to Waikato-Tainui claims to the Waikato River and West Coast 
Harbours, had repeatedly been raised at consultation hui and that it was important to whether 
or not the settlement was accepted. In response to concerns about rangatiratanga rights, the 
Crown had amended the draft final deed of settlement to specifically state that the settlement 
would not diminish the Treaty of Waitangi or any of its articles but Mahuta stressed that this 
did not go far enough for Waikato-Tainui negotiators.545  
 The inclusion of the direct reference to rangatiratanga rights remained a problem even 
after the Deed of Settlement was signed on 22 May 1995, as discussions occurred in July 
1995 just before the first draft of the legislation was introduced to Parliament. Waikato-
Tainui legal advisor Gerard Brown questioned why the inclusion of rangatiratanga rights was 
unacceptable to the Minister? Crown officials replied, much as they did to Ngāi Tahu when 
they were negotiating with the Crown over the development of their legal personality, that the 
term was undefined and that it would “introduce uncertainty into the Deed of Settlement.”546 
Eventually the Crown agreed during the meeting to include the reference to rangatiratanga 
544 Gerard Brown to Waikato negotiators, RC1, 1 May 1995, RC Apr - May 1995, (SS) Box 36, W-T archives, 
1. 
545 ToWPU official 4 to Gerard Brown, 3 May 1995, RC1, Correspondence May 1995 Vol 40 Box 18, W-T 
archives; Solomon to Te Maru, 3 May 1995, RC1, Correspondence May 1995, (SS) Box 38, W-T archives; 
Mahuta to Graham, 4 May 1995, AAKW W5105 7812 23, Archives NZ.  
546 OTS official 4 to Graham, 10 July 1995, AAKW W5105 7812 22, Archives NZ. 
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rights as a part of the detailing of the Treaty of Waitangi at the beginning of the settlement 
legislation. Nonetheless the first draft of the legislation contained the Treaty of Waitangi only 
in English in the preamble and thus there was no direct reference to rangatiratanga. The final 
legislation contained the Treaty of Waitangi in both English and Māori. A direct reference to 
rangatiratanga and Waikato-Tainui’s claims to the River remained, even if the protection 
memorials on the titles of lands across the River did not.547 
The effect of previous owners of Crown land on the return of land to Waikato-Tainui: 
Te Rapa Airbase and Ohinewai Coalcorp lands 
 
The return of land to Waikato-Tainui was largely governed by the Crown’s control of 
the process for retaining land for future settlement (land-banks), and the legal form in which 
land would be returned, but it was also affected by third-parties. Although Māori claimants 
such as Waikato-Tainui sought the return of land, former non-Māori land owners at times 
also sought the return of some of the same land that Waikato-Tainui were seeking. Under the 
Public Works Act 1981 the Crown had the power to acquire or take land for a wide variety of 
purposes.548 When land taken under the Public Works Act was no longer required for a public 
purpose, Section 40 of the Act provided an offer-back mechanism to the previous owner for 
purchase.549 The offer-back rights for previous land owners established by Section 40 were 
curtailed by Section 24(4) of the State Owned Enterprises Act 1986, which stated that Section 
40 of Public Works Act 1981 would not apply to land transferred from the Crown to a State 
Owned Enterprise (SOE).550 Following the landmark NZMC victory in the Court of Appeal 
547 Henare to Solomon, 10 May 1995, RC1, Correspondence May 1995, (SS) Box 37, W-T archives; Niwa Nuri 
& Solomon to Mahuta, 5 May 1995, RC1, Correspondence  May 1995 Vol 40, Box 18, W-T archives. 
548 A recurring theme in Māori claims to the Waitangi Tribunal (and subsequent Waitangi Tribunal Reports) has 
been the compulsory acquisition of Māori land for public purposes under various Public Works legislation from 
the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi to the present day: Cathy Marr, Public Works Takings of Māori Land: 
1840-1981, Rangahaua Whanui National Theme G (Wellington: Waitangi Tribunal, 1997). 
549 Public Works Act 1981, Section 40.  
550 State Owned Enterprises Act 1986, Section 24(4). 
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which led to the Treaty of Waitangi (State Enterprises) Act 1988, the offer-back rights for 
previous land owners were further reduced. The Treaty of Waitangi (State Enterprises) Act 
1988 inserted into the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975 Section 8A, which provided a legislative 
framework for the Waitangi Tribunal to making binding orders for the Crown to transfer SOE 
lands claims to “the Māori or group of Māori” for particular well-founded claims. Under 
Section 8A(5) of the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975, Section 40 of the Public Works Act 1981 
did not apply.551 
The debates within the Crown regarding the rights of previous owners of Crown land 
obtained under the Public Works Act 1981 began in 1992 when discussion took place over 
the return of Te Rapa airbase to Waikato-Tainui. Officials at ToWPU discussed with 
Department of Survey Lands and Information (DoSLI) and CLO officials whether land 
earmarked for the resolution of Treaty of Waitangi grievances had to be offered back to its 
previous owners first.552 DoSLI officials provided a number of legislative options such as the 
State Owned Enterprises Act 1986 Section 24(4), and the Treaty of Waitangi Act Section 
8A(5) to circumvent the offer-back. DoSLI officials stated that the Crown could treat the land 
used for settlements as a public work, simply stating that Section 40 offer-back procedures 
did not apply to land which the government required for the resolution of Waikato-Tainui’s 
claim. The Crown could also designate Crown owned land that was required for the 
settlement as exempted from the offer-back process.553  
The Te Rapa airbase land had previously been owned by the Livingstone Family and 
they were offered back the land according to the Public Works Act in mid-1992.554 Initially 
551 Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975, Section 8(5); Treaty of Waitangi (State Enterprises) Act 1988, Section 4.  
552 ToWPU official 4 to DoSLI official 4, 28 May 1992, TC30 Volume 23; ToWPU official 4 to CLO official 4, 
29 July 1992, TC30 Volume 25: both OTS archive.  
553 DoSLI official 4 to ToWPU official 4, 21 July 1992, TC30 Volume 24, OTS archive.  
554 “Base due to return to Tainui,” Waikato Times, 28 November 1992, TC30 Vol. 26, OTS archive.  
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there were concerns expressed to ToWPU officials that a private developer would purchase 
the land from the Livingstone Family.555 In October 1992 a DoSLI official wrote to ToWPU 
that the Livingstone Family declined to purchase the Te Rapa airbase and that it would be 
purchased for immediate transfer to Waikato-Tainui as a partial settlement of its claims.556 
Nonetheless in August 1993 a ToWPU official stated in a memorandum that the Tainui Māori 
Trust Board (with Crown funding) had purchased the land from the Livingstone Family.557 It 
is unclear how those negotiations took place and who precisely was involved but it 
presumably included representatives from ToWPU, the Tainui Māori Trust Board and the 
Livingstone Family. After the transfer of Te Rapa, no further lands were transferred to 
Waikato-Tainui before the signing of the Heads of Agreement. 
As Waikato-Tainui and the Crown were nearing a Heads of Agreement, former 
owners of land taken under the Public Works Act affected the return of land in Waikato-
Tainui’s settlement. The previous private land owners of some Crown land in the Waikato-
Tainui area felt that despite the provisions in the State Owned Enterprises Act 1986 and the 
Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975, before Crown land was offered to Waikato-Tainui it should 
have been offered back for purchase to the previous owner.  
Originally ten farmers at Ohinewai and Meremere had their lands taken under the 
Public Works Act for a coal mine and power station during the 1970s and early 1980s. The 
assets from the government’s State Coal Mines department were transferred to the newly 
established State Owned Enterprise Coal Corporation (or Coalcorp) in 1987.558 The State 
Owned Enterprises Act 1986 contained an amendment to the Coal Mines Act 1979 that 
555 “Tainui Māori Trust Board meeting,” 4 July 1992, RC Vol 11 1992, Box 11, W-T archive; Derek Burns to 
Graham, 6 August 1992, TC30 Vol. 25, OTS archive; Mahuta to Henare, 22 October 1992, RC Vol 29, Box 11, 
W-T archive.  
556 DoSLI official 4 to ToWPU official 4, 12 November 1992, TC30 Vol. 26, OTS archive.  
557 ToWPU official 4 to Te Maru, 5 August 1993, RC Vol 31, Box 12, W-T archive.  
558 McCan, Whatiwhatihoe, 252.  
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provided Ministerial discretion to dispose of lands.559 The Crown land at Ohinewai was not 
transferred to Coalcorp under Coalcorp’s 1988 Sale and Purchase Agreement because 
Coalcorp considered the land surplus to its requirements at that time. However, Coalcorp 
retained an unconditional option to purchase the land from the Crown under the 1988 
Agreement. Even though it did not purchase the land Coalcorp still managed the land and 
negotiated any disposals or sales. In this strange sense the land was subject to the State-
Owned Enterprises Act 1986, even though ownership was not transferred to Coalcorp. In 
1988 Coalcorp initiated the first steps towards offering some Ohinewai properties back to the 
landowners pursuant to Section 40 of the Public Works Act. Some of the land was sold back 
to four out of ten of the former landowners.560 However, before the offer-back procedures 
were instituted for all of the surplus lands, the Tainui Māori Trust Board was granted an 
injunction by the Court of Appeal in 1989 as result of Tainui Māori Trust Board v. Attorney-
General. Amongst other things, this prevented the sale of Coalcorp land (including land it 
managed) which was subject to the Waikato-Tainui raupatu claim.561  
On 30 June 1994 Coalcorp gave notice to the former landowners under the 1988 
Purchase and Sale Agreement that it wished to exercise its option to purchase all the 
Ohinewai land. Given the on-going negotiations with Waikato-Tainui at that time, the 
exercise of the option was deferred pending resolution of the negotiations.562 While the 
negotiations were nearing the Heads of Agreement that was signed in December 1994, two of 
the former land owners, the Levin Farm Settlement Trust and August Deane, initiated legal 
proceedings seeking to have the Section 40 offer-back procedures under the Public Works 
559 State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986, Schedule 5.  
560 Treasury to Minister of Finance, “Tainui Settlement: Status of Ohinewai – Coalcorp Lands,” 26 May 1995, 
TP-02-030-00-03, OTS archive. 
561 Tainui Māori Trust Board v. Attorney-General (1989); McCan, Whatiwhatihoe, 273-296. 
562 Treasury to Minister of Finance, “Tainui Settlement: Status of Ohinewai – Coalcorp Lands,” 26 May 1995, 
TP-02-030-00-03, OTS archive. 
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Act effected with respect to their former lands.563 As was noted earlier, under Section 24(4) 
of the State-Owned Enterprises Act, Section 40 of the Public Works Act does not apply to the 
transfer of lands from the Crown to State-Owned Enterprises. The Crown argued that the 
Ohinewai lands that Coalcorp planned to purchase were being sold to Waikato-Tainui on the 
condition that Coalcorp could subsequently lease-back the lands from Waikato-Tainui to 
complete the term of mining privileges that it still held under the Coal Mines Act 1979.564 
The land was still necessary for public purposes under the Public Works Act 1981.  
In the middle of intense negotiations nearing a Deed of Settlement with Waikato-
Tainui in mid-May 1995, Cabinet agreed to the principle that where land was subject to a 
Section 27B memorial under the Treaty of Waitangi Act (State-Owned Enterprises) 1988 
Section 40 offer-backs under the Public Works Act were waived.565 Waikato-Tainui did not 
take their claim through the Waitangi Tribunal, even though they had registered their claims 
with the Tribunal in 1987. They had chosen the path of direct negotiations and as a result 
lands they claimed were not subject to any recommendations or binding orders by the 
Tribunal. Nonetheless the effect on the Waikato-Tainui negotiations of the 27B memorial 
scheme established by the 1988 amendment to the State Owned Enterprises Act was still 
marked. The Ohinewai lands were set to be returned to Waikato-Tainui in the wider context 
of their Treaty settlement negotiations as Graham explained to National MP Rob Storey, who 
had taken up the cause of the farmers:  
The whole basis of the settlement with Tainui was to try to return as much of the 
confiscated lands as was feasible. Tainui could have simply gone to the Waitangi 
Tribunal and sought a mandatory order for the return of the lands covered by the 
563 Graham to Rob Storey, 25 May 1995, TP-02-030-00-03, OTS archive. 
564 OTS Director to Graham, “Crown Land Administered by Coalcorp,” 13 June 1995, TP-02-030-00-03, OTS 
archive. 
565 CAB (95) M 17/5, TP-02-030-00-03, OTS archive: “The Crown agrees that Section 40 offer back 
requirements under the Public Works Act should not apply in the case of transfer of SOE land consistent with 
the principle established in Section 8A5 of the Treaty of Waitangi Act.” 
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memorials. The Crown would not have been able to oppose such an application and 
the effect of such an order would have been to override the Section 40 provision. 
Rather than go through the application to the Tribunal, the consent of the Crown, and 
the return pursuant to the memorial without the Section 40 applying, it was agreed 
that the Tainui legislation would simply return those lands without the Section 40 
offer-back as if a mandatory order had been made.566 
Graham also made similar comments in the media.567 What Graham did not state was that the 
Tribunal had never made a binding order to return SOE lands, although it would once in its 
history later in 1998.568 Furthermore as Damian Stone has noted, “the original intent of the 
statutory memorials was to ensure that land transferred to state-owned enterprises would 
remain available for use in Treaty settlements,” however, “the Crown’s preference is to use 
more readily available Crown land (such as land-banked land and Crown forest licensed 
land), rather than memorialised land.”569 This was the case in both Waikato-Tainui and Ngāi 
Tahu’s negotiations. 
 Internally the Crown debated what path to take as OTS, CLO and Treasury officials 
tried to determine how to preserve the Ohinewai lands for the Waikato-Tainui settlement and 
for Coalcorp’s own proposed operations.570 The Ohinewai lands were a fairly significant part 
of the land area that was proposed to be returned to Waikato-Tainui, constituting 7.4% of the 
total area. The Attorney-General, Paul East, believed that fresh legislation was necessary to 
566 Graham to Storey, 25 May 1995, TP-02-030-00-03, OTS archive. 
567 “Ohinewai farmers face disappointment,” Mana News, 5 July 1995; “Farmers Can’t Buy Back Power Station 
Land,”5 July 1995: TP-02-030-00-03, OTS archive.  
568 Waitangi Tribunal, The Turangi Township Remedies Report (Wellington: Waitangi Tribunal, 1998). The 
Crown and Ngāti Turangitukua reached an agreement before the Tribunal’s binding recommendations came into 
effect.  
569 Damian Stone, ‘Chapter 10. The Financial and Commercial Dimensions,’ 143: Stone stated that more readily 
available Crown land was used “because most of this memorialised land is utilised in, and is often integral to, 
the commercial operations of an existing state-owned enterprise.” Stone could have also noted that private 
owners of memorialised land would cause difficulties in terms of public perception if land was purchased back 
and then transferred to Māori claimants. 
570 ToWPU official 4 to CLO, Treasury, Chapman Tripp and Paul Hendry, 12 June 1995; Treasury to ToWPU 
official 4, 13 June 1995: TP-02-030-00-03, OTS archive 
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overrule the Public Works Act.571 Coalcorp had intended to purchase the land in June 1994, 
but had delayed as a result of the on-going Waikato-Tainui negotiations. In August 1995 
Coalcorp exercised its option to purchase the Ohinewai lands but they were not used in the 
settlement as a result of Deane and Levin’s legal proceedings. While Deane and Levin 
continued their proceedings in Court to have their former lands offered back to them, MP 
Rob Storey also continued his own efforts to lobby Graham on behalf of the two farmers.572 
He proposed that the Crown provide compensation to the farmers for the loss of their offer-
back rights. In addition Storey also made some controversial comments that symbolised some 
of the backlash that existed to Treaty settlements. Storey brought to Graham’s attention a 
concern he had with the proposed transfer of residential properties that were all in the same 
street or in one village:  
I do not have any concerns about Māori as tenants any more than I would about 
Europeans as tenants, but I am concerned about a preponderance of rental 
accommodation at the lower end of the market which can present a number of social 
problems. I understand Tainui has a policy of not selling any land once they have 
acquired that land, and recognise that it is a matter for them to deal with, and I will 
raise it with them.573 
His comments reflected the views of some of the Pākehā majority who feared the social 
effects of the return of land to Māori claimants. 
 Although Graham did not address the final portion of Storey’s letter in which he 
expressed concerns with a concentration of Waikato-Tainui tenants in a geographical area, he 
did address Storey’s proposal for compensation. Graham did not agree that compensation 
should be provided to those farmers that did not have their offer-back rights exercised. He 
believed that those farmers, just as others who had their lands taken under the Public Works 
571 “Farmers upset over threat to land return,” Waikato Times, 19 July 1995 & “Trouble with Tainui deal,” New 
Zealand Herald, 19 July 1995: RC June-September 1995 Vol 41, Box 19.  
572 Storey to Graham, 6 July 1995, TP-02-030-00-03, OTS archive. 
573 Storey to Graham, 26 July 1995, TP-02-030-00-03, OTS archive. 
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Act, were paid full market compensation for their lands. Graham felt that it would have been 
inequitable to provide further compensation to one group of former landowners when it was 
not practical to do so for all landowners.574 His concerns would remain but he was overruled 
in Cabinet.  
The third reading of the Waikato-Tainui settlement legislation at Parliament passed in 
November 1995 and neither Levin nor Deane’s former lands were used in the settlement, but 
previous land owners were provided with the possibility to obtain $20,000 for the loss of 
purchasing rights.575 Section 42A of the Public Works Act (inserted by Section 38 of the 
Waikato-Tainui settlement legislation, the Waikato Raupatu Claims Settlement Act 1995) 
provided up to $20,000 to former owners of Crown land who would have been offered a right 
to purchase their former lands had Section 8A(5) of the Treaty of Waitangi Act not 
extinguished that right.576 The Levin and Deane proceedings were not heard until the middle 
of 1996 and a decision was delivered by Judge Hammond in December 1996.  
Judge Hammond found in favour of Deane and ordered that the approximately 78 
hectares of land that was offered back to him for purchase in 1989 was to be offered to him 
by Coalcorp again. Hammond found that Coalcorp had effectively entered into a legally 
protected agreement to sell the land back to Deane in 1989. In the case of the much larger 
approximately 600 hectare section of land formerly belonging to the EG Levin Farm 
Settlement Trust, Judge Hammond found in favour of the Attorney-General. In Levin’s case 
Coalcorp had not entered in an agreement to sell as they had with Deane. The Judge decided 
that the land was still to be used for a public work, despite the fact that the Coalcorp had 
temporarily changed its mind at one five month interval in 1989 when it had proposed to sell 
574 Graham to Storey, 9 August 1995, TP-02-030-00-03, OTS archive. 
575 Waikato-Tainui Raupatu Claims Settlement Act 1995, Attachment 2.  
576 Public Works Act 1981, Section 42A.  
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the land to another party. While Coalcorp had breached its obligations under Section 40 of 
the Public Works Act by not offering the land back to Levin first in 1989, that did not entitle 
Levin to purchase back the land. It is unclear if Levin’s lands were eventually transferred to 
Waikato-Tainui as part of their Treaty settlement but it is clear that Deane’s land was not.577 
The grievances expressed by some of the former landowners were enveloped in the 
negotiations for the Waikato-Tainui settlement but they had their origins in the 1988 Sale and 
Purchase Agreement between the Crown and Coalcorp. It was under the terms of the 1988 
Sale and Purchase Agreement that the rights of former owners were first removed.578 The 
matter had become further complicated by the injunction imposed by the High Court in 
Tainui Māori Trust Board v. Attorney General in 1989, but it was the transfer of assets that 
resulted from the State Owned Enterprises Act 1986 rather than the 1995 Waikato-Tainui 
settlement that began the process.  
  
577 August Daniel Deane v. Attorney-General & Henry Michael Horton and Barrie McCormick Campbell as 
trustees of the EG Levin Farm Settlement Trust v. Attorney-General (1996): TP-02-030-00-03, OTS archive. 
578 OTS Director to Graham, 27 June 1995, AAKW W5105 7812 22 Tainui: 1995 Pt.4, Archives NZ.  
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Conclusion 
 
The return of land to Waikato-Tainui and Ngāi Tahu was an important part of each 
Treaty settlement.  Waikato-Tainui’s focus on the return of land as the central component of 
their settlement was emblematic of their desire to have the maximum amount of land 
transferred. This focus also reflected the specific context of Waikato-Tainui’s negotiations, 
since their settlement was restricted to the return of land rather than other conservation issues. 
Waikato-Tainui sought mechanisms to retain the land and pushed for a form of customary 
title under which returned lands would be inalienable. Ngāi Tahu’s settlement consisted of 
the return of different categories of land—commercial and cultural redress. Ngāi Tahu sought 
mechanisms to retain important sites of significance but not as Waikato-Tainui had desired. 
For Ngāi Tahu the return of areas in fee simple title was adequate to ensure that essential 
lands such as the Crown Titi Islands were retained. Nonetheless both Waikato-Tainui and 
Ngāi Tahu sought the return of lands without marginal strips. The different ways that 
Waikato-Tainui and Ngāi Tahu approached the return of land reflected the unique manner in 
which each iwi sought to re-assert their rangatiratanga. The Crown’s limits on the form in 
which lands were returned was equally reflective of the Crown’s absolute sovereignty.  
Both Waikato-Tainui and Ngāi Tahu were concerned regarding the continuing 
alienation of Crown lands in their respective regions during the negotiations. The 
development of a protection mechanism to allow Ngāi Tahu and Waikato-Tainui the 
opportunity to reserve certain Crown lands for use in a future settlement, the land-bank, 
slowed the alienation of Crown land. The Crown established Ngāi Tahu’s land-bank first in 
1990 and Waikato-Tainui’s land-bank in 1993.The land-bank system was not perfect and it 
often frustrated Ngāi Tahu and Waikato-Tainui, but it was an innovative method to protect at 
least some Crown lands from alienation. The inclusion of three high-country pastoral leases 
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at Elfin Bay, Greenstone and Routeburn Stations in the Ngāi Tahu land-bank reflected an 
active desire by the Crown to facilitate Ngāi Tahu’s settlement aspirations. Nonetheless as a 
result of internal Crown pressure from DoC and external lobbying from conservation and 
sports recreation organisations, a large majority of the land contained in these high-country 
pastoral leases was retired into the conservation estate. This was a direct challenge to Ngāi 
Tahu’s rangatiratanga.  
The difficulties experienced by Waikato-Tainui and Ngāi Tahu to have Crown lands 
returned resulted from both Crown actions and those of third-parties such as conservationists. 
Restrictions on the return of certain Crown lands, such as DoC lands, emerged from 
opposition within the Crown but also from prominent conservation groups. The return of the 
Crown Titi Islands and other sites of significance to Ngāi Tahu were delayed for many years 
as a result of this opposition. Waikato-Tainui’s desire for the return of DoC lands, or at the 
least a strong co-management role in DoC lands in the Waikato confiscation area, was 
similarly opposed by both DoC and third-party conservation interests. The return of land to 
Waikato-Tainui was also complicated by other third-party interests in addition to 
conservationists. Two former private owners of Crown land taken under the Public Works 
Act, believed that they should have been offered land before its possible use in Waikato-
Tainui’s negotiations, and their actions successfully restricted the use of some Crown lands in 
the settlement. For Waikato-Tainui and Ngāi Tahu the return of land was governed by both 
their negotiations with the Crown but also the influences of outside interests. In this way both 
Waikato-Tainui’s rangatiratanga and the Crown’s kawanatanga were challenged by third-





Chapter 4 – The Politics of History and Treaty Settlements: The 
Formulation of Historical Accounts (preambles) and Apologies 
 
Treaty settlement negotiations are intended to address and resolve historical claims by 
Māori against the Crown. The negotiations are infused with a wide range of historical debates 
regarding the history of colonisation in New Zealand. Early in the Waikato-Tainui 
negotiations it became clear that the Crown would need to go beyond purely monetary 
redress and even the return of land—an apology was necessary and a historical account of the 
relations between the Crown and Waikato-Tainui.579 Former Treaty Negotiations Minister 
Doug Graham has commented that historical events needed to be put in “their proper place – 
not forgotten but accepted.”580 State apologies have increased in prominence since the late 
twentieth century especially. Historians, political scientists, sociologists and lawyers have 
explored the development of apologies by the state in North America, Europe, Japan, 
Australia and New Zealand.581 While these works have explored the political and historical 
contexts to apologies by the state, there has not been any analysis of the specific process of 
producing the state apology and historical account, and the players involved. Some of these 
works have also largely focused on apologies at the state-level rather than the iwi level 
apologies that marked the Crown’s apologies to Waikato-Tainui and Ngāi Tahu, especially 
the scholarship of Melissa Nobles, Robert R. Weyeneth, Kenneth Minogue and Michael 
Cunningham.582 The work on apologies has been limited to the formulation and context of 
579 Hickey, “Crown Apologies,” 82.  
580 Graham, Trick of Treaty?, 74. 
581 Roy L. Brooks (ed.), When Sorry Isn’t Enough: The Controversy Over Apologies and Reparations for 
Human Injustice (New York University: New York, 1999); Charles S. Maier, 'Overcoming the Past? Narrative 
and Negotiation, Remembering and Reparation: Issues at the Interface of History and the Law', in John Torpey 
(ed.), Politics and the Past: On Repairing Historical Injustices, Lanham, 2003, pp. 295-304; Nicholas Tavuchis, 
Mea Culpa: A Sociology of Apology and Reconciliation, Stanford, 1991. 
582 Robert R. Weyeneth, “The Power of Apology and the Process of Historical Reconciliation,” The Public 
Historian, v. 23, no. 3; Kenneth Minogue, 'Aborigines and Australian Apologetics,' Quadrant, September 1998, 
pp. 11-20; Michael Cunningham, “Prisoners of the Japanese and the Politics of Apology: A Battle Over History 
and Memory,” Journal of Contemporary History, v. 39, no. 4, 2004; Michael Cunningham, “Saying Sorry: The 
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the apologies, rather than the historical accounts that are prominent in the New Zealand 
Treaty settlement process. The historical accounts and the apologies that are produced are 
meant to be as unbiased, unemotional and neutral as possible but the process behind them 
reveals a series of discussions occurring between the Crown and Waikato-Tainui and Ngāi 
Tahu. If Linda Smith is correct and the writing of “history is mostly about power,” then these 
debates reflected the assertion of Waikato-Tainui and Ngāi Tahu’s rangatiratanga, and the 
Crown’s defence of its own sovereignty.583 Waikato-Tainui and Ngāi Tahu understandings of 
their respective histories with the Crown often differed from their Crown counterparts, and it 
is within these interactions that some sense of shared historical understanding was created. As 
one OTS official commented during the latter stages of the Waikato-Tainui negotiations, 
historical accounts embodied the “need to reconcile the Crown's desire for brevity and clarity 
with Waikato-Tainui's desire to set the historical record straight.”584 
 The confiscation of land that lay at the center of Waikato-Tainui’s historical claims 
was often discussed during the early phase of Waikato-Tainui’s negotiations dating back to 
the first scoping discussion in 1989, and remained prominent throughout the negotiations 
with National in the early 1990s. Once it became clear that a settlement would occur, work 
began by both the Crown and Waikato-Tainui on crafting what was referred to as a 
“preamble” (to the settlement agreement) but which was essentially a historical account. The 
historical debates between Waikato-Tainui and the Crown addressed the different 
understandings of the origins of the war in the Waikato during the 1860s and the aftermath 
and effects of war through to the present day. These involved Waikato-Tainui chief 
negotiator Robert Mahuta and his legal advisors, Denese Henare and Shane Solomon, and 
Politics of Apology,” The Political Quarterly, v. 70, 1999; Elazar Barkan, The Guilt of Nations; Melissa Nobles, 
The Politics of Official Apologies (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008). 
583 Linda Tuhiwai Smith, Decolonizing Methodologies, 34.  
584 OTS official 4 to Graham, 10 July 1995, AAKW W5105 7812 22 Tainui: 1995 Pt.4, Archives NZ, 1.  
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Waikato-Tainui’s historical advisor, Ann Parsonson. Officials at the ToWPU/OTS (it was 
restructured into OTS on 1 January 1995 a week and a half after the signing of the Heads of 
Agreement), the CLO and Parliamentary Counsel were involved on the Crown side. Since the 
Waikato-Tainui preamble and apology was the first of its kind in the New Zealand Treaty 
settlement process, the negotiations were spread over three preambles that were produced for 
each phase of the negotiation: in the period before the signing of the Heads of Agreement 
from October to December 1994, before the signing of the Deed of Settlement in May 1995 
and the first introduction of settlement legislation in July 1995. Each preamble was slightly 
different, but also shared some common sections and characteristics. 
Ngāi Tahu’s history had been examined to a far greater extent than Waikato-Tainui’s 
due to Ngāi Tahu’s Waitangi Tribunal hearings form 1987-1989. While Ngāi Tahu and the 
Crown each had concerns with the conclusions in the Ngāi Tahu Report, they agreed to use 
the Report as the baseline for the negotiation. The quantification of loss was the first site of 
historical debate in Ngāi Tahu’s negotiations with National in the early 1990s but it only 
lasted for approximately a year. As the negotiations slowly began to break down in 1993 and 
1994, the historical debates ended. It was not until the negotiations had recommenced and led 
to a Heads of Agreement in 1996 that historical debates resumed between the Crown and 
Ngāi Tahu. Much like the development of Waikato-Tainui’s preamble and apology, there 
were widely differing views on the history of Ngāi Tahu’s colonisation but a final 
compromise was reached. Ngāi Tahu’s primary historical advisor was Te Maire Tau and he 
was aided by Ngāi Tahu legal advisor Nick Davidson. OTS and CLO officials were similarly 
involved, but none from the Parliamentary Counsel office.  
Julie Bellingham has argued that the Crown has used the preamble (or historical 
accounts) and apologies to liberate itself from past wrongs and blame, rather than as an 
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accurate historical account. Bellingham questioned the extent of Māori claimant input into 
the formulation of historical accounts, and noted the Crown’s dominance of the process.585 
The negotiations over Waikato-Tainui’s preamble, Ngāi Tahu’s historical account and 
apologies to both iwi reveal that many of Bellingham’s observations were correct. Both iwi 
complained about the Crown’s refusal to include historical details and the Crown’s control of 
the overall process. Nonetheless, Bellingham overlooks the agency and role of Māori 
claimants, in this case Waikato-Tainui and Ngāi Tahu negotiators, in the formulation of the 
accounts and apologies. Both Waikato-Tainui and Ngāi Tahu had significant input into their 
apologies and historical accounts and obtained important concessions in the final versions. 
Richard Boast has commented that historical accounts are “inevitably lifeless, tedious to read 
and indeed to write.”586 What this chapter will show is that although the accounts and 
apologies tend to have the most neutral tone and uncontroversial historical positions, the 
debates that occur between the Crown and claimants are far from lifeless. Indeed, these 
debates embody the clash between Māori rangatiratanga and the Crown’s kawanatanga at the 
centre Waikato-Tainui and Ngāi Tahu’s Treaty settlement negotiations.  
Part I: The development of Waikato-Tainui’s preamble(s) and apology 
The Preamble to the Heads of Agreement 
 
In early October 1994 Cabinet approved a general mandate for Graham to develop a 
concrete offer for Waikato-Tainui negotiators. This provided the context for extended 
historical debates between Crown and Waikato negotiators regarding the wording of the 
preamble and the apology. The Crown sent Waikato-Tainui negotiators a draft of their 
proposed preamble in early October 1994 that was split into recitals denoted by a letter. The 
585 Bellingham, “The Office of Treaty Settlements and Treaty History,” M.A Thesis Victoria University of 
Wellington, 2006, 63-131. 
586 Richard Boast, The Native Land Court 1862-1887: A Historical Study, Cases and Commentary (Wellington: 
Brookers Ltd., 2013), 13.  
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Crown’s account took note of the tensions in the 1860s and that the Crown had acted in 
violation of the Treaty of Waitangi. The account stated that the New Zealand Settlements Act 
1863 was used to “wrongfully” confiscate 1.2 million acres areas of land in the Waikato. The 
preamble referred to the Waitangi Tribunal’s 1985 Manukau Report which found that the 
Crown’s invasion of the Waikato was contrary to Article II of the Treaty of Waitangi. The 
Crown sought to recognise that the physical and economic impact of the raupatu “both 
immediately and over time has been prejudicial to Waikato-Tainui and caused economic, 
social and cultural upheaval” and had contributed “to the development of New Zealand.” 
Waikato-Tainui’s negotiating principles of “i riro whenua atu, me hoki whenua mai” (as land 
was taken, so land should be returned) were explicitly recognised.587 In its essence this did 
not differ much from the Crown position as far back as 1990.  
The specific wording of the preamble would become a focal point of the negotiating 
process, and especially the terms used to describe the severity of Crown actions and effects. 
Internally the Crown was still struggling with the extent and nature of the Crown’s 
recognition of wrong-doing. The Solicitor-General had reviewed the Crown’s preamble draft 
and wondered what was “meant by the contribution to the development of New Zealand” and 
“by the contribution [of confiscated land] to the development of New Zealand. What is there 
that is relevant to the settlement?” A CLO official also had some trouble with that admission. 
Waikato-Tainui also sought to include that the acknowledgment of the contribution of 
raupatu land to the development of New Zealand was “quantified at approximately $6 
billion.”588 Waikato-Tainui negotiators requested that an acknowledgment of the financial 
loss be included in the preamble because of the significant difference between the estimates 
of loss and the final quantum provided. Although the issue of quantification of loss was not 
587 CAB (94) M 37/7; “Draft Heads of Agreement,” 12 October 1994: both TC 30 Vol. 37, OTS archive.  
588 CLO official 4 to ToWPU official 4, 17 October 1994, TC 30 Vol. 37, OTS archive, 5. 
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as important for Waikato-Tainui as it was for Ngāi Tahu, it remained an important fact to 
ensure that there was recognition of the multi-billion dollar nature of Waikato-Tainui’s loss. 
For Waikato-Tainui it was important to note that land confiscation had enabled New Zealand 
to develop a valuable dairy economy that it remains in many ways to this day—even if that 
dairy development had occurred decades after the initial confiscation.  
Waikato-Tainui’s first response to the Crown’s proposed preamble included a number 
of important suggested changes. While the Crown’s version recognised the Tribunal’s 1985 
Manukau report that indirectly condemned the confiscation there was also added: “It [the 
actions of the Crown] is also contrary to the Sovereign Status accorded Maaori under the 
Declaration of Independence.” Waikato-Tainui wanted the Crown to not only acknowledge 
the ongoing relationship between Waikato and the Crown in terms of the Treaty of Waitangi 
but also the 1835 "Declaration of Independence,” He Whakaputanga o Niu Tireni.589 The 
Declaration was signed largely by northern New Zealand rangatira (“chiefs”), but also by 
Tainui rangatira Te Wherowhero in 1839 nineteen years before he was crowned the first 
Māori King.590 This was the first time that the issue had come up during the negotiations, and 
was intended by Waikato-Tainui to set the historical scene for the signing of the Treaty of 
Waitangi in the following year. The Declaration contained stronger references to sovereignty 
than the Treaty and as a result perhaps it was unrealistic for the Crown to accept its inclusion, 
but seeking to include it in the preamble would have been understandable from Waikato-
Tainui’s point of view.591 
 At recital E the Crown stated: “The raupatu lands are estimated to total some 1.2 
million acres (although some compensation in the form of land and cash was assigned to 
589 Tainui Māori Trust Board version of Preamble, 26 October 1994, TC 30 Vol. 38, OTS archive.   
590 Orange, Illustrated History of the Treaty of Waitangi, 13-16.  
591 Interestingly this issue persists throughout negotiations and Tribunal hearings, especially in light of the 
arguments made by Nga Puhi in the Paparahi o te Raki hearings since 2010. 
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Māori in the Waikato through the compensation courts and other means).” Waikato-Tainui’s 
version had more details and some more extended discussion of the merit of the Waikato-
Tainui claim in relation to other claims, and the process under which some lands were 
returned following confiscation: 
The raupatu lands total some 1,202,273 million acres. Compensation in the form of 
cash and lands was assigned to Maaori in the Waikato through the compensation 
courts and to those Waikato Maaori who fought on the side of the Crown. These lands 
were not returned under the tribal estate but became part of the individual tenure title 
system of the Crown.592  
 
At draft recital F the Crown held that “the physical and economic effect of the raupatu both 
immediately and over time has caused economic, social, and cultural upheaval to Waikato-
Tainui.” To Waikato-Tainui the word “upheaval” was inadequate: they argued that 
“decimation” was more suitable, and wanted to add that the “effect of the War caused 
physical loss in terms of lives terminated by the invading colonial forces of the Crown.” 
Waikato-Tainui wanted to refer to the compromise that had been reached by both sides as 
being made “especially on the part of Waikato-Tainui.”593 The differences between Crown 
and Waikato-Tainui negotiators on these points were not really a matter of differing historical 
interpretations but of the inclusion of certain historical details. The inclusion of historical 
details in the end would play a key part in achieving reconciliation between the Crown and 
Waikato-Tainui claimants, as the support of Waikato-Tainui beneficiaries could often hinge 
on what kind of recognition had been achieved by Waikato-Tainui negotiators. 
  Graham himself was intimately involved in these negotiations much as Mahuta was. 
After advice from his officials, Graham responded to Waikato-Tainui’s desired changes to 
the Crown’s first draft with his own suggestions. Graham refused to mention the Declaration 
of Independence, but acknowledged that “cash and lands were assigned to Maaori in the 
592 Tainui Māori Trust Board draft preamble, 26 October 1994, TC30 Vol 36, OTS archive.  
593 Tainui Māori Trust Board draft preamble, 26 October 1994, TC 30 Vol. 38, OTS archive, 1-2, 5. 
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Waikato through the compensation courts but, it appears, to those Waikato Maaori who 
fought on the side of the Crown. These lands were not returned under the tribal estate but 
became part of the individual tenure title system of the Crown.” It was also conceded that the 
effect of war was beyond upheaval to extend, as Waikato-Tainui had wanted, to 
“decimation.” Graham also noted in the Crown's obligations that the grievances of Waikato-
Tainui were “justified and that recognition of that fact is overdue.” Graham allowed for the 
inclusion that the raupatu land was estimated by “Waikato-Tainui to have a value today of 
approximately $6 billion.”594   
CLO provided their own views on the Waikato-Tainui version of the preamble. One 
official did not approve of using the term “decimation” rather than upheaval, presumably 
because of its literal meaning. In section 3, in terms of good faith obligations, the CLO 
official wondered why the compromise of both sides had to be referred as “especially on the 
part of Waikato-Tainui.” During these debates over historical issues, very recent issues could 
often also be tightly interconnected such as the recent compromise that Waikato-Tainui 
thought they were making in accepting the Crown’s proposed financial compensation and the 
return of only certain lands, for example the exclusion of the conservation estate.595 The draft 
preamble returned to Waikato-Tainui at the end of October 1994 only kept those changes 
approved by Graham.596  
  Crown officials then turned to a historian who was not affiliated with the government 
to seek additional help with the task of composing a history that was not only acceptable to 
both Waikato-Tainui and Crown negotiators, but also historically accurate. Academic 
594 Graham notes on Heads of Agreement, 27 October 1994, TC 30 Vol. 38, OTS archive 
595 CLO official 4 to ToWPU official 4, 31 October 1994, TC 30 Vol. 38, OTS archive; Graham notes on Heads 
of Agreement, 27 October 1994, TC 30 Vol. 38, OTS archive, 1-2, 5-6. 




                                                          
historian James Belich was used as a consultant to review and comment on a draft of the 
preamble. The Crown had privately expressed to Belich a hesitancy to use the word 
“invasion” to describe the military incursion across the Mangatawhiri and into the Waikato. 
To the Crown Law Office the British acquired sovereignty in 1840 when the Treaty of 
Waitangi was signed, and thus the Crown could not invade itself. Admitting to the invasion 
of the Waikato would make the Crown liable to question its own sovereignty. Belich was 
blunt in his advice: “I understand that there is some reluctance to use the term 'invasion'. 
While re-registering my firm opinion that this term is historically accurate, I acknowledge 
that 'the Crown engaged in a war in Waikato' is legitimate. There is no shadow of doubt that 
military operations in the Waikato were initiated by the Crown.” The ongoing debate between 
Waikato-Tainui negotiators and the Crown, as well as within the Crown between Graham and 
the CLO, over whether to use the term upheaval or decimation to describe the result of 
confiscation on Waikato-Tainui was quickly resolved by Belich. “'Decimation' literally 
means reduction by one-tenth; in common usage it seems to tend towards reduction by nine-
tenths. Neither is accurate; 'caused heavy economic, social, and cultural damage to Waikato-
Tainui' may meet the case.” Belich concluded his historical advice with a recognition of the 
momentous nature of the negotiations, “I would like to record my congratulations to your unit 
and minister for what will, in my view as a specialist in the field and as a New Zealand 
general historian, be a major step forward in NZ ethnic relations.”597 
 When a third Crown draft of the preamble was sent to Waikato-Tainui negotiators at 
the end of November 1994, there were only cosmetic changes to the issues accepted for the 
second Crown draft at the end of October 1994. There remained recognition of the effect of 
the individual tenure title system on the dismantling of the tribal estate. In addition, Belich's 
597 James Belich to ToWPU official 4, 1 November 1994, TC30 Vol. 39, OTS archive, 1-2.  
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recommendation for “heavy economic, social and cultural damage” rather than “upheaval” or 
“decimation” was also accepted.598  
While there was general agreement on the preamble there were a number of historical 
details which Mahuta proposed to add to the preamble. Mahuta also sought to challenge the 
legal framework under which confiscation was first effected. During the late 1980s Waikato-
Tainui negotiators had consistently questioned the legality of the confiscations. Crown 
officials maintained that the confiscation of land was legal, albeit unjust.599 Waikato-Tainui 
requested that the words “unlawfully” be added to the sentence “large areas of land....were 
[“unlawfully” rather than unjustly] confiscated by the Crown.” The Crown continued to hold 
to the view that the confiscation had been legal.600 Mahuta also wanted the passages from the 
Manukau Report that condemned the invasion of the Waikato rather than solely a reference to 
the Report, and Article II of the Treaty of Waitangi in English and Te Reo Māori.601 The 
Crown accepted the inclusion of Article II, although it rejected the inclusion of the passage 
from the Manukau Report because it seemed to point to the illegal nature of the confiscation. 
By the final version of the Heads of Agreement preamble, a statement from the Manukau 
Report was included: “It can simply be said that from the contemporary record of Sir John 
Gorst in 1864, from the Report of the Royal Commission sixty years after that, and from 
historical research almost a century removed from the event, all sources agree that the Tainui 
people of the Waikato never rebelled but were attacked by British troops in direct violation of 
Article II of the Treaty of Waitangi.” The use of a Waitangi Tribunal report in the Waikato-
Tainui preamble signified the historical authority that the Tribunal still held, despite Waikato-
598 “Draft Heads of Agreement,” 29 November 1994, TC30 Vol. 40, OTS archive. 
599 Frame to Henare, 1 March 1989, TC30 Vol. 3, OTS archive; Frame to Jeffries, 30 May 1989, TC30 Vol. 3, 
OTS archive; Meeting minutes of Tainui Māori Trust Board and the Crown scoping session, 8 June 1989, TC30 
Vol. 3, OTS archive. 
600 Michael Litchfield, “The Confiscation of Māori Land,” VUW Law Review Vol. 15 No. 4 1985, 337-362. 
601 Waitangi Tribunal, Report of the Waitangi Tribunal on the Manukau Claim (Wai-8), (Wellington: 
Government Printer, 1985). 
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Tainui’s choice to skip the Tribunal process and proceed directly to negotiations. While the 
legality of the confiscation was not questioned in the excerpt from the Manukau Report, the 
statement that “Waikato never rebelled” pleased Waikato-Tainui negotiators. 
Mahuta thought that the preamble was far too brief and wanted to provide a more 
detailed historical account by referring to the purpose of the Kīngitanga, the reason for 
invasion by the Crown and specific sites of atrocities such as at Rangiaowhia and Orakau: 
The pivotal role in which the King movement played in the attempt to preserve the 
tribal lands. The attacks that occurred by the colonial forces such as at Rangiaowhia. 
The troops attacked the unfortified village where a number of families were living. 
The people of the village hastily sought refuge in the whare near the Church. After a 
short volley of fire from both sides the whare were set alight. Those who came out to 
escape the flames were shot. Those who remained were burnt to death. The heavy 
casualty suffered by the people including women and children as people evacuated en 
masse the village of Orakau as it was surrounded by 1100 soldiers.602 
 
Mahuta also sought to exclude some historical details.603 Strangely, although Waikato-Tainui 
advisors had previously requested that the effect of the individual tenure system and the 
process for the return of confiscated lands be specifically mentioned, by 9 December 1994 
they asked for its removal from the preamble. They originally desired the addition of the 
following statement: “Compensation in the form of cash and lands was assigned to Maaori in 
the Waikato through the compensation courts and to those Waikato Maaori who fought on the 
side of the Crown. These lands were not returned under the tribal estate but became part of 
the individual tenure title system of the Crown.” 604 The Crown had only added “or those who 
remained neutral” to “those Waikato Maaori who fought on the side of the Crown.”605 
Waikato-Tainui wanted the statement deleted in its entirety so that this specific section of the 
602 Mahuta to Peter Rowe, 7 December 1994, RC1, Correspondence Vol 37, December 1994, Box 15, W-T 
archives. 
603 Mahuta to Rowe, 7 December 1994, RC1, Correspondence Vol 37, December 1994, Box 15, W-T archive; 
Rowe to ToWPU official 4, 9 December 1994, TC 30 Vol. 41, OTS archive, 1; Belich, The New Zealand Wars 
and the Victorian Interpretation of Racial Conflict, 173. 
604 Tainui Māori Trust Board draft preamble, 26 October 1994, TC30 Vol 36, OTS archive.  
605 Crown draft Heads of Agreement, 29 November 1994, TC30 Vol. 40, OTS archive. 
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preamble would only refer to the confiscation of land, not the process that followed.606 When 
another draft was produced on 13 December 1994 the section noted above was still in the 
preamble, but italicised and in parentheses with a hand-written checkmark directly beside it. 
The copy of the draft belonged to the lead ToWPU official. This official had met with 
Graham to discuss the preamble that day and Graham may have indicated that the section 
should remain.607 It is unclear why Waikato-Tainui would have wanted to remove those 
specific historical details. By the 15 December 1994 version of the Heads of Agreement, the 
reference was still included and it would remain the same format for the final version of the 
preamble in the Heads of Agreement signed by Graham and Mahuta on 21 December 
1994.608  
 Crown Law had objections to many of Mahuta's proposed changes. Mahuta had asked 
that the wording should include that the confiscation was unlawful while CLO reiterated the 
injustice of the act but that the confiscation was legal. CLO noted: “The effects of such a 
concession [that the confiscation was unlawful] is that all that occurred subsequently is illegal 
and even though this is a without prejudice document I do not think the Crown should make a 
concession.”609 The CLO argument in relation to the legality of confiscation was connected 
to the Crown’s refusal to use the term “invasion” to describe the war. Both concessions 
undermined the Crown’s absolute sovereignty.  
CLO also had concerns with many of the historical statements provided by Mahuta. 
The statement that “Tainui never rebelled” raised “a number of historical issues” for Crown 
606 Mahuta to Rowe, 7 December 1994, RC1, Correspondence Vol 37, December 1994, Box 15, W-T archive; 
Rowe to ToWPU official 4, 9 December 1994, TC 30 Vol. 41, OTS archive, 1. 
607 Crown draft Heads of Agreement, 13 December 1994, TC30 Vol. 41, OTS archive.  
608 Crown draft Heads of Agreement, 15 December 1994, TC30 Vol. 41, OTS archive. 
609 CLO official 4 to ToWPU official 4, 9 December 1994, TC 30 Vol. 41, OTS archive. 
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Law although specific reason for their concern was not provided. The CLO official found that 
many of the historical statements requested by Mahuta were contradictory:  
[The fact that Waikato were] labelled as rebels to justify confiscation - seems 
unnecessary given the Crown's admission that the confiscations were unjust (people 
can draw their own conclusions from that admission); did not wish to sell their lands - 
when? eg Waikato Chiefs sold land in the 1840s; role of King movement - relevance?; 
cause of confiscation - again, it is difficult to see the relevance especially in light of 
the Crown's admission.610  
 
The CLO official also struggled to understand why the atrocities at Rangiaowhia and Orakau 
were singled out. A legal consultant for the Crown largely agreed with CLO's comments on 
the changes to the preamble regarding the illegality of the settlement and that the Crown 
would probably object to that historical interpretation. The legal consultant stated that:  
Perhaps it would be opportune to provide Tainui with the draft apology prepared by 
Frame [the former ToWPU Director] to see whether that would go some way towards 
meeting their requirements. I would be particularly concerned at any acknowledgment 
by the Crown that the land is conservatively valued at six billion dollars. I also recall 
Frame’s comment that it would be dangerous for the Crown not to acknowledge the 
casualties on the Crown side as well.611  
 
Some of Crown Law’s comments were correct. Waikato-Tainui rangatira had sold land but 
the role of the King movement was to stop the land sales, and this was strongly connected to 
the reason for invasion and subsequent confiscation.612 Mahuta was the (adopted) son of King 
Koroki and his sister was Te Arikinui, the Waikato-Tainui negotiating team and the King 
Movement were strongly intertwined.613 As for Rangiaowhia and Orakau the reason for its 
inclusion by Waikato-Tainui negotiators was as a tool of remembrance but the Crown sought 
to keep the historical details to a minimum. Waikato-Tainui negotiators wanted to ensure that 
610 CLO official 4 to ToWPU official 4, 9 December 1994, TC 30 Vol. 41, OTS archive.  
611 CLO official 4 to ToWPU official 4, 9 December 1994, TC 30 Vol. 41, OTS archive, 2; Mark O’Regan to 
Thomas,  9 December 1994, TC 30 Vol. 41, OTS archive, 1.  
612 McCan, Whatiwhatihoe, 32; Keenan, Wars Without End, 206-214; Belich, The New Zealand Wars, 78-79; 
Michael King, Te Puea: A life (Auckland: Penguin, 1977), 24. 
613 Carmen Kirkwood, Te Arikinui and the Millenium of Waikato (Ngaruawahia: Turongo House, 2001).  
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the murder of the elderly, women and children at Rangiaowhia and wounded soldiers and 
women at Orakau were emphasised and specifically recognised by the Crown.614  
During a mid-December 1994 meeting the Crown stated that the preamble “should 
take a broad brush approach to historical matters in the document and avoid detailed debate 
on historical points and interpretations.” Waikato-Tainui negotiators were fairly resigned to 
having to accept the finality of the settlement and tried to advance their own historical agenda 
on that point. “Denese [Henare] wanted to know if the settlement was full and final then why 
can’t we put what we like into it in respect to the historical facts?” Brent Wheeler noted that 
the detail of the historical facts should not become a “slinging” match. “It is not an issue of 
blame - it is an issue of factual statement and correction.”615 This reflected some of the 
observations made by historian Julie Bellingham regarding the necessity of factually correct 
historical accounts and apologies.616 Many of Waikato-Tainui’s requested changes to the 
preamble were not included in the final Heads of Agreement that was signed by Mahuta and 
Graham on 21 December 1994.617 The description of the confiscation as “unlawful” was not 
included, but there were many points of recognition of injustices perpetrated against 
Waikato-Tainui including that the “War caused loss of life among Waikato-Tainui and the 
physical and economic effect of the raupatu both immediately and over time has caused 
heavy economic, social and cultural damage to Waikato-Tainui.” The extract from the 
Manukau report which stated that “the Tainui people of the Waikato never rebelled” was also 
included, something Denese Henare was particularly concerned about.618 A final aspect that 
Waikato negotiators did manage to have changed was the reference to the value of the land 
614 Belich, The New Zealand Wars, 160-165, 173; Vincent O’Malley, “Te Rohe Pōtae War & Raupatu: A Report 
Commissioned by the Crown Forest Rental Trust, 2010,” 107-129, 144-178. 
615 ToWPU official 4, 13 December 1994 Meeting, TC 30 Vol. 41, OTS archive; Solomon,13 December 1994 
Meeting, RC1, Correspondence Vol 37, December 1994, Box 15. 2-3. 
616 Bellingham, “The Office of Treaty Settlements and Treaty History,” 72. 
617 “Waikato-Tainui and Crown Heads of Agreement,” 21 December 1994, TC30 Vol. 42, OTS archive.  




                                                          
confiscated. It had been estimated at approximately $6 billion in 1989 but in the intervening 
years it had doubled to increase to $12 billion as a result of inflation and increased land 
prices. The preamble in the Heads of Agreement would include the change to $12 billion, a 
minor consolation, but a small victory nonetheless.619 While the first version of the preamble 
in the final Heads of Agreement was completed, the apology remained to be crafted.  
The Royal Apology  
 
 The development of the Crown’s apology to Waikato-Tainui began in early 
November 1994, during the drafting of the preamble. The Crown contracted Alex Frame, the 
first ToWPU Director and leading official of the scoping negotiations that took place under 
the Labour government in the late 1980s, to develop the first draft of the apology. He had 
gone into private practice, but was now contracted to help formulate the apology to Waikato. 
Frame advised Graham that the apology and preamble needed to contain an admission by the 
Crown of having breached the spirit of the Treaty of Waitangi by crossing the Mangatawhiri 
in 1863. This was inevitably a political assessment “painted with a broad brush, taking into 
account modern conceptions of the Treaty of Waitangi” and disregarding features which 
would be relevant in a narrow legal analysis. Frame stated that “ministers have concluded, no 
doubt rightly, that the intensifying cycle of grievance/confrontation/grievance can only be 
broken by a bold admission by the Crown and the tendering of substantial compensation.”620 
His first draft had noted that Waikato-Tainui kuia (female elders) had expressed feeling like 
“orphans” during the scoping discussions of 1989 and wanted to include that detail in the 
apology. Frame later wrote that his use of the term “orphans” had caused the Crown some 
concern. The use of the term “orphans” was outside of the usual neutral terminology 
619 Te Maru to ToWPU official 4, 17 December 1994, TC 30 Vol. 42, OTS archive.  
620 Frame, “First Draft Apology,” 9 November 1994, TC 30 Vol. 39, OTS archive; Frame to Graham, 22 
November 1994, TC 30 Vol. 40, OTS archive, 2.  
234 
 
                                                          
advocated by the Crown.621 Nonetheless Crown officials and Ministers recognised the 
importance of using such emotive terminology and it was included in the final version of the 
apology.622 Part of the final apology stated: 
The Crown acknowledges that the subsequent confiscations of land and resources 
under the New Zealand Settlements Act 1863 of the New Zealand Parliament were 
wrongful, have caused Waikato to the present time to suffer feelings in relation to 
their lost lands akin to those of orphans, and have had a crippling impact on the 
welfare, economy and development of Waikato.623 
 
The use of the term “orphans” and the general tone of the apology fit into the explanatory 
framework extolled by Elazar Barkan, wherein the apology demonstrates a new “guilt of 
nations.”624 
The Crown sought to appease Waikato-Tainui's request to include historical details by 
stating that the details would appear in the apology during a mid-December 1994 meeting. 
Waikato-Tainui replied that if the important historical details would appear in the apology, 
then Waikato-Tainui preferred that Queen Elizabeth II delivered the apology personally at 
Turangawaewae Marae in Ngāruawāhia. This was the first instance that the delivery of the 
apology by Queen Elizabeth II was mentioned during the negotiations. Crown officials 
expressed their scepticism to the prospect of Queen Elizabeth II delivering the apology in 
person, but stated to their counterparts that they would investigate the possibility.625 
In May 1995 when the apology was being finalised and prepared for the Deed of 
Settlement signing, Waikato-Tainui legal advisor Denese Henare remained concerned that it 
did not recognise that Waikato-Tainui had never rebelled. At consultation hui during the first 
few months of 1995, individuals had stated that the issue of rebellion was important to them 
so the pressure to include the statement that Waikato-Tainui had never rebelled came from all 
621 Bellingham, “The Office of Treaty Settlements and Treaty History,” 86. 
622 Frame, “Raupatu Settlement – Legal Finality and Political Reality,” 258. 
623 Waikato-Tainui Deed of Settlement, 22 May 1995, 6.  
624 Barkan, The Guilt of Nations. 
625 ToWPU official 4, 13 December 1994 Meeting, TC 30 Vol. 41, OTS archive; Solomon,13 December 1994 
Meeting, RC1, Correspondence Vol 37, December 1994, Box 15. 2-3. 
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levels of Waikato-Tainui society.626 The Crown countered that the extract from the Manukau 
Report in the preamble explicitly stated that “the Tainui people of the Waikato never 
rebelled.” The final version of the apology contained an acknowledgment that the Crown’s 
“representatives and advisers acted unjustly and in breach of the Treaty of Waitangi…in 
unfairly labelling Waikato as rebels” which may have appeased Henare.627 
Waikato-Tainui legal advisor Shane Solomon continued to stress to Crown 
negotiators that the person that delivered the apology remained important. “The mere fact that 
Q[ueen]E[lizabeith]II apologises in person to Te Ata[irangikaahu] is vindication of our 
innocence and affirmation of the Crown's guilt and wrong doing.” The Crown had begun to 
inquire about the possibility of an apology from the Queen, especially in light of the myriad 
different grievances for which she might be responsible around the world due to the 
destructive effects of British colonisation. In letters to the editor the public also weighed in—
they were largely opposed to an apology directly from the Queen.628 Those opposed to the 
apology directly from the Queen could have no idea of its importance to the acceptance of the 
settlement by Waikato-Tainui.  
 On 3 May 1995 Graham asked that Mahuta approve the wording of the apology. 
Prime Minister Jim Bolger was travelling to the United Kingdom in early May 1995 and 
would bring up the issue with the Queen and her advisors. Graham had wanted the word 
“imperial” removed from the first paragraph of the apology in which it stated that “imperial 
troops” had crossed the Mangatawhiri in 1863. Mahuta opposed and decidedly pointed out to 
the Minister that Waikato-Tainui had not deleted the word “imperial” from their draft of the 
626 Solomon to Te Maru, 3 May 1995, May 1995, (SS) Box 38, OTS archive.  
627 Waikato-Tainui Deed of Settlement, 22 May 1995, 6-7. 
628 Solomon to Te Maru, 3 May 1995, RC1, Correspondence May 1995, (SS) Box 38, W-T archive, 2; MFaT 
official 1 to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 14 February 1995, AAKW W5105 7812 22 Tainui: 1995 
Pt.1, Archives NZ; Sue Freeman, “Tainui on a limb,” 8 March 1995, Waikato Times; Vernon White, “Royal 
Apology,” 9 March 1995, Waikato Times.  
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apology. Clearly Graham was concerned about how the Queen and her advisors would 
perceive that part of the apology. Mahuta countered that “there should not be any difficulty 
with the Palace since Her Majesty should be advised it is historical fact that in 1863 British 
troops invaded the Waikato.”629 There was still opposition, prior to Bolger's meeting with the 
Queen, from the Crown to the inclusion of the term imperial to describe the troops. 
Eventually the Crown came to believe that the alternative of “British” troops was probably 
even more objectionable because imperial troops could well refer to German or Japanese 
imperial troops.630 The word “imperial” remained a concern for the Crown and ultimately 
Waikato-Tainui had to accede to the use of the neutral “forces” to describe the Crown’s 
troops that crossed Mangatawhiri.631  
 Before the apology was finalised for Bolger to take to the United Kingdom with him, 
the OTS Chief Historian also had a change he desired to the apology. In the second clause of 
the apology the Crown expressed “its profound regret and apologise[d] unreservedly for the 
loss of lives because of the hostilities arising from the land war….” The Chief Historian 
believed that the war was about more than just land but a clash of sovereigns and a violation 
of Waikato-Tainui’s rangatiratanga. He advocated the use of the term “invasion” in place of 
“land war,” despite the Crown’s previous aversion to the use of the term in the preamble to 
the Heads of Agreement. James Belich had argued in a similar vein in The New Zealand 
Wars during the 1980s, and in his advice to the Crown regarding the preamble in November 
1994.632 The final version of the apology would use the term “invasion” in place of land war.  
629 Graham to Mahuta, 3 May 1995 & Mahuta to Graham, 4 May 1995, AAKW W5105 7812 23 Tainui: 1995 
Pt.2, Archives NZ, 1. 
630 Solomon, “Diary Note: Meeting of Advisers,” 5 May 1995, 2; Niwa Nuri to Mahuta, 5 May 1995, RC1, 
Correspondence  May 1995 Vol 40, Box 18, W-T archives. 
631 Waikato-Tainui Deed of Settlement, 22 May 1995, 6. 
632 Belich, The New Zealand Wars, 78-79; ToWPU official 4 to Gerard Brown, 6 May 1995, RC1, 
Correspondence  May 1995 Vol 40, Box 18, W-T archives. Danny Keenan has more recently argued that the 
invasion of the Waikato was primarily a result of disputes over land: Danny Keenan, Wars Without End. 
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The Queen and her advisors approved the apology and agreed to deliver the apology 
personally when the Queen visited New Zealand in October 1995. Waikato-Tainui 
negotiators had originally wanted the Queen to travel to Turangawaewae Marae to deliver the 
apology. 633 The Queen was unable to change her arrangements and did not travel to 
Turangawaewae. Nonetheless she delivered the apology to Queen Te Atairangikaahu at 
Parliament in October 1995.634  
The Preamble to the Deed of Settlement 
 
The significant historical issues that had been negotiated for the preamble prior to the 
signing of the Heads of Agreement from October to December 1994 were under negotiation 
again to the dismay of Waikato-Tainui negotiators in March 1995.Waikato-Tainui 
beneficiaries reported to Waikato-Tainui negotiators that they were very concerned that the 
historical details should be correct and not watered down. Shane Solomon had: 
concerns about the changes made in the recitals as these are matters that have been 
focused on by the old people in our consultations - such as the acknowledgments, the 
reference to not being rebels in the Manukau report, the principle of recognition of the 
'crime' not a 'wrong' etc. These are matters of substance that should not now be re-
negotiated in the DoS [Deed of Settlement]. There appears to be a significant watering 
down and a shift from the intention and purpose. I thought we (Waikato and the 
Crown) were to work co-operatively and not adversarily post HoA [Heads of 
Agreement]!635  
 
Historical debates were revived again in May 1995 as the schedule became extremely tight to 
have a Deed of Settlement completed for the celebration of Te Arikinui’s coronation which 
occurred annually on 22 May. Ann Parsonson began working intensively with Shane 
Solomon and Denese Henare to further develop a preamble for the final Deed of Settlement 
633 Solomon, “Draft apology,” 6 May 1995, RC1, Correspondence May 1995, (SS) Box 37, W-T archives; 
Gerard Brown to ToWPU official 4, 6 May 1995, RC1, Correspondence  May 1995 Vol 40, Box 18, W-T 
archives. 
634 Orange, Illustrated History of the Treaty of Waitangi, 222; McCan, Whatiwhatihoe, 295, 315. 
635 Solomon, “Deed of Settlement,” March or April 1995, RC1, Correspondence Mar - Apr 1995, (SS) Box 35, 
W-T archive, 7.  
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and the legislation. Parsonson’s first draft addressed the issues in far too much detail for the 
Crown and made a number of points that the Crown refused to include in the preamble, such 
as the fact that Te Wherowhero signed the Declaration of Independence but not the Treaty of 
Waitangi. Parsonson canvassed the co-operation that had existed between the Waikato 
communities and Pākehā until 1856.  Specifically Parsonson pointed to Governor Grey’s 
request to Te Wherowhero to protect the nascent settlement of Auckland when it was 
threatened by groups in the Tai Tokerau area in the 1840s, to counter-balance the old 
rationalisations that Waikato had been invaded because it threatened Auckland in the late 
1850s and early 1860s. Parsonson also addressed the atrocities committed by imperial troops 
at Rangiaowahia and Orakau, a point that the Crown still refused to include in the 
preamble.636 Shane Solomon thought Parsonson’s preamble draft captured what had 
"happened" but acknowledged that the "Crown will probably rebuke most of what she has 
written."637  
 In mid-May 1995 Waikato legal advisor Denese Henare complained that the Crown 
draft of the historical preamble appeared to take no account of Dr. Parsonson's draft. The 
Crown's draft did not even take extracts from the preamble to the Heads of Agreement that 
was produced in late 1994. The extract from the Treaty of Waitangi for example was only 
provided in English and therefore contained no reference to rangatiratanga. What was 
important to Henare was the nature and scope of the settlement and the basis of Te 
Wherowhero title, especially the pledges of land to the Kīngitanga. The OTS historian stated 
that the draft preamble was the result of a compromise between Parsonson's draft and that of 
636 Belich, The New Zealand Wars, 160-165, 173; Vincent O’Malley, “Te Rohe Pōtae War & Raupatu: A Report 
Commissioned by the Crown Forest Rental Trust,” 2010, 107-129, 144-178. 
637 Parsonson to Myrtle Te Maru, 1 May 1995, RC1, Correspondence May 1995, (SS) Box 37, W-T archive; 
Parsonson to Solomon, 2 May 1995, RC1, Correspondence Apr - May 1995, (SS) Box 36; Solomon to Te Maru, 
3 May 1995, RC1, Correspondence May 1995, (SS) Box 38, W-T archive, 3. 
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Crown officials.638 Henare wanted the section from the Manukau Report which stated that 
Waikato had not rebelled that was in the preamble to the Heads of Agreement, but the Crown 
initially refused. In internal meetings Waikato negotiators referred repeatedly to the 
importance of stating that Waikato had never rebelled. The Crown was concerned that this 
could be used against them later in Court and recommended alternative wording such as that 
they were "unjustly labelled as rebels". A Waikato advisor commented in a memorandum to 
Mahuta and other advisors: "The 1863 Act allowed the people of Waikato to be so labelled. 
They recognise this was unfair and unjust but the legal fact is that the Act has provided that 
this happened and it did. The Crown’s view was that to insert that Waikato never rebelled 
would mean the Act was wrong and therefore the confiscations were wrong and this is what 
the Crown were trying to avoid being made explicit or inferred."639 The passage from the 
Manukau Report was eventually added to the preamble to the Deed of Settlement, as it had 
been included in the Heads of Agreement. In the end Henare’s desire to have the pledges of 
land to the Kiingiitanga was not in the preamble to the Deed of Settlement, but it would 
appear in some form in the preamble to the settlement legislation.640 While the preamble to 
the Deed of Settlement did not entirely meet their expectations, Solomon and Parsonson both 
believed that the preamble had come a long way since the original Crown draft that 
mentioned next to none of Waikato's historical concerns.641  
 The preamble for the Heads of Agreement and the Deed of Settlement were very 
similar. Both preambles stated that the “Crown had engaged in a war against Maaori in the 
Waikato, causing suffering to the people there,” and that after the war large areas of land 
638 The OTS historian stated that "We don’t expect that either side will need to make any negotiations at this late 
stage." To which Henare wrote on the fax: "Too bad." 
639 Solomon, “Diary Note: Meeting of Advisers,” 5 May 1995, 2; Niwa Nuri to Mahuta, 5 May 1995, RC1, 
Correspondence  May 1995 Vol 40, Box 18, W-T archives. 
640 Henare to Solomon, 10 May 1995; OTS official 5 to Gerard Brown, 12 May 1995; both: RC1, 
Correspondence May 1995, (SS) Box 37, W-T archives;  
641 Parsonson to Henare, 12 May 1995, RC1, Correspondence May 1995, (SS) Box 38, W-T archives; Solomon 
to Mahuta, 25 May 1995, RC1, Correspondence  May 1995 Vol 40, Box 18, W-T archives.  
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were “unjustly” confiscated. Both versions also contained the reference to the Manukau 
Report which stated that “the Tainui people of Waikato never rebelled,” that the war had 
caused a series of negative impacts, and explicitly recognised Waikato-Tainui’s negotiations. 
But they also differed in a few ways. The preamble to the Heads of Agreement only 
contained Article II of the Treaty of Waitangi in Te Reo Māori and English, but the Deed of 
Settlement had the entire Treaty, including its own preamble. Unlike the Heads of 
Agreement, the Deed of Settlement’s preamble made an extended discussion (for a document 
of such overall brevity) of the Sim Commission, especially the limits of its terms of 
reference. Waikato-Tainui negotiators had also sought a reference to the injustice done to 
those Waikato Māori both north and south of the Mangatawhiri, and it was included. The 
reference to the process of lands returned to individuals following the confiscation was 
completely removed from the Deed of Settlement. The documents were nearly identical, with 
slightly more information in one section, the Sim Commission, and complete deletion of 
another section, the process of the return of confiscated lands in the 19th century. The Heads 
of Agreement and Deed of Settlement preambles would then form the basis for the final 
preamble produced for the settlement legislation. 
The Preamble to the Waikato Raupatu Claims Settlement Act 1995 
 
 Following the signing of the Deed of Settlement there was a slight lull in the 
negotiations regarding the historical account. Nonetheless the wording of another historical 
preamble to the legislation remained the subject of negotiation until the introduction of the 
Waikato Raupatu Claims Settlement Act at the end of July 1995. While the Heads of 
Agreement and Deed of Settlement preambles had no headings, the preamble to the 
settlement legislation was much longer than either of the first preambles and contained a 
number of headings: Kingiitanga, Confiscations of Waikato Land, Royal [Sim] Commission, 
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Waitangi Tribunal, Court of Appeal, Negotiations with the Crown, and Settlement of Claims. 
Waikato-Tainui requested the addition of the words “invasion” and “hostilities” to the 
heading that was titled “Confiscations of Waikato Land.” After having fought against the 
inclusion of the word invasion early in the negotiations over the historical account, the Crown 
now agreed to its inclusion in a heading within the preamble in addition to its inclusion in the 
apology. Henare and Parsonson’s previous requests for further information regarding the 
purpose of the King Movement were also provided in this final version of the preamble. 
While information was added regarding the Kīngitanga, the limits of the Sim Commission’s 
terms of reference that were noted in the Deed of Settlement preamble were deleted. Waikato 
sought some greater detail regarding the Sim Commission's conclusions that the confiscations 
had been more than just excessive and that compensation was necessary but the Crown 
hesitated to include details regarding the Sim Commission. The change to the reference to the 
Sim Commission would continue to frustrate Waikato-Tainui negotiators and advisors. 
Crown Law continued to lobby for changes as well. Both the Heads of Agreement and Deed 
of Settlement preamble had referred to the Crown “unjustly” confiscating large areas of land, 
but Crown Law sought to change the reference to the confiscation of “an excessive quantity 
of land.”642 In the end “unjustly” was accepted, but the explanation of the limits of the terms 
of reference of the Sim Commission remained excluded.  
After extended negotiations over the preamble that would accompany the settlement 
legislation, agreement was finally reached between Waikato-Tainui and Crown negotiators. 
The next task was for the Parliamentary Counsel to consult the document and prepare it for 
introduction to Parliament. The compromise preamble had resulted from lengthy negotiations 
and the changes recommended by Counsel did not sit well with Waikato-Tainui negotiators. 
642 Bill Patterson to Solomon, 14 July 1995, RC1, Correspondence June-September 1995 Vol 41, Box 19, W-T 
archives, 2, 7. 
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In the draft provided to Parliamentary Counsel, Recital F had the Crown “wrongfully” 
confiscating approximately 1.2 million acres but Counsel wanted to have it changed again 
from “wrongfully” to “an excessive quantity of land.” In a memorandum to Mahuta, Solomon 
wrote that “the new draft infers that the Crown did not act wrongfully and that the only 
injustice of the confiscations was the amount of lands that were taken, inferring there was a 
basis for raupatu in the first place. This is a complete aberration of the settlement.” 
Additionally the drafter focused excessively on the Sim Commission's conclusions without 
noting the limits of the Commission. Crown officials tried to assure Waikato-Tainui 
negotiators that the drafter was only following a set of Parliamentary guidelines to follow in 
terms of drafting the legislation. Solomon countered that one had to “look at the unique 
nature of the circumstances surrounding this legislation.” It was “not every day that the 
Crown settle[s] with Maaori on a grievance...the impressions and statements made by the 
Crown (including the Minister) are not reflected in the Bill. In fact people received comfort 
from the Minister on issues such as acknowledgment that the Treaty was breached, there was 
a wrong, [that] the Crown wanted to atone without qualification. We ourselves negotiated on 
this basis and articulated in the consultation round to the people that this was case." Waikato 
legal advisor Bill Patterson concurred with Solomon. “The reaction on the Waikato side is 
that these changes are not inadvertent nor merely stylistic but reflect a stubborn reaction on 
the Crown side against the 'rewriting of history' even though the historians on both sides have 
been in substantial agreement.” The complaints from the Waikato-Tainui negotiating team 
were so strong that Graham attended the Cabinet Legislation Committee and ensured the 
description of confiscations as unjust was reinserted into the preamble. Nonetheless Solomon 
believed that the allusion to the necessity of some kind of confiscation still remained.643  
643 Solomon to Mahuta, 18 July 1995 & Patterson to the Waikato Negotiating Team, 19 July 1995, RC1, 
Correspondence  June-September 1995 Vol 41, Box 19, W-T archives, 1 & 2.  
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Parsonson's support for the use of the term “wrongfully” to describe confiscation 
remained throughout. The Crown wanted to use the term “individuals who fought for the 
Kīngitanga” to describe those Waikato who had fought against the Crown, but Parsonson 
claimed that it was inappropriate because it did not reflect the communal nature of sacrifice. 
Parsonson also made an extended comment regarding the view of the Sim Commission 
propounded by the drafter: 
My main hope has always been that the ghost of the Sim Commission would be laid 
in the Preamble - in fact I had thought initially it could have been done much more 
directly by explaining that the Commission was limited in accordance with prevailing 
views at the time, both in its terms of reference and in its findings. To have an 
inadequate and poorly contextualised reference to [the] Sim [Commission] is worse 
than no mention at all - and I agree with Shane [Solomon] that if the ghost is in fact 
being allowed to walk again, we should simply back away. 
 
One senses the disappointment that old historical arguments, long before settled with Crown 
negotiators re-emerged again and again. "I had thought the Crown would welcome the chance 
to explain why Sim had resulted in a settlement (in 1946) that could not be lasting - and 
hence why the Crown is making the present settlement. I thought this would give the Crown a 
chance to respond to possible criticism. Above all, it is important to Waikato that the Crown 
admit that although Sim represented some progress in acknowledgement of wrongs done at 
the time, it did not go nearly far enough.” Solomon was extremely tired having to negotiate 
with officials over the preamble and recommended that Waikato-Tainui present a lengthy 
submission to the Select Committee regarding the preamble.644 
There were a number of submissions made to the Māori Affairs Select Committee 
regarding the Waikato settlement. This analysis will only concentrate on the submissions 
made in relation to the preamble and to the apology because of this chapter’s focus on 
historical debates. Seven submissions were received concerning Recital C of the preamble. It 
644 Parsonson to Henare, 19 July 1995 and Solomon to Patterson & Mahuta, 26 July 1995, RC1, Correspondence 
June to September 1995, (SS) Box 39, W-T archives, 4-6. 
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stated that “[t]hose chiefs who formally pledged their land to Pootatau Te Wherowhero gave 
up ultimate authority over the land to him, along with ultimate responsibility for the well-
being of the people, and through this bound their communities to the Kīngitanga, resisting 
further alienation of land.” The seven submissions argued that the rangatira of individual 
hapū had not given up ultimate authority over their land to Te Wherowhero as was recorded 
in the Recital. They were concerned that Recital C distorted the historical facts and 
perpetuated “the myth of surrender by independent hapū to the Kīngitanga.” Neither the OTS 
Historian nor Waikato's historian, Ann Parsonson, agreed that a change was warranted. Six 
submissions were received in relation to Recital H which asserted that “the Kīngitanga has 
continued to sustain the people since the Raupatu.” The dissenters contended that it was not 
the Kīngitanga which sustained the people but the people that sustained the Kīngitanga. The 
OTS Historian advised that the whole question was a false dichotomy since the Kīngitanga 
could not have existed without the people but that the Kīngitanga had clearly provided a 
moral leadership role for many Māori. Dr John Miller, as he had written in newspaper articles 
previously, submitted that Waikato had rebelled and further that Waikato had threatened 
Auckland. The Crown though differed on these two points and while acknowledging that 
there was “scope for historical interpretation on all the matters in the Preamble” the Recital 
was “factually correct.”645  
Waikato-Tainui also made submissions on its reservations with the portrayal of the 
Sim Commission in the preamble. Waikato-Tainui believed that the inadequacy of the 
Commission's term was not obvious enough in the preamble. The Crown countered in Select 
Committee that the Sim Commissions’ limitations were clearly present throughout the 
645 John Miller submission to the Māori Affairs Select Committee, August 1995, AAKW W5105 7812 22 
Tainui: 1995 Pt.5, Archives NZ. 
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preamble, even if it was not specifically stated.646 Since the Crown refused to revert the 
preamble to its pre-Parliamentary drafting form regarding the limitations of the Sim 
Commission, Waikato-Tainui included an extended section on the changes it desired to the 
preamble in its submission to the Select Committee. Waikato made submissions on the 
limitations of the Sim Commission and provided a more detailed explanation as to why the 
Sim Commission's focus was so limited.  
For instance, the Commission was instructed not to accept any argument that the 
confiscation legislation (the New Zealand Settlements Act and its amendments) was 
beyond the competence of the colonial parliament - an instruction which seems to 
reflect sensitivity to the debate on this point, inside and outside Parliament, in 1863-4. 
The imperial government had taken legal advice when considering the legislation in 
1864, after a handful of leading colonists raised doubts as to parliament's power to 
legislate for the compulsory taking of Maaori land. These men argued against the 
passing of the Settlements Act on the grounds that it violated the protection of Maaori 
lands afforded by the Treaty of Waitangi and that Parliament should not deal with the 
lands of people who were unrepresented there.647  
 
Parsonson noted there was considerable debate between politicians and colonists on the 
government's ability to confiscate land in such a wide-ranging manner. Māori Affairs 
Minister John Luxton made a reference in his speech to Parliament during the Bill’s first 
reading regarding these debates. He discussed the opposition of James Fitzgerald, William 
Swainson and Dr. Daniel Pollen to the original confiscation legislation when it was 
introduced in 1863.648 As Michael Allen has shown, Fitzgerald would turn out to be a strong 
supporter of more wide-scale confiscation by the time he was in office in 1865. It is not clear 
whether Luxton's officials were aware of Fitzgerald's support for the confiscation in 1865 
when he was in office.649 In any case, Luxton’s speech supported the submissions made by 
646 Unknown author, ? August 1995, AAKW W5105 7812 22 Tainui: 1995 Pt.5, Archives NZ.  
647 “Waikato-Tainui Raupatu Claims Settlement Bill: Submissions on Behalf of Waikato-Tainui,” 25 August 
1995, RC1, Correspondence  June-September 1995 Vol 41, Box 19.  
648 New Zealand Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 549, 8326-8328.   
649 Michael Allen, “Illusory Power? Metropole, Colony and Land Confiscation in New Zealand, 1863-1865,” in 
R Boast and R Hill (eds.) Raupatu: The Confiscation of Māori Land (Wellington: VUW Press, 2009). 
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Waikato-Tainui regarding their concerns with the legislation’s preamble. Graham was also in 
agreement with Waikato as his speech to Parliament at the first reading of the legislation 
echoed the very points Waikato negotiators had recently been arguing with the Parliamentary 
Counsel.650 The diverse viewpoints that were present in the many different drafts of the 
preambles to the Heads of Agremeent, the Deed of Settlement, and the legislation represented 
the series of different Waikato-Tainui and Crown interpretations of the history of war and 
confiscation in the Waikato. The preamble and the apology were in no way definitive 
histories of the war, confiscation and its aftermath, but they represented one attempt at some 
reconciliation. These historical debates indicate that the reconciliation process between 
Waikato-Tainui, Ngāi Tahu and the Crown were based on notions of compromise, but 
especially a recognition by the iwi that every detail desired would not be possible.  
W.H. Oliver, the preamble to the Waikato Raupatu Claims Settlement Act 1995 and the 
return of confiscated lands in the nineteenth century 
 
The preamble in the Deed of Settlement signed on 22 May 1995, which was much 
shorter than either the Heads of Agreement preamble or settlement legislation preamble, 
made no reference to the return of lands following confiscation. The preamble in the final 
legislation, much like the Heads of Agreement preamble, made a direct reference to the 
context and process of the return of some confiscated lands but with altered wording:  
[T]he Crown subsequently paid small amounts of monetary compensation and 
returned, by Crown grants, but not under customary title and generally not to those 
who had fought for the Kingiitanga, approximately one-quarter of the land 
confiscated.651 
 
Previously Waikato-Tainui had requested that the people to whom some of the original 
confiscated lands had been returned be referred to as “those who had fought on the side of the 
650 New Zealand Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 549, 8318-8320.   
651 Waikato Raupatu Claims Settlement Act 1995, Recital F.  
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Crown.” By the settlement legislation the Crown and Waikato-Tainui had compromised and 
now referred to lands being returned “generally not to those who had fought for the 
Kiingiitanga” rather than just “those who had fought on the side of the Crown.” The history 
of the return of lands would become a point of academic controversy. 
The preamble produced in the legislation was put under considerable scrutiny by 
historian W.H. Oliver not long after the legislation passed its third reading. The criticisms 
Oliver made of the Crown’s proposals for Treaty settlements earlier in 1995 had been in line 
with many of the criticisms made by wider Māoridom—such as the inadequate fiscal 
envelope and the lack of consultation with Māori—but his critique of the preamble was 
different.652 His criticism of the preamble to the legislation focused on three aspects.  
Firstly, he questioned whether the people actually pledged their authority to the King 
or conferred upon the Kīngitanga merely a veto to prevent further sales? This was a very 
complex and complicated question that he only left two sentences to address.  Was the right 
to veto lands sales not prominent evidence of authority—surely this was a form of mana 
whenua and a prominent aspect of authority in the Māori world? His second point was that 
the preamble stated that the Crown “initiated hostilities.” Oliver felt this implied that the 
Crown burst upon a “peaceful scene” when the situation in Waikato was allegedly 
“disturbed.” While he attempted to qualify his criticism with the recognition that the Crown 
had failed to explore other possibilities and had over-reacted by crossing the Mangatawhiri, 
he seemed to miss the larger point about why the Waikato district was “disturbed.” He states 
that “Kīngitanga Māori were not without a share in the responsibility for that.” Historian Julie 
Bellingham supported Oliver’s statement that “Māori were not without their responsibility for 
[the war].” She commented that it was unjust that the Crown “has been put on trial and only 
652 W.H. Oliver, “Pandora’s envelope: it’s all about power,” New Zealand Books, March 1995, 18-20.  
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its actions have been the subject of inquiry.”653 Both Oliver and Bellingham neglect to note 
that the “disturbed” state of the Waikato may have occurred because of the Crown’s forced 
disturbance in the Taranaki, and its aggression towards the King Movement.654  
Oliver’s final criticism, the only critique upon which he expanded at length, focused 
on the statement that land had been “returned…generally not [Oliver’s italics] to those who 
had fought for the Kingiitanga” which he believed was a “curious, even an evasive, 
phrase.”655 He believed that without thorough research on the issue there should not have 
been any statement made at all. Bellingham again supported Oliver’s views and highlighted 
the Crown’s failure to reference the Appendix to the Journal of the House of Representatives 
official reports that suggested a considerable amount of land had been returned to individuals 
designated as “returned rebels.”656 Originally Waikato-Tainui argued that the returned lands 
had been transferred to “those Waikato Māori who fought on the side of the Crown.”  The 
reality was that some land had been returned to Māori individuals designated by the New 
Zealand Parliament as “returned rebels.” But there are two limits to that evidence. The first is 
the unilateral Crown control of the designation of “returned rebel.” It is unclear how 
Parliament arrived at those designations. Secondly, and more importantly, these lands were 
likely to be the least productive and profitable lands in the region.657 
More important than the criticisms of the sources which Oliver offers to support his 
position, was that the use of the phrase “generally not” was a compromise between the 
parties. Waikato-Tainui originally wanted to refer to those who were returned lands following 
confiscation as having fought entirely for the British. The Crown felt that some lands were 
653 Bellingham, “The Office of Treaty Settlements and Treaty History,” 71. 
654 Belich, The New Zealand Wars, 73-98; Keenan, Wars Without End, 71-204. 
655 W.H. Oliver, “Getting facts on your side,” New Zealand Books, December 1995, 15. 
656 Bellingham, “The Office of Treaty Settlements and Treaty History,” 73-74. 
657 Craig Innes and James Mitchell, “Alienation of Māori granted lands within Te Rohe Pōtae Parish extension, 
1863-2011,” Report Commissioned by the Waitangi Tribunal (Wai 898, #A30), 2013; Appendix to the Journals 
of the House of Representatives, “Further Papers Relative to Confiscated Lands,” 1873 Session I, C-04B.  
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returned to those who had opposed the Crown, as Oliver had in fact later advocated, and the 
use of “generally not” was the middle point between the parties. OTS historians had wanted 
to reply to Oliver in NZ Books, but were not allowed by their superiors who wanted the issue 
to pass without further comment.658 The OTS historian that worked on the preamble and 
apology did comment later to Julie Bellingham that he considered Oliver’s criticism unfair, 
and that Oliver “showed no real appreciation of the type of document” that the settlement had 
produced.659 This was another example of the many compromises that had to be reached to 
produce the preamble.660 The intriguing question is why publish an article for such a small 
and specific column, what motivated Oliver to do this? In many ways it prefigures his 
“retrospective utopias” thesis: in his critique of the preamble to the Waikato-Tainui 
legislation he is attempting to uncover a form of history that he sees as corrupt because it 
serves a uniquely political end that distorts what actually happened.661  
Historians working for both claimants and the Crown were inevitably politicised by 
their craft—they had a certain goal in mind with the evidence they were presenting and the 
arguments they were making. But this tends to ignore the fact that even academic historians 
who are not subject to specific briefs which state that only breaches of the Treaty need to be 
explored will have their own socio-economic and political imperatives. As EH Carr has 
noted, history “is a continuous process of interaction between the historian and the facts, an 
unending dialogue between the present and the past.”662 Richard Evans similarly commented 
658 Interview with ToWPU official 3, 11 October 2011.  
659 Bellingham, “The Office of Treaty Settlements and Treaty History,” 73. 
660 Richard Hill, “Historical ‘Facts’ and the Waikato Raupatu Claims Settlement Act 1995,” Stout Centre Treaty 
Research Series, http://www.victoria.ac.nz/stout-centre/research-units/towru/publications/Historical-Facts-and-
the-Waikato-Raupatu.pdf, accessed 2 March 2015.  
661 W.H. Oliver, “The future behind us: the Waitangi Tribunal’s Retrospective Utopia,” in Andrew Sharp and 
Paul McHugh (eds.) Histories, Power and Loss (Wellington: Bridget Williams Books, 2001); W.H. Oliver, 
Looking for the Phoenix: A Memoir (Wellington: Bridget Williams Books, 2002).  
662 EH Carr and Richard Evans, What is History? (London: Palgrave, 2001), 30.  
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that “historians are always led by their present-day concerns.”663 Miranda Johnson has 
explored the unease which Oliver (and Giselle Byrnes) have had with “the possibility of a 
deep connection between the past and the present,” concluding that their “concern that the 
past is being judged by the standards of the present reveals an anxiety that the past will not be 
distinguished from the present.” Acknowledging the existence of the deep connection 
between the past and the present is essential to understanding Treaty settlement processes and 
seems to be missing from the critiques of Oliver and others such as Giselle Byrnes.664 History 
as an academic endeavour has always been heavily influenced by political ideologies and 
figures and this has continued in many ways during the involvement of historians in New 
Zealand’s Treaty settlement process.  
Part II: Debates over Ngāi Tahu’s preamble and apology 
 
The historical debates regarding Ngāi Tahu’s historical account and apology began 
soon after their interim settlement was signed in June 1996. The OTS historian assigned to 
the Ngāi Tahu claim met with Ngāi Tahu’s historian, Te Maire Tau, in the middle of that 
month. OTS' terms of reference included a strong reliance on the Tribunal report for findings 
of breaches of Treaty principles. The OTS historian reported to other Crown officials that 
Tau was largely content with the terms of reference. Tau also wanted a statement added 
which acknowledged that the “two parties would be approaching the statements from 
different cultural contexts and these contexts should be reflected in the statements.” This kind 
of thinking reflected Tau’s later work on the same issue. In “Matauranga Māori as an 
Epistemology” Tau argued that traditional Māori knowledge was a separate form of knowing 
663 Richard J. Evans, In Defence of History (London: Palgrave, 1997), 230.  
664 Miranda Johnson, “Making History Public: Indigenous Claims to Settler States,” Public Culture, 20:1, 97-
117, 117. Johnson also critiqued Giselle Byrnes who extended Oliver’s arguments in The Waitangi Tribunal and 
New Zealand History (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 2004).  
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that had to be preserved from the methods of Western epistemology.665 In that vein Tau 
wanted the preamble to have a specific structure that would begin with a karakia followed by 
a poroporoaki, mihi, a kaupapa and to finish with a specially commissioned waiata for the 
occasion. The apology was to be delivered orally as well as in written form. While many 
Ngāi Tahu members wanted the ceremony on a marae, Tau believed the occasion was of 
national significance and also wanted it in a public place so possibly there would be two 
ceremonies.666  
Tau also advocated for royal involvement in the ceremony since Waikato-Tainui had 
received royal assent and Waikato-Tainui had a history of antagonism to the Crown. Tau 
pointed out that Ngāi Tahu had always been very loyalist, raising funds for the campaigns in 
Waikato and Taranaki and sending many soldiers to both world wars.667 There was no 
opposition from the Crown for this recognition. The final version of the apology contained a 
section specifically addressing Ngāi Tahu’s loyalty and military sacrifice for the nation:  
The Crown recognises that Ngāi Tahu has been consistently loyal to the Crown, and 
that the tribe has honoured its obligations and responsibilities under the Treaty of 
Waitangi and duties as citizens of the nation, especially, but not exclusively, in their 
active service in all major conflicts up to the present time to which New Zealand has 
sent troops. The Crown pays tribute to Ngāi Tahu’s loyalty and to the contribution 
made by the tribe to the nation.668 
 
 As had occurred during the intense negotiating period in 1992 and 1993 regarding the 
quantification of loss, the issue of tenths remained as a point of difference between Crown 
and Ngāi Tahu representatives. Ngāi Tahu historians maintained that the principle of tenths 
mentioned in the 1991 Ngāi Tahu Tribunal Report applied to all of the purchases of land by 
the Crown and thus it was within that grievance that the large part of the value of Ngāi 
665 Te Maire Tau, “Matauranga Māori as an Epistemology,” in A. Sharp and P. McHugh (eds.), Histories, Power 
and Loss: Uses of the Past – A New Zealand Commentary (Wellington: Bridget Williams Books, 2001), 61-73.  
666 OTS official 5 to CLO contractor, 19 June 1996, Chapman Tripp Materials, OTS archive. 
667 OTS official 5 to CLO official 5 & CLO official 6, 30 July 1996, NE-12-027-00-04 Pt. 2, OTS archive; OTS 
official 5 to CLO contractor, 19 June 1996, Chapman Tripp Materials, OTS archive, 1. 
668 Ngāi Tahu  Deed of Settlement, 22 November 1997, 3.  
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Tahu’s loss resides. The Crown Law historian questioned the validity of the Ngāi Tahu claim 
to tenths in the Otakou purchase, and opposed the notion of tenths for all of the purchases. 
The Tribunal found that there was no evidence to support the contention by Ngāi Tahu that 
the Crown had promised to retain for Ngāi Tahu a tenth of the land that had been sold at 
Otakou. Nonetheless the Tribunal did state that had the Crown reserved a tenth of the land 
purchased at Otakou, and across all of the purchases of land from Ngāi Tahu, it would have 
been “greatly to the advantage of Ngāi Tahu.”669 The Crown Law historian noted that even 
those groups such as the Port Nicholson Trust that had tenths awarded in the mid-nineteenth 
century were not provided with a tenth of the lands in private ownership, but rather were used 
for educational or whatever civilising purposes the Government of the day desired. He 
claimed that not only would the land have been used in whatever way the Government of the 
day had decided, but that “it may have been that, with the increasing genetic migration of 
Ngāi Tahu in to the European population, the balance might have swung more towards public 
rather than purely native purposes.”670 A recognition that the notion of “tenths” had not 
applied for each and every land purchase, especially considering the size of the Ngāi Tahu 
rohe compared to other groups around the country, is uncontroversial. Nonetheless the 
rationalisation of a critique of tenths by making excuses for the manner in which colonial 
governments formulated land trusts for Māori is questionable. Making guesses at the 
potential use of such lands because of alleged “genetic migrations” is similarly unhelpful to 
the overall project of historical reconciliation, even though this memorandum was not put 
directly to Ngāi Tahu.  
Interestingly the detail upon which the Crown Law historian wanted to expand 
regarding how the issue of tenths might have played in each individual area was the opposite 
669 Waitangi Tribunal, The Ngāi Tahu Report, (Wellington: Waitangi Tribunal, 1991), 828-829. 
670 CLO official 6, “Extract from my memo on the 15 July version of the recitals,” 24 July 1996, NE-12-027-00-
04 Pt. 2, OTS archive, 1. 
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of what the Crown generally sought regarding the negotiation over the preamble for the 
Waikato settlement. The Crown’s focus in Waikato-Tainui’s preamble was on a very general 
interpretation of the history with as little detail as possible. In this case it was Ngāi Tahu that 
wanted to provide a more general view of the issue of tenths while Crown historians wanted 
to restrict any mention of tenths strictly to the Otakou purchase. Crown Law sought to 
explain that the Crown’s obligations to Ngāi Tahu could have been achieved by the use of 
tenths but that they could also have been achieved in another manner. Ngāi Tahu historians 
rejected this approach. Their view on the issue of tenths was supported by other historians 
such as Ranginui Walker and Ngāi Tahu’s Pākehā historians, especially Ann Parsonson and 
Harry Evison.671 The CLO historian was firm in his view of the alleged “reality of the 
history” and pointed to the Tribunal’s findings on the issue. In his advice to his superiors he 
painted a rather stark picture of the way in which history was being used to the benefit of 
Ngāi Tahu. In correspondence with Tau regarding tenths the OTS historian also relied on the 
Tribunal’s findings.672 The issue of tenths would remain the most contentious historical issue, 
and in the end it was included solely for the description of the purchase of the Otakou block 
with the qualification that Crown may also have achieved its obligations in another manner:  
The Tribunal considered that the Crown’s obligation [to make further provision for 
Ngāi Tahu in the purchase of the Otakou block] might have been satisfied by the 
creation of ‘Tenths’, or by other adequate provision.673  
 
 The Tribunal report was also referred to in relation to disagreements regarding the 
inclusion of other historical details. The Crown had purchased lands from Ngāi Tahu around 
Banks Peninsula in 1849 through Land Purchasing Commissioner Walter Mantell. The 
Tribunal found that Mantell had been unnecessarily high-handed in negotiations with Ngāi 
671 Walker, Ka Whawhai Tonu Matou, 105-110; Harry Evison, The Long Dispute: Māori Land Rights and 
European Colonisation in Southern New Zealand,  139-157; Ann Parsonson, “Evidence of Dr Ann R Parsonson 
on the Otakou tenths,” Report for Ngāi Tahu  claimants in the Ngāi Tahu  Waitangi Tribunal inquiry, C1, 1987. 
672 OTS official 5 to Te Maire Tau & Nick Davidson, 24 July 1996, NE-12-027-00-04 Pt. 2, OTS archive. 
673 Ngāi Tahu  Deed of Settlement, 22 November 1997, 14. 
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Tahu for the Port Levy Block section of Banks Peninsula, and had unfairly denied them 
reserves at Okains Bay and Pigeon Bay: “It is plain that Ngāi Tahu did not wish to sell land at 
Okains Bay and at Pigeon Bay. But they were overborne by Mantell, in clear breach of article 
2 which required the consent of Ngāi Tahu to the sale of their land.”674 Ngāi Tahu had 
claimed that they had also requested reserves in another area within the Port Levy block, the 
Kaituna Valley, but the Tribunal did not comment on the validity of the Kaituna Valley 
claims. Tau wished to include that Mantell had denied reserves requested by Ngāi Tahu at 
Okains Bay, Pigeon Bay and Kaituna Valley in the historical account.675  
The OTS historian expressed his concern with the Tribunal’s lack of commentary on 
Kaituna Valley and was hesitant to include the Kaituna Valley in the historical account. 
Nonetheless the OTS historian recognised that the Tribunal may have been mistaken in 
omitting the request to reserve Kaituna Valley from the purchase from its finding. He stated 
to Tau that OTS was “quite prepared to accept that the Tribunal merely overlooked Kaituna 
Valley, provided that there is good contemporary evidence that, as with the other two sites, 
Ngāi Tahu requested this reserve and were unjustifiably turned down. You may be able to 
supply us with such a reference. In the meantime, we will try to pin the matter down.”676 
Ngāi Tahu maintained that Kaituna Valley had merely been overlooked by the Tribunal and 
that Ngāi Tahu requests for its exclusion had occurred. The only reference that Ngāi Tahu 
provided was the work of historian Harry Evison, who was affiliated with Ngāi Tahu. His 
primary source analysis of the Port Levy Purchase revealed that the Kaituna Valley was a 
culturally and economically significant fertile area of land. During the negotiations regarding 
the purchase of Port Levy, some members of Ngāi Tahu specifically asked for its 
674 Waitangi Tribunal, The Ngāi Tahu Report, 561.  
675 Te Maire Tau to OTS official 5, 29 July 1996, NE-12-027-00-04 Pt. 2, OTS archive. 




                                                          
exclusion.677 The OTS historian recommended to his superiors that the historical account 
include the reference to Kaituna Valley. He argued for its inclusion as a result of Evison’s 
research and the historical context of the Port Levy purchase.678 Due to the historical 
evidence and the wider context of Crown intransigence in the purchase of the specific block 
in which Kaituna Valley was meant to be reserved, the reference to Kaituna Valley was 
included: “Significant to the Tribunal’s findings on the Port Levy purchase was the Crown’s 
refusal to make reserves, as requested by Ngāi Tahu, at Okains Bay, Kaituna Valley and 
Pigeon Bay.”679   
The Crown’s concerns with the inclusion of certain details by Tau in the historical 
account also applied to Tau’s draft of the apology. Tau wanted the following phrase 
incorporated into the apology: “The Crown recognises that it has failed in every material 
aspect to meet the obligations to Ngāi Tahu, its Treaty partner which arose from the Deeds of 
Purchase whereby the Crown acquired Ngāi Tahu land in the South Island, and to act towards 
Ngāi Tahu with the utmost good faith in a manner consistent with the honor of the Crown. 
Indeed the Crown admits that its failure to act in good faith reduced several generations of 
Ngāi Tahu to a state of landlessness, poverty and failed to protect their rangatiratanga.”680 
Tau's draft of the apology was too uncompromising for the CLO. While the Tribunal Report 
provided a thorough reference for both groups of historians there were still issues that were 
left open to debate. Tau stressed that the Crown had caused Ngāi Tahu complete landlessness 
while Crown Law emphasised that while the reserves were small, they still had some land 
reserved. A related point was Tau’s contention in his draft of the apology that the “Crown 
677 Evison, The Long Dispute, 218-219.  
678 OTS official 5, “Ngāi Tahu  History,” 29 August 1996; CLO official 5 to OTS official 5, 29 August 1996; 
OTS official 5 to CLO official 5, 5 September 1996; OTS official 5 to Te Maire Tau, 5 September 1996, all:  
NE-12-027-00-04 Pt. 2, OTS archive. 
679 Ngāi Tahu  Deed of Settlement, 22 November 1997, 15. 
680 Te Maire Tau to OTS official 5, 29 July 1996, NE-12-027-00-04 Pt. 2, OTS archive. (my italics) 
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had failed in every material aspect to meet the obligations of Ngāi Tahu.” Both the OTS and 
CLO historian agreed that “every material aspect” was inaccurate. Although there was 
resounding failure on the Crown’s part it was not quite in “every material aspect.” The OTS 
historian also alluded to the difficulties that the term “every material aspect” could present for 
Parliamentary Counsel when the settlement legislation was being drafted. This comment 
could have been a reference to extended negotiations that occurred with Parliamentary 
Counsel during Waikato-Tainui’s negotiations.681 Much as the term “decimation” had been 
the subject of attention for Waikato-Tainui and Crown historians to describe the effect of 
Crown policies on Waikato-Tainui people, Ngāi Tahu wanted the Apology to describe the 
Crown as having had acted “unconscionably” in relation to the purchase of lands and 
apportioning of reserves for Ngāi Tahu. The OTS and CLO historians both agreed that the 
term “unconscionably” was too strong as it had not been specifically noted in the Tribunal 
Report.682 
The OTS historian replied to Tau with CLO’s concerns regarding the use of the term 
“landlessness” and the notion that the Crown had failed to meet its obligations to Ngāi Tahu 
in “every material aspect.”683 Tau’s subsequent draft retained the terminology in both 
sections of the apology.684 Although the reference to landlessness and a failure by the Crown 
to meet its obligations in “every material aspect” would not remain, Tau was able to retain 
the use of the term “unconscionably” to describe the Crown’s conduct:  
The Crown acknowledges that it acted unconscionably and in repeated breach of the 
principles of the Treaty of Waitangi in its dealings with Ngāi Tahu in the purchases of 
Ngāi Tahu land. The Crown further acknowledges that in relation to the deeds of 
681 Te Maire Tau to OTS official 5, 29 July 1996, NE-12-027-00-04 Pt. 2, OTS archive, 2; CLO official 5 & 
CLO official 6 to OTS official 5, 30 July 1996, NE-12-027-00-04 Pt. 2, OTS archive. 
682 OTS official 5 to CLO official 5 & CLO official 6, 23 July 1996, NE-12-027-00-04 Pt. 2, OTS archive; OTS 
official 5 to Te Maire Tau & Nick Davidson, 24 July 1996, NE-12-027-00-04 Pt. 2, OTS archive; OTS official 5 
to OTS official 2, 28 August 1996, NE-12-027-00-04 Pt. 2, OTS archive. 
683 OTS official 5 to Te Maire Tau, 2 August 1996, NE-12-027-00-04 Pt. 2, OTS archive. 
684 Te Maire Tau to OTS official 5, 12 August 1996, NE-12-027-00-04 Pt. 2, OTS archive. 
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purchase it has failed in most material respects to honour its obligations to Ngāi Tahu 
as its Treaty partner, while it also failed to set aside adequate lands for Ngāi Tahu’s 
use, and to provide adequate economic and social resources for Ngāi Tahu.685  
 
The most controversial position put forward by Crown Law was that the Crown had 
been responsible for keeping Ngāi Tahu in poverty, but that this poverty was relative to their 
previous state.686 This differed significantly from Ngāi Tahu viewpoints on the matter. The 
Crown Law historian’s view of the “primitive” state of Ngāi Tahu before European contact 
was not an isolated contemporary interpretation of indigenous peoples. In Canada, British 
Columbian Chief Justice Alan McEachern made similar comments in the 1991 case of 
Delgamuukw v. the Queen in which he described the lives of British Columbian First Nations 
before the arrival of Europeans, specifically the Gitksan and Wet’suwet’en, as “nasty, brutish 
and short.”687 New Zealand historian Paul Moon has also described the lives of most Māori in 
the decade preceding the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi, the 1830s, as “nasty, brutish and 
short.”688 The criticism of Crown Law (and indeed McEachern and Moon) is not to endorse 
the Eurocentric ideal of the “noble savage”, but to call into question Crown Law’s very 
colonial rationales. The CLO historian’s view did not gain traction with OTS. The reference 
to the Crown failing to act in good faith and subsequently reducing Ngāi Tahu to poverty 
would remain and was expanded in the final version of the Apology:  
The Crown recognises that it has failed to act towards Ngāi Tahu reasonably and with 
the utmost good faith in a manner consistent with the honour of the Crown. That 
failure is referred to in the Ngāi Tahu saying ‘Te Hapa o Niu Tireni!’ (‘The 
unfulfilled promise of New Zealand’) The Crown further recognises that its failure 
always to act in good faith deprived Ngāi Tahu of the opportunity to develop and kept 
the tribe for several generations in a state of poverty, a state referred to in the proverb 
‘Te mate o te iwi’ (‘The malaise of the tribe’).689  
 
685 Ngāi Tahu  Deed of Settlement, 22 November 1997, 3. (my italics) 
686 CLO official 5 & CLO official 6 to OTS official 5, 30 July 1996, NE-12-027-00-04 Pt. 2, OTS archive. 
687 The Honourable Chief Justice Allan McEachern, Delgamuukw et al. v The Queen, “Reasons for Judgement.” 
Smithers Registry No. 0843. 8 March 1991, 13.  
688 Paul Moon, Fatal Frontiers: a new history of New Zealand in the decade before the Treaty (Auckland: 
Penguin, 2006), 220. 
689 Ngāi Tahu  Deed of Settlement, 22 November 1997, 3. 
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 The inclusion of a whakatauki (Māori proverb) within the apology was another 
important aspect of the apology. The former ToWPU Director had specifically included in the 
Waikato-Tainui apology wording that reflected the fact that Waikato-Tainui kuia had referred 
to having felt like “orphans” when their lands were confiscated by the Crown.690 Tau 
included in the Ngāi Tahu preamble a whakatauki to recognise all of those who had struggled 
for the resolution of Ngāi Tahu’s claims since the middle of the nineteenth century:  
The Crown makes this apology  in recognition of the protracted labours of the Ngāi 
Tahu ancestors in pursuit of their claims for redress and compensation against the 
Crown over nearly 150 years, the length and persistence of which are alluded to in the 
Ngāi Tahu proverb ‘He mahi kai takata, he mahi kai hoaka.’691 The Crown 
acknowledges their work and makes this apology to them and to their descendants.692 
 
 As the negotiations over the recitals continued this recognition of the work of those 
that had come before the current generation became a consistent concern for Ngāi Tahu’s 
historians. By early August 1996 both groups of historians were nearly in complete 
agreement on all the aspects of the apology, the preamble, karakia and waiata. Then on 5 
August Tau asked for another addition to the apology.693 He recommended that a part of 
Matiaha Tiramorehu’s petition to Queen Victoria in 1857 be included to represent the visions 
that had been conceived by Ngāi Tahu once the truly oppressive onslaught of British 
colonisation and settlement occurred. “This was the command thy love laid upon these 
Governors…that the law be made one, that the commandments be made one, that the white 
skin be made just equal with the dark skin, and to lay down the love of thy graciousness to 
the Māori that they dwell happily…and remember the power of thy name.” The OTS 
Historian conceded to its proposed addition.694 The preamble and apology remained largely 
690 Frame, “Raupatu Settlement – Legal Finality and Political Reality,” 258. 
691 “It is work that consumes people, as greenstone consumes sandstone.” 
692 Te Maire Tau to OTS official 5, 26 August 1996, NE-12-027-00-04 Pt. 2, OTS archive 
693 Te Maire Tau stated that Gabrielle Huria had given him the idea: Interview with Te Maire Tau, 5 May 2011.  
694 OTS official 5 to Tau, 8 August 1996, NE-12-027-00-04 Pt. 2, OTS archive, 3. 
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the same and there was little further contention regarding historical debates within Ngāi 




 The debates that took place during both Waikato-Tainui and Ngāi Tahu’s negotiations 
revealed the very different historical interpretations of both the Crown and respective iwi 
regarding the history of Waikato-Tainui and Ngāi Tahu’s claims. While OTS often led the 
negotiations, they were supported by the Crown Law Office which consistently attempted to 
limit the Crown’s legal liabilities. Waikato-Tainui and Ngāi Tahu on the other hand 
continually pressed the Crown to use more emotive terminology, and attempted to extend the 
boundaries of the historical interpretation of events. The negotiation of Waikato-Tainui’s 
apology and preamble was more difficult since negotiators lacked the canon of a Tribunal 
report for referral and they were the first to construct a preamble to a modern Treaty 
settlement. Their negotiations regarding the preamble and apology also extended over a ten 
month period from October 1994 to August 1995, from the period before the signing of the 
Heads of Agreement, through to the Deed of Settlement and finally the settlement legislation. 
The negotiations regarding Ngāi Tahu’s preamble and apology were negotiated relatively 
quickly within a three month period as the parties were able to use the Ngai Tahu Tribunal 
report to resolve any disagreements. Ngāi Tahu was unable to have the specific terminology 
originally sought in some cases, but obtained many concessions. Waikato-Tainui for its part 
failed to have specific mention of battles such as Rangiaowhia and Orakau placed into any of 
the preambles or apology, and the reference to the Sim Commission was inadequate from the 
point of view of Waikato-Tainui for the preamble to the Heads of Agreement and the 
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settlement legislation. But the statement that Waikato-Tainui never rebelled was included in 
every preamble, and there was explicit recognition of the pain and suffering that war and 
confiscation had wrought. The preambles and apologies of Waikato-Tainui and Ngāi Tahu’s 
settlements represented debates over not only the history of their respective claims, but also 






Waikato-Tainui and Ngāi Tahu’s Treaty settlement negotiations with the Crown 
symbolised in many ways the inherent tension that was and continues to be at the centre of 
the Treaty of Waitangi relationship between Māori and the Crown—the balance between the 
Māori right to tino rangatiratanga or self-determination and the Crown’s right to governor its 
kawanatanga. For Ngāi Tahu and Waikato-Tainui, the pursuit of rangatiratanga dominated 
nearly all of their negotiating positions. On the other hand, the Crown stressed throughout 
both negotiations that settlements would be limited by the practicalities of the Crown’s 
governance. Above all, there were legal, political and economic limitations that governed the 
parameters of the negotiations as a whole. These limitations fed into the final product of the 
negotiations in terms of the political recognition that was achieved by both Ngāi Tahu and 
Waikato-Tainui, the size of the financial compensation provided, the amount of land and 
form in which it was returned, and the historical accounts and apologies that accompanied 
both settlements.  
Waikato-Tainui and Ngāi Tahu took very different paths to negotiation, although both 
iwi submitted their claims to the Waitangi Tribunal at approximately the same time in 1986 
and 1987. Waikato-Tainui chose to proceed directly to negotiations with the Crown without a 
Tribunal hearing but attempted to turn to the Tribunal whenever their negotiations stalled. 
Waikato-Tainui’s negotiations began in the middle of 1989 with the Fourth Labour 
government. Waikato-Tainui was engaged in negotiations with the Labour government for 
just over a year until an offer was made to the iwi in September 1990, but Waikato-Tainui 
rejected that offer as it was limited and would have done little to enhance Waikato-Tainui’s 
rangatiratanga. Negotiations resumed with the Fourth National government in 1991 and 
proceeded slowly as some Crown lands, Hopuhopu and Te Rapa, were transferred to 
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Waikato-Tainui between 1991 and 1993 while the Crown developed its Treaty settlement 
policy. A Heads of Agreement was signed in December 1994, and a final Deed of Settlement 
in May 1995. Before Ngāi Tahu’s negotiations commenced with the Fourth National 
government in September 1991, Ngāi Tahu had their claims heard by the Waitangi Tribunal 
from 1987 to 1989. Ngāi Tahu’s negotiations with National were split in two distinct sections 
from 1991 to 1994 and from 1996 to 1997, with a breakdown in the negotiations from 
December 1994 to April 1996. Ngāi Tahu signed a Heads of Agreement with the Crown in 
October 1996 and a final Deed of Settlement in November 1997.  
The Crown, first under the Fourth Labour government and for the large part under the 
Fourth National government, gradually developed its Treaty settlement policy during the late 
1980s and the first half of the 1990s. While the pace of negotiations was relatively quick in 
comparison to Treaty settlement negotiations in the United States, Canada, or Australia, 
Waikato-Tainui negotiators were pressured by their constituency to complete a settlement as 
quickly as possible. The years of delay that resulted from the policy development process 
pressed hard on the Waikato-Tainui negotiating team. While the Minister in Charge of Treaty 
of Waitangi Negotiations, Doug Graham, and the Prime Minister, Jim Bolger, were 
supportive of settlements there was Cabinet level opposition, in addition to the policy 
development process that contributed to the delays. These issues were evidence of the 
political nature of the settlement process and the Crown’s overriding control of the 
negotiations. Throughout their negotiations Waikato-Tainui remained focused on the return 
of land as their key negotiating principle. Following the initial negotiations with the Labour 
government from 1989-1990, the National government offered Waikato-Tainui the return of 
the Hopuhopu Army Base in 1991. Waikato-Tainui’s early negotiations with the National 
government were dominated by the return of Hopuhopu in 1991 and Te Rapa in 1993 while 
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the wider parameters of a settlement were slowly negotiated from 1991-1994. The return of 
Hopuhopu (and Te Rapa) was further complicated by opposition from hapū within Waikato-
Tainui who wished to have the assets and lands returned directly to the local hapū, Ngāti 
Whawhakia and Ngāti Wairere.  
Ngāi Tahu’s earliest negotiations with the National government in late 1991 and early 
1992 were marked by the development of Ngāi Tahu’s legal personality. The Ngāi Tahu 
Māori Trust Board, which had been established in 1944 to manage and distribute the 
compensation from their 1940s settlement, was viewed by Ngāi Tahu as impinging on their 
rangatiratanga as the Trust Board was ultimately accountable to the Minister of Māori Affairs 
rather than the Ngāi Tahu people. Ngāi Tahu’s most pressing concern was the establishment 
of an organisation that would serve Ngāi Tahu tribal members without any interference from 
the Crown. Negotiations with the Crown regarding the development of Ngāi Tahu’s legal 
personality took place from late 1991 to mid-1993. While Ngāi Tahu viewed the new entity 
that would govern Ngāi Tahu members as an embodiment of Ngāi Tahu’s reaffirmed 
rangatiratanga, there was opposition by the Crown to the use of rangatiratanga terminology. 
Eventually an agreement was reached which minimised some of the Crown’s concerns that 
the word “rangatiratanga” would be entrenched in legislation. In 1993 legislation was 
introduced to Parliament to establish a new organisation to represent and govern Ngāi 
Tahu—the Te Rūnanga o Ngāi Tahu Bill.  
By mid-1993 Ngāi Tahu had the Crown’s support to develop Te Rūnanga o Ngāi 
Tahu, but there remained opposition from some hapū and constituent iwi within Ngāi Tahu 
such as Ngāti Mamoe, Waitaha and Tuhuru to the establishment of an iwi-based organisation. 
Auckland Central MP Sandra Lee and Southern Māori MP Whetu Tirikatene-Sullivan, on 
behalf of Ngāti Mamoe, Waitaha and Tuhuru, delayed the establishment of Ngāi Tahu’s legal 
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personality until 1996. These hapū claimed that Te Rūnanga o Ngāi Tahu would undermine 
the sovereignty of their hapū and they sought legal personality legislation of their own. 
Although both Waikato and Ngāi Tahu negotiators’ positions were buttressed by the Crown’s 
focus on iwi-level negotiators, the Crown’s prevailing domination of the wider process 
created a tenuous political environment within each iwi in terms of hapū dissent. The 
emphasis on iwi-level negotiators, and later Large Natural Groupings, served to disempower 
hapū.695 The Crown’s control of the negotiations extended from the political sphere to the 
determination of financial compensation.  
The financial aspects of both Waikato-Tainui and Ngāi Tahu’s settlements were 
heavily influenced by the Crown’s own limitations in terms of the need to negotiate 
settlements that would be in the best interests of all New Zealanders. If either Ngāi Tahu or 
Waikato-Tainui were fully compensated for their losses, then the nation would be 
bankrupted. The Crown made it clear that settlements would be political agreements that 
would be based on no more than, as Graham had put it, “an inside feeling that it is fair.” 696 In 
such an environment a justification of the amount of compensation provided was going to be 
extremely difficult. The methodology for calculating the respective losses of Waikato-Tainui 
and Ngāi Tahu were governed by their negotiating principles. Waikato-Tainui’s 
compensation was focused on the return of land, while Ngāi Tahu was focused on 
compensation that was tied to the substantial reserves that Ngāi Tahu claimed should have 
been awarded during the large land purchases of the 1840s to 1860s.  
Early in their negotiations with the National government in 1992, Ngāi Tahu were 
pressed by the Crown to formulate a settlement proposal. Based on the key negotiating 
principle that Ngāi Tahu should have been reserved one tenth of the land that had been sold, 
695 Cowie, “The Treaty Settlement Process,” 51.  
696  “Meeting of Ngāi Tahu  and Crown negotiators,” 11 February 1992, C-27-2-03 Vol.1, OTS archive, 2. 
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in early February 1992 Ngāi Tahu negotiators proposed a settlement that reflected the current 
land value of one tenth of the area of land sold between 1844 and 1864, $1.3 billion or one 
tenth of $13 billion. The Crown responded with a settlement valued at $100 million that was 
unconnected to any formulation or methodology. Following the Crown’s rejection of Ngāi 
Tahu’s settlement proposal, the negotiations regarding financial compensation stalled and 
were overtaken by the fisheries settlement and the establishment of the fiscal cap for all 
settlements in September 1992. From September 1992 to December 1994 the Crown 
gradually developed its new proposals for Treaty settlements that entrenched the fisheries 
settlement’s $170 million benchmark and eventually set the total cap of $1 billion for all 
settlements. Both Ngāi Tahu and Waikato-Tainui had to adjust their financial expectations so 
that their respective settlements would fit within the Crown’s newly set fiscal parameters—
what was dubbed at the time as the “fiscal envelope.” While both Waikato-Tainui and Ngāi 
Tahu were affected by the fiscal envelope proposal—both settlements were nominally worth 
$170 million—Waikato-Tainui’s settlement was signed right when the Crown’s proposals for 
Treaty settlements were released. Waikato-Tainui struggled to publically separate their 
settlement from the Crown’s fiscal envelope policy and its rangatiratanga was challenged by 
other iwi who felt that Waikato-Tainui had accepted the Crown’s offer too easily.  
Although the Crown established the fiscal parameters of settlement, Waikato-Tainui 
and Ngāi Tahu were both able to negotiate settlement instruments that allowed each iwi to 
expand beyond the limits of the fiscal envelope and the $170 million benchmark. The 
provision of interest on the unpaid sum of compensation, the Right of First Refusal and 
Deferred Selection Process mechanisms for the purchasing of Crown lands (in Ngāi Tahu’s 
case), and the negotiation of relativity clauses provided Ngāi Tahu and Waikato-Tainui with 
the ability to stretch their nominal quantums of $170 million far beyond that figure. While the 
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Crown’s kawanatanga or right to govern was entrenched by the establishment of the fiscal 
envelope policy, both iwi were able to assert some aspect of their rangatiratanga by 
negotiating these important financial instruments. They allowed both iwi to more confidently 
take their settlement packages back to their people to approve the settlements.  
The political and economic parameters of the negotiations also influenced the amount 
of land that was returned to both iwi and the manner in which lands were returned. The 
Crown’s overriding domination of the wider context of the negotiations was affected not only 
by Waikato-Tainui and Ngāi Tahu’s efforts to affirm their rangatiratanga by negotiating the 
return of as much land as possible, but by third-party interests such as conservationists and 
the former owners of Crown land taken under the Public Works Act. These third-parties 
affected the return of specific lands in both negotiations.  
Ngāi Tahu sought the return of specific culturally significant lands in fee simple title 
such as the Crown Titi Islands, Whenua Hou (Codfish Island), Rarotoka Island, the Arahura 
Valley, the bed of Lake Waihora and others. Where the return of lands in fee simple title was 
not possible, co-management arrangements were sought. Waikato-Tainui sought the return of 
lands in a form of inalienable customary title that would, in theory, protect the land from the 
powers of the Public Works Act and other land-taking legislation. For Ngāi Tahu the 
provision of land in fee simple title was adequate to ensure Ngāi Tahu control of those lands. 
Although Waikato-Tainui and Ngāi Tahu differed in their preferred mechanisms for the 
return of lands, both iwi sought the return of Crown land without marginal strips and 
advocated for increased control over whatever settlement assets and land was returned.  
The final chapter of this thesis investigated the negotiations regarding the formulation 
of the preambles to each settlement and the Crown apologies provided to Waikato-Tainui and 
Ngāi Tahu. These negotiations, like the discussions regarding the politics, economics and 
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land aspects of each settlement, had at their centre the tension between Waikato-Tainui and 
Ngāi Tahu’s rangatiratanga and the Crown’s defence of its own sovereignty and role as the 
governing power. The negotiations revealed the differing historical views that iwi negotiators 
and advisors held in contrast to Crown Ministers and officials, but they ultimately revealed a 
shared sense of historical understanding. The discussions and disagreements could often 
focus on the use of specific terminology that could even question the Crown’s own 
sovereignty. Ngāi Tahu and Waikato-Tainui negotiators and advisors pressed throughout 
their respective negotiations for specific recognition of the historical context under which 
their claims were settled. Although the Crown ultimately controlled the process under which 
the preambles and apologies were produced, there was a significant aspect of Waikato-Tainui 
and Ngāi Tahu agency in the changes that were achieved for each preamble and apology.  
Waikato-Tainui was the first iwi to have a preamble and apology included in their 
settlement and subsequently the negotiation over these aspects of their settlement extended 
over many months. Without the canon of a Tribunal report, Waikato-Tainui and the Crown 
were also unable to refer to an agreed upon text to break deadlocks and solve disagreements. 
Ngāi Tahu and the Crown on the other hand were able to refer to the various Ngāi Tahu 
Tribunal reports and research reports produced for the Tribunal hearing whenever any major 
differences between the parties surfaced. Both iwi placed considerable importance on the 
value of their preambles and apologies, but that is not the case for all iwi who have settled. 
The Crown’s policy is that without an apology, a settlement is not possible. Other iwi 
negotiators have sought the inclusion of specific historic Crown officials in their historical 
account, but the Crown has only allowed references to general Crown policy and historical 
figures at a high level such as Governors and Ministers of Native Affairs. These different 
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conceptions of the importance of historical accounts and apologies reveal the widely 
diverging views within Māoridom on the topic.  
The contribution of this thesis lies in its investigation of the first two major Treaty 
settlements concluded in the modern era of Treaty settlement negotiations in New Zealand—
Waikato-Tainui’s settlement in 1995 and Ngāi Tahu’s settlement in 1997. The existing 
historiography has addressed these two settlements in very brief detail, and this is the first in 
depth study of the negotiation process from the point of view of both the Crown and Ngāi 
Tahu and Waikato-Tainui. This improved understanding of Treaty settlement processes, and 
specifically the first two pioneering settlements in the modern era, allows for a greater 
awareness of the difficulties and intricacies of the negotiation process for both Māori and the 
Crown.  
In the end all parties would have felt that some measure of victory had been gained by 
the end of their negotiations. The Crown had settled two sets of major claims and established 
precedents to govern the Treaty settlement process for over fifteen years. The Crown had 
introduced a level of economic and political certainty from two previously obstructive iwi 
that had used legal, political and social means over the years to obtain their settlements.The 
Crown had cemented its governance and thereby strengthened its kawanatanga, yet had also 
given some key concessions. Waikato-Tainui and Ngāi Tahu were able to regain a measure of 
rangatiratanga through the return of land and compensation, for Ngai Tahu the development 
of Te Rūnanga o Ngai Tahu, and in general were able to increase their political influence and 
power regionally through their economic clout. The negotiation of the relativity clauses was 
especially important as they challenged the Crown’s financial certainty. Just as the Crown’s 
kawanatanga was challenged, so too was Waikato-Tainui and Ngai Tahu’s rangatiratanga, 
although the Crown’s sovereignty remained strongly in place. Their claims were now settled 
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and the negotiations took place largely within the Crown’s tight parameters. Ultimately, both 
Ngai Tahu and Waikato-Tainui rangatiratanga and the Crown’s kawanatanga were 
simultaneously challenged and enhanced by the negotations.  
This study has highlighted the importance of Waikato-Tainui and Ngāi Tahu 
rangatiratanga within the Treaty settlement process, and the Crown’s focus on maintaining its 
kawanatanga or right to govern. The rangatiratanga-kawanatanga paradigm allows for a 
greater appreciation of the motivations pushing and pulling Waikato-Tainui, Ngāi Tahu and 
the Crown in the positions and actions each group took during the negotiations. This 
increased knowledge of the motivations of Waikato-Tainui, Ngāi Tahu and the Crown 
enables a better awareness of the intricate and complex Treaty settlement process. The focus 
on a rangatiratanga and kawanatanga interpretation has allowed for a greater understanding of 
Treaty settlement negotiations, because it was the clash between rangatiratanga and 
kawanatanga that first created the historical context of Māori grievances and ultimately 
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